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ABSTRACT 
 
STATUS, REVISIONISM, AND GREAT POWER STRATEGY - 
US-CHINA POSITIONAL COMPETITION AND THE STRUGGLE  
FOR LEADERSHIP IN ASIA-PACIFIC 
 
by 
ÅBERG John Hugo Simon 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
The dissertation addresses the core IR problem of revisionism and relates it to both the 
declining superpower and the rising great power, both the United States and China. The 
dissertation also offers a novel conceptualization of international order in terms of which 
revisionism is understood. The theoretical innovation of the dissertation modifies 
established structural realist theories and shifts the explanatory focus from security to 
status. Since status, defined as social position, is composed of both power and prestige, 
both change in the balance of power and the balance of prestige explain revisionism, 
which then cause dissatisfaction in the form of status anxiety in the dominant state. This 
leads the dominant power to revise the international order to maintain its leading status. 
It then attempts to block the ascendance of the rising challenger, which frustrates the 
status aspirations of the rising power who responds by carving out an alternative 
international order that can satisfy its desire for status. The theory explains when and why 
revisionism relates to both the status-maintenance strategy of the declining dominant power 
and the status-enhancement strategy of the rising great power. The declining superpower 
revises to maintain, whereas the rising great power revises to enhance. The dissertation applies 
this insight to the positional competition for leadership in the Asia-Pacific and the struggle 
between alternative regional orders. The US pivot to Asia under the Obama 
administration exemplifies the revisionist status-maintenance strategy. China, after Xi 
Jinping’s assumption of power, then begins to carve out an alternative regional order. On 
the US side, the dissertation scrutinizes the cases of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and 
America’s Principled Security Network. On the Chinese side, the dissertation scrutinizes 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and China’s project for an Asian Security 
Order. 
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1 
1. Introduction 
According to conventional realist wisdom, the dominant state is a status quo power by 
definition, whereas rising states are inevitable troublemakers – revisionists poised to 
upend the established international order. For sure, there is a certain logic to it. The 
dominant state at the top of the pecking order will not freely give up its position of 
power; and the rising state, well familiar with the fact that the king zealously guard his 
thrown, knows that it will never reach the top unless positional barriers are dismantled 
and the international order rectified. In the past, war determined the outcome in this 
zero-sum positional competition, after which the winner rectified the international 
order. Yet this folk wisdom does not stand on a solid scientific ground. 
After all, the rising state is on the right side of history, in a domain of gain; the 
dominant state, on the other hand, is in relative decline, in a domain of loss, to use the 
terminology of prospect theory. Then why would the rising state sacrifice the strides 
it has made prematurely? Knowing that history is on its side, the rising state can safely 
bide its time and gain even greater strength. The dominant state, on the other hand, 
knowing that its position is getting weaker in relative terms, feels that it has to act.1 
Whether the First and the Second World Wars primarily should be attributed to actions 
by a rising or a declining Germany is thus far from set.2 Whether it is appropriate to 
speak of hegemonic wars at all when major wars often start small and grow big, 
questions the characterization of major wars as an epic struggle between rising and 
dominant powers.3  
One of the main characteristics of the peace settlements after major wars in 
1815, 1918, and 1945 is the increasing institutionalization of the international orders 
that followed,4 which tell us that, apart from being merely about status or position, the 
                                                 
1 Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique (New York: Routledge, 
2008); Steve Chan, Looking for Balance: China, the United States, and Powerbalancing in East Asia 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
2 Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Cornell University Press, 2000); William C. Wohlforth, 
“Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics 61, no. 01 (2009): 28–57. 
3 Woosang Kim and James D. Morrow, “When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?,” American Journal of 
Political Science 36, no. 4 (1992): 896–922; Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino, “Lost in 
Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory,” International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009): 
389–410.  
4 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after 
Major Wars (Princeton University Press, 2001). 
2 
struggle over the international order, and hence revisionism, is just as much about 
rules. Today, thanks to nuclear weapons5 and the immaterial foundation of the global 
political economy that has made territorial conquest obsolete,6 we do no longer have 
to fear the recurrence of major wars among the core states of the international system. 
Yet positional competition and the struggle over the institutional foundation of the 
international order ceaseth not. After all, war, in the Clausewitzian sense, is merely the 
continuation of politics by other means, and in the age of nuclear power and virtual 
economies, war as a means for restructuring the international order is utterly irrational. 
But man loves to compete nonetheless,7  and human fallibility and lust for power 
unfortunately prevents a utopian scheme. 8  Even so, the primary driving force of 
positional competition is structural. 9  Hence, revisionism primarily relates to the 
structural imperatives of the international system. 
This brief introduction sets the tone for the topic of my dissertation; namely, 
US-China positional competition and the struggle for leadership in the Asia-Pacific, 
which focuses on the contemporary characteristics of status driven revisionism and 
great power strategy. With this said, I will now specify the problems and puzzles of 
the dissertation, state the research questions, and outline the aim and rationale of the 
study.  
 
                                                 
5 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989); Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the 
Prospect of Armageddon (Cornell University Press, 1989); Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and 
Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (1990): 730–745. 
6  John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations 
Theory,” Review of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994): 72-77; Richard Rosecrance, The 
Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
7 Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987). 
8 Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1946); Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (Louisville, Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2001). 
9 Randall L Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict 
Over Scarce Resource,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War, ed. Ethan 
B Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
3 
1.1 Problems and Puzzles 
A dissertation should seek to accomplish three principal things. It should address core 
puzzles, strive for theoretical innovation, and scrutinize new data or cases. In the 
following section, I will outline these three scientific components of the dissertation.10  
In relation to the first scientific component, one of the most enduring questions 
of IR concerns what China wants.11 Is China a status quo-seeking or a revisionist state? 
However, the same type of puzzle applies to the United States. As the trend towards 
multipolarity is steadily progressing, we should also direct our attention to the United 
States. Some years before the 2008 Financial Crisis, Immanuel Wallerstein argued that 
the United States was in relative decline and that “the real question was not whether 
US hegemony was waning but whether the United States can devise a way to descend 
gracefully.”12 Now, few are questioning American relative decline, yet Wallerstein’s 
question remains one of the central puzzles for contemporary international relations – 
how will the United States handle the fact that it no longer stands unchallenged at apex 
of the global hierarchy? Hence, the question concerning the United States is of equal 
importance: is the United States a status quo-seeking or a revisionist state?  
However, the two core puzzles are not an either/or question. Instead, the core 
puzzles that underlie the research relate to the fact that China and the United States 
both seek to preserve and change the international order, that both, counterintuitively, 
are status quo and revisionist powers. 
                                                 
10 Andrew Abbott, Methods of Discovery – Heuristics for the Social Sciences (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 2004); Richard Swedberg, The Art of Social Theory (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2014). 
11 See, for instance, Douglas Lemke and Ronald L. Tammen, “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of 
China,” International Interactions 29, no. 4 (2003): 269–71; Alastair I. Johnston, “Is China a Status 
Quo Power?,” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 5–56; Jeffrey W. Legro, “What China Will Want: 
The Future Intentions of a Rising Power,” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 03 (2007): 515–534; David C. 
Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2009); Feng Huiyun, “Is China a Revisionist Power?,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, 
no. 3 (2009): 313–34; G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign 
Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008); M. Taylor Fravel, “International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing 
China’s Potential for Territorial Expansion,” International Studies Review 12, no. 4 (2010): 505–32; 
John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 381–96; Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After 
Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” International Security 
36, no. 1 (2011): 41–72; Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Books, 2012); Kejin Zhao, 
“China’s Rise and Its Discursive Power Strategy,” Chinese Political Science Review 1, no. 3 (2016): 
539–64. 
12 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New York: 
The New Press, 2003), 27. 
4 
Starting with China, previous studies claim that China is either a status quo 
power13 or a revisionist power,14 and proponents of the different standpoints have their 
daggers drawn about whose account is the most accurate one.15 Yet we need to escape 
the trap of the either/or logic and open up to the possibility that China simultaneously 
can be a status quo power and a revisionist power. This becomes obvious when we 
consult primary official Chinese sources as well as secondary academic exegesis of 
Chinese foreign policy. As Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
National People’s Congress Fu Ying makes clear, China has indeed “chosen to 
integrate itself into the international order,” yet at the same time, it seeks to 
“improve…its representation.”16 Similarly, Yong Deng, in his groundbreaking study 
on China’s struggle for status, accentuates that “the CCP leaders have sought to 
engineer China’s great power emergence within the world order,” but in doing so “they 
have geared their diplomacy toward changing the international hierarchy to facilitate 
China’s great-power ascent.”17  Here we notice a tension between integrating and 
accepting the rules of the game and changing the status order, as evidenced by China’s 
admission to the WTO and its acceptance of global trade rules, while simultaneously 
struggling to gain a greater position within the WTO hierarchy.18 
If we turn to the United States, we can observe a comparable puzzle. For sure, 
logically the United States cannot be a revisionist power in relation to the positional 
status dimension of the international order. If it desires to maintain its preeminent 
position, this unequivocally means preservation of the status-quo. Yet whereas Barack 
Obama stresses the desire to maintain global leadership, he at the same time 
emphasizes the need to write new regional rules to ensure leadership in the Asia-
                                                 
13 See, for instance, Alastair I. Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”; Jeffrey W. Legro, “What 
China Will Want”; Feng Huiyun, “Is China a Revisionist Power?” 
14 See, for instance, John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm”; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for 
Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2012). 
15 See the contending perspectives of Walter Russel Mead and G. John Ikenberry. Walter Russel Mead, 
“The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014): 
69–79; G. John Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order,” 
Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014): 80–90. 
16 Fu Ying, “Debating the Contemporary International Order,” speech at Fullerton Hotel, Singapore, 
July 29, 2015, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2015-f463/july-636f/fullerton-lecture-fu-
ying-d620, accessed February 25, 2016, emphasis added. 
17 Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 17-18, emphasis added.  
18 Scott Kennedy and Cheng Shuaihua, eds., From Rule Takers to Rule Makers: The Growing Role of 
Chinese in Global Governance (Bloomington: RCCPB and ICTSD, 2012). 
5 
Pacific.19 In their respective studies on the Bush administration’s “transformational 
diplomacy,” Robert Jervis and Ian Hurd highlight that the United States, in that it wants 
to preserve its dominant position in the international order, simultaneously “seeks to 
change the rules of that order.”20 In this way, the United States is taking active part in 
a “process of changing and remaking the social foundations of the international 
system.”21 I hash out this problem at length in the conceptual section of the literature 
view. 
Status quo and revisionism are best conceptualized in relation to a struggle 
between “alternative international orders,” 22  which makes the definition of 
international order fundamental to the scientific enterprise of investigating 
preservation and change in the international system. What is at stake, however, does 
not fit a unidimensional conceptual framework. On the one hand, we are grappling 
with a social-relational, positional dimension of the international order that concerns 
status; on the other hand, we are dealing with a social-systemic dimension of the 
international order that concerns institutions. Yet apart from a conceptual framework 
that takes into account both the positional and the institutional dimensions of the 
international order, we must also demonstrate how they relate to the two core domains 
of the international order – the economic domain and the security domain. My 
conceptual framework addresses this problem and makes a significant contribution to 
the definitional parameters of international order, necessary to improve our 
understanding of status quo-seeking and revisionism and the ongoing struggle between 
alternative regional orders in the Asia-Pacific. 
The second scientific component of the dissertation concerns theoretical 
innovation. Even though the underpinnings of my theoretical framework to a large 
extent build on structural realist insights, there are certain theoretical problems that 
call for theoretical remodeling in order to enable the analysis of status quo-seeking and 
revisionism to pierce both ways – towards explaining the policies of preservation and 
change of both the rising great power and the declining superpower.  
                                                 
19 The White House, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Defense 
Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC, 2012); Barack Obama, “President Obama: The TPP Would Let 
America, Not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade,” The Washington Post, May 2, 2016. 
20 Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2006): 7. 
21  Ian Hurd, “Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy,” 
International Politics 44, no. 2 (2007): 198. 
22 Steve Chan, Looking for Balance, 170. 
6 
Various structural realist theories essentially view the dominant state as 
“always satisfied” and the rising power as dissatisfied and revisionist by definition.23 
The theories can therefore not fathom that the US is a deeply conservative power in 
that it wants to maintain its preeminence atop the global hierarchy, yet at the same 
time, in both its neoconservative and liberal internationalist guises, a deeply revisionist 
power that wants to rewrite the rules of the game.24 The theories can neither conceive 
of China as simultaneously being dissatisfied with the international status order 
dominated by the United States while being satisfied, in part, with the institutional 
foundation of the international order, which serves its interests, incurs great benefits, 
and largely underpins its rise. Yet despite their shortcomings, the major structural 
realist theories all elucidate that the dominant power will take preventive measures to 
block the ascendance of the rising state.25 As Mearsheimer states: “the United States 
can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the 
point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia.”26 These preventive 
measures to maintain dominant status are revisionist. 
In essence, we need to shift the theoretical focus from security to status. The 
explanatory focus of structural realist theories relates status quo-seeking and 
revisionism to issues of security and conquest, or rather insecurity and territorial 
aggrandizement, with the analytical focus on either status quo or revisionism 
depending on what structural logic one adheres to; whether defensive realism or 
offensive realism, whether theorized as part of security-maximizing or power-
maximizing behavior.27  Various IR scholars have convincingly demonstrated that 
states want status, and have accentuated the importance of status, rather than security, 
in explaining revisionism and dissatisfaction with the status quo.28 However, their 
                                                 
23 A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); Robert Gilpin, War and 
Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1981); John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics; Steve Chan, “Can’t Get No Satisfaction? The Recognition of Revisionist States,” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4, no. 2 (2004): 207–38; Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and 
the Power-Transition Theory. 
24 Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World”; John Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” The 
National Interest 111, Jan-Feb (2011): 16–34. 
25 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics; for a discussion of more recent works by power-transition theorists that also acknowledge this 
aspect, see Tudor A. Onea, “Between Dominance and Decline: Status Anxiety and Great Power 
Rivalry,” Review of International Studies 40, no. 01 (2014): 125–152. 
26  John Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?” September 17, 2004, 
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034b.pdf, accessed February 13, 2014. 
27  Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979); John J 
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 
28  Randall L. Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System”; William C. Wohlforth, 
7 
theoretical focus repeats the flaws of the various structural realist theories by only 
focusing on rising states and the link between status enhancement and revisionism, 
leaving the link between status maintenance and revisionism unexplored. This is 
problematic since “none of the principal power-wielders in world affairs is happy with 
the status quo,” as Samuel Huntington succinctly points out.29 Hence, status concerns 
relates to both rising and declining powers.  
Offensive realism explains revisionism in terms of power, hegemonic stability 
theory incorporates the hierarchy of prestige and the rules of the system in addition to 
power, and power-transition theory adds that power parity must be combined with 
dissatisfaction. In contrast to offensive realism, change in the balance of power is not 
the only explanatory factor, we also have to include change in the balance of prestige; 
in contrast to hegemonic stability theory, prestige is not a mere reflection military 
power, nor are the rules of the system always tilted in favor of the hegemonic state; 
and in contrast to power-transition theory, dissatisfaction is not an autonomous 
domestic-level variable, but is structurally induced. Since status, which I define as 
social position, is composed of both power and prestige, we have to take into account 
change in both the balance of power and the balance of prestige in explaining 
revisionism, which then cause dissatisfaction in the form of status anxiety in the 
dominant state, not the rising state. This leads to the hegemonic power to revise the 
international order in order to maintain its dominant status. In doing this, it attempts to 
block the ascendance of the rising challenger, which frustrates the status aspirations of 
the rising state who responds by carving out an alternative international order that can 
satisfy its status ambitions. Hence, my theoretical innovation makes a contribution by 
providing an explanation for when and why revisionism relates to both the status-
maintenance strategies of the relatively declining superpower and the status-
enhancement strategies of the rising great power. My theoretical contribution then also 
addresses the temporal problem of structural realist theories – namely, that the rising 
great power acts to revise, whereas the declining dominant power reacts to preserve – 
                                                 
“Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei 
Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” International Security 
34, no. 4 (2010): 63–95; Steven Ward, “Race, Status, and Japanese Revisionism in the Early 1930s,” 
Security Studies 22, no. 4 (2013): 607–39; T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, 
eds., Status in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Reinhard Wolf, “Rising 
Powers, Status Ambitions, and the Need to Reassure: What China Could Learn from Imperial 
Germany’s Failures,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014): 185–219.  
29 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (1999): 37. 
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by turning it on its head. The rising power is not the first-moving revisionist; instead, 
the relatively declining dominant power moves first and revises to maintain, whereas 
the declining dominant power reacts and revises to enhance. 
One of the great contributions of liberal theories is that they bring to the fore 
the increasingly expansive institutional mechanisms that “bind” and “lock in” states to 
certain international orders.30 However, the logic of path-dependency of the liberal 
historical institutionalist perspective has a status-quo bias that disregards active choice 
at critical junctures; neither does institutional path-dependency have to favor the 
dominant state, nor is the rules-based international order as open as liberals assume. 
The central problem liberals fail to take into account is that the logical corollary of a 
“lock in”-mechanism is a “lock out”-mechanism. Security provision by whom, and for 
whom? A regional trade regime including whom? Whereas realists need to put 
emphasis on the importance of rules for positional appropriation within systems of 
monopolistic competition,31 liberals fail to theorize the positional, social-relational 
insider-outsider logic that perpetuates all form of politics; namely, that institutions 
work in tandem with exclusionary social closure.32  
Liberals and constructivists are right to point out that secondary states “buy 
into” the international order;33 they defer to the leading state and form a “circle of 
recognition” 34  that accepts its leadership. This accentuates the significance of 
recognition for the performance of status functions.35 In this sense, revisionism is 
indeed prosocial. At the same time, the logic of positional competition still applies to 
the rivalling leadership contenders that compete for the acquiescence of secondary 
states in order to change the international order. Thus, by treating self-esteem as the 
ultimate end of status recognition or status as an end in itself,36 one misses the mark. 
                                                 
30 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory; G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and 
Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
31 Arthur L. Stinchcombe, “Monopolistic Competition as a Mechanism: Corporations, Universities, and 
Nation-States in Competitive Fields,” in Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory, 
ed. Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
32 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Max Weber, 
Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
33 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 71-74. 
34 Erik Ringmar, “The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia against the West” Cooperation and Conflict 
37, no. 2 (2002): 115–36. 
35  John Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 7-8. 
36 See, Richard Ned Lebow, “Spirit, Recognition, and Foreign Policy: Germany and World War II,” in 
The International Politics of Recognition, ed. Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 87-108; Erik Ringmar, Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of 
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I define status as social position (see section 2.1.5.1 for an elaborate definition). 
The struggle for status is a struggle for the end of influence, and both power and 
prestige are means to that end.37 The struggle for power takes the form of a struggle to 
acquire capabilities, while the struggle for prestige takes the form of a struggle to 
increase “reputational capital”38 in order to gain the acquiescence of secondary states. 
As such, the importance of “making friends,”39 in particular by providing international 
public goods, makes it faulty to denote China as a “post-responsible power;”40 neither 
is China a “responsible stakeholder” that passively accepts the US characterization of 
responsibility. What is at stake is rather a “clash of responsibilities,” as part of the 
positional struggle for regional leadership and contending alternatives for regional 
order.  
For if China is a “geopolitical insider,” as John Ikenberry likes to claim, then 
why is China excluded from the TPP and why is it encircled by the US security 
network in the Asia-Pacific? Moreover, how can one claim that China is satisfied with 
the status quo of the regional security order when Xi Jinping stresses, “it is for the 
people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the 
security of Asia.” In addition, why did China establish the AIIB and why did the United 
States and Japan refuse to accept the invitation? These empirical puzzles provide the 
direction for the third scientific component of the dissertation, namely the 
incorporation of new empirical cases. These cases – the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), America’s Principled Security Network, the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB), and China’s project for an Asian Security Order – include both the 
economic and the security domain of the regional order of the Asia-Pacific.  
The cases further connects to the problem of “Chinese assertiveness,” which 
purportedly triggered the US “pivot” to Asia.41 Yet we should turn the causal arrow on 
                                                 
Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Years War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Steven 
Ward, “Race, Status, and Japanese Revisionism in the Early 1930s” 
37 Cf. Randall L Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System”; Iver B. Neumann, “Status 
Is Cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian Russians Seek Great Power Status,” in Status in World 
Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 85–114. 
38 Arthur L. Stinchcombe, “Monopolistic Competition as a Mechanism,” 293. 
39 Xuetong Yan, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014): 153–84. 
40 Yong Deng, “China: The Post-Responsible Power,” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2014): 117–
32. 
41 That the US pivot to Asia was a response to counter an “assertive China” has developed into a truism 
among China watchers. As described by Robert Ross: “Worried that a newly assertive China was 
becoming a destabilizing force, the White House moved to counter any perceptions of its own weakness 
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its head. Faced with China’s rise, the US pivot to Asia was a proactive move to uphold 
US sole superpower status and global leadership by revising the regional order. Thus, 
it was not Chinese assertiveness that prompted the US pivot; the US pivot prompted 
Chinese assertiveness. This connects to recent studies that claim that China indeed is 
more assertive, and revisionist, now, but that it started to take shape after the US pivot 
to Asia, in particular after Xi Jinping assumed power.42  
Below follows the specific research questions. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
The overarching research questions of theoretical interest are the following: 
 
 When and why do great powers seek to revise the status quo? 
 How can we reconcile the counterintuitive proposition that both the 
dominant power and the rising power, simultaneously, can be 
understood as status quo-seeking and revisionist powers? 
 
The overarching research questions are given contemporary relevance through the 
following specific empirical questions: 
 
 Is there an ongoing positional struggle for leadership between the 
United States and China in the Asia-Pacific? 
 How can we understand the US pivot to Asia as a status-maintenance 
strategy designed to change the regional order? 
 How can we understand China’s reaction as a status-enhancement 
strategy designed to change the regional order? 
                                                 
by strengthening the US presence in the region.” According to Kevin Rudd: the pivot was 
“Washington’s response” to “a more assertive Chinese foreign and security policy.” And, as stated by 
Elizabeth Economy, “for most observers outside China, it was Chinese assertiveness that was the action, 
while the US pivot was, in large measure, the reaction.” Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot: 
Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive,” CHINA US Focus, December 6, 
2012,http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-problem-with-the-pivot-obamas-new-asia-
policy-is-unnecessary-and-counterproductive/, accessed June 28, 2014; Kevin Rudd, “Beyond the 
Pivot: A New Road Map for U.S.-Chinese Relations,” CHINA US Focus, February 26, 2013, 
http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/beyond-the-pivot-a-new-road-map-for-u-s-chinese-
relations/, accessed February 22, 2014; Elizabeth C. Economy, “John Kerry on China and the Pivot,” 
The Diplomat, February 28, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/john-kerry-on-china-and-the-pivot/. 
42 Yong Deng, “China: The Post-Responsible Power,” 128-129; Xuetong Yan, “From Keeping a Low 
Profile to Striving for Achievement,” 156–58. 
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1.3 Aim and Rationale of the Study 
The central aim of the study is to offer a contribution to the perennial question of IR 
theory – what do states want? The traditional realist answer to this core theoretical 
question is security. To be sure, security is man’s most foundational need, and so as 
well for states, especially in a state of warre or anarchy, when self-preservation is the 
closest we can come to a natural right. 43  Yet when one is safe, when times are 
characterized by peace and development, then the primary objective of security and 
the minimalist principle of self-preservation yields to the secondary objective of status 
and the teleological and maximalist principle of status-maximization.44 In fact, the 
advent of the nuclear age, and the ensuing robust non-appearance of direct wars 
between great powers has produced a situation where the core states of the 
international system enjoy an abundance of security. Then, what secure states want is 
the “positional good” of status, and specifically the influence vested in status.45  
Modifications and extensions of realist IR theory have convincingly 
demonstrated that states want status and that it can be central to explaining 
dissatisfaction with the status quo. However, as I substantiated above, their analytical 
focus severs the link between status-maintenance strategies and revisionism by 
omission; namely, by exclusively putting the attention on revisionism in terms of 
status-enhancement. The purpose of the study is to develop a conceptual and 
theoretical framework that take into account and explain, not just rising great powers 
revisionist desires and what causes them, but also the revisionist strategies of the 
relatively declining superpower. Instead of viewing the present competitive dynamic 
between the United States and China in terms of security, the study elucidates concerns 
about status and leadership and explains how both status-maintenance and status-
enhancement strategies relate to revisionism. This is a matter of theoretical and 
conceptual priority, not a claim that traditional considerations of security are 
unimportant or irrelevant. Neither does the analytical focus on the competitive logic 
of US-China relations mean the absence of substantial US-China cooperation. Again, 
it is a matter of perspectival priority, not empirical one-dimensionality. 
                                                 
43 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
44 Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, 192-193; Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), section III, chapter 2. 
45 Randall L Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System” 
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What follows from the conceptual and theoretical purpose is the empirical aim 
to demonstrate the adequacy of the framework by applying it to contemporary 
international relations, in particular by demonstrating its usefulness in explaining the 
ongoing positional struggle for leadership in the Asia-Pacific. The aim is to show how 
my framework applies to four specific empirical cases, two from the economic domain 
and two from the security domain of the regional order. The four cases are the 
following: the TPP, America’s Principled Security Network, the AIIB, and China’s 
project for an Asian Security Order. 
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
I organize the dissertation around 11 chapters inclusive of the introduction and the 
conclusion. After this introductory chapter follows the theoretical chapter where I 
discuss core concepts, review relevant theories, and outline my own theory. I examine 
the shortcomings of competing IR-theories of revisionism and provide the rationale 
and theoretical basis for the study. In particular, I hash out various significant 
components and synthesize them into a new theoretical framework. After the 
theoretical chapter follows a chapter on methodology where I discuss philosophy of 
science, outline the research methodology, and present the data collection methods and 
the material.  
The next seven chapters are the empirical chapters. The first two empirical 
chapters scrutinize the change in the balance of power and the balance of prestige. The 
next chapter examine the institutional barriers that the United States faced in the Asia-
Pacific before the US pivot to Asia. Then follows a chapter that ascertains that the 
change in the balance of power and the balance of prestige generated status anxiety in 
the United States, which triggered the US pivot to Asia. The next chapter then deals 
with the US pivot to Asia and includes two case studies: the TPP and America’s 
Principled Security Network. The chapter substantiates these cases as projects 
designed to revise the regional order of the Asia-Pacific in order to maintain US 
leadership and an Americancentric world order.  The next chapter scrutinizes Chinese 
status expectations, how China perceives US relative decline and the US pivot as a 
status challenge. After that follows a chapter on China’s revisionist regional projects: 
the AIIB and China’s project for an Asian Security Order. The chapter outlines these 
cases as projects designed to revise the regional order of the Asia-Pacific in response 
13 
to the US pivot and the exclusionary Americancentric project pursued by the Obama 
administration. The last chapter of the dissertation is the conclusion. 
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2. Theory 
In this chapter, I will critically evaluate the different conceptual and theoretical 
problems of status quo-seeking and revisionism. I will discuss core concepts, review 
competing IR theories of revisionism, and outline my own theory. The aim of this 
chapter is thus to construct a coherent conceptual and theoretical framework that will 
be applied to the empirical cases.  
 
2.1 Core Concepts 
In this section, I will discuss the core concepts of status quo, revisionism, and 
international order. This discussion will result in a definition of status quo and 
revisionism and a novel conceptual framework of international order in terms of which 
the two core concepts are understood. 
 
2.1.1 The “Double Hermeneutic” of Status Quo and Revisionism 
In order to avoid ambiguity, the central concepts of status quo and revisionism need to 
be clearly defined. First and foremost, we must separate the social scientific concepts 
of status quo and revisionism from their popular meanings and connotations. The 
“double hermeneutic” of social science means that layman notions, and even the taken-
for-granted use of social science concepts by experts and policymakers, might intrude 
on the scientific conception of researchers.46 Status quo and revisionism are thus not 
merely “neutral” social scientific concepts, but also politically loaded notions. In 
particular, revisionism is imbued with negative connotations, and political actors often 
decry the label when being categorized as such. Dominant actors associate the status 
quo as something positive and normatively desirable, whereas revisionism is 
something negative and morally deplorable. More than just an analytical tool, this 
normative bias turns revisionism into a rhetorical smearing device.  
This conceptual condition can be traced to four particular factors. First, when 
revisionism was coined as a reformist social-democratic concept, orthodox Marxists 
embedded revisionism into their debunking strategies against persons accused of 
eroding “true” Marxism. Second, although revisionism ought to be an acceptable 
practice in the study of history, especially so as new facts come to elucidate earlier and 
                                                 
46 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984). 
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less accurate historical accounts, after the Second World War revisionism became 
associated with historians that denied the holocaust. Third, in the study of IR the 
concept has long been intimately associated with major wars and historical actors such 
as Nazi Germany, Maoist China, and Imperial Japan. Fourth, as challenges to the 
established international order indeed fit under the label of revisionism, the defenders 
of the status quo will use the revisionist label to debunk and delegitimize any such 
perceived attempts.  
In sum, the pejorative associations of revisionism need to be disentangled in 
order to make it analytically non-controversial.  
 
2.1.2 Reclaiming the Meaning of Revisionism 
Revisionism means modification, amendment, reform, or change. It differs from the 
sudden, radical, fundamental, complete, and violent change of revolution. In IR, 
however, revisionism is strangely enough normally associated with the latter. 
As a concept, revisionism was coined by Eduard Bernstein and based on a 
reformist understanding of Marxism, which emphasized that socialism could be 
achieved democratically, and peacefully, through progressive reforms. In essence, 
revisionism emerged as a strategy distinct from the revolutionary way of political 
change.47 One can make further connections to Deng Xiaoping’s guiding philosophy 
for reform and liberalization – “crossing the river by feeling the stones” – and the later 
emphasis on “gradualism, controllability and the taking of initiative” by Wen Jiabao.48 
In IR, the mainstream understanding of revisionism connects the concept to major wars 
and radical change that lead to the complete eradication of the old systemic 
components – Jacobin style. Yet the more precise understanding of revisionism is 
reform, modification, and gradual change.  
 
2.1.3 From Brute Force to Military Restraint 
Another problem with revisionism concerns its association with the use of force. IR 
scholars normally define revisionist states as entities that use “military force to change 
                                                 
47 Manfred B. Steger, The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
48  Joseph Yam, “The ‘Concept of Scientific Development’ in Finance,” June 12, 2008, 
http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/publications-and-research/reference-materials/viewpoint/20080612.sht 
ml, accessed August 31, 2016. 
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the status quo.”49 However, this definition confuses means for ends. Instead, various 
mitigating circumstances suggest that great powers are unlikely to engage in war for 
revisionist purposes in the contemporary age, at least against other fellow great 
powers. In other words, great power competition is not bound to take a violent form: 
“intergroup competition does [not] exclude the possibility that particular types of 
social practices might act as mitigating circumstances for intergroup violence.”50 One 
primary mitigating factor, and three reinforcing mitigating factors, are of particular 
significance in relation to revisionism and the irrelevance of the direct use of military 
force between great powers. 
Above all, nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction (MAD) work to 
curb violent interstate conflict. “Nuclear deterrence should work to lower dramatically 
the possibility of war by either miscalculation or deliberate decision (or if somehow 
such a war broke out, then nuclear deterrence should work against its escalation into a 
large and fearsome one).”51 In fact, nuclear weapons have revolutionized international 
relations and brought great power relations into a new age of military restraint. In the 
present great power system, the core states enjoy an abundance of security.52 Whereas 
nuclear deterrence curbs inter-state conflict, it does not ameliorate positional 
competition. This primary mitigating factor is supplemented by three reinforcing 
factors. 
First, self-extension and conquest do not follow the logic of the past since 
mobile factors of production, global financial centers, and global information and 
communication networks all “challenge the geographical basis of conventional 
international relations theory,” which have eroded the formerly close-fitting 
connection between territory and wealth.53 This accentuates that power is exercised 
                                                 
49  Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” 
International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 105; John Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” in International 
Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 73. 
50 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or 
Rereading,” International Studies Review 4, no. 1 (2002): 85, emphasis added. 
51 Robert J. Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul,” Political 
Science Quarterly 125, no. 3 (2010): 371. 
52 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace; Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution; Kenneth 
N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities”; see also, Robert Rauchhaus, “Evaluating the Nuclear 
Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (2009): 258–77; 
John Mueller, The Remnants of War; Bruno Tertrais, “The Demise of Aries” 
53 John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap”; Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State 
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through institutions “directly on people – not on land.”54 Invading another country 
does no longer promise the same bounty or status that territorial conquest and colonial 
possessions did in the past – great powers do no longer improve their position through 
territorial conquest. The Russian annexation of Crimea is, perhaps, the most telling 
example. 
Second, even though theoretical perspectives differ, it can be argued that 
economic interdependence fortifies “the pacific effects” already “induced by the 
condition of mutual assured destruction”55 as it adds incentives to restrain international 
disputes by raising the costs of conflict.56 This has given rise to the concept of Mutual 
Assured Economic Destruction (MAED), which arguably characterize the relationship 
between the United States and China.57 Third, it is “impossible to think seriously about 
international relations without reference to the changes in norms relating to conquest 
and security management,” 58  which have constrained the resort to violence in 
“resolving political deadlocks.”59  
These mitigating factors all contribute to the general evolutionary process of 
“strategic restraint” and the way leading states preserve and change international 
orders.60 
 
2.1.4 The Problématique of International Order 
The analytical use of status quo and revisionism, satisfied and dissatisfied states, stems 
from classical realist thought. 61  At the very foundation lie the problématique of 
international order. That is, status quo and revisionism are used as heuristic devices 
against which state intentions, grand strategic orientations, and foreign policy actions 
are judged in terms of either preservation or change of the international order. Status 
                                                 
54 Susan Strange, “Toward a Theory of Transnational Empire,” in Global Changes and Theoretical 
Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, ed. Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau 
(Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1989), 170. 
55 Robert J. Art, “The United States and the Rise of China,” 372. 
56 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Addison Wesley School, 1977). 
57 James Dobbins et al., “Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence,” 
Occasional Paper (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2011), 8-9. 
58 Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 37. 
59 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 457. 
60 Cf. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory 
61 E.H. Carr differentiated between satisfied and dissatisfied states as well as haves and have-nots; Hans 
Morgenthau referred to imperialistic and status quo powers; Henry Kissinger distinguished between 
revolutionary and status quo states; Arnold Wolfers separated states in terms of status quo and 
revisionism; and, Raymond Aron referred to forces of conservation and revision. 
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quo and revisionism are therefore best understood in relation to a struggle between 
“alternative international orders.”62 This makes it necessary to specify and define the 
fundamental concept of international order. 
A.F.K. Organski differentiated between types of powerful and satisfied and 
powerful and dissatisfied states. The latter type refers to latecomers and challengers: 
rising states “who seek to upset the existing international order and establish a new 
order in its place.”63 In the same vein, Aron Friedberg claims, “fast-rising powers are 
almost invariably troublemakers.”64 The rising state, well familiar with the fact that 
the king zealously guard his thrown, knows that it will never reach the top unless 
positional barriers are dismantled and the international order rectified. Despite its 
apparent logic, these claims are problematic since it assumes that the dominant state is 
always satisfied and the rising state always dissatisfied. 65  The issue of 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction often “appears as a post hoc construction” or is de facto 
used as “an analytical constant,” instead of making it an object of empirical inquiry.66 
We must avoid this use of status quo/revisionism, satisfied/dissatisfied, and not put on 
conceptual blinders that prevent us from observing that both the dominant state and 
the rising challenger can be satisfied or dissatisfied with certain dimensions of the 
international order. Whereas the dominant power certainly is positionally conservative 
in that it wants to maintain its position atop the global hierarchy, it can certainly be 
dissatisfied with its position and the rules in a certain regional institutional 
environment. The rising great power is certainly positionally dissatisfied until it 
reaches the apex of the regional or the global hierarchy, yet it can be satisfied with the 
regional and global institutional landscape, which incurs great benefits, underpin its 
rise, and is commensurate with its values. Even though the sole superpower strives for 
full-spectrum dominance, open markets, and diplomatic access, there has never been, 
and their never will be, a dominant power will total control. The dominant power must 
revise to maintain its sole superpower status.  
Treating status quo and revisionism merely in terms of power or position67 
leaves no theoretical room for dissatisfaction with the institutional order; and treating 
                                                 
62 Steve Chan, Looking for Balance, 170. 
63 A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 361, 366. 
64  Aaron Friedberg, “Warring States: Theoretical Models of Asia Pacific Security,” Harvard 
International Review, 18, no. 2 (1996): 13. 
65 Steve Chan, “Can’t Get No Satisfaction? 
66 Ibid, 207, 209. 
67 John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 
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revisionism merely in terms of the rules of the game68 leaves no theoretical room for 
dissatisfaction with the international status order. This conceptual problem lies at the 
core of the analytical imprecision and the inability to make a coherent argument about 
whether the United States and China are status quo-seeking or revisionist powers. 
However, many scholars implicitly invoke notions of both status and institutions in 
their assessments. 
Arthur Kroeber makes the argument that “the notion that China-backed 
financing institutions pose a threat to the international rules of the game is overblown. 
For the most part, these institutions will simply create more competition. This might 
discomfit the incumbents, but the economic impacts will on balance be beneficial.”69 
This shows that China, on the one hand, favors the institutional status quo, yet on the 
other hand, wants to establish new status hierarchies that might discomfit dominant 
states, which is a matter of positional revisionism. Notwithstanding potential 
beneficial economic consequences, the competitive dynamic is about positional 
indivisibility, not economic benefits or systemic complementarity.  
The gist of Scott Kennedy’s argument is the same. Kennedy fears “not that 
China has been or will be an anti-status quo power, but that it won’t be, that it is so 
wedded to the status quo that China will forestall important reforms that are 
desperately needed.” He argues, however, that “China’s main goal here is to increase 
its own influence over governance…not necessarily any specific substantive reform.”70 
Since influence is vested in position, Kennedy’s argument about reform primarily 
relates to rules. If the dominant power block positional ascendance within the system, 
the rising great power will seek to break positional barriers, even if it is largely satisfied 
with the institutional framework. 
The China 2020 Research Team, spearheaded by Zhou Qiren of the National 
School of Development at Peking University, also spells out a similar dynamic. The 
China 2020 Research Team argues that China “should not…replace the existing world 
order and set of values with a brand new one; rather it should work towards improving 
the order currently in place, and gradually realize its objective of overtaking the US to 
                                                 
68 Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory 
69  Arthur Kroeber, “China Reshapes Asia: Financing China’s Global Dreams,” China Economic 
Quarterly (November 2015): 27-28, emphasis added. 
70 Scott Kennedy and Cheng Shuaihua, eds., From Rule Takers to Rule Makers: The Growing Role of 
Chinese in Global Governance (Bloomington: RCCPB and ICTSD, 2012), 11, 20, emphasis added. 
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become number one sometime in the latter part of the century.”71 Similarly, Yong 
Deng accentuates that “the CCP leaders have sought to engineer China’s great power 
emergence within the world order,” but in doing so “they have geared their diplomacy 
toward changing the international hierarchy to facilitate China’s great-power 
ascent.”72  
China’s overarching goal is, perhaps, primarily positional. In one way or 
another, various scholars recognize China’s institutional status quo inclination, at least 
in relation to the economic order, yet they simultaneously refer to a positional order 
that China indeed desires to change in order to increase its influence. Besides, 
whatever change China desires, such change is truly revisionist, that is, incremental 
and reformist in nature. 
In the case of the United States, we find a comparable dynamic, albeit a 
reversed one, concerning the tension between the positional and the institutional 
dimensions of the international order. Christopher Layne makes an important 
clarification:  
Although some scholars argue that as a hegemon the United States is a status quo 
power, its grand strategy is actually a peculiar mix. The United States is a status quo 
power in that it aims to preserve the existing distribution of power. Consistent with 
the logic of offensive realism, however, the United States is also an expansionist 
state that seeks to increase its power advantages and to extend its geopolitical and 
ideological reach. To preserve the status quo that favors them, hegemons must keep 
knocking down actual and potential rivals; that is, they must continue to expand.73 
 
That the United States seeks to preserve its dominant position, its sole superpower 
status, is indeed an example of status quo-seeking. However, Layne faces problems 
theorizing US revisionist expansionism since his professed theory, offensive realism, 
conceives of revisionism only in terms of power, which leaves no theoretical room for 
dissatisfaction with the institutional dimensions of the international order. Knocking 
down rivals and expanding one’s reach in the contemporary era is a matter of erasing 
institutional barriers in the most strategically significant region. 
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Robert Jervis and Ian Hurd further highlight that the United States, in that it 
wants to preserve its dominant position in the international order, simultaneously 
“seeks to change the rules of that order.”74 In this way, the United States is taking 
active part in a “process of changing and remaking the social foundations of the 
international system.”75  
With the above discussion in mind, I will now define the fundamental concept 
of international order. 
 
2.1.5 Defining International Order 
The “problem of order” is the fundamental problem of the social sciences,76 yet in IR 
the concept of international order is surprisingly undertheorized. IR scholars address 
components of international order without defining international order as a whole. 
Realists primarily focus on the component of power or capabilities,77 and at times 
incorporate prestige and rules;78 liberals primarily focus on rules or regimes;79 and 
constructivist focus on rules, norms, and values.80 This is, of course, a schematic 
divide, but it illustrates the problem of addressing components of international order 
without defining international order as a whole. In this section, I will attempt to address 
this problem and construct a novel conceptual framework of international order. 
A major problem relates to the view of the international system as self-
regulating. Kenneth Waltz’s structural-functionalist perspective views the 
international system in terms of an auto-adjustment process; “patterns emerge and 
endure without anyone arranging the parts to form patterns or striving to maintain 
them,” and thus “order may prevail without an orderer; adjustments may be made 
without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without an allocator.”81 In other words, if 
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something like an international order exists, it is the result of a self-regulating pattern 
devoid of intentional actors. With capabilities as the only structural component, one 
certainly facilitates nomothetic generalizations, but faces problems in accounting for 
social change and how great powers actively and intentionally try to modify and 
change the international order. 
Shiping Tang, in his eloquent examination of the concept of order, divides order 
into various conceptual layers and provides a rigorous definition of order in terms of 
its basic meaning, its differentiation, its measurement, and what accounts for its 
stability and legitimacy. At the basic level, Tang defines order as “predictability of 
things within a human community or social system,” and as such, he points to the fact 
that “agents’ behavior, social interactions, and social outcomes…come under some 
kind of regulation.”82 Tang underlines that order is also a continuum, ranging from 
disorderly chaos to robust order, and given his definition at the basic level, the 
conceptualization is open to encompass all types of order and all possible components 
of order. Socio-political orders are indeed relational in that they encompass certain 
groups or communities. Yet what Tang fails to highlight properly is that the 
predictability or regularity of socio-political orders always exist according to some 
basic ordering principle that structure the order in the most fundamental way. Tang’s 
definition of order takes us a long way, but does not help us enough unless we specify 
what ordering principle that is at stake. 
Kenneth Waltz famously distinguished between two ordering principles: 
anarchy and hierarchy.83 They are not mutually exclusive, but can coexist within the 
international system. More than merely existing “in anarchy,” 84  states are better 
described as interacting in an international system characterized by “hierarchy in 
anarchy.”85 As Randall Schweller puts it, “the international system is oligarchical (or 
hierarchic) precisely because it is an anarchic one, wherein might makes right and 
differences in power and wealth serve to perpetuate inequality rather than alleviate 
it.”86 Yet if we refer to anarchy as the mere nonexistence of a pan-national global 
authority, this is not really an ordering principle, but rather the absence of a global 
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political order. Instead, what we should refer to as the two fundamental ordering 
principles of human communities are hierarchy and equality. 
From the chicken-yard pecking order87 to the dominance structures among 
monkey and ape societies, social dominance hierarchies are omnipresent among 
vertebrate societies, including human societies. In fact, they serve as the universal 
“spinal cord” of human communities,88 and it can be questioned if undifferentiated 
groups exist at all.89 
In his treatment of rank, or status, Adam Smith deploys the notion of sympathy. 
Smith puts emphasis on man’s natural propensity to sympathize with joy, with success 
and achievement, which constitutes the very foundation of ambition and the 
hierarchical ordering of society – in contrast to the much weaker human propensity to 
sympathize with grief, and the many times outright disdain for misery and failure. This 
basic “disposition of mankind” to sympathize with, or “to admire, and almost worship, 
the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and 
mean condition,” serves as the foundation of the hierarchical order and affords society 
its stability through deference and subordination to those of superior rank.90 As a 
result, ambiguities about status and role differentiation breed unpredictability and 
disorder.91 
Despite sovereignty, the master institution of the Westphalian system, with all 
states enjoying the same formal sovereign rights, status hierarchies exist side-by-side 
in both formal (e.g. weighted voting rights, veto powers) and informal (e.g. imposition 
of international custom) ways, and are structured by unequal access to capabilities and 
prestige, and constituted in terms of recognition and nonrecognition.92 Even if the 
Westphalian system established sovereign equality among its formally recognized 
subjects, European great powers have historically imposed social dominance 
structures of superior-inferior relationships within their respective imperial and 
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colonial domains. One might argue, however, that contemporary international politics 
is different, that social dominance orders is a thing of the past now that colonialism is 
brought to an end and we move towards a more peaceful, civilized, equal, rules-based, 
and reciprocal institutional order. Yet in relation to great power management, the 
market, and diplomacy, the differentiation of these primary institutions in terms of 
status is still ubiquitous. Indeed, the major flaw of the English School of international 
relations and the master concept of “international society” is that it fails to theorize 
properly the hierarchical structuring of the international order.  
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the epitome of a hierarchical, 
not an equal, international order where security management is the responsibility of a 
few core states. Alliances are not always marriages of convenience between two equal 
parts, they are often asymmetrical and serve to discipline and bind subordinate security 
dependent states into a certain security order. The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
adheres to the egalitarian principle of “one country, one vote,” yet key GATT decisions 
were long made by the Quad group (US, Japan, EU, Canada), and in the contemporary 
era major powers are increasingly forming new status groups that lead and coordinate 
trade negotiations and decision-making processes in various issue-areas in the WTO. 
Moreover, with an increasingly sluggish WTO process and the impasse of the Doha 
Development Round, the organization of international trade through regional 
economic blocs highlight the growing significance of different regional status 
groupings in the trade landscape. The diplomatic landscape is also being shaped by 
powerful actors trying to exclude or limit the influence of their competitors in various 
multilateral arenas and forums. In relation to international law, without juristic 
competence states do not stand a chance when attacked by armies of lawyers in 
international arbitration processes, not to mention the capacity needed to bear the costs 
of litigation. Thus, in a reciprocal, horizontal institutional order, capabilities affect 
legal outcomes.93 Other, more controversial primary institutions such as human rights, 
environmental stewardship, and nationalism, cannot be understood without the 
concept of status. A liberal, cosmopolitan conception of global individual rights 
requires imposition – the intervention from powerful actions in some form; 
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environmental regulation requires agreement between high-polluting high-status 
actors; and the self-determination of certain nations requires recognition and active 
support from powerful backers.  
Although often associated with brute force, social dominance orders are not the 
same as tyranny – even Baboons exercise social responsibility. The dominant players 
at the apex of the hierarchy indeed have extensive rights, yet responsibilities are just 
as significant. If duties are unfulfilled, looming threats of non-recognition will face the 
dominant actors, with other pretenders ready to seize the throne. Even so, social 
dominance orders are increasingly institutionalized and legal. States do not merely face 
armies and navies, but nuclear weapons inspectors, Anglo-American law firms, and 
global credit institutes. We are thus moving towards increasing legal-rational, 
bureaucratic domination in the international system. 94  Certainly, institutional 
governance mechanisms need to be legitimate and one cannot escape the significance 
of some form of consent. Nevertheless, there is an inherent and unescapable tension 
between the master institution of sovereignty, and the reality of hierarchy within the 
primary institutions of great power management, the market, diplomacy, and 
international law. Hence, the rules and values that make up the institutional 
environment only come into effect when they are acknowledged, strategically 
deployed, and acted upon by dominant powers. 
Amitav Acharya makes an important contribution to the study of the regional 
order of Asia-Pacific, but misses the crucial point just stressed above. Acharya outlines 
what he terms as a consociational security order, consisting of three central 
mechanisms: balance of power, cooperative institutions, and elite restraint. However, 
with this model, Acharya cannot explain the increasingly competitive US-China 
relationship; neither the fact that rival projects for regional order are being erected. 
The driving force behind US-China strategic competition is that, as the balance of 
power and the balance of prestige undergo change, uncertainty about status and the 
struggle for influence are breeding tensions. Balance of power as an institutional 
agreed upon great power arrangement is fundamentally a matter of status recognition, 
and implies distinct spheres of influence, whereas regional cooperative institutions are 
frameworks that regulate interaction among groups differentiated by status and an 
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insider-outsider logic. Elite restraint is certainly important, but it is more a product of 
nuclear deterrence than anything else.  
International order is fundamentally an institutional concept. As defined by 
Craig Parsons, institutions are “properties of groups” consisting of “formal or informal 
rules, conventions or practices, together with the organizational manifestations these 
patterns of group behavior sometimes takes on.”95 Oran Young defines institutions as 
“recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles, coupled with collections 
of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of those roles.”96 
With institutions as properties of groups, status refers to membership and relative 
standing within the group,97 whereas role is the behavioral expectations that come with 
a certain status. Status and institutions thus regulate international orders. Yet it is 
status, not institutions, that solves collective action problems.  
The classic collective action problems refer to challenges in motivating actors 
to make costly contributions and in coordinating group efforts. In particular, status 
solves the “start-up” problem through initial contributions, and the “free-rider” 
problem through subsequent contributions. In contrast to rational actor models that 
focus on how individual motivation affects collective action problems, status secures 
collective goods structurally and functions as a “coordination mechanism.” In this 
way, high status actors take a proactive stance towards public goods provision; they 
are central to “the initiation of, contributions to, and continuation of collective 
action.”98 Consequently, there cannot be any cooperation “after hegemony” devoid of 
high status actors that coordinate collective action and assume leadership 
responsibilities for public goods provision, and therefore, the competitive positional 
dynamic and clashing projects for international order cannot be avoided.99 
In sum, we have two dimensions of any international order in terms of which 
regulation and the “predictability of things” unfolds; namely, the social-relational 
status dimension, structured by the ordering principles of hierarchy and membership, 
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and the social-systemic institutional dimension, structured by normative ordering 
principles. The scope of international order essentially takes two basic forms: global 
or regional. The UN and the WTO resemble the closest equivalents of global order and 
regional trade agreements and regional alliance systems are examples of regional 
orders. International orders also consist of two principal domains: the economic 
domain and the security domain. 
I will now outline and define the core dimensions of international order. 
 
2.1.5.1 The Three Ps of the Social-Relational Status Dimension: Position, Power, 
Prestige 
The core issue in the debate about the concept of status concerns whether it is an 
objective structural reality or a matter of social evaluation.100 I contend that status is 
an objective structural reality, which, however, consists of both objective and 
intersubjective status attributes necessary for its materialization. At the center of my 
conceptual apparatus is the notion of status as positional – a social position imbued 
with certain rights and responsibilities within a grouping.101 Position is thus the core 
status concept, yet power and prestige are means to the end of position; they are the 
necessary objective and intersubjective status attributes that enable positional 
attainment. Power is indeed a means to an end, yet when the primary objective of 
security is realized, power becomes a means to the secondary objective of status. 
Prestige is equally a means to an end,102 yet when one argues that prestige is a means 
to the end of power, it is logically connected to a positional, social-relational notion of 
power since intersubjectively ascribed prestige cannot be a means to achieved 
capabilities, which result from self-effort. However, this positional notion of power103 
is better conceptualized as status, status that is attained within the sphere of 
international politics, and the sphere of politics is always the sphere of influence.104  
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2.1.5.1.1 Status as Social Position 
Status as social position relates to both the issue of membership in a specific grouping, 
as well as an actor’s relative standing within the group.105 I further connect status as 
social position to political struggles for influence and political control. Hans 
Morgenthau argues that “the desire for power” is not characterized by “the individual’s 
survival but with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secured,” 
and this desire is only satisfied when no one is “above or beside him.”106 Morgenthau’s 
classic assertion that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power,”107 
is thus properly read as a “struggle for position” to maximize international influence.108 
This further connects to Robert Jervis view of primacy, which “implies that the state 
has greater ability than any rival to influence a broad range of issues and a large number 
of states.”109 
Positional goods “are either (1) scarce in some absolute or socially imposed 
sense or (2) subject to congestion or crowding through more extensive use.” 110 
Traditionally, the connection between position and influence has been that between 
great power status and “spheres of influence.”111 The growing institutionalization of 
international politics means that the international order in fact develops a more 
constitution-like character, 112  in which the struggle for the “positional good” of 
leadership increasingly takes the form of a struggle to “set status in stone” through 
institutional privileges.113 The positional good of leadership is indivisible and the 
exclusion of leadership pretenders are central to the struggle for alternative 
international orders. This struggle is essentially about the hierarchical structuring of 
the international order and the forming of the institutional landscape.  
Hence, we cannot think of international orders outside the social relations that 
constitute them and how certain actors and activities are kept together as well as apart. 
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International orders do not only enable interaction, they also erect barriers to 
interaction. This fact links status and recognition to questions of membership criteria 
and exclusionary social closure, 114  which regulates the insider-outsider logic of 
international orders. As Max Weber puts it, social closure occurs when “one group of 
competitors takes some externally identifiable characteristic of another group…as a 
pretext for attempting their exclusion.”115 Social closure “is an ever-recurring process, 
it is the source of…group monopolies,” and “its purpose is always the closure of social 
and economic opportunities to outsiders.”116 It is a central mechanism for controlling 
access to social goods and resources or for appropriating “positional goods.” 
However, status holds behavioral expectations, which we understand in terms 
of the concept of role.117 The actor occupying the position needs to live up to its 
associated expectations by playing its corresponding role. Thus, “every status has its 
‘dynamic aspect’ – a role.”118 While status locates actors hierarchically within the 
prevailing order, roles specify the expected and appropriate behaviors associated with 
the particular social position. When actors put the rights and responsibilities that 
explicitly or implicitly constitute statuses into effect, they perform roles. In other 
words, the role is “what the status calls on one to do.”119 In particular, three types of 
leadership roles stand out: structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual leadership roles. 
Structural leadership is a matter of translating material capabilities into leverage in the 
bargaining process; entrepreneurial leadership is about agenda setting, policy 
innovation, and institutional brokerage; and intellectual leadership concerns values, 
ideas and shared understandings that come to shape the institutions.120  
An actor’s status and the role it performs is inescapably tied to a “circle of 
recognition” that participates in the performance.121 In fact, the leader “cannot perform 
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his role without the cooperation of his circle.”122 Hence, “collective acceptance or 
recognition” is necessary to attain status.123  By recognizing the leadership of the 
dominant actor, the social grouping grants the actor certain rights and responsibilities. 
Yet in order to gain status recognition the leader must possess both power and prestige 
attributes that imbue it with the capacity and the reputation to perform the role, and 
carry out the central tasks of public goods provision and influence rule making.  
I will now define the status attributes necessary for positional attainment: 
power and prestige. 
 
2.1.5.1.2 Power and Prestige as Achieved and Ascribed Status Components 
By viewing status as social position, there should now be few questions about what 
status is, yet questions remain about the components of status. I claim that in order to 
attain social position two status attributes are required: power and prestige. The 
positional struggle is a struggle for the end of status, and the influence that derives 
from that end, while power and prestige are means to that end. This relates to the 
traditional sociological division between achieved and ascribed status attributes that 
pertain to individuals in domestic societies. Achieved status attributes are attained 
through personal effort (i.e. income, education), whereas ascribed status attributes are 
known at birth (race, ethnicity, sex, age, family, religion).124 I adhere to this standard 
conceptual scheme, yet I modify the meaning of ascribed status to suit the international 
political realm. Power counts as the achieved status attribute par excellence concerning 
states, and prestige counts as the socially ascribed status attribute. Although ascribed 
status attributes traditionally are viewed as qualities known at birth and apparently 
beyond individual control, the very process of ascribing certain attributes positive or 
negative value is inherently a matter of power-laden social construction, or in other 
words, a struggle for the “definition of value.”125 
I define power in terms of capabilities in the standard structural realist sense. 
There are five core capabilities of importance as outlined by Kenneth Waltz: economic 
wealth, military strength, resource endowment, size of population and territory, and 
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political stability and competence.126 The first two are the core capabilities that count 
in the struggle for positional attainment; however, they certainly rest on a foundation 
composed of the other three.  For instance, without resources (natural and human 
resources, material and immaterial resources) there can be no economic development 
and thus no military advancement. The fusing of idea into matter – technological 
innovation in its essence – is necessary for the development of a wealthy, powerful, 
and advanced nation. Nevertheless, the analytical focus is on economic capabilities 
and military strength as they relate to the core domains of the international order. 
Power as a status attribute counts for states’ objective ranking in economic and military 
hierarchies, whereas status as social position is about membership and relative 
placement within a grouping. Yet, as will be emphasized below, power is not sufficient 
by itself for the attainment of leadership position. 
A “status situation,” as defined by Max Weber, refers to “social estimation of 
honor.” 127  Weber emphasizes that “not all power…entails social honor…‘mere 
economic’ power, and especially ‘naked’ money power, is by no means a recognized 
basis of social honor. Nor is power the only basis of social honor.”128 What Weber 
points to is that domestic social stratification is not based on a single principle – even 
though Marxists (economic class) have long tried to claim so – but rests on multiple 
principles or status attributes. Yet what about the international political arena? Is 
international society a warrior society where military power provides the only basis 
for status? 
During European dynastic rule the ascribed status attribute of family was 
“conferring status according to the whims of the marriage market” and religious lines 
long divided Europe between Protestants and Catholics.129 Likewise, the Eurocentric 
and colonial stratification system based on race prevented Japan from attaining great 
power status in the early twentieth century.130 In the recent anthology Status in World 
Politics, Deborah Larson, T.V. Paul and William Wohlforth list eight status attributes 
relevant for contemporary international relations – both tangible and intangible – and 
posit that status “cannot be read off a state’s material attributes” alone.131 Similarly, 
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apart from the status attributes of military strength and ideological appeal, Randall 
Schweller lists various attributes that have become important for achieving 
international status, such as culture, political development, technological 
achievements, strength of national currency, foreign direct investment, among 
others.132 In sum, the enjoyment of status in the international realm depends on both 
hard (material) and soft, socially ascribed, (ideational) attributes. 
I define prestige in terms of reputation and the admiration felt for someone 
based on a valuation of its achievements and qualities. This relates to Thomas Hobbes’ 
view of glory, which he equates with reputation.133 It further relates to what Joshua 
Kurlantzick calls a “nation’s brand”134  and to Arthur Stinchcombe’s definition of 
prestige as “reputational capital,” which one gains “by governing the use of one’s 
name.”135 Prestige is therefore the foundation of a nation’s soft power, which affords 
states with “the ability to shape the preferences of others” through attraction. 136 
However, prestige and its associated soft power is not merely gained from values and 
norms that attract followers. As Schweller points out, “economic might has supplanted 
military strength as the primary currency of national power and prestige.”137 In this 
way, economic achievements build reputation. Even so, the aspiring leader needs to 
perform “honorable deeds”138  and be associated with “reputable qualities,” which 
satisfy the expectations of secondary states who form a circle of recognition that 
approves of its leadership status. The dominant actor’s prestige is therefore the 
outcome of the circle’s judgment of the aspiring leader’s role performance.  
Service and sacrifice, protection and provision, are thus central to the 
“responsibility of those with high status and office.” In this way, “those toward the 
apex of the status hierarchy earn honor by living up to the responsibilities associated 
with their rank or office, while those who attain honor by virtue of their 
accomplishments come to occupy appropriate offices.”139 Even if we argue that the 
“purpose” of prestige “is to impress other nations with the power one’s own nation 
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actually possesses,” 140  what specific achievements and qualities that make up a 
nation’s reputational capital and serve as the basis for positive or negative valuation in 
a certain context cannot be deduced, but must be empirically adduced.141 This boils 
down to the “international perception of [the] government’s policies” and actions.142 
Yet gaining reputational capital is part of a struggle for the definition of value, which 
engages leadership contenders in a productive process of negotiation and contestation, 
of delegitimation and relegitimation,143 both in relation to each other and in relation to 
the secondary states whose acquiescence is needed for the construction of the 
alternative international order. 
Social mobility in the power hierarchy unavoidably becomes a matter of self-
effort and a “struggle for achievement,” which cannot be separated from the climbing 
of objective capability ladders. Conversely, social mobility in the prestige hierarchy 
becomes a matter of a “struggle for reputation,” which cannot be separated from 
intersubjective social evaluation. For instance, China does not necessarily have to 
become more democratic or Western in order to gain leadership status. Instead, it has 
to struggle to achieve power, perform honorable deeds, and fight for the elimination 
of Western-style prestige attributes that validate leadership recognition.  
In sum, leadership status is based on both power and prestige; both material, 
objective, and achieved attributes and ideational, intersubjective, and ascribed status 
attributes. In this way, both power and prestige are the necessary means necessary for 
status recognition (see Table 1 and Figure 1).  
 
Table 1. Material and Ideational Status Components 
 Material Ideational 
Status Components Power Prestige 
Status Attributes Achieved status attributes Ascribed status attributes 
Means of Change Change through effort Change of social evaluation 
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Figure 1. Material and Ideational Components Necessary for Leadership 
Status 
           Leadership Status 
 
 
 
                       Power Hierarchy Prestige Hierarchy 
 
 
                        Achieved Status Attributes    Ascribed Status Attributes 
                (Capabilities, hard power)       (Reputation, soft power) 
 
2.1.5.2 The Social-Systemic Institutional Dimension: Primary and Secondary 
Institutions 
In this section, I will define the social-systemic institutional dimension of the 
international order. Institutions are ordering mechanisms that regulate state behavior. 
There are primary and secondary institutions. The former is constitutive, the latter 
regulative. Institutions are also imbued with certain values, which function as 
normative ordering principles in that they guide the workings of the institutional 
machinery in a certain way.  
If we return to Craig Parsons’ definition of institutions as “properties of groups” 
consisting of “formal or informal rules, conventions or practices, together with the 
organizational manifestations these patterns of group behavior sometimes takes on,”144 
this definition concerns what the English School of international relations term 
secondary institutions. Whereas primary institutions are constitutive of “both the 
pieces/players and the rules of the game,” secondary institutions are “expressions of” 
primary institutions.145 As constitutive, primary institutions “do not just regulate, but 
they also create the possibility of the very behavior they regulate.” 146  Whereas 
secondary institutions or “regulative rules have the form ‘Do X,’ constitutive rules 
have the form ‘X counts as Y in context C.”147 For instance, since China certifies 
certain conditions X, it counts as a great power Y, in the international system C. The 
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regulative rules in the UNSC allows great powers to DO certain things, like using their 
veto power X. 
Barry Buzan further differentiate primary institutions in terms of master 
institution and derivative institutions that spring from the master primary institution.148 
Sovereignty is the master primary institution of the Westphalian international system, 
and non-intervention and international law its derivatives, which in turn give birth to 
secondary institutions with more specific regulative rules and values and 
organizational manifestations. For instance, in the case of the primary institution of 
sovereignty and its derivatives non-intervention and international law, they give birth 
to the secondary institutions of the UN Charter, the United Nations, and ICC. The 
primary institution of diplomacy has bilateralism and multilateralism as its derivatives, 
whereas embassies, the United Nations, conferences, forums, and various IGOs and 
regimes serve as secondary institutions. Great power management is another master 
primary institution, with derivatives such as balance of power, alliances, and war, and 
with secondary institutions such as the UNSC, NATO, and the US-led hub-and-spokes 
alliance system in the Asia-Pacific. The primary institution of the market, with trade, 
financial liberalization, and hegemonic stability as its derivatives, are connect to 
secondary institutions such as WTO, NAFTA, IMF, and ADB. Barry Buzan also 
includes territoriality, equality of people, nationalism, and environmental stewardship 
in his list over primary institutions (see Table 2). However, I do not include 
environmental stewardship; I subsume territoriality and nationalism under 
sovereignty; and I only discuss equality of people if it relates to the core primary 
institutions, which I argue are sovereignty, diplomacy, great power management, and 
the market. These are implicated in the two primary domains of the international order, 
the economic domain and the security domain. 
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   Table 2. Primary and Secondary Institutions 
 
Source: Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the  
Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 180-182 
 
 
2.1.5.2.1 Rules and Values as Secondary Institutional Components 
Rules and values are the two core secondary institutional components. Rules are 
formal or informal, and range from binding agreements and legal contracts to 
international custom, conventions, norms, and practices. They are prescriptions about 
what actions are deemed permitted and appropriate or prohibited and illegitimate. In 
case of binding legal agreements, rules are connected to international courts and 
dispute settlement mechanisms or to formal alliance commitments. In case of informal 
rules, they take the form of authoritative standards of established practice and 
international custom. Rules are further permeated by political values, that is, “the 
moral principles and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social group.”149 As 
Stefano Guzzini puts it: “Order is surely always for someone, but it also always stands 
for something, some value.” 150  Interestingly, despite his standard emphasis on 
                                                 
149 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society?, 164. 
150 Stefano Guzzini, “The Ambivalent ‘Diffusion of Power’ in Global Governance,” in The Diffusion of 
Power in Global Governance. International Political Economy Meets Foucault, ed. Stefano Guzzini 
and Iver B. Neumann (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 8. 
37 
preponderance as the source of stability, Robert Gilpin seems to share this view: 
“Governance at any level, whether national or international, must rest on shared 
beliefs, cultural values, and, most of all, a common identity.”151 Samuel Huntington 
agrees, stressing that the dominant state strive to “promote its values among other 
peoples and to shape the international environment so as to reflect its values.”152 
Hence, rules work according to a certain ideational logic or normative ordering 
principles. To exemplify, “as an ordering project, liberal internationalism seeks to 
structure social and political power in ways conducive to the realization of particular 
liberal principles.”153 
In this sense, we can make a distinction between formal-procedural authority 
and substantive-purposive authority, where the former puts the emphasis on rule-
following and basic agreements concerning the necessary procedures, and the latter 
puts the emphasis on the values that should direct a community towards an overarching 
goal or guiding purpose.154 Whereas the former connect rules to their procedural 
legitimacy and evaluation of them in terms “of the fairness of the decision-making 
procedures used by authorities and institutions,”155 the values that permeate rules are 
assessed in terms of its objective legitimacy or its subjective legitimacy.156 
Objective legitimacy is about whether there is a correspondence between rules 
and an external standard of morality. Thus, “an observer postulates normative criteria 
and this observer will then analyze to what extent” certain institutions live up to the 
postulated standard.157 Apart from being a mere academic exercise carried out by 
scholars in the ivory tower, objective legitimacy is also central to political legitimation 
strategies in which competing political projects are represented in terms of how well 
they meet certain normative standards. Subjective legitimacy, on the other hand, turns 
                                                 
151  Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 402, emphasis added. 
152  Samuel P. Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” International Security 17, no. 4 
(1993): 69-70. 
153  Ian Clark and Christian Reus-Smit, “Liberal Internationalism, the Practice of Special 
Responsibilities and Evolving Politics of the Security Council,” International Politics 50, no. 1 (2012): 
40. 
154 Anthony F. Lang, Jr, International Political Theory (London: Palgrave, 2015), 21-31. 
155 Tom R. Tyler, “A Psychological Perspective on the Legitimacy of Institutions and Authorities,” in 
The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 416. 
156 Shiping Tang, “Order: A Conceptual Analysis” 
157 Dieter Fuchs, “European Identity and Support for European Integration,” in Debating Political 
Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union, ed. Sonia Lucarelli, Furio Cerutti, and Vivien Ann 
Schmidt (London: Routledge, 2011), 58. 
38 
the focus to the legitimacy beliefs of citizens or state leaders who, according to their 
particularistic view about the rightfulness of a certain institutional arrangement, 
“decide which normative standards they use to evaluate a regime.” 158  Subjective 
legitimacy becomes crucial in relation to the compliance of secondary states. Yet when 
secondary states accept or “buy into” the institutional arrangement of the international 
order we are rather dealing with intersubjective legitimacy – shared values in its proper 
sense.  
Therefore, just as status cannot be separated from power and prestige, and 
ultimately recognition, the rules-based governance mechanisms of the international 
order cannot be separated from values and legitimacy. Recognition thus serves as the 
intersubjective requirement for the agentic dimension of the status order, and 
legitimacy serves as the intersubjective requirements for the systemic dimension of the 
institutional order. Nevertheless, the rules and values that come to make up the 
institutional components of the international order only do so when they are 
strategically deployed and acted upon by the core states of the international system in 
their efforts to gain acquiescence from secondary states. 
In sum, on the one hand, international orders are social-relational and 
hierarchically stratified and the most prominent status is that of leadership. Status is 
not based on material positionality alone but equally rests on prestige and requires 
recognition. Certain rights and responsibilities also accompany leadership status. On 
the other hand, international orders consist of social-systemic primary institutions and 
secondary institutional governance mechanisms, such as rules and values, and the 
organizational manifestations of the institutions, evaluated in terms of their legitimacy. 
Status puts the focus on positionality, the agency and steering capacity actors enjoy at 
certain structural locations, whereas institutions have non-intentional and indirect 
effects on state behavior in accordance with certain normative ordering principles. The 
utility of status is influence, whereas the utility of institutions is compliance (see Table 
3). 
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Table 3. Definition of International Order 
International Order 
Scope: global/regional 
Core Domains: economy, security 
 
Meta-Dimensions of 
International Order 
Social-Relational, Positional 
Status Dimension 
Social-Systemic,  
Institutional Dimension 
Components of 
International Order 
Power Prestige Rules Values 
Intersubjective 
Requirement of 
International Order 
Recognition Legitimacy 
Utility of  
International Order 
 
Influence Compliance 
 
 
2.1.6 Defining Status Quo-Seeking and Revisionism 
With the above discussion in mind, I will now briefly define status quo-seeking and 
revisionism. 
Great powers seek leadership status to organize and influence the rules and 
values of the international order. The key issue is who organizes the international 
order. Declining states want to maintain their existing status and rising states want to 
enhance their status. Both types of states thus engage in revisionist policies to further 
these ends. In this context, there are two overarching types of status driven 
revisionism: 
 
 Declining states: revise to maintain 
 Rising states: revise to enhance 
 
However, we face two specific types of revisionism: positional revisionism and 
institutional revisionism. Positional revisionism becomes a matter of status, of 
“recognition and standing” rather “than specific alterations to the existing rules.”159 In 
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contrast, institutional revisionism becomes a matter of changing “the rules by which 
relations among nations work.”160  Hence, positional competition is not always only 
about status, but, as Robert Jervis puts it, about setting the “‘rules of the game’ by 
which international politics is played, the intellectual frameworks employed by many 
states, and the standards by which behavior is judged to be legitimate.”161 The fact 
that, in contrast to the game of chess, the players in the game of states, “can reinterpret 
existing institutions as they go along,” and therefore “one needs to distinguish between 
changes in and changes of primary institutions.”162 Yet in order to properly account 
for the positional dimension of the international order one also needs to include 
changes in and changes of secondary institutions. In this way, revisionism can be 
viewed according to a typology of institutional change that span from deep to shallow 
change (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Typology of Institutional Change 
Deep--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Shallow 
Change of             Change in                 Change of                  Change in 
Primary institution       Primary institution    Secondary institution        Secondary institution 
 
 
 
Changes in secondary institutions is either positional or procedural. For 
instance, the IMF reforms is an example of this kind of change. However, since 
dominant states rarely allow free international political competition within the 
organizations they control, such revisionism will hardly ever change the incumbent 
position, it will only rearrange among the subordinate positions and change certain 
decisionmaking procedures. This ceiling prevents status enhancement for rising 
leadership pretenders that instead must engage in changes of secondary institutions. 
Change of secondary institutions are positional in terms erecting new organizations 
and groupings that change the hierarchical structure, including the top position, and/or 
new rules and values that bring new normative content to the regulative rules and 
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practices. The TPP and the AIIB are examples of such changes to the regional order 
of the Asia-Pacific. Changes in primary institutions concerns changes in interpretation 
of how a certain primary institution should constitute the actors and the fundamental 
rules of the game. The Responsibility to Protect represent a prime example of change 
in primary institutions by making sovereignty conditional upon states’ responsibility 
to protect its citizens from mass atrocities. As will be demonstrated, the beginning of 
the unipolar era implied a change in the primary institution of great power 
management, and China’s current project for an Asian Security Order represents a 
change to this post-Cold War configuration of a sole superpower and many great 
powers. US reform of the regional security order as well as China’s project for the 
regional security order are not merely about changes of and changes in secondary 
institutions, but also relate to changes in the primary institution of great power 
management. 
However, I prefer to separate the positional and the institutional dimensions in 
order to get a clearer analytical picture of the dynamic of change, as illustrated in Table 
3 where I outline my definition of international order. If we combine the positional and 
the institutional dimensions in terms of status quo and revisionism we end up with a 
2x2 table that generates an even more fine-grained typology of status quo and 
revisionism (see Table 4). 
If we look at the 2x2 table composed of the positional and institutional 
dimensions of international order, we end up with four particular types that we can use 
for heuristic purposes to judge what types of projects for the regional order of the Asia-
Pacific the United States and China are pursuing. This plays out differently depending 
on what domain of the international order that is analyzed, whether the economic or 
the security domain. The types of projects that emerge from the 2x2 table are 
conservative, reformist, aspirational, and transformational. The conservative project is 
the epitome of status quo-seeking, where the project for international order is designed 
to preserve both established positional and institutional arrangement. The reformist 
revisionist project, although intended to preserve the status order, is designed to change 
the institutional environment in order to make it more congenial for positional 
preservation. The aspirational revisionist project, on the other hand, is designed to 
change the international order for status-enhancement purposes, while leaving the 
institutional environment more or less intact. Ultimately, the transformational 
42 
revisionist project is designed to change both the positional and the institutional 
arrangement of the established international order. 
 
 
Table 4. Positional and Institutional Dimensions of Status Quo and 
Revisionism                 
          Institutional Dimension  
  
            Status Quo             Revisionism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.7 From Rare Strategic Moments and Postwar Order Creation to 
Piecemeal Reordering Processes and Parallel Governance Structures 
In IR, due to the traditional emphasis of change to the international order through major 
wars, revisionism relates to the “displacement type” of institutional change. Order 
creation then takes place at “rare strategic moments” that occur “after victory.”163 The 
mitigating circumstances outlined in section 2.1.3 and the institutional hallmark of the 
contemporary international order suggest that we have to rethink this scenario – states 
will no longer be given a clean slate to transform the international order wholesale in 
their favor. Instead of rare strategic moments and postwar order creation, revisionism 
becomes a matter of piecemeal reordering processes and incremental erection of 
parallel governance structures. This resembles an “institutional layering” process in 
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which parallel status orders and institutional structures exist side by side in a 
multilayered international order.164 
In order to grasp contemporary international political change in terms of a 
reordering process, we thus have to consult the literature on institutional layering. As 
Francis Fukuyama argues: 
 
Given the enormous conservatism of human societies with regard to institutions, 
societies do not get to sweep the decks clear in every generation. New institutions are 
more typically layered on top of existing ones… [Therefore] it is impossible to 
understand the possibilities of change in the present without appreciating this legacy, 
and the way it often limits choices available to political actors in the present.165 
 
Moreover, as Mahoney and Thelen emphasize, “layering does not introduce wholly 
new institutions or rules, but rather involves amendments, revisions or additions to 
existing ones. Such layering can, however, bring substantial change if amendments 
alter the logic of the institutions or compromise the stable reproduction of the original 
core.”166 For instance, Bo Rothstein posits that the growth of a parallel system of 
private welfare provision in the Scandinavian countries might weaken the support for 
the universal welfare programs among the middle class whose support is crucial to 
upholding the Scandinavian welfare model.167 Zhang Baohui examines the case of 
Hong Kong and shows how various political stakeholders, in light of the unfavorable 
political balance of power in relation to Beijing, have employed a layering strategy 
that incrementally seeks to change the anti-democratic nature of Hong Kong’s 
functional representation by adding new rules to the existing ones. 168  Conceiving 
revisionism in terms of layering brings back the concept to its original focus on 
incremental change. 
However, in international relations, due the absence of a global polity, layering 
becomes a matter of parallel status hierarchies and institutional arrangements existing 
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side by side.169 Institutional layering does not add another floor on top of an already 
existing house; it adds a neighboring house next to it.  As such, the acquiescence of 
subordinate states relates to how great powers assume new responsibilities, bind states 
to new institutions, and erect alternative channels for the provision of public goods.  
A process can be either owned or un-owned: “Owned processes are ‘doings’ 
attributable to a particular ‘doer,’” whereas “un-owned processes are ‘doings’ which 
are not attributable to a particular ‘doer.’” 170  A reordering process is thus not 
necessarily attributable to certain agents, but can be a “subjectless process which gives 
rise to new configurations of relations.”171 Examples of such un-owned processes are 
interdependence and regionalization. Although these processes indeed depend on 
decisions and consist of concrete ties, they are not processes with agentic properties. 
For instance, economic interdependence consists of trade linkages, foreign direct 
investment, outsourcing, processes of specialization, and global division of labor that 
create an intermeshed web of relations and mutual dependencies for the delivery of 
goods and services. Regionalization simply means that this process takes a regional 
form. Conversely, regionalism or a regional bloc is a configuration of owned processes 
attributable to the purposive action of regional elites to foster greater political 
integration, establish shared institutions, and construct a common regional identity. 
Revisionism as a reordering process is an owned process.  
We understand the intentionality of owned processes in terms of a project. The 
project is identified “by the fact that it unfolds, or at least tries to unfold, according to 
some generic plan; the plan is the unity of the project, lending interpretive coherence 
to the various actions which make up the project. Without this overall goal, the various 
activities would be meaningless.”172 The project incorporates the “ultimate ends” that 
“provide legitimacy and cohesion to the political order.”173 In order to materialize, 
however, to project needs to be performed. Erik Ringmar defines performances as 
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“actions that are explicitly staged in order to achieve certain effects.” 174  These 
performances strive to build one’s reputational capital and take place in front of 
relevant audiences: “those people whom we are particularly keen to impress and those 
whose recognition is particularly important for us.”175 Foreign policy orientations thus 
manifest as foreign policy performances, which allow us to grasp what effects state 
actors really desire to produce. Through these foreign policy performances, the telos 
of the revisionist project is projected onto the international political stage. For the 
project to be considered revisionist it must go against the positional and/or the 
institutional characteristics of the established international order.  
 
2.1.8 Two Contending Alternatives: Great Power Status, Regional 
Leadership Role, and Regional Orders versus Superpower Status, Global 
Leadership Role, and Global Order 
Although we are dealing with piecemeal reordering processes and incremental erection 
of parallel governance structures, the struggle over the international order is still 
between two contending alternatives. The basic difference connects great power status 
to regional leadership roles and regional orders, and superpower status to a global 
leadership role and global order. This is a struggle in the primary institution of great 
power management. 
 
2.1.8.1 Great Power Status, Regional Leadership Roles, and Regional Orders 
Hedley Bull gives one of the most elaborated definitions of great power status. He 
defines great power status as consisting of three core aspects: first, the existence of a 
club with certain membership criteria in relation to which the members are 
comparable; second, the members of the great power club are in the top rank militarily 
and holders of strategic nuclear weapons; and significantly, third: 
 
Great powers are powers recognized by others to have, and conceived by their own 
leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties. Great powers, for 
example, assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining 
issues that affect peace and security of the international system as a whole. They 
accept the duty, and are thought by others to have the duty, of modifying their 
policies in the light of the managerial responsibilities they bear.176 
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Bull stresses that great power status takes the form of special rights and responsibilities 
attached to the specific social position.  Along the same vein, David Lake reviews the 
concept of status and argues that it is not necessarily a zero-sum “positional good,” but 
a positive-sum “club good.” Lake asserts that researchers might miss the point when 
they attribute status concerns as the causal driver behind rivalries, which are better 
analyzed as conflicts about authority. 177  Certainly, as Bull also emphasizes, the 
existence of a club with certain membership criteria is central to great power status, 
and the UNSC is the prime example of a grouping in which great power status indeed 
functions as a club good. However, great power status as a club good only relates to 
the global order. It is also apparent from Bull’s conception that the very concept of 
great power status implies a regional sphere of influence. The reluctance to confer 
great power status connects to the very rights and privileges – or authority – that it 
entails. The struggle for great power status or great power equality is about claiming 
the very rights and privileges associated with the status. Once recognized as a true 
equal, certain rights and responsibilities should follow and decision makers in other 
polities should take the interests of the great power into consideration. Bull elucidates 
how this relates to the unique managerial role that comes with great powers status, 
which in essence relates to the management of the international order. Bull accentuates 
that this managerial role takes six particular forms, with the last three relating 
specifically to the authority of great powers:178 
 
1. Preservation of the general balance of power 
2. Avoidance and control of crises 
3. Limitation and containment of wars 
4. Unilateral exercise of local preponderance 
5. Spheres of influence, interest or responsibility 
6. Great power concert or condominium 
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Bull does not discuss the first aspect in length apart from emphasizing that it includes 
the preservation of the relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence. The second and third 
aspects focus on the exercise of restraint in order to avoid crises and war.  
The fourth and the fifth aspects are the more ambiguous in contemporary global 
politics. In terms of the unilateral exercise of local preponderance, Bull posits that this 
takes three forms: dominance, hegemony, or primacy. Dominance is characterized by 
the “habitual use of force” against lesser states in the immediate neighborhood of the 
great powers. Here US military interventions in Central America and the Caribbean, 
until Franklin Roosevelt’s “good-neighbor policy” was introduced in the 1930s, is used 
as the illustrative example. Hegemony refers to those situations when the great power 
prefers to rely on other mechanisms than the use of force, which is only resorted to in 
extreme cases. Bull argues that this was the guiding strategy of the United States in 
Central America and the Caribbean and of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe during 
the Cold War. 
 
The great power is ready to violate the rights of sovereignty, equality and 
independence enjoyed by the lesser states, but it does not disregard them; it 
recognizes that these rights exist, and justify violation of them by appeal of some 
specific overriding principle…The Soviet and American hegemonies both produce 
a kind of order. The lesser states in each area cannot resort to force against each 
other, nor can their governments be overthrown, except by leave of hegemonial 
power.179 
 
Primacy, on the other hand, is achieved without the use of force against lesser states 
and is equal to leadership that takes place within “a group of states whose peoples 
together display some of the signs of a single political community.”180 Here Bull makes 
use of US leadership in NATO as the obvious example of primacy. However, primacy 
within a specific grouping does not obviate the use of that group to dominate others, 
and the definition of dominance as “habitual use of force” does not apply in the 
contemporary age of international politics. Besides, as Kenneth Waltz highlights, 
NATO is better viewed “as the instrument for maintaining America’s domination of 
the foreign and military policies of European states.”181 Nevertheless, what we can 
extract from Bull’s conception of dominance, hegemony, and primacy is that they form 
the basis of a continuum that ranges from the least consented and most forceful type to 
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the most accepted and socially recognized type of social dominance, authority, and 
leadership. As mentioned before, with growing institutionalization of international 
relations we are moving towards increasing legal-rational, bureaucratic domination in 
the international system. 
In terms of spheres of influence, interest or responsibility Bull refers to more or 
less informal agreements or established practice among great powers that 
“confirm…their positions of local preponderance, and avoid collision or friction 
between them.”182 More specifically:  
 
We should distinguish an agreement or understanding between two powers to 
recognize the fact of one another’s preponderance in some area, from an agreement 
to recognize each other’s rights in that area. It is one thing for the United States and 
the Soviet Union to recognize the fact that certain parts of the world are within each 
other’s spheres of influence; it is another to treat such spheres of influence as 
legitimate.183 
 
The understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning their 
respective spheres of influence was not based on formal agreement, but on implicit 
rules and mutual acceptance of non-intervention within each other’s spheres of 
influence. Such understandings can “arise from reciprocal declarations of policy, or 
simply from behavior of the parties which is as if in conformity with a rule, even though 
that rule is not agreed, not enunciated nor even fully understood.”184 
Significantly, Bull’s notion of great power status and its corresponding 
managerial role is intimately linked to a regional scope of international order in which 
great powers act as leaders of their region and are granted specific spheres of influence 
in their immediate neighborhood. Extra-regional powers should not meddle; neither 
should lesser states in the region seek alliances with extra-regional powers. Hence, 
recognition of great power status or great power equality relates to an explicit or 
implicit acknowledgement of a great power’s legitimate right to a regional sphere of 
influence, and that it can exercise authority and leadership, more than anywhere else, 
in its region, and to do so undisturbed. 
The sixth form that the managerial role takes – joint action in terms of a great 
power concert or condominium – then really becomes a matter of great power 
coexistence and respect for each other’s spheres of influence whilst engaging in 
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cooperation in areas of shared interests, such as combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
or fighting climate change. In order to protect the rules of coexistence, Bull suggests 
that it is important to: 
 
 Contain ideological conflicts 
 Appease dissatisfied states “for what they regard as just change” 
 Secure acquiescence of smaller states when exercising special rights and 
duties185 
 
This is of course a dynamic game. The ambition of great powers is “to influence and 
control circumstances,” while lesser states should “adapt themselves to circumstances 
which, essentially, do not depend on them.” However, “such a contrast…is 
oversimplified and expresses opinions rather than the reality: the manner in which the 
small states adapt themselves to circumstances contribute to the form circumstances 
actually assume.”186 Great powers can only perform their managerial roles if they are 
recognized by a significant circle of recognition. This is where the struggle ensues, the 
struggle for acquiescence of secondary states and the struggle against extra-regional 
influence. Just as much as this can be depicted in terms of an inter-civilizational 
struggle,187 encompassing both traditional geopolitics and geoeconomics,188 it is just 
as much a clash that goes on within the region189 – a struggle for the very positional 
and institutional components that will constitute the regional order in the first place.  
Barry Buzan offers the closest contemporary illustration of an international 
order in which the above great power conception can be accommodated: 
 
I have argued here for a ‘third way’ between those who believe in ongoing US 
hegemony and those who believe in the necessity for the US to take a more 
accommodative leadership role in a multi-power world order. This ‘third way’ 
departs from the essentially Western status quo motivation of the mainstream 
debates and both expects and welcomes a more radical transformation in the world 
order. In this ‘third way,’ there are no superpowers only great powers and regional 
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powers, capitalism in various versions is the accepted form of political economy, 
regional orders are stronger than the global one, and at the global level there is a 
well-grounded pluralist international society mainly motivated by coexistence, but 
with significant elements of cooperation around collective problems (e.g. arms 
control, environmental management) and projects (e.g. trade, big science)….The 
unique feature of this ‘third way’ is that for the first time it combines both a 
relatively even distribution of power worldwide and a densely integrated and 
interdependent global system and society. This might be labelled decentred 
globalism to contrast it with the centred globalism captured in the many core–
periphery characterizations of the modern world order. It is a label that expresses 
the emergence of a truly post-colonial world order.190 
 
With this in mind, I will not outline how great power status differs from superpower 
status and that it, in fact, challenges the primary institution of great power 
management.  
 
2.1.8.2 Super Power Status, Global Leadership Role, and Global Order 
The notion of coexistence that underpins great power status does not resonate with 
superpower status and the post-Cold War international order. Superpower status is 
qualitatively different from great power status. The unprecedented change that 
followed the end of the Cold War meant the end of coexistence. What emerged was a 
truly unipolar global structure with one preeminent power vastly superior to all other 
countries. To capture this, Krauthammer proclaimed the “unipolar moment,” and 
Fukuyama announced the “end of history.” In light of American preponderance, a new 
global order characterized by economic globalization, complex interdependence, and 
multilateral institutions would render the old game of great power rivalry obsolete. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was about to depict the world 
in an image consistent with visions of liberal internationalism, and in which the United 
States as the sole superpower became the guardian of human fate. 
Instead of regional leadership roles performed by great powers, the superpower 
exercises a global leadership role; instead of great powers that enjoy local 
preponderance, the superpower exercises global preponderance; and instead of 
regional rights and responsibilities assigned to great powers, the superpower is the 
world’s police with rights to patrol a global sphere of responsibility. Superpower status 
is thus about genuine “global statecraft.” 191  A superpower has “the reach and 
capabilities to promote its interests in virtually every part of the world” and does so 
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“with little reference to those of others.”192 At the core is the notion that only one 
global set of legitimate rights and responsibilities apply everywhere. Gone is the 
obsolete (and morally repugnant) notion of spheres of influence in favor of a global 
sphere of responsibility, in which the superpower (the United States) command the 
allegiance of a “coalition of the willing” in the fight for the common universal good, 
and distribute roles to other major powers in the name of “burden-sharing” – with more 
(Democratic administrations) or less (Republican administrations) engagement with 
multilateral institutions.  
Much more than being a great power among others, the United States is an 
exceptional country that has a unique mission to “lead the world’s democracies in 
spreading liberal values because defeating evil would make everyone more secure.”193 
The traditional exceptionalist conception of the United States as a “city on a hill” of 
higher values “that had to keep itself pure and distant from the unsavory practices of 
European balance-of-power politics,”194 is now reconceptualized as exceptionalism 
that demands global activism. The difference between neoconservatives more prone 
to use unilateralism and liberal internationalists that prefer to work more closely with 
institutions is about preferred means, rather than a challenge to America’s exceptional 
role as a superpower. It is an instrumental question. Whereas the Bush administration’s 
transformational diplomacy “at the point of a gun” represents a “radical grand 
strategy,”195 the Obama administration sees “no contradiction between believing that 
America has a continued extraordinary role in leading the world towards peace and 
prosperity and recognizing that that leadership is incumbent, depends on, our ability 
to create partnerships…because we can’t solve these problems alone.” 196  Yet 
democrats still leave the door open to go beyond the United Nations if it proves 
sluggish and morally unworkable. In this way, the United States together with a group 
of core Western powers “moved toward a view of the world in which defense of 
humanity overrode not only the sanctity of state sovereignty but in certain 
                                                 
192 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” 36, 42. 
193 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (Penguin, 2012), location 6246. 
194 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Relational Constructivism: A War of Words,” in Making Sense of 
International Relations Theory, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 
161. 
195 John Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 21. 
196  Barack Obama, “News Conference by President Obama,” Whitehouse.gov, April 4, 2009, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/news-conference-president-obama-4042009, accessed 
October 8, 2014. 
52 
circumstances the authority even of the UN itself.”197 As a result, the United States 
infused superpower status with another notion of exceptionalism different from the 
traditional conception, namely that the superpower stands “above the rules.”198 
Superpower status thus implies a global hierarchy, a genuinely global 
leadership role, within a truly global order in which the superpower has command of 
the commons and global access.199 In contrast to Bull’s focus on containing ideological 
conflicts among great powers and appeasing dissatisfied states, ideological crusade 
and universalism is characteristic of US superpower status. There is less avoidance of 
crisis, as superpower holy wars might lead to protracted wars and quagmires. From 
Clinton to Obama, the United States have pursued “global hegemony.”200 The Kantian 
cosmopolitan dream embedded in democratic peace theory and American 
transformational superpower diplomacy would entail the creation of a “community of 
mankind” led by the United States as the guardian of human fate who serves a higher 
moral cause and protects world society from recalcitrant heretics, at the same time as 
it establishes a “non-zero-sum game.”201 In effect, however, it means “a shift from 
balance-of-power politics to logics of divide and rule.”202 Hence, US sole superpower 
status and global order represent a challenge to the traditional understanding of the 
primary institution of great power management and its derivative the balance of power. 
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   Table 5. Great Power Status vs Superpower Status 
Great Power Status Superpower Status 
Regional leadership role Global leadership role 
Exercising local 
preponderance 
Exercising global 
preponderance 
Regional sphere of  
influence 
Global sphere of  
responsibility 
Shared global rights and 
responsibilities, 
exclusive regional rights 
and responsibilities 
Special and exclusive  
global rights and 
responsibilities 
Thin common moral 
framework, inter-
civilizational coexistence 
Thick common moral 
framework, intra-
civilizational relations 
Balance of power Dived-and-rule 
 
 
 
If we put everything together, international orders take two principal forms: 
regional orders and global order. The Eurocentric Westphalian international system 
and its conception of balance of power was essentially a regional construction, while 
the rest of the world was subordinated in imperial and colonial schemes. Yet with 
decolonization, the reform and opening of China, the collapse of Soviet communism, 
capitalist globalization, and the “rise of the rest” we are witnessing the emergence of 
a truly global political participation in international relations. Therefore, in the 
contemporary era the primary institution of balance of power becomes a “world of 
regions” with different legitimate regional hierarchies and institutional arrangements 
– a world without no sole superpower, only coexisting great powers, spheres of 
influence, “multiple modernities” and “varieties of capitalism.”203 Global order, on the 
other hand, becomes globalist. A world with a sole superpower implies one global 
security hierarchy and a global sphere of responsibility (full-spectrum dominance, 
command of the commons), one dominant mode of capitalist modernity (global market 
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access), and global intracivilizational relations (end of history), in which alternatives 
figure as examples of recalcitrance or “backwardness” that are “in need” of a civilizing 
mission. The chief issue of contestation between the sole superpower and aspiring 
great powers “is the former’s intervention to limit, counter, or shape the actions of the 
latter.”204 This is primarily a struggle between global and regional orders (see Table 
5). Yet it is a long-drawn-out struggle of piecemeal reordering processes and 
incremental erection of parallel governance structures. 
The conceptual section is now completed. In the following section, I will 
review competing IR theories of revisionism. 
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2.2 Competing IR Theories of Revisionism 
In this section, I will review competing theories of revisionism. In order to theorize, it 
is imperative that you review and “know thy canon.” Theorizing must be placed on a 
solid foundation of previous scholarly work, relating to the central catalogue of the 
field of study. In order “to be a skillful theorizer,” as Richard Swedberg puts it,  
 
You…need to know some social theory and be able to handle it well. You may, for 
example, need to take a concept from one theory and combine it with a concept from 
another theory. You may want to eliminate some part of a theory and replace it with 
a new idea of your own, and so on.205 
 
Hence, one must review, problematize, and critically evaluate the canon in order to 
draw out conceptual pieces and put them to work in new ways. In this section, I will 
draw out the various pieces, and in the following section, I will put them to work in 
new ways. 
Even though I deal with various theories, I will primarily engage the IR realist 
canon. In the subsection that follows, I will start by dissecting classical philosophers 
and political theorists, in particular Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith, and then 
interject my evaluation of their work into my reading of the classical realist IR-canon, 
in particular the work of Hans Morgenthau. The discussion will result in my core 
assumption – status-maximization as influence-maximization. The subsections that 
follow will primarily address various structural realist theories together with shorter 
discussions of liberalism and constructivism and other more recent studies beyond the 
IR realist canon. That will then lead to the creation of my own theory: “Theory of 
International Order and Status Driven Revisionism.” 
 
2.2.1 Setting the Assumption Straight: The Desire for Status and Influence 
To be sure, security is man’s most foundational need, and so as well for states. When 
one is not safe and survival not guaranteed, actions flow mechanically to preserve 
one’s life. In a state of warre or anarchy, self-preservation is the closest we can come 
to a natural right. The focus on the minimalist principle of self-preservation formed 
the nucleus of Thomas Hobbes’s empirically grounded counsel. Hobbes was 
delivering a perforating critique of the ideational drivers of the civil wars of his time, 
rejecting the classical perfectionist principle of virtue as a false and dangerous delusion 
                                                 
205 Richard Swedberg, The Art of Social Theory, 169. 
56 
that pits man against man, group against group, in endless warfare. Yet he 
simultaneously observed that individuals in the middle of the chaos struggled to protect 
themselves. This anti-Aristotelian and anti-teleological critique upholds two core 
natural laws: every man seeks peace; every man will defend himself. Living in an 
orderly and stable society is thus akin to a natural right, a right guaranteed by the 
Leviathan, and obeying the commands of the sovereign and promoting attitudes 
conducive to the minimal good of civil peace (such as avoidance of pride, showing 
gratitude, forgiveness, equal treatment of people, and acceptance of arbitration) is the 
responsibility of the people.206 Up to this point, I have no quarrel with Hobbes.  
Yet when one is safe, then what? When one is safe, when stability is imposed 
and security guaranteed, then the traditional answer of security and the minimalist 
principle of self-preservation yield to the teleological and maximalist answer of status, 
power, and influence. Then the “struggle for existence” ceases to take the form of a 
struggle for securing existence per se, and continues in the form of a struggle for what 
kind of existence, in terms of what kind of existence we prefer. Without looming 
existential threats, the “great purpose of human life,” as Adam Smith aptly puts it, 
channels towards “bettering our condition.”207 The desire for continual development 
and progress, for achievement, is what drives man in his endeavors when he is secure, 
because status, or “rank, distinction, preeminence, no man despises, unless he is either 
raised very much above, or sunk very much below, the ordinary standard of human 
nature.”208 Thus, when we are securely rooted, we start cultivating ambition. Instead 
of fighting to survive, we struggle to thrive. We enter “a contest for distinction,” as 
Jeremy Bentham befittingly puts it, “not a struggle for existence.”209 Reinhold Niebuhr 
reverberates the same message: “the will-to-live becomes the will-to-power.”210 
Today, more than ever, the great power relations in the international system 
resembles such a world. As spelled out above, the principal mitigating factor of nuclear 
deterrence makes great power interstate warfare obsolete. In fact, nuclear weapon-
holding great powers reside in a world of abundance of security. Ascertaining this is 
not the same as neglecting the fact that blood-stained proxy wars are still occurring, 
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neither the fact that severe human security concerns are affecting the everyday life of 
millions, if not billions; it only means that the principal power wielders in the 
international system are facing an external environment fundamentally different from 
the traditional insecure great power landscape. Labelling the Cold War a “Long 
Peace”211 does not repair the limbs of men, women and children, victims of land mines 
in proxy wars from Angola to Afghanistan, yet it captures the fact that the robust non-
appearance of direct war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and other 
great powers, during the Cold War is theoretically significant. We essentially move 
from the realm of security to the realm of status where a struggle for position 
characterizes the competitive logic among great powers.212  
Thus, at the most fundamental level, we can separate between two core 
principles: the minimalist principle of self-preservation, and the maximalist principle 
of status-maximization. Security means that one seeks to defend oneself, while status 
means that one seeks to better oneself.  
In Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiment, I discern a tension between 
positional rivalry and social approbation. Smith stresses that when ambition “has got 
entire possession of the breast” it allows “neither a rival nor a successor,”213 yet he 
treats social approbation or the desire “to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind” 
as the ultimate end of ambition.214 Similarly, Richard Ned Lebow, in his focus on the 
three core innate human drives – appetite, spirit, and reason – also brings this tension 
to the fore. Lebow treats Morgenthau’s famous treatise of the human animus 
dominandi as part of a spirit-based drive, yet this is, from my point of view, a 
misreading of Morgenthau, whose positional account most closely resembles the drive 
of appetite: 
 
[T]he desire for power is closely related to [selfishness] but is not identical with it. 
For the typical goals of selfishness, such as food, shelter, security…have an 
objective relation to the vital needs of the individual….The desire for power, on the 
other hand, concerns itself not with the individual’s survival but with his position 
among his fellows once his survival has been secured. Consequently, the selfishness 
of man has limits; his will to power has none. For while man’s vital needs are 
capable of satisfaction, his lust for power would be satisfied only if the last man 
became an object of his domination, there being nobody above or beside him, that 
is, if he became like God.215 
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Lebow interprets “the desire for power” and the individual’s desire for “position 
among his fellows” as an expression of the spiritual drive directed towards the end of 
self-esteem.216 Yet what is at stake here is both the status enhancing desire of man and 
the basic human need to belong; man’s desire to excel and reach greater positional 
heights is not contradictory to man’s fundamental need to belong. Status is a social 
concept manifested as membership and relative position within a social grouping. 
Leadership must be recognized and the rules and values of the group must be 
legitimate. The desire for preeminence or leadership primarily concerns the drive of 
appetite, and capabilities (achievement) and prestige (reputation) are the necessary 
means for status recognition and the quenching of the positional thirst. The problem 
with the positional appetite for power is that it cannot be consumed, like wealth or 
food; instead, it should be understood as a metaphor, central to describe the status-
enhancing nature of man where the insatiable desire for greater heights simultaneously 
takes place within a human setting where it is dependent on recognition – yet it is 
influence, not self-esteem, that is the ultimate end for states.  
Hence, in contrast to Lebow, I argue that it is the power and influence one gains 
at the top of the pecking order that is the source of the craving, and which allows for 
the implementation of the political project. Wealth (power) and honor (prestige) are 
indeed instrumental goods, yet not for the end of self-esteem, but for the end of 
influence, which derives from positional attainment – the power to set the agenda, 
shape the rules, and institutionalize one’s dominance. Lebow admits that appetite and 
spirit are often intertwined and “difficult to disentangle.”217 From my point of view, 
this is because not only influence is vested in position, so is rightly self-esteem. Self-
realization occurs positionally, and self-esteem is the result of a successful matching 
between self-identity and status. Exceptional great power identities are satisfied when 
leadership roles are assumed, which certainly imbues the nation and its leaders with a 
tremendous sense of self-worth. In this sense, spirit and appetite are indeed 
intertwined, but it does not trump appetite as the core driver of positional competition. 
The fact that states are relational, not atomist, does not outdo the positional logic and 
the desire for power and influence. 
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In his attempt to demonstrate the explanatory salience of the basic human drive 
of the spirit, Lebow brings his analytical confusion to the fore: 
 
Hitler’s rhetorical strategy and the basis of his support indicate the extent to which 
the spirit was central to his rise to power and subsequent popularity. Ian Kershaw, 
author of the most comprehensive study of Hitler’s speeches, concludes that he 
‘always enjoyed a particular talent, approaching demagogic genius, for appealing to 
the populist national emotions, hopes, and aggression of increasing numbers of 
ordinary Germans, in particular by exploiting deep-rooted resentments which the 
name ‘Versailles’ conjured up.’ He wisely refrained from talking about his wider 
imperialist aims, as they could not be achieved without a second world war. Hitler’s 
racism, which vaunted the superiority of the Aryans over other races, was also 
intended to enhance his listeners’ self-image and self-esteem. Economic 
improvements and stability, valued in their own right, were also portrayed as a means 
of restoring German dignity and self-esteem.218 
 
What Lebow outlines above is not about Hitler’s or the German ruling elite’s drive or 
motivation, but a matter of the German national sentiment. Nazism became a potent 
means for rallying the German populace by playing on one of the most powerful 
notions of the human spirit – the nation. However, this spiritual foundation does not 
equate with the greedy motives of Hitler’s “wider imperialist aims.” What Lebow 
describes is nothing more than Hitler’s cunning exploitation of the self-identity needs 
of the battered and humiliated German nation in order to garner support for an 
unquenchable imperialistic appetite. Lebow surely pinpoints important factors behind 
Hitler’s domestic rise to power, but fails to grasp Hitler’s and the ruling elite’s 
motivation. One might claim that irrational idiosyncratic and psychological factors 
played the biggest explanatory part behind Hitler’s actions, 219  yet overall, the 
analytical focus on spirit (drive) and self-esteem (end) cannot answer the following 
question: Why seeking world domination when already highly esteemed by your 
people at the nation’s current level of standing? 
Friedrich Nietzsche viewed power as the ultimate telos of man, yet it is not a 
matter of power defined as capabilities in the structural realist sense, but a matter of 
overcoming obstacles, gaining advantages, and subduing the environment. The “will 
to power” is not a matter of survival in terms of a reactive adoption to the environment, 
but a matter of the proactive objective to dominate the environment.220 Capabilities 
are certainly necessary for this end, yet the end is different from capabilities. 
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Morgenthau’s animus dominandi connects to this Nietzschean notion. What 
Morgenthau emphasizes is the simple truism that political positional appetite cannot 
be quenched; that political actors are only satisfied as long as they enhance their 
position, and when they have reached the top, they are only satisfied as long as they 
maintain that position. Just as vote-maximizing political party machines crave votes 
in domestic elections, states crave higher and higher positions within the international 
order. Hence, what secure great powers want is the “positional good” of leadership 
status, and in particular, the influence that is vested in leadership status, which enables 
the materialization of the international political project. Properly understood, I am in 
this way referring to status-maximization as influence-maximization. 
Morgenthau views politics as “governed by objective laws that have their roots 
in human nature.”221 More than a cause, this is a theoretical assumption; human nature 
is an analytical constant. As such, it does not point to the underlying cause that drives 
positional competition, which is material; namely, fundamental structural change or 
redistribution of power in the international system. Even so, power is not causally 
sufficient for status, since both power and prestige are necessary to attain status. 
Hence, the maximization of power and prestige works to serve the goal of status-
maximization, and it is through status that states maximize influence. 
I will now critically evaluate the central works of the structural realist canon: 
neorealism, offensive realism, power-transition theory, and hegemonic stability 
theory. 
 
2.2.2 Neorealism’s Structural-Functionalist Status Quo Bias and the 
Absence of a Competitive Positional Logic 
Kenneth Waltz’s core neorealist postulation, that in a system of anarchy “security is 
the highest end” and the “concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain 
their positions in the system,”222 is accurately criticized for its “status quo bias.”223 It 
begs the significant question: “When survival is assured, what does neorealism 
explain?”224  
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However, it is important to keep in mind that Waltz’s logic follows from the 
functionalist and evolutionary reasoning that Waltz relies upon in his structural model. 
Responsible for Waltz’s status quo bias are processes of socialization and competition: 
“In social sectors that are loosely organized or segmented, socialization takes place 
within segments and competition takes place among them. Socialization encourages 
similarities of attributes and of behavior. So does competition. Competition generates 
an order, the units of which adjust their relations through their autonomous decisions 
and acts.”225 The isomorphism of Walt’z model – the development of similar units – 
derives from these structural pressures and “the functional requirements” of the 
international system, which produce functionally equivalent units “by selecting out 
dysfunctional behaviors”226 – behaviors not conducive to survival, such as pacifism. 
Thus, claiming “that ‘the structure selects’ means simply that those who conform to 
accepted and successful practices more often rise to the top and are likelier to stay 
there.”227 In other words, in a competitive environment, if states do not adhere to the 
structural pressures of the system they will be punished (not survive). Security seeking, 
or status quo behavior, is thus functional to Waltz systemic theory, and not necessarily 
an empirical depiction of state motivation. Waltz makes this clear: 
 
Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they may 
range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone. 
Survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have, other than the 
goal of promoting their own disappearance as political entities. The survival motive 
is taken as the ground of action in a world where the security of states is not assured, 
rather than as a realistic description of the impulse that lies behind every act of 
state.228  
 
 
As the objectives that states seek “may be endlessly varied,” Waltz does not mean that 
revisionist behavior is non-existent, only that there is no causal imputation located at 
the system-level of analysis that can explain revisionist behavior. Waltz accentuates 
that “patterns emerge and endure without anyone arranging the parts to form patterns 
or striving to maintain them.”229 This systemic auto-adjustment is the invariant and law-
bound pattern of a recurrent balance of power that characterizes Waltz’s view of the 
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international system. This logic also favors balancing behavior against bandwagoning, 
as a revisionist bid for hegemony will be checked by balancing mechanisms that work 
according to the overarching functional “need” of the system to retain equilibrium. 
Since, for Waltz, the system-level offers no causal explanation for revisionist behavior, 
he urges us to search for explanations for social change at the unit-level of analysis.230  
As explained by Fareed Zakaria, “the international system pressures states towards 
moderate behavior only, anything else must be explained at some other level of 
analysis.” 231  Scholars that adopt Waltz logic therefore always resort to state-level 
factors to explain foreign policy outcomes that go beyond the expectations of security-
maximization.232 On this point, his model is logically consistent, but the question is: is 
it relevant? 
The international system certainly pressures states towards moderation, yet the 
international order can be changed in peaceful ways.  Contrary to other structural 
functionalist accounts, Waltz does not include institutional or cultural systems into his 
systemic model.233 As anarchy and the distribution of capabilities are the only structural 
properties included in Waltz model, he has no theory of international order. Waltz 
certainly facilitates nomothetic generalizations spanning millennia, but faces problems 
in accounting for system-level of pressures that induce revisionism. Although 
competition is a central part of Waltz functionalist theory, the focus on security-
maximization in fact blurs the competitive positional dynamic of international politics. 
Even though Waltz claims that great powers are fairly assured that they will not be 
attacked by other fellow great powers due to the effect of credible nuclear deterrents,234 
his theory of international politics does not provide a theoretical basis at the system-
level of analysis that can account for competition among secure great powers. States 
are not happy with adequate security; secure states do not desire to maintain their 
positions, but want to maximize status. No one elucidates this better than Randall 
Schweller whose apposite critique of Waltz’s structural realism deserves to be quoted 
at length. 
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Neorealism’s assumption that states seek to maximize their security (not power or 
influence) transforms classical realism from a game of pure positional competition to 
one of collaboration with mixed motives. This is because, among security-seeking 
states, there is no inherent competition—no state seeks to win at the others’ expense. 
This is not to suggest that security is never a positional good. The familiar concept of 
the security dilemma explains how one state’s gain in security necessarily makes 
others less secure. But the security dilemma operates only under very specific 
conditions: (1) when security is scarce (offense has the advantage over defense), (2) 
states cannot signal their true intentions (offensive weapons and doctrines are 
indistinguishable from defensive ones), and (3) there is no true aggressor (otherwise, 
states are arming to defend themselves against a real threat). In theory and under most 
real-world conditions, security is a positive-sum value; it can be both commonly 
desired and commonly shared without diminishing its enjoyment for any individual 
actor. The same cannot be said for positional goods, such as prestige, status, political 
influence, leadership, political leverage, or market shares. All states cannot 
simultaneously enjoy a positive trade balance; and if everyone has status, then no one 
does. Indeed scarcity confers status. Positional competition is therefore zero-sum, in 
that a gain (loss) for one player becomes a corresponding loss (gain) for the 
opponent(s).235 
 
This positional logic is absent in Waltz’s structural realism. When positional 
competition is the name of the game, there cannot be “appropriate” or “sufficient” 
amounts of power, 236  only the need to maximize power and prestige in order to 
maximize position and influence. I will now turn the critical lens to John Mearsheimer’s 
offensive structural realism, as his work represents a major departure from Waltz’s 
status-quo bias and security-maximizing logic.  
 
2.2.3 Offensive Realism’s Revisionist Bias and Analytical Problems  
At the core of John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, we find the argument that clashes 
over the status quo emerge due to persistent security concerns under the condition of 
anarchy. In anarchy “states can never be certain about each other’s intentions” and 
cannot know “whether they are dealing with a revisionist state or a status quo 
power.” 237   This encourages power-maximization, not security-maximization and 
status quo-seeking, as it is only by maximizing power that states can increase their 
security. Mearsheimer states,  
 
Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, 
they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have 
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revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they 
think it can be done at a reasonable price.238 
  
As such, “[t]here are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the 
occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential 
rivals.”239 This represents what we can call Mearsheimer’s revisionist bias. However, 
this bias is analytically opaque. 
As obvious as it may seem, to conceptualize all states, except for the hegemon, 
as revisionists have shortcomings. Intuitively, one wonders: why do we not observe 
chaos and perpetual warfare? Mearsheimer explains this empirical enigma by adopting 
a singular definition of revisionist means and ends: the “ultimate aim” of all great 
powers “is to gain a position of dominant power,” and thus change “the balance of 
power” through the means of “force” – if the price is right.240 Mearsheimer makes use 
of the geographical factor of US naval isolation – the “stopping of the water”241 – and 
the temporal notion of revisionist challengers “biding their time” or “wait[ing] for 
more  favorable circumstances”242 to explain the absence of revisionism. 
Mearsheimer is right in that the ultimate aim of great powers is to gain the 
position of dominant power, yet properly understood that is about the end of status-
maximization, whereas power-maximization is about acquiring the means to that end. 
Mearsheimer takes a contradictory leap by defining revisionists as actors that want to 
change the balance of power by force when the price is right. As such, by plain 
definition, not all states can be revisionists. The price will almost never be right, as it 
is impossible for other great powers to act on their ultimate aim with the necessary 
means. A potential revisionist challenger has to wait until it can conquer the United 
States in the Western hemisphere with force. Even though revisionist intentions should 
be the normal according to Mearsheimer’s own account, we will search endlessly 
without finding a revisionist state. First, we started out with the notion that all states 
are revisionists, yet if all states are revisionists we will only discover revisionists, 
which becomes tautological. By claiming that there are no status quo powers, 
Mearsheimer in fact treats revisionism as constant, when it should depend on variation 
in the material environment in order to connect to a solid structural logic. Yet by 
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addressing the disturbing empirical problem that many states, if not the vast majority 
of states, de facto display status quo behavior, Mearsheimer entangles himself in a 
theoretical predicament where the use of force, great power forbearance, and 
geographical hurdles literally extinguish potential revisionists. Although the systemic 
incentives to change the status quo should be greater than the constraints, this logic 
becomes suspicious when revisionist behavior shines with its absence. For now, states 
hold their fire until they have acquired the necessary amount of military capabilities to 
change the balance of power with force. In essence, this becomes power-transition 
theory without the inclusion of the analytical concept of dissatisfaction.  
Mearsheimer’s understanding of revisionism can in fact not help us identify 
revisionists in the present great power system. States no longer improve their position 
through territorial conquest. In an age of abundance of defense, at least among great 
powers, positional competition short of violent conflict characterizes intergroup 
competition. While useful in Hobbesian orders governed by the logic of brute force, 
conquest does not translate into positional rewards in the contemporary age. As Yan 
Xuetong puts it: “Colonization or territorial expansion can no longer make any country 
a superpower.” 243  The sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea 
illustrates the downside of territorially expansionist strategies. In fact, increasing 
capabilities do not automatically convert into status within international orders, and as 
offensive realism neglects the institutional hallmark of the current international order 
it unfortunately becomes unworkable. With the focus on capabilities, geography, and 
force, Mearsheimer’s theory omits “a host of other ways of gaining and exercising 
influence.”244 
In addition, John Mearsheimer’s offensive logic of power-maximization 
squares badly with his underpinning assumption of security as the primary goal. Power 
is indeed a means to an end, yet when the primary objective of security is realized 
power seizes to be a means to the end of security, but to the end of status. The offensive 
logic, or rather the proactive, assertive, aspiring, and forward-deployed logic pertains 
to social mobility, position, and influence – not security. Hence, power-maximization 
is a means for positional attainment. This brings further light on the shortcomings of 
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Mearsheimer’s focus on regional hegemony. Mearsheimer is right in that the regional 
hegemon indeed wants to prevent other powers from gaining regional hegemony, but 
why would the offensive push of the regional hegemon halt? Rather than being 
satisfied with regional hegemony and a strategy of offshore balancing, the regional 
hegemon continues to strive for global hegemony,245 or sole superpower status, global 
leadership, and world order, which implies leadership status in the region of the rising 
challenger. Certainly, rising powers seeks regional hegemony or leadership in the 
regional order and thus influence at the expense of the dominant state. However, 
hegemony or leadership status in the regional order depends on power and prestige, 
which is the dual basis for status recognition, not just material capabilities. With 
capabilities as the only factor that makes up the dominant power, Mearsheimer omits 
a crucial status component as well as he overlooks institutional revisionism by the 
dominant state. 
Rising powers strive to maximize status and influence, but they are not always 
revisionists; they might always desire to be able to revise the international order in its 
favor, but they are not always engaged in a strategy to revise the international order. 
The superpower or the hegemon is not always revisionist; it certainly does not always 
desire to change the international order that largely was its own making, but the 
measures to prevent the rising challenger that Mearsheimer acknowledges 246  are 
indeed revisionist, and it is this attempt to block the ascent of the rising power that in 
turn triggers the revisionist strategy of the rising power. More about this later, for now 
I will turn to power-transition theory and hegemonic stability theory. 
 
2.2.4 Power-Transition Theory’s Prestige Stasis and Hegemonic Stability 
Theory’s Institutional Stasis 
Power-transition theory (PTT) differentiates between “powerful and satisfied” and 
“powerful and dissatisfied” states. The satisfied states are those that designed the 
“rules of the game” after the last major war, while dissatisfied states are newcomers 
and “challengers”: states that “seek to upset the existing international order and 
establish a new order in its place.”247 The central theoretical claim of PTT revolves 
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around parity and dissatisfaction, and what it aims to explain is hegemonic war. Once 
a more symmetric power relationship is reached between the dominant power and the 
rising dissatisfied challenger, hegemonic war will occur. 
PTT is often mischaracterized and used as the straw man in journal articles. 
For instance, that China is a rising power and dissatisfied by definition is often treated 
as a PTT argument.248 However, dissatisfaction is not taken-for-granted or viewed as 
an inevitable consequence of increasing capabilities. More specifically, “while parity 
defines the structural conditions where war is most likely,” the significant “motivation 
driving decisions for war is relative satisfaction with the global or regional 
hierarchy.”249  PTT certainly views parity as a causally necessary factor, yet it is 
insufficient by itself to produce effects and needs to coincide with dissatisfaction to 
produce hegemonic war. As already emphasized above, the conceptual one-sidedness 
of treating the use of force as a necessary revisionist means for a necessary revisionist 
event – hegemonic war – cannot be retained, yet the significant factor that needs to be 
specified is dissatisfaction. 
Several power-transition theorists have identified status inconsistency as a 
source of dissatisfaction in times of power transition.250 Status inconsistency “depends 
upon a stratification system ordered not on a single principle but on multiple principles, 
and these multiple principles establish orderings that may be, in empirical fact, 
relatively independent of one another.”251 Hence, one’s position in the power hierarchy 
does not necessarily correspond to one’s position in the prestige hierarchy. It is this 
notion of a mismatch between power and prestige that is at the core of PTT research 
on status inconsistency. While I recognize the analytical usefulness of dissatisfaction 
and its potential compatibility with status inconsistency, the analytical treatment of 
status inconsistency has flaws.  
The detachment of the concept of prestige from social, institutional reality, as 
exemplified by the operationalization of prestige as an objective, quantitative measure 
in terms of a country’s number of embassies,252 is problematic since it neglects “the 
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multilateral context of great-power relations.”253 Status is a matter of social position, 
and prestige is an intersubjective, socially ascribed status attribute that has relational 
effects in terms of positional placement and membership status within the international 
order. Another problem, in light of Organski’s original one-sided focus on the rising 
state as the revisionist actor, is that the power-prestige mismatch at the core of status 
inconsistency is assumed to be tilted against the rising power. That is, the rising power 
increases its power, which generates a mismatch since the prestige hierarchy still 
favors the dominant power. The rising power is assumed to suffer from a prestige 
deficit as the balance of power undergoes change. This makes the balance of prestige 
static and sluggish, while the balance of power is dynamic and changeable. However, 
both power and prestige are dynamic and subject to change. It is when the power and 
prestige balances change, and with it, the growing possibilities for the rising power to 
institutionalize leadership status, that the dominant power becomes anxious. That the 
dominant state remains satisfied as the rising power gains in strength and reputation is 
logically implausible. Indeed, the rising power also evaluates the international order, 
and if it views it as prohibitive to the realization of its status aspiration, it gives rise to 
dissatisfaction. Yet this happens after, not before, the dominant power attempts to 
prevent its ascent.254 
Robert Gilpin’s version of hegemonic stability theory (HST) connects to this. 
According to Gilpin, the international order consists of a tripartite “governance 
structure” that includes distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige, and the rules 
of the system. In view of that, 
 
The most destabilizing factor is the tendency in an international system for the 
powers of member states to change at different rates because of political, economic, 
and technological developments. In time, the differential growth in power of the 
various states in the system causes a fundamental redistribution of power in the 
system.255 
 
Gilpin views power as the primary dynamic component of the international order, but 
he also stresses that, in “eras of relative peace and stability…the prestige hierarchy has 
been clearly understood and has remained unchallenged,” however, “a weakening of 
the hierarchy of prestige and increased ambiguity in interpreting it are frequently the 
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prelude to eras of conflict and struggle.”256 Accordingly, Gilpin recognizes that the 
distribution of prestige is changeable, and if there is an increased ambiguity in 
interpreting the hierarchy of prestige, this logically relates to the rising great power as 
much as to the declining superpower.  
A problem with HST, however, is its treatment of the rules of the system as 
disproportionately favoring the dominant power. This makes the institutions of the 
international order static. Even though the international order was created by the 
hegemonic power “after victory,” the institutional structures of the international 
system undergo change incrementally and might follow a trajectory that the dominant 
power views as unfavorable. Revisionism for the dominant power in relative decline 
might therefore become a matter of combating institutional unfavorability and creating 
a new institutional landscape that maintains its preeminent status. Hence, we must 
move beyond the institutional stasis built in to HST and factor in development 
trajectories that incrementally change, not only the power and prestige balances, but 
also the institutional components of the international order in a way that the 
superpower views as unconducive for the maintenance of its dominant status. 
However, these institutional barriers to status maintenance only become salient with 
fundamental structural change.  
Thus, in order to explain revisionism by the dominant power we have to move 
beyond the prestige stasis built into power-transition theory, and the institutional stasis 
built into hegemonic stability theory. With this said, I will now evaluate the liberal 
canon. 
 
2.2.5 Dissecting the Liberal Canon: Collective Action Problems, Normative 
Bias, and the Status-Quo Bias of Institutional Path-Dependency 
In the 1980s, during the height of the debate about US decline, neoliberal 
institutionalists argued that institutions and regimes, not preponderance, would do the 
work in maintaining a favorable and cooperative international order “after 
hegemony.”257 Scholars, both neoliberals and neorealists, started to approach the study 
of international order with particular attention to “international regimes.”258 As power 
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became less concentrated with the rise of new powerful actors (then Japan), 
international regimes would continue to steer international order in a benign (liberal-
democratic) way. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet 
communism, multilateralism and economic cooperation started to encompass greater 
spans of the globe and made the perspective of great power coexistence redundant (if 
not already morally corrupt).  
The analytical focus turned to different issue-areas in which states, together 
with a variety of non-state actors, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and transnational corporations (TNCs), jointly exercised power and expanded the 
range of cooperation. This leads Stefano Guzzini to point out that the biggest 
contribution of regime theory is the focus on the expansion of the scope of governance, 
which, however, simultaneously becomes its biggest weakness: 
 
Whereas initially, [regime theory] was meant to be read in parallel to the realist 
research programme, projecting a different picture of the international order and its 
governance, its empirical curiosity implied that it could expand to virtually all issues 
which showed at least some political salience. Opening up the complexity of the 
international order, the different ways of governing it in all its sub-parts, made a 
wonderful research agenda (there was always ‘more research to be done’), but it was 
bound to make it increasingly more complicated to see the forest (global governance) 
for all its trees (regimes).259 
 
However, apart from expanding the scope of governance, regime theory introduced a 
functionalist/utilitarian institutional logic to the study of international order. While 
acknowledging the existence of anarchy, neoliberal institutionalists stressed that self-
interested states engage in rational cost-benefit calculations that increase 
institutionalized cooperation and solve collective action problems. As states and other 
actors interact in anarchy they become increasingly enmeshed in webs of 
interdependence, they set up regimes and achieve joint gains by pursing their material 
self-interests. In this way, institutional cooperation is not a onetime game, but an 
iterated game, making repeated cooperation more beneficial than the one-off benefits 
of defection. This point is important, for in place of power, at times of relative decline, 
institutionalized cooperation effectively becomes the new foundation for a stable 
international order according to liberals. Regimes become devices that solve collective 
action problems through actors’ self-interested behavior, which produce benign 
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structural outcomes under the uncertain condition of anarchy. States can essentially 
build order through voluntary cooperation due to the repeated game incentives.260  
Despite the sophisticated glare of neoliberal institutionalism, it suffers from 
one major theoretical flaw: it is status, not the self-interested actions of wealth-
maximizing states, that solves collective action problems. The classic collective action 
problem refer to challenges in motivating actors to make costly contributions and in 
coordinating group efforts. In particular, status solves the “start-up” problem through 
initial contributions, and the “free-rider” problem through subsequent contributions. 
In contrast to rational actor models that focus on how individual motivation affects 
collective action problems, status secures collective goods structurally and functions 
as a “coordination mechanism.” In this way, high status actors take a proactive stance 
towards public goods provision; they are central to “the initiation of, contributions to, 
and continuation of collective action.” 261  Consequently, there cannot be any 
cooperation “after hegemony” devoid of high status actors that coordinate collective 
action and assume leadership responsibilities for public goods provision. For instance, 
the Paris Treaty on climate change would be irrelevant without the joint leadership of 
the United States and China. Yet in areas where high status actors do not share a 
common interest, the competitive positional dynamic cannot be avoided, leading to 
contending alternatives for the organization of the international order. 
Other fellow liberals have criticized the neoliberal institutional logic from a 
different standpoint: 
  
The focus of neoliberal institutional theory is the way in which institutions provide 
information to states and reduce the incentives for cheating. But this misses the 
fundamental feature of the prevailing order now so deep and pervasive that the kind 
of cheating that these theories worry about either cannot happen, or if it does it will 
really not matter because cooperation and the institutions are not fragile but 
profoundly robust.262 
 
Adopting a historical institutionalist perspective, John Ikenberry shows that the “most 
important characteristic of interstate relations after a major war is that a new 
distribution of power suddenly emerges,” which produce “new asymmetries between 
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powerful and weak states.” 263  According to Ikenberry, the international order 
established after the Second World War is structured around three core components: a 
multilateral and negotiated rules-based order; provision of public goods; and “voice 
opportunities” for secondary states whose elites “buy into” the normative structure of 
the order. The argument goes: “if the leading state can bind itself and institutionalize 
the exercise of power” it increases the willingness among weaker states to partake in 
institutional cooperation, which enables the leading state to “lock in” their “policy 
behavior” and, through the logic of “path dependency,” create a robust and durable 
international order.264  
Ikenberry stresses that two core variables shape the incentives and capacities 
of the victors to institutionalize political control after major wars: power disparity and 
state type.265 The greater the power asymmetry is and the more democratic the states 
are, the greater the opportunities for successful institutional binding and construction 
of a durable postwar order. Despite Ikenberry’s eloquent contribution to the crux of 
postwar settlements and order creation, he leaves us with two conundrums related to 
the core variables that concern order maintenance, which questions the robustness of 
the international order: 
 
 Since the construction of the postwar orders is based on large power 
asymmetries, then why will the established international order stand firmly 
grounded when the balance of power and the balance of prestige undergo 
change? Even though the United States institutionalizes its power, why would 
positional competition end? Why would a rising power that is approaching 
parity with the United States, accept subordinate status within an American-
led international order? 
 
 Democratic states form the core of the established liberal international order, 
then why would the United States relinquish primacy and give up its 
leadership position when challenged by an undemocratic hegemonic 
pretender? 
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To answer these questions, Ikenberry would use his much-repeated response: rising 
powers are beneficiaries of the open American-led liberal international order – they 
are geopolitical insiders that all benefit from the status quo. 266  At the core of 
Ikenberry’s argument, we find that (1) clashes over the status quo only emerge when 
states’ material well-being is threatened; (2) that economic interdependence has 
restraining effects on intergroup competition; and (3) that liberal engagement 
eventually, and inevitably, lead authoritarian states to become democratic. In this way, 
“there is an optimist assumption lurking in liberal internationalism that states can 
overcome constraints and cooperate to solve security dilemmas, pursue collective 
action, and create an open, stable system.”267 As rising states tie their development 
trajectories to the global capitalist system they become deeply intertwined within a 
beneficial web of interdependence that makes it outright foolish to challenge the 
system. 
However, Ikenberry’s answers suffer from a range of problems. First of all, 
“status or position is often more important than wealth or other physical goods.”268 
One line of research suggests that actors do not pursue status as a means to a material 
end, but “as an end in itself.”269  Yet more than an end in itself, states crave the 
influence that springs from status.270 In any case, we have to move away from the 
assumption that “a state’s satisfaction with its place in the existing order is a function 
of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.”271 Economic growth and 
material well-being will not ameliorate intergroup conflict, on the contrary, it will 
increase as competition for scarce positional goods and political influence will 
intensify with growing prosperity.272  
Albeit Ikenberry is right in emphasizing that secondary states must “buy into” 
the leading state’s project for international order, there is a normative bias in liberal 
theory. At the center of the majority of post-Cold War liberal IR theories, we find the 
conviction that Western democracies have “a duty or a burden to remake the 
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betterment of ‘global humanity.’” 273  This is intimately associated with a view of 
international progress and modernization that is “based in the necessity of American 
world leadership.”274 However, we cannot escape the fact that the rise of China is 
effectively quelling liberal optimism as the Chinese economic model and authoritarian 
politics question the inevitability of Western-style, liberal modernization.275 In spite 
of Ikenberry’s optimism, he simultaneously, and dissonantly, argues that “there is an 
authority crisis in today’s liberal order” and emphasizes that the foundations upon 
which the post-1945 liberal order was built might be eroding:276 
 
The question today is how will the system evolve – and how will the United States 
respond to a successor liberal order in which the United States plays a less 
dominating role? How necessary is the United States as a liberal hegemonic leader 
to the stability and functioning of liberal internationalism? And will the United 
States remain a supporter of liberal order in an era when it has fewer special 
privileges? For half a century, the United States essentially had liberal order built to 
its specifications. What happens when this special status ends?277 
 
These questions are of crucial importance, and, in particular, they elucidate the 
weakness of the institutional “lock in” mechanism and the logic of “path dependency” 
embedded in Ikenberry’s historical institutionalist perspective. The Achilles heel of 
Ikenberry’s account is that it contains a logic of institutional reproduction that is overly 
deterministic and suffers from a status quo bias,278 specifically in its treatment of how 
institutions will always favor the dominant power. As I stressed above, the social-
relational and institutional structures of the international system might change 
incrementally and follow a trajectory that the hegemonic power views as unconducive 
to maintain its dominant status. Exogenous shocks or changes in the environmental 
might lead to the creation of new institutions that do not have to be in the interest of 
the dominant state. When faced with an evolving institutional landscape deemed 
unfavorable for status maintenance, why would the superpower sit still and accept the 
status quo? From a power-distributional perspective, the argument that institutions can 
mitigate rivalry is also questionable as “political conflict and strategic bargaining” is 
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central to both the creation and change of institutions.279 Even if rising powers benefit 
from the social-systemic institutional set-up and do not display dissatisfaction in that 
dimension, why would they accept positional subordination when the power and 
prestige balances shift? And why would the dominant state yield to their demands? 
The crux of the matter is positional. In essence, “institutions are fraught with 
tensions because they inevitably raise resource considerations and invariably have 
distributional consequences. Any given set of rules or expectations, formal or informal, 
that patterns action will have unequal implications for resource allocation.” 280 
Institutions are not mere neutral problem-solving arenas, but configurations of 
privilege and sites of power and contestation.281 Realists stress that concerns about 
relative gains and distributive matters make states more reluctant to cooperate than 
liberals assume.282 This becomes particularly evident at unsettled times of fundamental 
structural change when entrenched stakeholders try to block institutional change and 
thus contribute to the emergence of what Francis Fukuyama terms a “dysfunctional 
equilibrium”283 or when they create new institutions that maintain their special status 
and “lock out” competitors trough exclusionary social closure.284 Rising powers, on 
the other hand, strive to “set status in stone,” either through institutional privileges in 
existing organizations285 or through the creation of new ones. In essence, “locking in” 
is about convincing actors to accept their positions and the associated roles, yet this 
task becomes increasingly difficult as the international system undergoes fundamental 
change. Ikenberry is thus overly utopian when he suggests that the United States 
should “accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the 
regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s 
core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East 
Asia.”286 In the struggle for the positional good of regional leadership, you cannot have 
the cake and eat it too. 
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Whatever Ikenberry means when he argues that China is a “geopolitical 
insider,” it is a fact that the United States excluded China from the TPP and the US 
alliance system in the Asia-Pacific, and it is equally true that the United States does 
not figure in China’s project for regional order.  Liberals thus fail to properly take into 
account that the logical corollary of a “lock in”-mechanism is a “lock out”-mechanism. 
Security provision by whom, and for whom? A trade regime for whom covering what 
rules? Hence, liberals fail to theorize the positional insider-outsider logic that 
perpetuates all form of politics; namely, that institutions work in tandem with ceilings 
to positional enhancement and exclusionary social closure. While actors occupying the 
throne will attempt to avoid the painful experience of downward mobility and do 
whatever they can to maintain their special status and influential position at the top of 
the pecking order, new leadership pretenders will carve out alternative institutional 
arrangements that satisfy their desire for status. 
 
2.2.6 Constructivism: The Promise and Problem with Ideational Factors 
Since status is a matter of social position, and prestige one of its necessary attributes, 
we also have to discuss constructivism. Prestige, defined as a nation’s reputation or 
image, is an intersubjective, socially ascribed status attribute. It is a matter of social 
evaluation, and ultimately ideas about the leading state and its honorable conduct. In 
this sense, prestige is what dominant powers jockeying for status and influence make 
of it, and what secondary states think of it. However, status is not what any state make 
of it, because status always also depend on power, the hard-core capabilities needed to 
organize the international order and provide public goods. Leadership status is what 
great powers with great amounts of power strive for in order to institutionalize the 
exercise of power. Preponderance, as hegemonic stability theory makes clear, is 
needed to organize the international political order. At the same, as hegemonic stability 
theory also highlights, we cannot ignore prestige. Both power and prestige are causally 
necessary to attain leadership status, and prestige, since it is a matter of reputation, 
ultimately becomes a matter of ideas, morality, and social evaluation.  
Thus, we cannot ignore the ideals or values embedded in the international 
political project. Yet political values about how to organize the international order 
necessitate power for its implementation. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and 
the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America (ALBA) have 
great ideals, but not great power, and hence they will remain toothless projects for the 
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international order. As classical realist E.H. Carr made clear, realism and morality – 
power and prestige; power and ideals – are different sides of the same coin,287 and that 
coin is status. This very much connects to what Samuel Barkin terms realist 
constructivism, which he views as fruitful to “address the phenomenon of political 
change.”288 As Barkin makes clear:  
 
Waltz’s theory of the structure of power, without scope for morality, becomes static 
in the same way that theories of the structure of morality without power do. Neither 
pure realism nor pure idealism can account for political change, only the interplay of 
the two, subject to the assumption that morality is contextual rather than 
universal…Realism argues that no universal political morality exists and, therefore, 
if we want ours to triumph, we must arrange to have it do so through the application 
of power.289 
 
 
The atomistic realist self that overlooks the relational nature of man, and by extension 
the relational ontology of the state and the international order, cannot be retained.290 
Great powers that desire to gain regional leadership and organize the international 
order cannot do so in isolation. At the same time, the logic of positional competition 
still applies to the struggle between leadership contenders for the acquiescence of 
secondary states. 
At the center of constructivism lies the claim that state identities and 
international order are constructed through discourse. Thus, the benign identity and 
the objectives of the international political project cannot be understood outside their 
“discursive condition of emergence.” 291  However, discourses are only systems of 
meaning which cannot produce effects without agency.  
 
A focus on discourse is…bound to obscure many pressing research questions – 
notably issues of agency. After all, discourse denotes a structure of signification, a 
system of meaning, and as such it has no subjectivity and cannot act. Discourse in 
and of itself is mute, like a book on a shelf before someone reads it. As a result, 
interpretative approaches are badly suited to explain political events and, by 
implication, changes in the international system.292  
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Through narratives, the state is viewed as a particular character, with particular values 
and beliefs, with unique historical memories and future purposes that come alive 
through official and semi-official narratives, which “create a presence…in space and 
time.”293 Yet narratives are not merely constructed; they are enacted – performed on a 
“world stage.”294 These geopolitical performances are dependent on recognition from 
relevant audiences: “those people whom we are particularly keen to impress and those 
whose recognition is particularly important for us.”295 The aspiring leader therefore 
struggles to “lock down” the meaning of “cultural resources”296 that rationalize its 
claim to leadership. The production and reproduction of such “imaginative 
geographies,”297 and the struggles over which concrete rhetorical commonplaces that 
will be deployed, “are always also struggles about the identity of some particular actor, 
and hence part of the active process of bounding that actor.”298 Hence, it is through the 
performance of “honorable deeds”299 that the leadership pretender gains “reputational 
capital”300 in order to gain the acquiescence from secondary states, which constitute a 
“circle of recognition.”301  
In order to be an object of positive valuation the leader must possess both 
power and prestige attributes that imbue it with the capacity to perform the role, and 
carry out the central tasks of public goods provision and rule making. By recognizing 
the leadership of the dominant actor, the social grouping grants the actor certain rights 
and responsibilities. The dominant actor’s prestige is therefore the outcome of the 
circle’s judgment of the aspiring leader’s role performance, which, if successful, 
enables “relational power”302 and influence over the dependents that subscribe to the 
dominant political project. The managerial role of the great powers thus relate to the 
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development of “shared understandings of responsibility and by exploiting their own 
unequal power over subordinate states within their spheres of influence.”303  
This connects to a view of hegemony, shared by English School theorists and 
neo-Gramscian scholars, as “a social relation that produces a hierarchy among actors 
in which the defining feature is the legitimation of power inequalities”304 and the 
socially recognized nature of the hegemon.305 This further relate to the conception of 
“strategic social construction”306 and its combination of both rational and normative 
considerations to overcome the battle between rationalism and constructivism as we 
recognize that states do engage in means-ends calculations for the sake of obtaining 
needs and wants. “Actors are making detailed means-ends calculations to maximize 
their utilities,” but “the utilities they want to maximize involve changing the other 
players utility function in ways that reflect the normative commitments of the 
[actors]” 307  – in order to secure their acquiescence to the revisionist project for 
international political order.  
My distinction between positional and institutional dimensions of international 
order thus sheds light on two fundamental characteristics of international order. Yet 
status in the positional hierarchy is not solely the result of power, but of prestige and 
recognition. And institutions and rules are not value-neutral sites of political 
cooperation, but incorporate certain political values that form the basis of their 
legitimacy. Both prestige (and recognition) and values (and legitimacy) are ideational 
and depend on intersubjective meanings and shared understandings. However, in 
contrast to Janice Bially Mattern, these shared understandings are not, by themselves, 
causally sufficient sources for international order. 308  Hard-core capabilities is 
necessary, without which there would be no order, and the failure to grasp this is 
constructivism’s biggest flaw.  
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2.2.7 Beyond the IR Canon – Examining Other Relevant Research 
Beyond the IR canon, several scholars have made important contributions to the study 
of revisionism by putting light on the revisionist behavior of the dominant state. Steve 
Chan makes a noteworthy contribution: 
 
That a hegemon has already attained the largest share of benefits from the existing 
international order should not preclude it from trying to gain even more benefits. 
Contrary to the existing tendency in the relevant literature to treat the hegemon as a 
status-quo power by definition, it is quite plausible for this country to pursue a 
revisionist agenda in order to transform the international system in a direction that 
it finds even more congenial than the current system.309 
 
Although Chan is correct in pinpointing an important problem in the existing literature, 
his view of revisionist motives is not convincing. Chan relegates revisionism to a 
matter of instrumental pursuit of whatever is beneficial. However, revisionism does 
not relate to a vague notion of benefits, but to making the international order more 
amiable for the maintenance or enhancement of status. This occurs when distribution 
of power and prestige change and give rise to obstacle courses that threaten the status 
of the dominant power. 
Robert Jervis provides another important account of hegemonic revisionism. 
Rather than being “a status quo power continuing the order in which it now wields 
significant power,” Jervis accentuates that “a variety of systemic, national, and 
individual reasons explain why the United States is a revisionist hegemon seeking a 
new and better international system.”310 Even though it seems as if Jervis wishes to 
write an all-inclusive academic cookbook that includes ingredients from all three 
levels of analysis, his primary focus is on the structural logic of unipolarity combined 
with the ideational factor of belief in international progress. The specific structural 
logic of position that characterizes unipolarity is that of being unrestrained, of being 
an actor that faces a minimal obstacle course. Together with the belief in international 
progress, the structural environment did not inhibit the hubris of the Bush 
administration’s “transformational diplomacy,” which Jervis claims is not 
idiosyncratic to Bush; instead, it is an enduring phenomenon,311 at least it seemed so 
until the election of Donald Trump.312  
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Nevertheless, the greatest explanatory weight is on the structural logic of 
position. The revisionist policies of the Bush administration was concentrated to a 
particular time and place – a time when its structural position was unchallenged, and a 
place (the Middle East) where its status position in fact was unthreatened. Thus, while 
I have no quarrel with Jervis concerning his explanatory logic, my analytical focus 
covers a different time and place – a time of multipolarity when US power is declining 
in relative terms, and a place (East Asia) where its status position is under challenge. 
The ideational basis is not structurally induced hubris, but structurally induced status 
anxiety. In fact, unipolarity presents a relatively indeterminate structural logic – you 
strike where you please. Or rather, it opens for other more idiosyncratic explanatory 
factors. Yet emerging multipolarity and relative decline gives rise to a much stronger 
structural determination – the region of the rising challenger becomes the target of the 
relatively declining superpower.  
Recent studies about China’s status ambitions and US-China relations also 
bring important aspects to bear in mind and evaluate. Yong Deng dissects various 
theoretical insights about status, but unfortunately, he does not develop a clear 
theoretical model that synthesizes his informed discussion into a parsimonious model 
that specifies the causal logic.313 Hugh White stresses that the core problématique of 
US-China relations and the regional order of the Asia-Pacific lie in “matters of status 
and identity.”314 However, White mostly provides a descriptive account and suggests 
that the United States and China should share power in Asia, yet he offers no clearly 
specified theory of why the United States would give up its dominance in East Asia, 
and why China would want to share power with the United States in the region. 
Another significant perspective comes from Graham Allison and his notion of 
a US-China Thucydides Trap, which points to “the attendant dangers when a rising 
power rivals a ruling power.”315 Historically, out of the 16 major historical examples 
when a rising power challenged the ruling power, 12 cases led to war.316 Accordingly, 
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“based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the 
decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the 
moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not.”317 
Consequently, Allison argues, “the defining question about global order for this 
generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’s Trap.”318   
As Thucydides famously put it: “It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this 
inspired in Sparta, that made war inevitable.” As such, the core variables are rising 
capabilities and fear, yet Thucydides locates fear in the dominant state – the rise of 
Athens inspired fear in Sparta, not in the rising state. Research conducted on the topic 
of preventive war follow this reversal away from the traditional analytical focus on the 
rising state.319 This is part of structural, domestic, and cognitive processes; the ruling 
elites of the hegemonic state perceive that fundamental structural change is occurring 
and come to believe that preventive action is necessary “while the advantage is still on 
one’s side.”320 However, out of the four cases when war was avoided, three cases 
occurred after the advent of the nuclear age and the ensuing stabilization of 
international relations among the core states of the international system. In fact, the 
last three power-transitions all avoided war, and instead of extrapolating from the 
previous historical pattern, we should instead refer to the emergence of a new, peaceful 
trend in the competitive relations among great powers. The robust nonappearance of 
direct war between nuclear weapon holding great powers clearly informs us that a 
focus on hegemonic war in an age of abundance of defense is obsolete. Indeed, as 
China steadily increases its nuclear capabilities,321 we can expect greater strategic 
stability, 322  yet positional competition, on the other hand, will increase in 
intensification. It also makes accommodation less likely as the usual war-avoiding 
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incentives to appease the rising great power323 seize to make sense. Thus, as both 
options the dominant previously had in its arsenal to deal with impending power shifts 
(preventive war and accommodation) are no longer as relevant, it opens up for 
sustained positional competition through exclusionary social closure, institutional 
revisionism, and the erection of parallel international orders.  
In fact, when great powers are secure, the core variable apart from power and 
prestige is not fear, but anxiety. Instead of physical fear, the emergence of a rising 
challenger inspires status anxiety in the dominant state.324 It is the concern about 
downward mobility aroused by the increasing competitive pressure that causes the 
dominant state to engage in closure strategies to prevent the rising power from 
occupying the top position. Hence, fundamental structural change causes status 
anxiety, not fear, which leads the dominant state to reassess the region of the rising 
challenger and pushes it to revise the regional order. It is when the dominant power 
tries to change the international order in its favor and blocks the ascendance of the 
rising power that the rising state feels it must respond. Tudor Onea aptly elucidates 
this aspect: 
 
In relation to the dominant state, rising powers prefer adopting a conciliatory 
approach, which would allow them to consolidate their position without triggering a 
clash. When rising powers accept the risk of a rivalry pitting them against the 
dominant state, they do so only after the latter blocks their further advancement.325 
 
This connects to Steven Ward stimulating account of Japanese revisionism in the 
1930s. Ward contends that “rising great powers become incapable of or unwilling to 
orient themselves toward reassurance, not because of increasing capabilities but rather 
due to the domestic political effects produced by perceptions of status immobility – the 
idea that the status quo is unable to accommodate the rising state’s claims to increased 
status.”326 However, despite its elegance, Ward’s study omits a vital point. Perceptions 
of status immobility are caused by an institutional reality that frustrates the status 
ambitions of the rising state. The institutional reality of the unequal London Naval 
Treaty represented Japan’s real hindrance and its perceptions of status immobility 
could not exist without this concrete institutional reality. In terms of causation, the 
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institutional “logic-of-position” necessarily comes first, whereas the ideational “logic 
of interpretation” of status immobility is secondary. 
 Ultimately, many studies and assessments conceive the US pivot to Asia in 
terms of security327 – that it was a security induced move. Yet such analyses miss the 
point. Robert Kelly provides the most problematic account of the security-induced 
nature of the US pivot to Asia. 328  Kelly combines basic insights of realism and 
liberalism and posits that states pursue four broad foreign policy goals – national 
security, economic growth, prestige, and promotion of values – which also explain the 
US pivot to Asia. First, he tries to explain the specific with the general – Kelly 
essentially brings out the IR cookbook consisting of realist, liberal, and constructivists 
ingredients and stirs it into an explanatory mess. In other words, a descriptive all-
inclusive list evades putting the attention on the particular causal mechanism that 
explains the outcome. It offers a safe hiding place for a scholar that shies away from 
social scientific judgement, from ascertaining which explanation one finds most 
convincing and parsimonious. Second, as Kelly uncritically accepts the standard 
paradigmatic narratives of mainstream IR-theory, he fails in bringing novel theoretical 
insights that can shed new light on the topic. As such, he merely reiterates the much-
repeated claim that China is growing into a major national security challenger for the 
United States. He further posits that national security is the highest goal, a goal that 
Kelly also assumes to be the primary purpose of the US pivot to Asia, despite 
acknowledging, strangely enough, the absence of existential threats facing the United 
States. Kelly further argues that an East Asian Security dilemma would not affect the 
United States security very much; neither would a change in the balance of power. 
Hence, claiming that the main driver behind the US pivot to Asia is national security 
is contradictory and unconvincing. 
 The US pivot to Asia was not about survival in the sense of an existential threat, 
but about who that is going to be the guardian and leader of the Asia-Pacific regional 
order, and who that is going to exert decisive influence about how that very order 
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should be constituted. The concerns about China’s A2/AD capabilities is not a matter 
of survival, but concerns a challenge to US military superiority and its command of 
the commons, and ultimately, who that is going to call the shots in the Western Pacific. 
In relation to the militarization of the Asia-Pacific, the US is not a victim of attack, but 
is actively buttressing its position and taking measures to uphold its global managerial 
role as structural change ensues. The TPP is not merely about economic growth, but 
about who that is going lead and control the direction of regional economic integration.  
 As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Obama administration Martin 
Dempsey makes clear, the overseas basing is secure and “the homeland is safe,”329 
and as spelled out in the RAND report Choices for America in a Turbulent World: 
Strategic Rethink, the United States faces no existential threat.330 Thus, understanding 
the US pivot in terms of the traditional notion of security is ill conceived, instead, the 
core theoretical focus should be on status. The Obama administration’s concern about 
China and the Asia-Pacific region was not about fear and physical insecurity, instead, 
relative decline generated status anxiety, which directed its grand strategic pivot to 
Asia. This move and its associated project for an Americancentric region, in turn, 
triggered China’s response; it prompted positional competition for regional leadership 
and China’s rival projects for regional order. 
I will now build on the above discussion and specify my own theory – “Theory 
of International Order and Status Driven Revisionism.” 
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2.3 Theory of International Order and Status Driven Revisionism 
In this section, I will outline my theory. I will synthesize the major points of criticism 
I raised above and construct my own theoretical alternative – “Theory of International 
Order and Status Driven Revisionism.” 
 
2.3.1 Core Assumptions 
First of all, we have to do away with neorealism’s assumption of security-
maximization. When great powers enjoy abundance of security, they struggle for 
something different; when the primary objective of security is assured, they struggle 
for the secondary objective of status. These objectives are not mutually exclusive. 
States can be engaged in struggles for security and status simultaneously. Yet with the 
advent of the nuclear age, the revisionist strategies of great powers are no longer about 
security, but about status in the international order. 
Second, we need to modify offensive realism’s assumption of power-
maximization. Great powers indeed maximize capabilities. Yet this maximization does 
not merely serve the end of security, rather, in the contemporary era great powers 
maximize power to attain status in the international order. John Mearsheimer partly 
and implicitly acknowledges this by arguing that the ultimate end of great powers is to 
become regional hegemons. But to become a regional hegemon is not solely a matter 
of power. Power is indeed necessary, and primary, but it is not sufficient. Both power 
and prestige are necessary to attain leadership status in the international order, and 
since influence is vested in position, states maximize status to maximize influence.  
Robert Gilpin’s view of the competitive logic of the international system in 
terms of a “recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a 
state of anarchy”331 therefore needs to be modified. More specifically, the competitive 
logic in the anarchical international system is about a recurring struggle to acquire 
power and prestige in order to attain status and influence in the international order. 
The logical corollary of this understanding of politics is that human progress cannot 
transcend competition, conflict, and struggle.332 The dominant form of struggle is 
“positional competition” among groups in which “the primary goal of the players is to 
win or, at a minimum, to avoid relative losses.”333 
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Third, great powers are assumed to be rational actors. Even though status 
ambition, the aspiration for distinction and for attaining the admiration of others, is an 
emotion or a drive, it needs to be mobilized in order to be realized; it must aim towards 
objects that will grant distinction and admiration. The status ambition of great powers, 
the aspiration for leadership and for attaining the admiration of a certain circle of 
recognition, is calculative. It is deliberately channeled towards acquiring power and 
prestige, which are instrumental for the attainment of status. The quest for status is 
thus rational; it requires instrumentality for its success. 334  Yet the successful 
achievement of status is not about self-esteem. From a realist perspective, the utility 
that great powers derive from leadership status in the international order is influence, 
which allows the leading state to organize the international order and exercise power. 
Fourth, “the essence of social reality is the group.”335 This “tribal” nature of 
man serves as the foundation for intergroup conflict and further connects to status 
groups as fundamentally constituted by an insider-outsider logic.336 Even though the 
units that comprise the international system are groups, i.e. nations, the group dynamic 
of particular interest pertains to the status dimension of the international order. In this 
sense, as already stated above, revisionism is prosocial. Yet the logic of positional 
competition simultaneously applies to the rivalling leadership contenders that compete 
for the acquiescence of secondary states in order to change the international order. 
 Fifth, great powers seek regional leadership status, and thus seek to lead, 
influence and shape the regional order. Conversely, superpowers seek global 
leadership status, and thus seek to lead, influence, and shape the global order, and 
especially the region that is the “world center.” Thus, a superpower performs a global 
leadership role, whereas a great power performs a regional leadership role. A world 
without superpowers implies a “world of regions” with coexisting great powers, 
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spheres of influence, “multiple modernities” and “varieties of capitalism.” 337 
Conversely, a world with a sole superpower implies one global security hierarchy and 
a global sphere of responsibility (full-spectrum dominance, command of the global 
commons), one dominant mode of capitalist modernity (global market access), and 
global intracivilizational relations (the End of History). The chief issue of contestation 
between the superpower and aspiring great powers “is the former’s intervention to 
limit, counter, or shape the actions of the latter.”338  
Apart from assumptions, a theory must offer a causal mechanism with a logical 
set of causal components that explain why states pursue status driven revisionism. In 
the following section, I will outline the causal mechanism.  
 
2.3.2 The Causal Mechanism of Status Driven Revisionism 
Socio-political international orders consist of a social-relational status dimension and 
a social-systemic institutional dimension (see Table 3). Great powers seek leadership 
status to organize and influence the rules and values of the international order. The key 
issue is who that organizes the international order. Declining states want to maintain 
their existing status and rising states want to enhance their status. Both types of states 
pursue different types of revisionist projects to further these ends (see Table 4). I will 
now outline why and when the dominant power engages in revisionist status-
maintenance strategies and why and when the rising power engages in revisionist 
status-enhancement strategies.  
The realist focus on the competitive nature of the zero-sum anarchic 
international environment offers an indispensable foundation for the understanding of 
international political processes. Various structural realist theories accurately pinpoint 
that the primary cause that drives positional competition is change in the distribution 
of power. However, since both power and prestige are necessary to attain leadership 
status, we must also include change in the distribution of prestige. As Robert Gilpin 
succinctly puts it, “[a] decline of prestige is…an injury to be dreaded.”339 
Hence, we are dealing with two logics, one material and one ideational. The 
change in the balance of power follows a causal logic-of-position, whereas the change 
in the balance of prestige follows a causal logic-of-interpretation. The material logic-
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of-position treats the material environment as a given, as “existing in an objective state 
separate from the actors,” and we thus explain action as a “direct consequence” of 
actors’ “position vis-à-vis exogenously given material structures.”340 Here it relates to 
how the logic-of-position is consequential to one’s status. The ideational logic-of-
interpretation explains by demonstrating “that someone arrives at an action only 
through…interpretation of what is possible and/or desirable.”341 Here it relates to an 
interpretation of what the balance of prestige means for one’s status. Both the balance 
of power and the balance of prestige operate at the system-level of analysis, yet they 
induce certain perceptions among officials and foreign policy elites at the domestic-
level of analysis. In terms of the balance of power, we assume objective rationality in 
line with the distribution of capabilities and actors’ material positionality; in terms of 
the balance of prestige, we assume (a)rationality, that is, the perceptions of the 
distribution of reputational capital work according to a specific form of rationality in 
line with a specific ideational logic-of-interpretation. 342  Hence, “no coherent 
explanation of human action bypasses mental processes.” 343  I thus engage the 
domestic-level of analysis in terms of how decision-making processes are affected by 
perceptions of one’s material positionality and one’s reputational capital as these 
factors undergo fundamental change. However, these state-level perceptions are not 
autonomous domestic-level variables, but are induced by the system-level factors of 
power and prestige. 
For long, the dominant power has been the primary organizer of the 
international order, but what happens when there is more than one high-status actor in 
town? What happens when unipolarity erodes and the balance of power and the 
balance of prestige undergo fundamental change? Instead of the traditional focus on 
the rising power as the first-moving revisionist, we should make a theoretical reversal 
and first focus on the dominant power in relative decline, particularly by focusing on 
how it is affected by, and how it responds to change in the two core status components 
of power and prestige. After all, the rising state is on the right side of history, in a 
domain of gain; the dominant state, on the other hand, is in relative decline, in a domain 
of loss, to use the terminology of prospect theory. Then why would the rising state 
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sacrifice the strides it has made prematurely? Knowing that history is on its side, the 
rising state can safely bide its time and gain even greater strength and reputation before 
it challenges the established international order. The dominant state, on the other hand, 
knowing that its position is getting weaker in relative terms, feels that it has to act.344 
States are not always revisionist; instead, revisionist action is induced by 
fundamental change in the distribution of power and prestige. As the rising power 
rapidly acquires power and prestige, it will be perceived as a status threat to the 
dominant state in relative decline, which has “to struggle to maintain its international 
position.”345  Yet rather than physical insecurity and fear among domestic foreign 
policy elites, the change in the power and prestige balances induces status anxiety.346 
Status anxiety refers to concerns about relative position in the social hierarchy; it is the 
feeling of impending downward mobility or positional challenge.347 “The closer the 
rising power will get to supplant the dominant state, the more intense the latter’s status 
anxiety, and the higher the likelihood of rivalry.” 348  Hence, the change in the 
distribution of power and prestige induces status anxiety, a state-level factor felt and 
experienced by officials and foreign policy elites. This change, however, is combined 
with the efficient cause of a crisis or critical juncture (or “formative moments,” 
“unsettled periods,” “constitutional moments”),349 which prompts status anxiety in the 
relatively declining dominant state. 
Status anxiety is not a matter of an irrational psychological condition that 
paralyzes the actor; on the contrary, status anxiety discloses the opportunity and 
                                                 
344 Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory; Steve Chan, Looking for Balance 
345 Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Michael Beckley, “Debating China’s Rise and U.S. Decline,” 
International Security 37, no. 3 (2012): 174. 
346 Tudor A. Onea, “Between Dominance and Decline”; Cf. Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in 
International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2008), 51. 
347 Tudor A. Onea, “Between Dominance and Decline”; Alain De Botton, Status Anxiety (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2004); see also See, Kevin Avruch, “Reciprocity, Equality, and Status-Anxiety in the 
Amarna Letters,” in Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations, ed. Raymond 
Cohen and Raymond Westbrook (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2000). 
348 Tudor A. Onea, “Between Dominance and Decline,” 127. 
349 Critical junctures are major “historical turning points” in that they “disrupt the existing political and 
economic balance in one or many societies.” See, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why 
Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (London: Profile Books, 2012), 431, 432. 
On how perceptions of decline can influence decision-making in times of crises, see Norrin M. Ripsman 
and Jack S. Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s,” 
International Security 33, no. 2 (2008): 148–81. On foreign policy change and crisis, see Jakob 
Gustavsson, “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?,” Cooperation and Conflict 34, no. 1 
(1999): 73–95. On formative moments, see Erik Ringmar, Identity, Interest, and Action. On critical 
situations, see Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 
2008). For various other notions of the same basic concept, see Craig Parsons, How To Map Arguments 
in Political Science, 74. 
91 
motivates action. Status anxiety indeed unsettles the dominant state as the taken for 
granted reality of being at the apex of the established international order is now 
challenged, yet it simultaneously reveals the possibility and the necessity to act. As 
Søren Kierkegaard elucidates, anxiety “awakens…freedom’s possibility,” anxiety 
becomes “a ministering spirit” that guide action.350 In other words, it sets in motion 
the “vigorous activity” of the leading actors “to hold their high positions.”351 It leads 
the dominant state to take preventive measures. As Tudor Onea explicates, “Dominant 
actors are likely to resist the efforts of upcoming powers to claim status superior to 
their own because they fear that they will lose their upper rank.”352 Hence, “status 
anxiety motivates a dominant actor to impede the new arrivals’ advancement, to 
conserve superiority in the areas in which it is still ahead, and to recoup losses in those 
in which it has fallen behind.”353 This is similar to what John Mearsheimer argues 
when he states that, “the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain 
China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the 
roost in Asia.” 354  These preventive measures to maintain dominant status are 
revisionist and target the rising state.  
Faced with fundamental change in the distribution of power and prestige, 
together with the efficient cause of a crisis, status anxiety pushes the declining 
superpower to revise the regional order of the rising power so as to make it more 
congenial for the maintenance of its dominant status and prevent the ascent of the 
rising challenger – revise to maintain.  
To maintain status, the dominant power seizes the opportunity to “lock out” 
the rising challenger; it contests the growing influence of the rising power trough 
exclusionary social closure and revises the institutional environment of the regional 
order. In fact, “[h]igh-status groups can maintain their privileged position only as long 
as they perform exclusionary acts.”355 In order to maintain dominant status, global 
leadership, and world order, the sole superpower must attain leadership in the region 
where the rising challenger resides and prevent it from becoming the regional 
hegemon. This exclusionary mechanism of positional appropriation is intensifies 
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strategic rivalry and status competition by excluding the rising great power, 
disavowing it a leading position, and upsetting its status ambitions. Tudor Onea further 
elucidates this aspect: 
 
In relation to the dominant state, rising powers prefer adopting a conciliatory 
approach, which would allow them to consolidate their position without triggering a 
clash. When rising powers accept the risk of a rivalry pitting them against the 
dominant state, they do so only after the latter blocks their further advancement.356 
 
However, despite this conciliatory approach and the fact that the rising power is biding 
its time, the rising state nonetheless cultivates expectations for further gains. In 
contrast to the relatively declining dominant power, fundamental change does not 
trigger status anxiety in the rising great power, but rather status expectations – the 
feeling that by being on the right side of history it enjoys prospects for greater 
positional rewards. However, by blocking the advancement of the rising power, the 
dominant power frustrates these expectations, which, in turn, triggers dissatisfaction 
in the form of status frustration, the feeling that the dominant power’s new project for 
the international order is prohibitive to the realization of the rising power’s status 
aspiration. The exclusionary practices of the dominant state and the feelings of status 
frustration they generate in the rising state give birth to “ideas of rectification,”357 
which leads the rising power to revise the international order. The only way to release 
the tension is to react to the competitive pressure and carve out an alternative regional 
order that can satisfy its status ambitions – revise to enhance. 
While the dominant state engages in exclusionary closure, the rising state 
engages in usurpationary closure. The aim is to “secure for itself a privileged position 
at the expense of some other group,”358 more specifically the aim is the positional good 
of leadership359 and “the closure of social and economic opportunities.”360 Exclusion 
is the use of power downwards to maintain position; usurpation is the use of power 
upwards to enhance position.361 As Frank Parkin emphasizes, closure strategies are 
always “directed against competitors who share some positive or negative 
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characteristic,” and “[t]he nature of these exclusionary practices, and the completeness 
of social closure, determine the general character of the distributive system.”362  
Two particular forms of status disavowal emerge from these closure strategies: 
either the competitor is subordinated through a positional ceiling or it is excluded 
altogether. Furthermore, since the institutional landscape follow various trajectories, 
we move beyond the institutional stasis of hegemonic stability theory and the 
determinist logic of path dependency of liberal historical institutionalism and factor in 
development trajectories that incrementally change both the social-relational, 
positional dimension and the social-systemic, institutional dimension in ways that the 
dominant power views as unfavorable for the maintenance of its preeminent status. As 
new secondary institutions emerge and evolve, the dominant state might in fact face 
unfavorable institutions in the regional order of the rising challenger. The notion of 
systemic unfavorability captures this institutional condition.  
Both status disavowal and systemic unfavorability thus capture what is at stake 
both before and after great powers attempt to revise the regional order. Hence, the 
institutional structures of a particular international order give rise to certain constraints 
or barriers. However, positional and institutional obstacles to status maintenance in 
regional secondary institutions only become salient in times of fundamental change 
associated with crisis and status anxiety/status expectations. It is only when the 
causally necessary factors are in place that great powers launch revisionist protects to 
dismantle the barriers, with the purpose of maintaining/enhancing status. 
Variation in revisionist projects for the international order thus depends on the 
existence or non-existence of positional and institutional barriers (see Table 4). 
 
 Positional barriers either take the form of a positional ceiling or social 
exclusion (status disavowal). Positional revisionism then becomes a matter 
of revising those barriers that are prohibitive to the attainment of status, but 
not necessarily the rules and values of the prevailing international order. 
Change becomes a matter of position. 
 
 Institutional barriers are unfavorable rules, practices, and values (systemic 
unfavorability). Institutional revisionism then becomes a matter of revising 
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the rules and values that are unfavorable to the attainment of status. Change 
becomes a matter of institutions.  
 
To sum up, fundamental change in the distribution of power and prestige + the 
efficient cause of crisis induce status anxiety/status expectations, which motivates 
action. Then, the existence of institutional barriers (status disavowal and/or systemic 
unfavorability) necessitate a revisionist project. Along these lines, we have a dynamic 
theory of status driven revisionism that relates to both the declining superpower and 
the rising great power and their struggle to change the international order to satisfy 
their ambitions for status and leadership (see Figure 3).
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                Figure 3. The Causal Mechanism of Status Driven Revisionism 
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3. The Three M’s of Scientific Inquiry: Methodology, Methods, 
and Material 
All research is imbued with underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions, more 
or less explicitly pronounced. These are questions of methodology, or the “concern with 
the logical structure and procedure of scientific enquiry.”363 Thus, methodology should not 
be confused with methods, which are the various techniques for gathering material. In this 
chapter, I will outline the methodological underpinnings of the research and what method 
I have used to collect material. 
 
3.1 Methodology 
In terms of ontology, we can refer to two types of ontology: philosophical ontology and 
scientific ontology. The former is about philosophy of science and the fundamental 
presuppositions about “how we as researchers are able to produce knowledge in the first 
place.” The latter is about the processes and factors that researchers uncover to explain 
things in the world. With this division, “philosophical ontology is logically, and necessary, 
prior to…scientific ontology,” because “we cannot make defensible claims about what 
exists until the basis on which we are doing so has been clarified.”364  
In terms of philosophical ontology, I adopt a critical realist approach. On the one 
hand, critical realism puts emphasis on ontological realism, underlining that reality exists 
independently from the mind. The world is out there, and whether we like it or not, it will 
continue to exist independently of our being. In other words, critical realism adopts a mind-
world dualist approach.365 However, this reality consist of real but non-observable “deep” 
structures. In fact, one cannot see or touch the balance of power or the international order. 
Hence, our knowledge of this world is conceptually mediated; ontological realism is 
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therefore combined with epistemological relativism. To use the terminology of Roy 
Bhaskar, the “intransitive” side of knowledge (ontological realism) is combined with the 
“transitive” side of knowledge (epistemological relativism). We can try to penetrate the 
“depths” of reality as profound as possible, but we will never be able to reach its “bottom,” 
so to speak.366 And since we always need concepts to make sense of reality, the “facts” of 
the world are theory-dependent, or to use David Easton’s apt definition: a fact is “a 
particular ordering of reality in terms of a theoretical interest.”367 
Critical realists put emphasis on what they term INUS-conditions, which emphasize 
causal complexes in which factors jointly produce effects, in contrast to independent factors 
that individually produce effects. To spell out the INUS-condition, it means combination 
of factors that are Insufficient and Nonredundant but part of a causal complex that is 
Unnecessary but Sufficient to explain an outcome.368 Thus, instead of an independent 
variable explaining the dependent variable, we have a causal complex with interlacing 
factors that jointly explain an outcome. 
The causal complex that produces effects is what we might better define as a causal 
mechanism. Gudmund Hernes defines a causal mechanism in the following way:  
 
A mechanism is a set of interacting parts – an assembly of elements producing an effect not 
inherent in any one of them. A mechanism is not so much about ‘nuts and bolts’ as about 
‘cogs and wheels’ – the wheelwork or agency by which an effect is produced. But a 
mechanism or inner workings is an abstract dynamic logic by which social scientists render 
understandable the reality they depict.369 
 
This connects to the definition outlined by Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen who 
state “[e]ach part of the theoretical mechanism can be thought of as a toothed wheel that 
transmits the dynamic causal energy of the causal mechanism to the next toothed wheel, 
ultimately contributing to producing outcome Y.” Thus, “causal mechanisms can have 
effects that cannot merely be reduced to the effect of X, making it vital to study causal 
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mechanisms together with causes instead of causes by themselves.”370 As such, the causal 
mechanism is the whole machinery, and the various causal components form the vital parts 
of the machinery. 
In the Popperian conception of science and progress, scientists are eternally 
producing new hypotheses that are tested against empirical facts, upon which they are either 
refuted or accepted, leading theories to either degenerate, getting tossed on the dump of 
obsolete erroneous knowledge, or to proliferate, providing an ever-stronger foundation for 
the edifice of science. This model of scientific progress “is gradualist and incremental”371 
– brick by brick science progresses, or if metaphorically conceived of as a snowball, layer 
by layer, science is growing its circumference in perpetuity. 
However, multiple logics and rationales can be in the mind of decision makers 
simultaneously, and the rhetorical evidence coming from a certain politician utilized to 
ascertain a particular scientific claim can be contradicted when the same politician speaks 
in front of a different audience.  Different measures of power can also radically alter the 
moment when power-transition occurs. Much also depends on how the researcher 
interprets history. Whether one views Germany’s actions in the First World War as directed 
against Great Britain or as a preventive enterprise aimed against Russia has consequences 
for the theoretical insights. 372 In the first case, Germany becomes a rising state engaging 
in offensive warfare against the dominant state – Great Britain. In the second case Germany 
becomes a dominant state launching a preventive war against the rising state – Russia. 
Moreover, if we dig into recent trade research, we find similar problems. For instance, 
Eichengreen, Rhee, and Tong applied a gravity approach to model China’s trade flows to 
show how they affect other Asian countries. They find that advanced Asia benefits from 
the rise of China, whereas the opposite is true for developing Asia.373 Strangely enough, 
four years later another group of researchers used a similar approach, yet their results are 
                                                 
370 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 29. 
371 Andrew Abbott, Methods of Discovery: Heuristics for the Social Sciences (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2004), 89. 
372 Cf. Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Steve Chan, 
China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory; Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino, “Lost in 
Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory,” International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009): 389–
410; William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”  
373 Barry Eichengreen, Yeongseop Rhee, and Hui Tong, “The Impact of China on the Exports of Other Asian 
Countries,” NBER Working Paper 10768 (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004) 
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the reverse. 374  Although scholars adopt similar approaches, their research yield 
contradictory results, and in this case, whether China’s impact is beneficial or 
disadvantageous to other Asian trading nations remains elusive.  
Hence, the various theoretical schools of IR will not be discarded because someone 
manages to falsify a certain hypothesis. Instead, social scientific IR-theories are better 
viewed as paradigms, as perspectives, more or less relevant in certain areas, times and 
places. It is a matter of perspectival priority, not empirical one-dimensionality. With this 
in mind, a core justificatory reason behind my methodological approach is the existence of 
a large body of research that explains revisionism and dissatisfaction with the status quo in 
various sophisticated ways.375 Unlike the “closed” and controlled experimental setting of 
the laboratory in the natural sciences, the presence of “open systems” in the social 
sciences 376  prevents progress in the Popperian sense, but still, an attention to causal 
mechanisms gain “increased precision, power, or elegance in the large-scale theories.”377 
In terms of scientific ontology then, it refers to the concrete “stuff” or the factors 
and processes that make up my causal mechanism. In section 2.3, I have outlined my 
“Theory of International Order and Status Driven Revisionism,” and in Figure 3, I have 
illustrated the causal mechanism. There is therefore no need to repeat the causal factors 
that represent the scientific ontology of the dissertation.  
 
3.2 Methods 
I make use of “within case” process tracing to show how my causal complex makes 
empirical sense.378 Process tracing is a well-suited method used to pinpoint the causal chain 
of events and connect it to the specific outcome. In this way, the links of the causal chain 
“is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps,” and “the investigator looks for observable 
evidence of each step.”379 Through a retrospective perspective, the temporal aspect is 
                                                 
374 David Greenaway, Aruneema Mahabir, and Chris Milner, “Has China Displaced Other Asian Countries’ 
Exports?,” China Economic Review 19, no. 2 (2008): 152–69. 
375 This is highlighted in Jason W. Davidson, “The Roots of Revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922-39,” Security 
Studies 11, no. 4 (2002): 125–59. 
376 Milja Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis 
377 Arthur L. Stinchcombe, “Monopolistic Competition as a Mechanism,” 267. 
378 Craig Parsons, How To Map Arguments in Political Science, 23. 
379 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Cornell University Press, 1997), 
64. 
100 
captured by tracing the process back in time.380 As highlighted by Sandra Halperin and 
Oliver Heath: 
 
Using case studies and within-case analysis, the researcher searchers for evidence of the 
causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case, through examining data from 
histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, or others sources. These might help 
reconstruct the sequence or structure of events, or reveal the motives or perceptions of 
government officials or decision makers.381 
 
 
The main purpose of the study is to demonstrate the conceptual and theoretical adequacy 
of my model. The cases I choose therefore serve as “crucial cases”382 in that they serve to 
generate new theory that goes against conventional wisdom, here by highlighting how both 
the dominant power and rising power can be understood as revisionists, and by changing 
the theoretical focus from security to status. The cases thus highlight how the dominant 
state in relative decline is pursuing a revisionist status-maintenance strategy, and how the 
rising great power is pursuing a revisionist status-enhancement strategy.  
The four specific cases also serve to illustrate how states can be revisionist in 
relation to either one or both dimensions of the international order, as outlined in the 2x2 
table in section 2.1.6 above (see Table 4). The cases are also crucial in the sense that they 
represent contemporary examples of how the relatively declining superpower and the rising 
great power are behaving in the midst of ongoing fundamental change, and thus departs 
from the normal examination of historical cases where scholars shy away from saying 
something about contemporary political circumstances.  
 
 
                                                 
380 Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Process Tracing in History and Political 
Science: Similar Strokes for Different Foci,” in Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and 
the Study of International Relations, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2001), 137–66. 
381 Sandra Halperin and Oliver Heath, Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 90. 
382 Harry Eckstein, “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,” in Handbook of Political Science, Vol 7, 
ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79–138.  
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3.3 Material  
The strength of the case study is that it can handle many different types of empirical 
material.383 I make use of both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are “direct 
or first-hand evidence…that show minimal or no mediation between document/artefact and 
its creator,” whereas secondary sources “contain information that has been interpreted, 
commented, analyzed, or processed in some way.”384  The primary sources that I use are 
speeches, interviews, policy documents, factual accounts from newspapers, and other 
records from government agencies and research data from international organisations. In 
terms of secondary sources, I make use of books and academic journal articles written by 
scholars as well as biographies, newspaper articles, and reports from international 
organizations and think tanks that contain interpretive content. This multifaceted use of 
material is central to process tracing.385 
Since I do not read Mandarin, the research faced a language barrier in relation to 
material about China. However, this language barrier is surmounted by the fact that the 
Chinese government publishes an extensive amount of information in English and provides 
professional and well-functioning government websites with up-to-date information. 
White papers and policy documents from Chinese government agencies as well as speeches 
by Chinese officials are all available in English. Chinese official newspapers and state news 
agencies also publish their information in both Mandarin and English, which provide 
another source of information. I also conducted interviews with Chinese scholars and think-
tank professionals with an expertise in Chinese foreign policy, which serve as a 
complement to the other sources. Interviews made it possible to get a more detailed and 
comprehensive understanding about the research subject.  
Hence, both primary and secondary sources, both qualitative and quantitative data, 
serve as the material for the dissertation. With the methodological chapter now completed, 
I will begin with the empirical examination. 
 
                                                 
383 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London: Sage, 2008). 
384 Sandra Halperin and Oliver Heath, Political Research, 329. 
385 Ibid, 90. 
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3.4 Limitations of the Study 
Apart from the language barrier mentioned above, the study suffers from a few other 
limitations. In terms of theory, there is always a tension between parsimonious theoretical 
explanations and rich empirical accounts. To a certain extent, I have followed the rule of 
parsimonious theorizing: explain as much as possible with as little as possible. Yet I have 
departed from structural realism’s sole focus on power, since I contend that it is not 
sufficient to gain status in the international order. And while I eschew thick empirical 
description without clear theoretical content, I still wish to make my study empirically 
relevant. In this sense, embedded in the dissertation is a tradeoff between theoretical 
parsimony and empirical thickness. 
In terms of method, the cases I examine are crucial cases – one case for each core 
domain of the international order, one case for the regional economic order and one case 
for the regional security order. In relation to the Obama administration, the two selected 
cases stand on a solid ground, as does the case pertaining to China’s efforts to create an 
Asian security order for Asians. However, one might argue that the One Belt, One Road 
(OBOR) initiative would serve as a better case to examine than the AIIB. Yet at the start 
of the dissertation, the nature of OBOR was unclear, whereas the AIIB stood out as the 
clearest empirical example of China’s grand strategy and its pursuance of leadership in the 
regional economic order. It is a clear example of how China’s institutionalizes leadership 
status, whereas this remains to be seen in relation to OBOR. Even so, OBOR figures in 
China’s comprehensive vision for the regional order at large, and I therefore mention 
OBOR as appropriate when I examine the Chinese cases. 
Another limitation is the fact that I only examine the United States and China. The 
dissertation does not include case studies of how Japan, as an autonomous and independent 
player, competes with China for leadership status in Asia. Japan is by no means excluded 
from the dissertation, yet I only deal with China-Japan competition before the US pivot to 
Asia as well as I examine how Japan forms a crucial element of the Obama administration’s 
reformist revisionist project for the regional security order. In this sense, I essentially treat 
Japan as a reinforcing part of the United States’ status-maintenance strategy. 
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4. Fundamental Change in the Balance of Power 
In this chapter, I will ascertain the primary causal driver behind the increasing positional 
competition between the United States and China – fundamental structural change in the 
balance of power. I will analyze the economic and military balances separately. 
 
4.1. Fundamental Change in the Balance of Economic Power 
Though opinions differ as to its significance, the rise of China and the relative decline of 
the United States is a fact.386 The gradual emergence of East Asia as the new world center 
is of similar factual magnitude. China’s rise presents the greatest challenge to the sole 
superpower status of the United States, whereas East Asia is replacing Europe as the central 
stage for geopolitical – geoeconomic and geostrategic – competition. 
During the three decades between 1979 and 2009, China experienced an average 
annual GDP growth rate of 9.9% (see Table 6). According to the mathematical “rule of 
70,” a ten percent growth rate doubles a nation’s GDP every seven years, which has been 
the case for the last three decades. Even though China’s current growth trajectory is 
heatedly debated, the Chinese government has set the target to double its 2010 GDP level 
by 2020. China’s impressive growth has been dubbed an “economic miracle”387 and the 
World Bank calls China’s economic transformation “the most remarkable development of 
our time.”388 On top of that, China has made the notable achievement of lifting around 700-
                                                 
386 For various perspectives on China’s rise, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm”; Aaron L. 
Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: M. Taylor Fravel, “International Relations Theory and China’s Rise”; 
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International Politics 3, no. 1 (2010): 5–36; Chengxin Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: 
Western Representations of China’s Rise (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012); Linus Hagström 
and Björn Jerdén, “East Asia’s Power Shift: The Flaws and Hazards of the Debate and How to Avoid Them,” 
Asian Perspective 38, no. 3 (2014): 337–62; Barry Buzan and Michael Cox, “China and the US: Comparable 
Cases of ‘Peaceful Rise’?,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 6, no. 2 (2013): 109–32; Thomas 
J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2015). 
387 Justin Yifu Lin, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li, The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform 
(Chinese University Press, 2003). 
388 Vikram Nehru, Art Kraay, and Yu Xiaoqing, “China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century” 
(World Bank, 1997), p. 97, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1997/09/694610/china-2020-
development-challenges-new-century, accessed December 2, 2015. The authors of the World Bank report 
state the following: “China is embarked on an extraordinary voyage of change. Its breathtaking speed and 
sweep promise new economic horizons and fresh hope for China’s huge population. China has telescoped 
into one generation what other countries took centuries to achieve. In a country whose population exceeds 
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800 million people out of poverty and displays the fastest expansion by a major country 
ever recorded in history.389  
       
           Table 6. China’s Average Annual Growth Rate 
Years China’s Average Annual 
Growth Rate (nominal GDP) 
1979-2009 9.9% 
 
1990-1999 10.7% 
 
1980-1990 10% 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); China Statistical Yearbook, 2010, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2010/indexeh.htm 
 
 
In 2005, China surpassed the United Kingdom and France in terms of nominal GDP and it 
outstripped Germany in 2007. In 2010, China reached another milestone as it overtook 
Japan as the second-largest economy in the world.390 In just ten years, from being the sixth-
largest economy in the world in 2000, China rose to occupy second place in the global 
economic hierarchy. To put it differently: “In 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, the 
American GDP was eight times greater than China’s, but less than ten years later it is less 
than three times greater.”391 In 2009, China overtook Germany as the world’s largest 
exporter,392 and in 2010, China displaced the United States as the largest manufacturing 
                                                 
those of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America combined, this has been the most remarkable development 
of our time.” 
389  World Bank, “Country Overview,” 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview, 
accessed May 3, 2016. 
390 World Bank, “Multipolarity: The New Global Economy” (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 
2011), 15. 
391 Michael Yahuda, “China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Journal of Contemporary China 
22, no. 81 (2013): 447. 
392 World Bank, “Multipolarity: The New Global Economy,” 15. 
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country in the world.393 In 2013, China surpassed the United States as the largest trading 
nation,394 and on top of that, China is the biggest market for a wide variety of products, 
ranging from automobiles,395 steel396 and smartphones397 to semiconductors398 and luxury 
goods. 399  China is also the world’s largest energy consumer 400  and the biggest oil 
importer.401  
In 2006, the United States was the number one trading partner for 127 countries, 
yet by 2011, that position had been drastically reversed. China had then become the number 
one trading partner for 124 countries, while the US remained number one for 76 
countries.402 In 2009, China became ASEAN’s largest trading partner, displaying a 20.9 % 
increase in trade between 2010 and 2011. On average, bilateral trade has grown over 20 
percent per year over the last two decades.403 China is also the top trading partner of both 
Korea and Japan, significantly ahead of the United States and the rest of their trading 
partners.404 In contrast, between 2000 and 2010, the share of US exports in the Asia-Pacific 
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china-overtaking-us-global-trader-0. 
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declined by 43 %.405 Thus, “China’s size, location, and dynamism exert an inexorable 
gravitational pull,”406 which seem to depict that “the economic fundamentals are moving 
against the United States.”407  
By all measures, US relative decline is an objective fact. As stated by Joshua R. 
Itzkowitz Shifrinson: 
 
In economic affairs, China is now the world’s second largest economy; and over the course 
of 1991 to 2011, it narrowed the ratio of U.S. GDP to Chinese GDP from 15:1 to 2:1. 
Moreover, its annual GDP growth has been greater in absolute terms than the United States’ 
since 2006.408 
 
If we use purchasing power parity (PPP) as the gauge, China has already surpassed the 
United States as the largest economy in the world.409 If one uses the “inclusive wealth” 
measure recently developed by the United Nations to get a more comprehensive grasp and 
analysis of a country’s productive base, the situation looks slightly different. It measures a 
country’s wealth rather than its income in terms of three capital types: manufactured capital 
(investment, output growth, population, productivity, etc.); natural capital (fossil fuels, 
minerals, agricultural land, fisheries, etc.); and human capital (employment, educational 
attainment, health, etc.). If we consider this measure, China drops in the ranking – from 
being the first- (PPP) or the second-largest economy (GDP) in the world, China is instead 
the fourth wealthiest country in the world (see Table 7). Nevertheless, the difference is not 
very drastic as China is soon to overtake Germany and claim third place in the inclusive 
wealth index. Moreover, as stated by the China 2020 Research Team, “different indices 
will have discrepancies in the results; but generally speaking, China has already become 
                                                 
405  US Chamber of Commerce, “Trans-Pacific Partnership,” September 12, 2016, 
https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/trans-pacific-partnership, accessed September 21, 2016. 
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http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/07/09/southeast-asia-will-markets-and-geography-trump-tpp, accessed 
November 12, 2014. 
407 Arvind Subramanian, Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance (Washington, DC: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011), 197. 
408  Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Michael Beckley, “Debating China’s Rise and U.S. Decline,” 
International Security 37, no. 3 (2012): 175. 
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one of the most important economic bodies in the world.”410 As outlined above, China is 
the world’s largest market for a great range of important commodities, but it is also the 
largest investment location,411 and the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves.412 
 
Table 7. Distribution of Economic Power 
 GDP (2015)  
in millions of 
current 2015 
US$ 
World 
Rank 
GDP, PPP 
(2014)  
in millions of 
2014 US$ 
World 
Rank 
Inclusive 
Wealth (2010)  
in millions of 
constant 2005 
US$ 
World 
Rank 
United 
States 
17,947,000 
 
 
1 17,419,000 2 143,824,201 1 
China 10,982,829 
 
2 18,017,073 1 31,969,803 4 
Japan 4,123,258 
 
3 4,655,494 4 54,693,320 2 
Germany 3,357,614 
 
4 3,757,092 5 35,855,483 3 
 Source: IMF, World 
Economic Outlook 
Database (online),  
October 2016 
Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
(Online), April 2016 
Source: UNU-IHDP and 
UNEP, Inclusive Wealth Report 
2014, pp. 220-226 
 
Apart from the rise of China, Asia as a whole is recovering its former strength:  
 
In the half century since 1950, Asia has been the fastest growing part of the world economy, 
outperforming all other regions. This was in stark contrast with past experience. In the 
four and a half centuries from 1500 to 1950, Asia stagnated whilst all other regions 
progressed. In 1500, Asia accounted for 65 per cent of world GDP, and only 18.5 per cent 
in 1950. Since 1950, the Asian share has doubled.413 
 
However, as recently as 1990, the global economy was still dominated by North America, 
Western Europe, and Japan, which accounted for around half of world GDP, and two thirds 
                                                 
410 China 2020 Research Team, “Repositioning China in 2020,” in The World According to China. Chinese 
Foreign Policy Elites Discuss Emerging Trends in International Politics, ed. Shao Binhong (Leiden: Brill, 
2014), 94. 
411 UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance” (New 
York: United Nations, 2015). 
412 Bloomberg News, “China’s Foreign Reserves Slow Decline as Currency Stabilizes,” March 7, 2016, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-07/china-s-foreign-reserves-slow-decline-as-currency-
stabilizes, accessed May 4, 2016. 
413 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millenial Perspective (Paris: OECD, 2001), 142. 
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of world trade. This structural environment has changed significantly since then, a change 
that started to accelerate following the “global financial crisis” in 2008. Although 
economies all over the world felt the impact of the economic turmoil, the crisis was mainly 
confined to North America and Western Europe more than it was truly global, and East Asia 
in particular experienced a speedy recovery.414 What stands out is that in contrast to the 
situation in 1990, the gap between advanced and emerging economies has not only been 
reduced, but has been reversed (see Table 8). In addition, if we compare Europe and East 
Asia & Pacific – the declining old world centre, and the rising new world centre – the trend 
looks the same (see Table 9 and Table 10).    
 
      Table 8. Shares of World GDP (PPP), 1990-2020 
Group of Countries 1990 2000 2010 2015 2020 
 
Advanced economies 63.9% 57.0% 47.4% 42.4 39.2% 
 
Emerging economies 36.1% 43.0% 52.6% 57.6% 60.8% 
 
The gap between them 27.8% 14.0% 5.2% 15.2% 21.6% 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (online), April 2016 
 
        
       Table 9. Shares of World GDP (PPP), 1990-2020 
Regions 1990 2000 2010 2015 2020  
European Union 26.6% 23.7% 19.0%  16.9 15.6% 
Emerging and 
Developing Asia 
12.5% 16.7% 25.8% 30.6% 35% 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (online), April 2016 
 
European Union 25% 22.9% 19.0% 17.3% (2014) Projection n/a 
East Asia & Pacific 20.2% 23.9% 28.8% 31%    (2014) Projection n/a 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online), April 2016 
                                                 
414 World Bank, “Emerging Stronger from the Crisis: East Asia and Pacific Economic Update 2010, Volume 
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          Table 10. Shares of World GDP (nominal), 1990-2020 
Regions 1990 2000 2010 2015 2020  
European Union 31.2% 26.5% 25.9%  22.2% 20.8% 
Emerging and 
Developing Asia 
4.8% 6.9% 14.8% 21.3% 25.4% 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (online), April 2016 
European Union 33.6% 26.5% 25.8% 22.1% Projection n/a 
East Asia & Pacific 20.9% 24.4% 25.4% 29% Projection n/a 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online), April 2016 
 
China accounts for the vast bulk of the growth of what is categorized as emerging 
economies, equally so in terms of the growth of East Asia. Instead of a global economy 
dominated by North America, Western Europe, and Japan, it is preferable to talk about 
regionalized tripolar global economy consisting of North America, the European Union, 
and East Asia. Together these three regions roughly account for 80% of World GDP (North 
America 26.5%, European Union 22.1%, East Asia & Pacific 29%, see Table 11), whereas 
the economic output of the rest of the world is unevenly spread among a few stronger 
countries, such as Brazil, Russia, and South Africa. This tripolar structure is further 
pronounced if we consider intraregional trade. The share of intraregional trade exceeds 50% 
in all three regions: in North America, the share of intraregional trade is 50.2%, and in 
Europe and Asia respectively, the share is 68.5% and 52.3% (see Table 12). The rest of the 
world is far behind these three core regions. The share of intraregional trade in Latin 
America is 25.8%, in Africa 17.7%, and in the Middle East 8.8%. Besides, there is one 
significant caveat to these numbers. Since the WTO does not disaggregate the intraregional 
trade data for East Asia, and instead embeds it into the larger category of Asia, it seems safe 
to claim that East Asia’s share of intraregional trade is higher than 52.3% given that its 
production networks are denser than those in South Asia.415  
 
                                                 
415 Salvatore Babones, “The Regional Structure of the Global Economy: Economic Hierarchies and Growth 
Strategies,” IROWS Working Paper, no. 113 (Riverside: University of California, 2016), 
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110 
Table 11. Shares of World GDP 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online), April 2016 
 
Table 12. Share of Intraregional Trade 
 
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO), International Trade Statistics 2015 (online), Geneva: 
WTO, 2016 
 
The Asia-Pacific is thus emerging as the new world centre and replacing Europe as the 
central stage for geostrategic competition. The United States, since it is both a Pacific and 
an Atlantic country, will remain connected to the centre stage of geostrategic competition 
even as the power gap between East Asia and Europe increases.416  
                                                 
416 Yan Xuetong, “Power Shift and Change in the International System,” in The World According to China. 
Chinese Foreign Policy Elites Discuss Emerging Trends in International Politics, ed. Binhong Shao (Leiden: 
Brill, 2014), 141. 
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Furthermore, despite the global economic slowdown, Asia “remains the engine of 
global growth,” as director of the Asia and Pacific Department of the IMF Changyong Rhee 
accentuates:   
 
While Asia’s growth is moderating, the region remains the engine of global growth and 
the region is expected to grow by 5.3 percent in 2016 and 2017, which is 2 to 4 percentage 
points higher than the growth rate in other regions. And also, this growth rate accounts for 
two-thirds of global growth as it has been since 2010. So Asia remains the engine of the 
global growth.417 
 
In addition, as Stephen Roach makes clear, the largest contributor to this growth, 
outcompeting all other countries by far, is China: 
 
If Chinese GDP growth reaches 6.7% in 2016 – in line with the government’s official target 
and only slightly above the International Monetary Fund’s latest prediction (6.6%) – China 
would account for 1.2 percentage points of world GDP growth. With the IMF currently 
expecting only 3.1% global growth this year, China would contribute nearly 39% of the 
total.418 
 
Yet even though the above trends are hard to deny, the picture becomes more nuanced if 
we disaggregate the data. If we return to the inclusive wealth measure, in terms of which 
the United States holds a clearly dominant position, what accounts for the biggest bulk of 
the US inclusive wealth is human capital. Whereas human capital accounts for 78% of US 
inclusive wealth, it only accounts for 47% of China’s inclusive wealth composition.419 
Among the five core capabilities that Kenneth Waltz outlines, the capability that holds 
particular weight in a virtual and service-dominated global economy is resource 
endowment, or rather human resource endowment. This can be connected to charges for 
the use of intellectual property (payments and receipts for the authorized use of intellectual 
property rights through licensing agreements and the like) in which the United States totally 
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dominates the market in comparison to China’s meager performance. The United States 
received 130 billion US dollars in earnings in 2014, whereas China received 676 million 
US dollars in receipts in 2014 (excluding the 574 million received by Hong Kong). In 
contrast, China was charged 22 billion US dollars for the use of others’ intellectual 
property.420 
Moreover, in a global capitalist economy organized around global and regional 
production networks and global values chains (GVC’s), we need to take trade in value-
added into account. Even though East Asia is emerging as the new world centre, the nature 
of China as the “world’s factory” has long been in the form of being a hub for the assembly 
of intermediate goods that are exported to US and European markets. In 2011, the total 
share of foreign value added in Chinese exports was 32.3%, whereas the foreign value 
added share of US gross exports was 15%. Yet if we disaggregate the data further, we find 
that China’s domestic value added as a share of production in the industrial sector of 
electrical and optical equipment only amounted to 15.4%, whereas the equivalent figure 
for the United States was 59.5%. Out of China’s intermediate imports of electrical 
products, almost 65% end up in exports.421 A large and significant share of exports of 
value-added from Japan and Korea pass through China before the products reach their final 
destination in advanced consumer markets.  
Whereas PPP is a measure of the price on a range on non-tradeable goods useful to 
catch differences in living standards between two locations, GDP is a measure of all the 
output (the value of final goods and services) produced within a country in a given period 
and tells us more about a country’s international purchasing power. Yet without taking 
trade in value-added into account one inflates the value of trade. For instance, the US-
China trade balance would be significantly lower if calculated in valued-added terms: 
 
The 2005 US-China trade shortfall would have even been cut by more than half, from US$ 
218 to US$ 101 billion, if it had been estimated in value added and adjusted for processing 
trade. Similarly, in 2008, the US$ 285 billion bilateral deficit would have been reduced 
by more than 40 percent.422 
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One detects the same pattern concerning the Japan-China trade balance as well as the trade 
balance between the Western EU countries and China. If gauged in terms of value-added, 
the EU15-China trade balance would be 49% less than the gross terms and China’s trade 
balance with Japan would change from a surplus in gross trade terms to a deficit in terms 
of value-added.423 As a whole, it shows that technological expertise and design are powerful 
assets that account for a nation’s competitiveness, and that a country’s placement in the 
global value chain presents a different picture of its economic standing that is somehow 
blurred if one merely takes into account gross GDP figures. 
The paradoxes of China’s relative economic strength and weakness pertaining to 
the impact of its sheer market size and its placement in the global value chains can be further 
illustrated by two well-known examples involving the American tech giant Apple. 
All Apple’s flagship products – iPod, iPhone, iPad – are assembled in China, but 
the Chinese value-added represent a minor share of the total value of these hi-tech devices. 
They make a substantial contribution to China’s exports, but the products contain 
intermediate components that corporations from advanced economies like Japan, Taiwan, 
Korea, Germany, and the United States manufacture. These intermediate inputs are 
imported to China for assembly. Many of these corporations outsource some of their 
production of intermediate goods to China itself, and so the big bulk of the value is either 
added outside China or repatriated to foreign-owned companies. 424  As such, China’s 
position and influence at the lower ends of the value chain is not as pronounced as observers 
sometimes believe.   
However, another example involving Apple paints a slightly different picture. In the 
recent court case between Apple and Xintong Tiandi (a Chinese company that sells leather 
products branded with the name IPHONE) about the iPhone trademark, the Beijing 
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Municipal High People’s Court ruled in favor of Xintong Tiandi, which can continue to use 
Apple’s famous global brand name.425 The court ruling took place against the backdrop of 
a number of actions that have serious ramifications for Apple. Previously, new Chinese 
regulations that outlaw foreign ownership of online publishing services had been imposed, 
which forced Apple’s iBooks and iTunes Movies to store their online content on servers 
based in China, resulting in a shutdown of Apple’s services. Besides, billionaire investor 
Carl Icahn reportedly “blamed China’s economic slowdown and worries over government 
interference” when he recently sold all his shares in Apple as the company faced a 
remarkable 26% plunge in iPhone sales on the Chinese mainland.426 As BBC business 
reporter Dave Lee makes clear, China’s impact on Apple is unequivocal:  
 
Slowing sales in established markets has not been too much of a problem for Apple, 
as China has always been there to prop up its earnings and keep it posting quarter 
after quarter of record-breaking profits. But with revenues in China taking a hit, the 
whole company suffers.427 
 
In other words, you cannot ignore China, or you do so at your own peril. China is by no 
means giving up the competitive race to develop a more sophisticated economy. Its 
ambition is to climb the global value chain and turn the country into a true regional center. 
In fact, China is making strides in climbing the global value chains and is acquiring an 
increasingly sophisticated manufacturing base: 
 
There is clear evidence that China is moving up the value chain. The domestic value-added 
content of China’s exports has risen across all sectors and now exceeds that of both Korea 
and Taiwan Province of China. This has been driven both by a decline in the importance 
of what is known as the processing trade, which is characterized by a low degree of value 
addition, and by a decline in the import intensity of many of China’s exports. There is 
evidence that China is increasingly becoming a global export leader in parts that it 
previously imported from advanced Asian economies—liquid-crystal display (LCD) 
screens are a particularly striking example, though similar patterns hold for many other 
components.428 
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Even though China still lags behind the United States, Japan and Europe in terms of 
innovation competitiveness,429 figures from the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) show that China is rapidly improving its position. 
 
In 2014, China accounted for the largest number of patent applications received by any 
single IP office – a position it has held since 2011. It received more applications than Japan 
and the US combined…Of the top 10 IP offices, China’s IP office (+12.5%) saw the fastest 
annual growth in filings received in 2014.430 
 
As well, in 2014, the leading PTC applicant431 was Huawei Technologies of China, which 
published 3442 applications, ahead of Qualcomm of the United States and Panasonic of 
Japan. Strikingly, Huawei recorded a 63% growth in applications, whereas Panasonic 
declined by 41%.432 
Furthermore, China’s attractive market, and its appeal as both an investment 
location and a foreign investor endow it with considerable advantage. In terms of 
infrastructure, China has long been a key player and is the number one investor in the 
world.433 According to Deutsche Bank global strategist Sanjeev Sanyal, China is a “world 
investor,” especially so “amid growing demand for infrastructure investment in other 
developing countries.”434 Besides, in terms of foreign exchange reserves, as former US 
Deputy Treasury Secretary Roger Altman points out, “no nation is wealthier.”435 Certainly, 
accumulating large foreign exchange reserves primarily denominated in US dollars serves 
as a wise strategy to insulate the national economy from future crises; it does not challenge 
the international financial order, instead it props up the US dollars and helps the United 
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States to maintain its position as the global currency leader. However, the fact that China 
still holds the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world, around 3.2 trillion US dollars 
by February 2016, despite the recent slowdown in its economy and massive stimulus 
spending,436 gives China a substantial source of influence that can be used for productive 
purposes to enhance its position. This is especially true concerning the China created 
multilateral development banks NDB and AIIB. In these banks, China institutionalizes its 
leadership position and provides public goods, which makes friends and boosts its influence. 
Even the most vocal proponents of the endurance of America’s sole superpower 
status claim that American “economic dominance has eroded from its peak,”437 and that in 
the economic domain of the international order “the world is not unipolar at all.”438 Even 
though they highlight China’s weaknesses, they recognize that China truly is “the only 
country with the raw potential to become a true global peer of the United States.”439 Then, 
as fundamental structural change ensues, the mainstream view that China is on a trajectory 
to overtake the United States as the leading economic power, notwithstanding the 
differentials in time frame the various estimates brings forth, has not been erased from the 
consciousness of scholars, experts, and officials alike. It is not a matter of if, but when, 
China will surpass the United States. Whether it will happen 2019,440 2020 or 2025441 is a 
matter of debate. Hence, with China as the second largest economy in the world and East 
Asia as the new world center, the world has undergone fundamental structural change. 
At the height of the “unipolar moment” not many scholars believed that unipolarity 
would be short-lived,442 and the debate about American relative decline in the 1980’s was 
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rapidly silenced as “seemingly overnight the threats to United States’ military and economic 
supremacy were removed from the international chessboard” with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War.443 Yet two decades after the triumphant victory over 
Soviet communism, the ongoing redistribution of power and the regionalized tripolar 
structure of the world economy indicate that the US top position no longer is unchallenged. 
Before the 2008 financial crisis, Immanuel Wallerstein argued that the US was in relative 
decline and that “the real question was not whether US hegemony was waning but whether 
the United States can devise a way to descend gracefully.”444 Now, few are questioning 
American relative decline,445 yet Wallerstein’s question remains one of the central puzzles 
for contemporary international relations – how will the United States handle the fact that it 
no longer stands unchallenged at apex of the global economic hierarchy? 
 
4.2 Change in the Balance of Military Power 
The change in the balance of military power is not yet a matter of fundamental change that 
implies a challenge to US global military preponderance, but China’s military expansion 
indicates a challenge to US regional superiority. I will ascertain this claim below. 
The United States is by far the biggest military spender in the world. According 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the military expenditure of the 
United States as a share of GDP was 3,3% in 2015. This represents a notable decrease since 
2010 when the military expenditure amounted to 4,7% of its GDP, a change attributed to 
sequestration or the automatic spending cuts in the US federal budget implemented in 2013 
in order to reduce the fiscal deficit. The military expenditure of China, Japan and India as 
a share of GDP have on the other hand been relatively constant, amounting to 1,9%, 1% 
and 2,3% respectively in 2015 (see Table 13). However, considering the fact that China and 
India are rapidly rising economies, the size of their respective shares have been growing, 
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whereas the size of Japan’s share has remained constant due to its stagnant economy. Even 
so, China’s military budget of 214 billion US dollars in 2015 far exceeds that of India (51 
billion), as well as that of Japan (46 billion), and as China steadily increases its military 
budget while the United States undergoes sequestration, the military expenditure gap 
between the two largest economies in the world is shrinking. In 2010, there was a 600 
billion dollar gap between US and China, yet in merely 5 years this gap has been reduced 
to less than 400 billion. This becomes evident when we look at gross military expenditure 
instead of gauging the military budget as a share of GDP (see Table 14).  
If we go back to 1990 as the starting point for our comparison, the magnitude of the 
change in military expenditure becomes even clearer. In 1990, China and India were at a 
level of rough parity in terms of military expenditure, and considerably below the level of 
Japan. Yet over the last 25 years China’s military spending has skyrocketed in comparison 
to Japan and India (see Table 15). This period also displays the marked increase in military 
spending that took place during the Bush administration and the global War on Terror, 
which started to decrease from its peak under the Obama administration with the 2011 
Budget Control Act (see Table 16). 
In fact, China’s military spending is larger than that of all other countries in East 
Asia, South Asia, and Oceania combined. Implying that China, in terms of share spending, 
is the regional military power. However, the United States still outspends the world in 
terms of military expenditure, and spends more than China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, United 
Kingdom, India, France, and Japan combined, relating to the fact that the US is the global 
military power. 
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Table 13. Military Expenditure as Share of GDP, 2004–2015 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
US 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 4,2% 4,6% 4,7% 4,6% 4,2% 3,8% 3,5% 3,3% 
 
China 2,1% 2,0% 2,0% 1,9% 1,9% 2,1% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 
 
Japan 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,9% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 
 
India 2,8% 2,8% 2,5% 2,3% 2,6% 2,9% 2,7% 2,6% 2,5% 2,4% 2,5% 2,3% 
 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex 
 
Table 14. Military Expenditure, in constant (2014) US$ b., 2004–2015 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
US 582, 
400 
610, 
176 
619, 
653 
635, 
921 
682, 
967 
737, 
747 
757, 
992 
748, 
646 
706, 
082 
650, 
081 
609, 
914 
595, 
472 
China 72, 
415 
79, 
809 
92, 
586 
103, 
716 
113, 
527 
137, 
401 
144, 
383 
155, 
898 
169, 
321 
182, 
930 
199, 
651 
214, 
787 
Japan 47, 
245 
47, 
155 
46, 
558 
45, 
954 
45, 
515 
46, 
364 
46, 
527 
47, 
161 
46, 
584 
46, 
380 
45, 
867 
46, 
346 
India 33, 
403 
35, 
548 
35, 
718 
36, 
151 
41, 
003 
48, 
277 
48, 
470 
48, 
940 
48, 
766 
48, 
406 
50, 
914 
51, 
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Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex 
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Table 15. Military Expenditure 1990-2015, China, Japan, and India 
 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex 
 
Table 16. Military Expenditure 1990-2015, US, China, Japan, and India 
 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex 
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Another way of gauging the military balance of power is offered by the Correlates 
of War Project and the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). This index 
includes military budget, military personnel, iron and steel production, energy 
consumption, urban population, and total population. According to this indicator, China 
had already surpassed the United States at the turn of the millennium, and its CINC ranking 
is vastly superior to both Japan and India (see Table 17). This result, however, should 
immediately give one pause on its own. That China in 2000 should have surpassed the 
United States in national capability proves the irrelevance of the CINC as an index of 
military power and national capability. It simply deviates too much from reality. 
David Singer founded the Correlates of War Project in the 1960s with the aim 
generating systemic scientific knowledge about war.446 The various inputs that make up 
the concept may have been useful in the previous eras of the World Wars when steel 
production and mass armies certainly played an important role for national strength and the 
building of powerful militaries. Yet that China’s massive contemporary stock of steel, 
much greater than that of the United States and other advanced economies, should give 
China greater military strength does not reflect the contemporary era of advanced and 
technologically sophisticated warfare, nor does it say anything about power projection 
capabilities.  
In order to gauge the strength of modern militaries Credit Suisse developed another 
index. The Military Strength Index (MSI) consists of six key inputs; namely, aircraft 
carriers, aircrafts, attack helicopters, submarines, tanks, and active personnel. This index 
provides a more accurate picture of the military balance of power. The United States, with 
a fleet of 20 aircraft carries, 13900 aircrafts, 920 attack helicopters, and 72 submarines, 
clearly discloses America’s military superiority as compared to its closest rivals.447 After 
the United States, the top four countries are Russia, China, Japan, and India (see Table 18). 
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Table 17. Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) 
 
Source: Correlates of War Project, available at: http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-
sets/national- material-capabilities 
      
     Table 18. Military Strength Index 
Country Ranking Score 
US 1 0.94 
Russia 2 0.80 
China 3 0.79 
Japan 4 0.72 
India 5 0.69 
Source: Michael O’Sullivan, “The End of 
Globalization or a More Multipolar World?” (Credit 
Suisse Research Institute, 2015), 41. 
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Composite Index of National Capability (CINC)
US China Japan India
123 
Even though this index provides a more accurate outline of the current military 
hierarchy, it only measures conventional forces and do not take nuclear capabilities into 
account, nor the qualitative difference of capabilities, platforms, and weapons systems. 
Neither is the disruptive potential of anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities and other 
cyber and space technologies included. Yet if we take into account nuclear capabilities, it 
would only strengthen the top position of the United States and Russia since they account 
for nine tenths of the world’s nuclear arsenal.448 
In fact, no nation on earth rivals the United States in terms of global military power 
and power projection. Just the mere fact that the United States divides the world into six 
geographic command zones – USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, 
USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USPACOM – that are subsumed under the Unified 
Command Plan, which set forth the missions and responsibilities of the combatant 
commanders around the globe, is notable in itself (see Figure 4). Apart from the geographic 
division, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), United States 
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and the United States Transportation Command 
(USTRANSCOM) are also incorporated in the Unified Command Plan. The USSOCOM 
is responsible for a wide range of special operations, ranging from short duration strikes 
and special reconnaissance to psychological and counterinsurgency operations; the 
USSTRATCOM is responsible for deterring and detecting strategic attacks against the 
United States, and is in charge of “US nuclear capabilities, space operations, global 
surveillance and reconnaissance, intelligence, communications, computers, global missile 
defense and combatting weapons of mass destruction”; and the USTRANSCOM “provides 
the Department of Defense with an aggregate of transportation capabilities and assets” that 
support “a diverse array of joint mobility missions.”449 No other country in the world has 
a similar global outlook, dividing the continents into different zones of responsibility – a 
clear illustration of US sole superpower status.  
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Figure 4. US Unified Command Plan 
 
Source: US Department of Defense, “Unified Command Plan,” available at https://www.defense.gov/About/ 
Military-Departments/Unified-Combatant-Commands 
 
According to data from Flight Global, the overall number of US aircrafts is 13,717, 
compared to 2942 for China. Whereas the numbers of American aircrafts are evenly 
distributed between the US Air Force and the US Navy and US Army, Chinese Aircrafts 
are heavily tilted towards the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), which holds 
1977 units.450 Moreover, apart from differences in quantity, there are qualitative difference: 
 
The compositions of the fleets also differ. The United States has around 2,200 short range 
fighters, compared to about 1,200 for China. Weighting by quality, the United States has 
an even more substantial advantage; China continues to fly over 400 J-7s, an effective 
aircraft, but not competitive in any sense with the U.S. fleet. The United States also has 
massive advantages in other aircraft types. The United States, for example, owns 78 percent 
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of the world’s tanker aircraft; a unique capability for a state that views itself as having 
unique responsibilities.451 
 
Whereas no country is challenging the global military presence and unique sole 
superpower status of the United States, the picture changes if we take a closer look at the 
regional balance of military power. Here we can observe a significant ongoing change in 
the balance of power in East Asia, which present challenges to the US Pacific Command, 
particularly along China’s maritime periphery.  
According to Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Deployments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China released by the US Department of Defense, 
China’s military capabilities greatly surpass those of Taiwan. In terms of air forces, China 
is ahead of Taiwan in terms of fighters, bombers, transport, and special mission aircrafts 
(see Table 19). In addition to that, China has a large number of ballistic missiles (see Table 
20). How China’s military capabilities translate into power projection is further presented 
in the report The US-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving 
Balance of Power, 1996-2017, released by the RAND Corporation. The report gauges 
United States’ and China’s advantages and disadvantages in ten operational areas: Chinese 
air base attack, US vs Chinese air superiority, US airspace penetration, US airbase attack, 
Chinese anti-surface warfare, US anti-surface warfare, US counterspace, Chinese 
counterspace, US vs China cyberwar, and nuclear stability. The report also includes two 
scenarios (Taiwan scenario and Spratly Islands Scenario), as well as a time frame that 
gauges the development since 1996 until the present day. The assessment of the power 
projection capabilities ranges from major advantage, advantage, and approximate parity to 
disadvantage and major disadvantage. Nuclear stability is gauged in terms of confidence 
in second-strike capability.452  
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Table 19. Taiwan Strait Military Balance in 2015, Air forces 
 China Airforce Taiwan Airforce 
Total Within range of  
Taiwan 
Total 
Fighters 1700 130 384 
Bombers 400 200 0 
Transport 475 150 19 
Special Mission 
Aircraft 
115 75 25 
Source: US Department of  Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of  China 2016 (Washington, DC, 2016), 109. 
 
Table 20. China’s Missile Forces 
System Missiles Launchers Estimated Range 
 
ICBM 75-100 50-75 5,400-13,000+ km 
MRBM 200-300 100-125 1,500+ km 
SRBM 1000-1200 250-300 300-1000 km 
GLCM 200-300 40-55 1,500+ km 
Source: US Department of  Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of  China 2016 (Washington, DC, 2016), 109. 
 
 
In 1996, China faced a major disadvantage in almost all operational areas in both 
scenarios, but by 2010, the situation had changed markedly, particularly in relation to the 
Taiwan scenario, and in 2017, the situation in relation to the Spratly Islands scenario has 
also changed significantly. In 2017, in relation to the Taiwan scenario, China has the 
advantage in Chinese airbase attack and Chinese anti-surface warfare, and has reached the 
level of approximate parity in the operational areas US vs Chinese air superiority, US 
airspace penetration, US counterspace, and Chinese counterspace. In relation to the Spratly 
Islands Scenario, China does still not have the advantage in any operational area. However, 
in the operational areas Chinese air base attack, Chinese anti-surface warfare, US 
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counterspace, and Chinese counterspace the balance of power has reached a level of 
approximate parity.453 
In terms of a Chinese airbase attacks China’s number of intermediate, short-range, 
and cruise missiles have increased rapidly since 1996, and they possess much greater 
accuracy. This was also highlighted in the 2016 Annual Report to Congress by the US 
Department of Defense; namely, that the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) “is developing and 
testing several new classes and variants of offensive missiles, including a hypersonic glide 
vehicle; forming additional missile units; upgrading older missile systems; and developing 
methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.”454 China has also developed unique anti-
ship ballistic missiles, which presents a new and distinctive challenge to US aircraft carrier 
strike groups (CSG’s). 
China is also replacing many of its obsolete older generation aircrafts. While fourth-
generation aircrafts now make up around half of PLAAF, fifth-generation aircrafts enter 
service within a few years and “will significantly improve” the PLAAF.455 China has also 
developed sophisticated over-the-horizon (OTH) intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and systems that can detect stealth aircraft.456 Moreover, 
China’s rapid expansion of attack submarines, including nuclear-powered, diesel electric 
and air-independent powered submarines, adds to China’s significant military expansion.  
The sheer number of PLA navy vessels, as well as the large quantity of coast guard 
and maritime law enforcement vessels, also testify to China’s rapidly expanding presence 
in the region. The PLA Navy has the “largest force of principal combatants, submarines, 
and amphibious warfare ships in Asia.”457 The PLA navy widely outnumbers Japan’s naval 
forces and is more numerous than the United States in terms of submarines, amphibs, and 
small combatants, while the US Navy has the edge in terms of aircraft carriers and large 
combatants (see Table 21). 
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Although China only has one operational aircraft carrier, with a second one under 
construction, this new capability poses a looming threat to the United States’ dominant 
status in the Western Pacific. Regardless of China’s intentions, the sustained development 
of even larger, more modern naval forces, including aircraft carriers, is in itself 
incompatible with US sole superpower status, full-spectrum dominance, and command of 
the global commons. 
 
Table 21. Naval Power in the Asia-Pacific 
Naval Combatants US  China  Japan 
Aircraft carriers 21 (11 aircraft carriers 
and 10 carrier air 
wings) 
1 0 
Large Combatants 92 79 46 
Small Combatants 43 107 0 
Amphibs 33 53 3 
Submarines 55 64 18 
Source: US Department of  Defense, Quadrennial Defense 
Review 2014 (Washington, DC: Department of  Defense, 
2014), 39-41. 
Source: US Department of  Defense, Asia-Pacific 
Maritime Security Strategy (Washington, DC: US 
Department of  Defense, 2015), 12. 
 
The above illustrates the change in the regional balance of power and China’s 
robust and expanding presence in the air and maritime domains, which accounts for 
China’s disruptive military power, or its A2/AD capabilities (for a complete depiction of 
the US-China military score card, see Figure 5). In other words, you simply cannot ignore 
the lateral pressure – as the balance of power changes and Chinese capabilities increase, 
China acquires the means to exert greater political influence and becomes able to exercise 
regional rights and responsibilities commensurate with its great power status. Even though 
China’s military modernization is far from complete, the quality of China’s military 
capabilities is increasing rapidly. In just ten years, the ratio of modern naval surface forces 
and air forces has increased from below 5 percent in 2000 to around 25 percent in 2010. In 
terms of submarine forces and air defense forces, the modern ratio has increased from under 
10 percent in 2000 to 55 percent and 40 percent respectively in 2010 (see Table 22).  
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   Figure 5. US-China Military Score Card 
 
 
Source: Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the 
Evolving Balance of Power, 1997-2017 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html.  
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   Table 22. PLA Modernization 
 
Source: US Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016” (Washington, DC, 2016), 43. 
 
The change in the balance of military power is not yet a matter of fundamental 
structural change that implies a challenge to US global military preponderance, but it 
nonetheless indicates a challenge to US regional superiority. As Matteo Dian points out: 
 
Even though the PLA is not able to disrupt the US military access to commons on a global 
scale and for extended periods of time, vast investment in conventional and asymmetric 
A2AD capabilities has enabled it to challenge US freedom of action in specific regions 
such as the area within the First Island chain for at least limited periods of time.458 
 
China’s rise thus has implications for the original regional balance of power that existed 
after the end of the Cold War between China, predominately a land power, and the United 
States, the preeminent sea power. That strategic balance is now being broken with China’s 
growing military presence in its near seas. As Zhang Tuosheng points out:  
 
[A]fter the end of the Cold War, on the basis of China having a strong land-power 
advantage and the US having a strong sea-power advantage, the military strengths of the 
two countries found a certain strategic balance in the Western Pacific along the lines of 
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131 
China’s border and territorial seas. Since the beginning of the new century, however, the 
original strategic balance has been broken, with China’s strengthening, both economically 
and militarily, and its accelerated defense modernization. In the coming decade or two, if 
there is no fundamental change in the current trend, the balance between their military 
strengths and strategies may shift to the first island chain in the Western Pacific. By then, 
China will have the strategic advantage in its near sea and the US will maintain its strategic 
advantage and dominance in the vast sea, outside of the first island Chain.459  
 
In sum, China now possesses the largest navy and air force in Asia and this inevitably has 
consequences for the United States’ command of the regional commons and presents 
challenges for the maintenance of American full-spectrum dominance in the regional 
domains. This change in the regional balance of power affords China the power to patrol 
its near seas more robustly, and in the coming future, even beyond, with a truly global 
Chinese military power lurking in the background as a credible scenario if current trends 
continue.  
Yet apart from the change in the balance of power, we also have to examine China’s 
reputational capital. The next chapter will scrutinize the change in the balance of prestige.  
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5. Fundamental Change in the Balance of Prestige 
In this chapter, I will ascertain that the distribution of prestige was changing in China’s 
favor until the Obama administration assumed power and launched the US pivot to Asia. I 
treat the balance of prestige as an intersubjective ideational structure, and I will ascertain 
that China’s reputation in the Asia-Pacific, and the world, grew at America’s expense. This 
is particularly true concerning China’s economic prestige, whereas China’s military 
reputation is more negative and ambiguous. But whereas China was viewed in a more 
favorable light than the United States in the region, Japan and China’s views of each other 
deteriorated as they struggled for regional leadership, which, together with concerns about 
China’s military intentions, impeded regional integration. Even though China and Japan 
did not buy into each other’s regional projects, the struggle for leadership was played out 
in a multilateral context exclusive of the United States. When the Obama administration 
assumed power, it felt that unless the United States acts to shape regional trends and revises 
the regional economic order, China’s charm offensive would eventually bear fruit. This 
aspect will be covered in chapter seven where I examine the status anxiety that the change 
in the balance of power and the balance of prestige generated, but for now, let us 
concentrate on the change in the distribution of prestige. 
For long, China’s reputation has been tainted by threat discourses. In fact, the story 
about China has been told in the West for centuries, a story recurrently plotted along murky 
and adversarial lines. Napoleon’s famous warning, “Let China sleep, for when the Dragon 
awakes, she will shake the world,” pointed towards a lurking threat. So did the cautioning 
of a “Yellow Peril” by Emperor William of Germany, referring to a coming danger from 
the East, which Greenberry Rubert later connected to the biblical revelation of the rising 
“Kings of the East.”460 After the US-China rapprochement in the 1970s, the revolutionary 
threat from the “red menace” gradually dwindled until it was supplanted by a transfigured 
“China threat” thesis, which gained strength after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. With 
China’s rapid economic development and military modernization, the adversarial logic 
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now revolves around “capability-based” and “intention-focused” China threat 
discourses.461 
Chinese leaders are well aware of the damage that threat discourses cause; it stains 
China’s image, tarnishes its reputation, and reduces its attraction as a partner and great 
power. Chinese scholars and government officials have since the end of the 1990s begun 
to recognize the importance of cultivating soft power. The concept of soft power have 
gained prominence in Chinese academic journals and newspapers, and have been 
discussed, elaborated and promoted by scholars, think-tank experts, and government 
officials in seminars and conferences. Significantly, it is also a component of the Chinese 
measure of comprehensive national power.462 A different, yet related concept is the long-
standing Chinese notion of discourse power, which, according to Kejin Zhao has been the 
fundamental principle of the CCP since its founding in 1921. Definitions of discourse 
power by Chinese scholars differ, ranging from a “right to speak,” “soft power,” and 
“diplomatic skill” or “strategic prestige” to more post-structuralist understandings of 
discourse that “expresses power relationships” designed to maintain a dominant social 
order through power facts, shared rules, and social practice.463 Yet in any case, whatever 
definition one views as the most accurate one, it is safe to conclude that prestige or a benign 
reputation is crucial for China to gain discourse power. 
Both “soft power” and “discourse power” are concepts linked to China’s strategy to 
change the balance of prestige, in terms of improving China’s image and reputation, with 
the aim “to create a new political model, rather than just follow the established order.”464 
It involves the launching of new diplomatic concepts and ideas (new security concept, 
responsible power, good neighbor policy, peaceful development, harmonious world, etc.), 
public diplomacy, active engagement in regional and international multilateral institutions, 
magnanimous development assistance, economic cooperation, and the promotion of 
China’s development experience as a successful example, without officially supporting the 
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notion of Beijing Consensus to avoid direct ideological confrontation with the Western 
world at large, and the United States in particular.  
In a bid to increase its reputation China launched “China opportunity theory” and 
“China contribution theory” as direct countermeasures to the “China threat theory” and 
“China collapse theory.” 465  Yet the most important new concepts are “peaceful 
development” and China’s “good neighbor policy.” Although “peaceful rise” was the first 
concept to be coined, before it was supplanted by China’s official adoption of “peaceful 
development” to avoid the connotation of an impending challenge imbued in the concept 
of “rise,” the two concepts essentially envision the same thing. Developed by Zheng Bijan, 
a top advisor that worked closely with the Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao leadership, peaceful 
development envisions a path to prominence that ostensibly differs from the trajectory of 
rising powers in the past. As Hu Jintao stated: 
 
It is only through the road of peaceful development that the progress of the human race and 
the prosperity of a nation shall and can be achieved. History tells us that any attempt by a 
country to realize its interests through the use or threat of force, or to place its interests 
above those of other nations will get nowhere. Such attempts are against the tide of history 
of human development and against the fundamental interests of people all over the 
world.466  
 
Chinese leaders ensure that it will adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; 
pursue an independent foreign policy of peace; follow the path of reform of opening to the 
world; conduct economic and technological corporation and scientific and cultural 
exchange; seek win-win cooperation; and promote world peace through its own 
development. “China has never sought hegemony, and never will in the future,” as Chinese 
leaders often reiterate to substantiate that China’s rise represents a radical departure from 
the historical record. As Zheng Bijan argues, “In the past, the rise of a big power often 
involved toppling the international order and a threat to peace. China breaks this rule. 
While seeking a peaceful international environment to ensure our development, we are 
safeguarding world peace through our own development.”467 While the message indeed is 
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for the world to hear and for great powers to take notice of, it is particularly intended to 
reach China’s Asian neighbors. The very reason why peaceful rise/peaceful development 
“was proposed in the Hu Jintao era was in effect an intention to declare China’s expansion 
of national power and its presumed forthcoming rise to global power status, and to gain 
acceptance of this declaration from neighboring Asian countries.”468 This acceptance of 
China specifically relates to the opportunities that China’s rise offers its neighbors. As 
Zheng puts it: 
 
Generally speaking, in the coming two or three decades, or in the early twenty-first century, 
Asia will face a rare historical opportunity for peaceful rise, and China’s peaceful rise will 
be a part of Asia’s peaceful rise. This not only means that China’s reform, opening up, and 
rise are partly attributable to the experience and development of other Asian countries; it 
also means that China, as an Asian country, will play a more active and useful role in the 
development, prosperity, and stability of all the other Asian countries, and its neighbors in 
particular.469 
 
In other words, “China’s peaceful rise and the sustained, rapid, coordinated, and sound 
growth of its economy will bring about tremendous historic opportunities, not threats, to 
the Asia-Pacific region.”470 These economic opportunities is the lure, the tangible benefits 
that should draw the region closer to China. 
At the same time as the concept of peaceful development was disseminated, China 
formally launched its “good neighbor policy.” At the 2003 ASEAN+3 summit, Wen Jiabao 
pronounced China’s good neighbor policy, designed to create a “friendly neighborhood, 
secure neighborhood, and prosperous neighborhood.” By enunciating the policy at the 
summit level of the premier regional grouping, Chinese leaders sent “a strong signal to all 
participants indicating that China is fully amendable to the ‘ASEAN Way’ of incremental 
consensus-building and group decision-making.”471 
Yet the conception of peaceful development and the formal articulation of China’s 
good neighbor policy in 2003 was not the initiation of China’s work to strengthen its 
prestige in the region, it was rather the product of diplomatic efforts that China had been 
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practicing since the 1980s, mostly on a bilateral basis,472 and multilateral efforts that started 
to intensify in the second half of the 1990s, when China opened up to regional multilateral 
cooperation. Those efforts now resulted in the creation of China’s official master slogan 
and counterhegemonic alternative to the “China threat theory,” as well as its leading policy 
concept designed to enhance the pursuit of regional cooperation. Before disseminating the 
theory of peaceful development, China had already started to increase its standing in the 
region through a series of honorable deeds and regional cooperation with the ASEAN that 
improved its image as a benign and responsible great power.  
A first crucial milestone for the change in the balance of prestige occurred during 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The United States’ haphazard response during the 
AFC struck a severe blow to Washington’s prestige in the region. There was not only 
serious “disagreement over the causes” of the crisis, but the initial American refusal to 
contribute to Thailand’s rescue package made Asian leaders question the American 
commitment to regional development.473 The conditionalities imposed by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) on countries hit by the crisis further contributed to “politics of 
resentment” throughout the region in which the outside forces of the US and IMF “became 
the target of criticism and blame.”474 The view was that “Washington may have aggravated, 
rather than ameliorated, the crisis.”475 At the same time, “China made a symbolic move” 
by not devaluating its currency and publically coating itself in the benign veneer of a 
responsible state “standing up for other Asian nations.” 476  As stated by Singaporean 
diplomat Chan Hen Chee, Washington’s “response or failure to respond to the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997 strengthened China’s standing in the region.”477 The same year 
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ASEAN + 3 was created, an East Asian wide grouping including the ASEAN plus China, 
Japan, and South Korea, and the first informal China-ASEAN summit was held. 
Divisions regarding the proper pathway to implement the ambitious “Bogor Goals” 
of region-wide liberalization also haunted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC). Depicted as civilizational divides, these competing “Anglo-Saxon” and “Asian” 
paths to regional integration478 represented different normative and regulatory institutional 
frameworks for regional economic integration. Many East Asian countries preferred a 
“consensus-led, incrementalist, and voluntary approach” over the “reciprocity-based 
negotiations and binding commitments” advocated by the United States. 479  This 
“ideological clash” 480  and the Clinton administration’s unsuccessful attempt to alter 
APEC’s mode of operation further tainted America’s prestige.  
Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Bush administration started to push for 
the inclusion of security issues as agenda items in APEC. Notwithstanding the American 
success in including security issues into the APEC agenda, resulting in the 2003 “Bangkok 
commitments,” the perception that the United States was preoccupied with security and the 
War on Terror at the expense of economic matters was growing, and “many ASEAN 
countries felt highly uneasy with broadening APEC’s focus.”481 Yet more significantly, 
after 9/11, many viewed the United States as a power who neglected Asia and who 
disappointed regional leaders when it did not send top ranking officials to regional 
summits, which added to the picture of a disinterested and arrogant superpower. 
“Washington completely forgot about Asia, and particularly East and South East Asia, as 
it turned its attention to the Middle East. The failure to send top ranking officials to ASEAN 
and APEC meetings is only the most visible manifestation of the policy of neglect and 
purposelessness.”482 Many East Asian elites observed “with dismay the growing evidence 
of American incompetence in handling various global and regional challenges,” and 
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accordingly, “America’s standing” was seriously “damaged.” 483  Consequently, 
“America’s zeitgeist had clearly shifted” due to Washington’s actions in the Middle East 
and its handling of the global War on Terror, which intensified the “questioning of United 
States global leadership.”484 
Simultaneously, in stark contrast to the United States, China’s reputational capital 
was increasing in the region. In 2002, at the sixth ASEAN + 3 summit in Cambodia, China 
announced that it would deliver debt relief for the poorest members of the ASEAN 
(Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam). The signing of the groundbreaking China-
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) the same year and China’s bestowment of an 
“early harvest,” consisting of reduced or removed tariffs on around 600 agricultural 
products for Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam without reciprocity before the 
agreement came into force in 2010, was viewed as a benevolent deed. The joint China-
ASEAN Declaration on Conduct (DoC) in the South China Sea in 2002 and China’s 
decision to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003 as the first 
non-ASEAN member to do so further improved its image in the region. China and ASEAN 
were now ready to declare their “Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.”485  
In other words, in 2003, the stage was already set for China to unveil its master 
concept of peaceful development, designed to put China’s rise in a unique and benign 
context, and to launch its good neighbor policy, the logical appendix for friendly relations 
and regional cooperation. China’s preference for coexistence converged with the 
diplomatic approach of the ASEAN Way,486 and by following Deng Xiaoping’s proverb of 
“setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development,” China managed to improve its 
image and establish cooperative relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors through 
benign deeds and a friendly bearing. In fact,  
 
By engaging with multilateral organizations like the [ASEAN] and fostering more 
interactions between foreign and Chinese officials, China can reduce fears of Beijing, 
giving it time to gain influence without troubling other countries about its rise. By working 
with multilateral organizations, Beijing also can signal to other countries that it can play 
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by international rules and be a responsible power. It cannot hurt that as the United States 
became less interested in multilateralism, China’s participation in multilateral 
organizations made Beijing look more cooperative by comparison.487 
 
In the mid-2000s, China and ASEAN had initiated cooperation in 48 functional 
mechanisms and Japan and ASEAN cooperated in 33 functional mechanisms, whereas the 
cooperation between the United States and ASEAN merely spanned seven mechanisms. 
Not only had China initiated more projects with the ASEAN than Japan and the United 
States, they had also been initiated during a much shorter time span.488 And according to 
interviews with ASEAN diplomats conducted by Joshua Kurlantzick, China’s approach to 
international diplomacy was seen as beneficial because Beijing “would not interfere or 
meddle.” Thus, “foreign nations could benefit because China would not make demands 
upon others nations’ sovereignty, economic models, governance or political cultures.”489 
In Southeast Asia, Chinese diplomats also have deep local knowledge; they visit more 
frequently, and engaged higher-level diplomats than the United States at the time. China 
also displayed willingness to be a “proactive mediator,” as demonstrated in its mediation 
between Cambodia and Thailand, and the fact that the Six-Party Talks could not have 
happened without China’s active support further testifies to its diplomatic strength. In 
relation to the latter, “Asian news outlets…typically portrayed China as a rational actor 
mediating between two angry, unbalanced nations led by madmen – North Korea and the 
United States.”490  
As David Shambaugh pointed out in 2005, Beijing’s diplomacy was “earning praise 
around the region” and “most nations” saw “China as a good neighbor, a constructive 
partner, a careful listener, and a nonthreatening regional power.”491 Across the region 
“elites and populaces in most nations see China as a constructive actor – and, potentially, 
as the preeminent power.”492 China’s good neighbor policy concurred with the “relative 
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inattention” given to the region by the United States during the Bush administration,493 and 
Beijing’s improved image and reputation happened as the United States experienced a 
sharp decline in its soft power. As Joshua Kurlantzick makes clear,  
 
This decline began in the Clinton 1990s and has spiraled further downward in the Bush 
2000s, as cuts in American public diplomacy, scandals in American corporations, new 
restrictions on entering the United States, misguided trade policies, a retreat from 
multilateral institutions, and human rights abuses in Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, and other 
places have combined to undermine the allure of America’s ideas, values, and models.494 
 
Apart from the fruits that China’s effective regional engagement bore, China’s successful 
economic development was also contributing to its increasingly positive reputation. Albeit 
inadvertent, another significant milestone was reached when Joshua Cooper Ramo coined 
the concept of the Beijing Consensus in 2004. In Ramo’s famous article that disseminated 
the concept to a global audience, he argued:  
 
The Beijing Consensus offers hope for the world. After the collapse of the Washington 
Consensus, the breakdown of WTO talks, the implosion of Argentina’s economy, much of 
the world was uncertain what a new paradigm for development ought to look like. [The 
Beijing Consensus is] appealing to nations that have ambitions for development and 
security but have seen hundreds of years of failure of development models that rely too 
much on developed nations for assistance.495 
 
Even though China did not officially endorse the Beijing Consensus by name in order to 
avoid an open ideological clash at an inopportune time, China still proclaims that 
developing countries can learn from its development experience and offers assistance to 
countries in desperate need of economic development. Across Southeast Asia, China’s 
economic model was viewed as attractive; from Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand to 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam.496 It testifies to what Ramos called “the intellectual 
charisma” of China’s economic development model.497 As Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho 
Jeong point out: 
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[The] dissemination of the Beijing Consensus bestows upon ‘Chinese-style socialism’ 
greater international recognition, not only as an economic development model but also as 
a new model of political system and social structure. With the Beijing Consensus, China 
can finally rid itself of its stigma as a non-democratic state and a human rights violator – 
as argued by the Western world – and can now assume a leading role vis-à-vis the US 
within international society by recommending various development policies to Third 
World countries.498  
 
In 2005, Joseph Nye acknowledged that, “in terms of political values” the Beijing 
consensus “has become more popular than the previously dominant ‘Washington 
consensus.’”499 A similar argument was made by Clyde Prestowitz in 2007, “today, it is 
China whose soft power is waxing while America’s wanes. Everywhere one goes, one finds 
that people admire China and want to know what is happening in China. They may fear the 
US, but they admire it less. It is the China model that now has appeal.”500 This view could 
only be reinforced in 2008, when two occurrences at opposite ends of the globe seemed to 
unfold in emblematic nearness. With the “triumphant” Beijing Olympics freshly stored in 
the global cortex, the crash of the Lehman Brothers and the 2008 Financial Crisis 
intensified the juxtapositions of a “strengthened China” and a “battered West.”501 
As China increased its reputational capital and the Beijing Consensus gained 
worldwide appeal, perhaps the most vivid sign of America’s declining reputation came in 
2009 when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the elections in Japan and Yukio 
Hatoyama was selected Prime Minister. Before Hatoyama assumed his position, he 
published an op-ed in the New York Times titled “A New Path for Japan” in which he 
delivered a perforating attack on the United States’ image and moral standing. Hatoyama 
argued that US-style capitalism did not care about human dignity, that it was “void of 
morals or moderation.” After spending several paragraphs debunking immoral US-led 
market fundamentalism and universal globalism, Hatoyama announced, “I also feel that as 
a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial crisis the era of US-led globalism is 
coming to an end and that we are moving toward an era of multipolarity.” 502  That 
Washington’s staunchest ally in the region publically delegitimized the United States and 
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its economic model in front of a global audience undoubtedly testifies to America’s 
tarnished prestige in the region as the Obama administration entered office.  
The above narrative of a change in the balance of prestige gains further support 
from primary data on global attitudes found in international public opinion surveys. This 
is further evidence for the fact that during the Bush administration the United States’ 
reputational capital plummeted, whereas China’s prestige markedly increased. 
To begin with, in a 2003 poll conducted by Pew Research Center it is concluded 
that the initiation of the second Iraq war “significantly weakened global public support for 
the pillars of the post-World War II era – the UN and the North Atlantic alliance.”503 In 
2005, the Pew Research Center conducted a poll on the views of America’s role in the 
world, and the results indicate a strong decline in US prestige. The attitudes about US sole 
superpower status and the emergence of a peer competitor or a group of countries rivalling 
the United States are striking. “Majorities in every other country surveyed, aside from the 
US, favor another country challenging America’s global military supremacy.” In Asia, 
support for a military power rivalling the United States ranges from 73% in Pakistan and 
Lebanon and 74% in China to 79% in Indonesia and more than 80% in India. 504 
Significantly, in Asia and the Middle East, substantial majorities in Pakistan, Indonesia, 
Turkey, and Jordan “favor the rise of China as a military equal to America.” Concerning 
the question whether China’s rise is an opportunity that benefits their country, publics in 
Asia “are uniformly more positive” than compared to the rest of the world. For instance, 
by a margin of 53% to 36%, Indians see benefits to themselves in China’s economic 
emergence. Pakistan and Indonesia approve by still wider margins of 68%-to-10% and 
70%-to-23%, respectively.”505 
In the 2007 poll on how the world sees China, Pew Research Center unequivocally 
concluded: “China’s fans are most prevalent” in Asia and Africa. In Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh, majorities of the surveyed, reaching 83%, 65%, 79%, and 74% 
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respectively, held favorable views of China. In Indonesia, where a majority favored the 
rise of China as a peer competitor in 2005, a plurality of 43% now viewed China’s 
expanding military power in a negative light. Even so, 66% of Indonesians polled still 
viewed China’s growing economy favorably. A general sentiment also shared by Indians. 
In Malaysia and Pakistan 57%, and in Bangladesh 51%, viewed “China’s stronger military 
is good for their country.”506 
However, Japan and South Korea are notable exceptions, where substantial 
majorities worried about both China’s expanding economic power and its military power. 
In general, the sentiment about China’s military power was more negative, whereas 
China’s rapidly expanding economy did not arouse the same concerns. “In 33 of 46 
countries, including China itself, China’s growing economy is viewed as a good thing by 
majorities or pluralities.” However, “in 32 of 46 countries surveyed, China’s increasing 
military muscle is viewed with alarm.”507 
In the 2005 BBC World Service Poll, conducted by the international polling firm 
GlobeScan and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at University of 
Maryland, China was viewed in a favorable light in many Asian countries. In India (66%), 
Philippines (70%), Indonesia (68%), and Australia (56%) majorities viewed China in a 
positive light. However, views about China in South Korea and Japan were divided. In 
South Korea 49% viewed China in a positive light, whereas 47% held negative views, and 
in Japan 25% viewed China favorably, whereas 22% viewed it negatively, and 53% took 
no position.508 Even so, Steven Kull, the director of PIPA, was astonished. “It is quite 
remarkable that with its growing economic power China is viewed as so benign, especially 
by its Asian neighbors that it could threaten or seek to dominate. However, this cordial 
view from around the world does appear to depend on China restraining itself from seeking 
to convert its burgeoning economic power into a threatening military presence.” 509 
Similarly, Doug Miller, the President of GlobeScan, stated, “China clearly has the respect 
                                                 
506 Pew Research Center, “How the World Sees China,” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 
December 11, 2007, http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/12/11/how-the-world-sees-china/, accessed November 
12, 2016. 
507 Ibid. 
508 PIPA & GlobeScan, “22-Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively by Most Countries Including Its 
Asian Neighbors,” 2005, available at http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/China/China_Mar05/China_ 
Mar05_rpt.pdf, accessed November 12, 2016. 
509 Ibid. 
144 
of the world because of its exceptional economic achievements, and most people seem to 
hope for its continued economic success. However, with military approaches generally 
unsupported in today’s world, citizens worldwide are hoping China will pursue a soft 
power route to world influence.”510  
Hence, these positive views of China came with an important caveat, namely that 
it hinges upon its economic power, and that it could change if it becomes more militaristic. 
This insight connects to evidence from another poll by PIPA and GlobeScan, which 
demonstrated that in sixteen countries, most viewed a future trajectory where China is 
“significantly more powerful economically” as something positive, whereas in seventeen 
countries, most viewed a future scenario where China is “significantly more powerful 
militarily” as something negative.511 Nevertheless, “China is viewed much more positively 
than two other major powers, the US and Russia, which are viewed quite negatively.”512  
In a 2005 poll by the Australian think-tank Lowy Institute, China’s good name, 
with respect to Australia, is confirmed. Whereas 69% of the polled Australians had positive 
feelings for China, only 58% had positive feelings for the United States. According to 
Lowy Institute, “Australians feel most positive about the countries with which we have 
longstanding, deep and stable relationships,” which makes the comparatively bad number 
for the United States even more astonishing given the long and intimate US-Australia 
relationship. 513  When asked about external threats, the surveyed Australians ranked 
China’s growing power as the least among threats, while the threat from US foreign 
policies worried Australians considerably more. Concerning the question of free trade 
agreements, Australians were more positive about signing a free trade agreement with 
China (51% thought it would be good, 20% thought it would be bad), while expressing 
ambivalences towards a trade deal with the United States (34 % thought it would be good, 
32% thought it would be bad).514 
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In various local polls, we find similar evidence. In a 2006 poll conducted in 
Thailand, 83% of the participants had a favorable view of China, and more than 70% of 
the Thai viewed China as their closest friend.515 Moreover, despite the ambivalent survey 
data cited above, South Korean polls conducted in 2006 indicate that majorities viewed 
China as the most significant country for South Korea’s foreign policy.516 Robert Sutter, 
although being skeptical of China’s challenge to the United States in the region, claims 
that, “[t]he greatest gains in Chinese regional influence have been registered in South 
Korea and in Southeast Asia. Elite and popular opinion in these countries has shown strong 
pro-China tendencies, and some government leaders have reflected this as well.”517 
In essence, during the Bush administration, East Asia experienced “strong elite and 
popular opinion moving in anti-American direction,” 518  and the survey data clearly 
indicates that China, conversely, had boosted its prestige considerably worldwide although 
notable reservations about China’s military power were present. With the significant 
exception of Japan, and perhaps South Korea, China had a good reputation in Asia, and it 
was enjoying the highest standing among the great powers. In fact, Beijing had managed 
to change “its image across much of the globe, from threat to opportunity, from danger to 
benefactor”519 – at America’s expense. In 2009, Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, and Stephen 
John Stedman argued that the belief that the United States is “a vital provider of 
international order…has vanished. Fewer people around the world accept or trust 
American power – or regard it as legitimate.”520  
While America’s standing in Asia and in the world had been seriously damaged, 
China, on the other hand, had “risen as a potential competitor to the United States in the 
Asian region.”521 As China steadily climbed the power and prestige hierarchies, it sought 
to institutionalize leadership status within a regional institutional context exclusive of the 
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United States. However, Japan’s refusal to accept Chinese leadership prevented the 
realization of this goal. Even so, status disavowal and systemic unfavorability in the 
evolving regional order raised obstacles for US status maintenance. In the following 
section, I will account for these institutional barriers.  
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6. Institutional Barriers: US Status Disavowal and Systemic 
Unfavorability in the Evolving Regional Order of the Asia-
Pacific 
At the end of the Cold War, Asia-Pacific states started to explore alternative regional 
pathways. The initial search for regionalism brought fourth two dissimilar conceptions of 
regional cooperation that, however, shared a common denominator – the exclusion of the 
United States. When Australia first launched the idea of the APEC in 1989 it did not include 
the US, but represented an extended Asia-Pacific vision of economic regionalism, which, 
nevertheless, was rectified after harsh American reactions. As Amy Searight points out, 
“US officials at the State Department…were incensed that Australia had failed to consult 
with them and had omitted the United States and Canada from its proposal. Secretary of 
State James Baker made clear that the United States expected to be included in any Pacific 
grouping.”522 However, the APEC initiative was countered by Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad’s proposal for the Japan-led East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). 
When South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok put forward the idea that South Korea 
might support Mahathir’s proposal “out of Asian solidarity,” James Baker, yet again, made 
the American position vividly clear: “it was Americans, not Malaysians, who had shed 
their blood for Korea forty years before.”523 The United States, as envisioned by Baker’s 
famous expression, was determined “to check any move by the East Asians” that would 
draw “a line down the middle of the Pacific” and exclude the United States from the 
region.524  
In contrast to the conventional wisdom of a unipolar moment with solid confidence 
in America’s dominant position, perceptions of relative decline and anxieties about United 
States’ future in East Asia were prevailing among US officials against the backdrop of 
Japan’s rise and the “Asian renaissance.” According to Kai He, this sentiment lasted until 
1997 when the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) struck the region and the United States 
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stopped worrying about its place in East Asia. As the economic turmoil spread across the 
region, perceptions of longlasting US hegemony gained ground instead.525 
In 1997, in the midst of the AFC, and faced with the United States’ lukewarm 
response to the crisis, Japan launched the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), an 
organization Japan deliberately envisioned without the United States to “promote solutions 
to regional financial issues by Asian leaders themselves without US pressure.”526 The plan, 
however, quickly succumbed to opposition from the US and the IMF and stood without 
Chinese support. Even so, the United States did not manage to stop or showed no interest 
in halting the creation of the ASEAN + 3 that was established the same year and excluded 
the United States. As the opinion that “APEC is not Asian enough” resonated “on the 
Western side of the Pacific,”527 the ASEAN + 3 was seen as a “unique regional platform” 
for East Asian countries “to engage and cooperate through dialogue and joint activities.”528  
In 2001, the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), consisting of renowned 
intellectuals from the APT countries, submitted its report Towards an East Asian 
Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress to the APT Summit in Brunei in 
2001. The report stated: 
 
The Vision Group envisions East Asia moving from a region of nations to a bona fide 
regional community with shared challenges, common aspirations, and a parallel destiny. 
The economic field, including trade, investment, and finance, is expected to serve as the 
catalyst in the comprehensive community-building process.529 
 
Among the many reasons behind the need for “a united voice to advance the region’s 
common interests,” we find the challenges and opportunities of “growing 
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interdependence,” the need to ameliorate “rivalries and competition,” “geographical 
proximity,” “common historical experiences and similar cultural norms and values.” Apart 
from these liberal, realist, and constructivist logics used to substantiate the basis for an East 
Asian Community, The Vision Group also notices the “trend towards regional trading 
blocs,” which adds the geoeconomic dimension.530 
Subsequently, the East Asian Study Group (EASG), composed of government 
officials from the APT countries, submitted its final report to the ASEAN + 3 Summit in 
Cambodia in 2002, in which it assessed the recommendations of the EAVG and the 
viability of turning the ASEAN + 3 into an East Asian Summit (EAS). The final report of 
the EASG stated that “East Asian cooperation is inevitable and necessary,” that “deeper 
integration of an East Asian community is beneficial and desirable,” and that the “EAS is 
a desirable long-term objective, but it must be part of an evolutionary process that builds 
on the substantive comfort levels of the existing ASEAN+3 framework.”531 The EASG 
also recommended 26 concrete measures to be implemented in order to push regional 
cooperation to the next level. 
Even though the political EASG seemed to endorse the recommendations of the 
intellectual EAVG, a struggle for leadership and disputes over membership were raging in 
the background between China and Japan. China preferred the ASEAN + 3 and the vision 
of basing an East Asian Community on that same grouping. At the China-ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting in June 2004, the joint statement declared, “[b]oth sides agreed that an 
East Asian Community is a long-term objective for East Asian co-operation to be 
developed through the existing ASEAN Plus Three Mechanism.”532 Japan, on the other 
side, wanted members outside of the ASEAN + 3 to be able to participate in East Asian 
Summit, in particular India, Australia, and New Zealand, but also opened the door for the 
United States. For this reason, the ASEAN + 3 never developed into the EAS; instead, the 
EAS was created in 2005 as a separate forum, which at first expanded into an ASEAN Plus 
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Six mechanism, including India, Australia, and New Zealand, and later allowed extra-
regional countries, like the United States, to join. As stated by Shintaro Hamanaka:  
 
After the inclusion of non-APT countries in the EAS was decided, China started to assert 
that the APT Summit, not the EAS, should be the basis of a future East Asian Community. 
Japan conversely insisted that the EAS should play an important role with regard to the 
establishment of an East Asian Community.533 
 
However, one can question how successful Japan really was, as not only China but also 
ASEAN regards the ASEAN + 3 as the “main vehicle towards the long-term goal of 
building an East Asian Community.”534 In relation to this premier grouping, the United 
States is an outsider; it is excluded from the grouping that the countries in the region 
themselves views as the most important regional platform or secondary institution, with 
the notable exception of Japan. What we observe is regional contestation over membership 
and leadership status in a regional diplomatic secondary institution, ranging from closed 
regional secondary institutions more akin to a regional block encompassing East Asia, or 
ASEAN+6 by extension, to open institutions like the EAS, including the United States and 
other extra regional states. This struggle in relation to the shape of the regional diplomatic 
order cannot be properly understood without the positional status dimension. 
As trade between the East Asian countries steadily increased, this struggle also 
started to involve contestation in relation to the regional regulation of the market. Bilateral 
free trade agreements (FTAs) started to proliferate in the region in the beginning of the 
new millennium against the backdrop of competitive pressures from FTA’s in other parts 
of the world and protracted WTO negotiations.535 The signing of CAFTA between China 
and ASEAN spurred a series of ASEAN + 1 FTA’s, notably with Japan, Korea, India, 
Australian and New Zealand. The number of trade agreements in the region grew rapidly 
and increased from only three in 2000 to over 50 in 2011. Yet by 2006, the United States 
                                                 
533 Ibid, 70. 
534  ASEAN, “ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation,” January 22, 2014, available at http://www.asean.org/ 
news/item/asean-plus-three-cooperation, accessed March 12, 2014; see also ASEAN, “Chairman’s Statement 
of the 8th ASEAN + 3 Summit Vientiane, 29 November 2004,” June 13, 2012, 
http://asean.org/?static_post=chairman-s-statement-of-the-8th-asean-3-summit-vientiane-29-november-
2004, accessed August 12, 2016. 
535 Mireya Solís, “Global Economic Crisis: Boon or Bust for East Asian Trade Integration,” in The Global 
Economic Crisis and East Asian Regionalism, ed. Saori N. Katada (London: Routledge, 2012), 49. 
151 
had only concluded one single bilateral FTA in East Asia – with Singapore. This can be 
compared to China, which had concluded ten FTA’s and had six under negotiation, and 
Japan, which had concluded eleven and had 5 under negotiation as of February 2010 – a 
reflection of the competitive relationship between the two economic hubs of East Asia.536  
The crisscrossing trade agreements gave rise to a regional institutional order with a 
peculiar “noodle bowl” character of multiple rules of origin (ROO) and other 
discriminatory trade rules (see Figure 6). This puts outsiders at a disadvantage and 
increases transaction costs for enterprises.537 In fact, “[t]he regional focus of trade has been 
accentuated by both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade that selectively limit trade 
openness, either amongst countries or in specific commodity categories…making global 
trade not-so free after all.”538 Notwithstanding the position of the US market as the most 
important end location for goods produced and assembled in East Asia, the United States 
faced increasing institutional restrictions in the region. East Asia is not unique in terms of 
non-tariff barriers, and the United States itself is one of the most protectionist economies 
in the world.539 Nevertheless, the fragmented institutional character of the regional order 
in fact marginalizes the United States and put American business at a disadvantage. 
The dominant “soft mercantilist” or “neomercantilist” principles that characterize 
the development strategies of East Asian nations differ from the neoliberal economic 
values advocated by the United States. In fact, the United States “struggle with” everything 
from non-tariff barriers, capital controls, and cultural discrimination “from most of its 
Asian trading partners.”540 The East Asian approach to regional economic integration and 
trade liberalization also favors an incrementalist approach that takes different levels of 
development and variegated development paths into consideration, which stand at odds 
with the “reciprocity-based negotiations and binding commitments” favored by the 
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Washington.541 In other words, the systemic unfavorability of the East Asian economic 
order prevented US status maintenance. 
 
Figure 6. The East Asian Noodle Bowl Structure 
 
Source: Richard E. Baldwin, “Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian 
Regionalism,” Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration (Asian Development 
Bank, February 2007), 5. 
Note: The figure shows FTAs signed or under negotiation in East Asia as of January 2006. 
 
 
At the ASEAN + 3 Summit in Laos in November 2004, China proposed the creation of an 
East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) composed of the ASEAN + 3 countries, whereas 
Japan, at the ASEAN Economic Ministers’ meeting in Bangkok in 2006, proposed the 
creation of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) based on the 
ASEAN + 6 countries. This competitive dynamic to move beyond the bilateral and 
minilateral focus in order to create a region-wide FTA can be contrasted to the US proposal 
for a Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), launched at the APEC Summit in Vietnam 
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in November 2006, which includes all APEC countries. The EAVG had earlier articulated 
that “[t]he economic field…is expected to serve as the catalyst in the comprehensive 
community-building process,”542 and now both China and Japan launched proposals that 
connected the long-term goal of community-building to economic arrangements that 
uphold the exclusion of the United States, thus formalizing proposals for a true regional 
bloc. In this way, the developments in the region further connects neo-mercantilism to “the 
pursuit of ‘regionness,’” which in essence “can be seen as transcending the nation-state 
logic in arguing for a segmented world system, consisting of self-sufficient blocs.”543 
However, lingering concerns about China’s military role and the struggle for leadership 
and economic influence between China and Japan prevented deeper institutionalization of 
the regional cooperation process and proved to be an obstacle for the regional community 
building.544 As Chien-peng Chung makes clear, 
 
Indeed, the rise of new economic and financial cooperative mechanisms would be an 
important step forward for an Asian regional integration project, but this could not have 
been done without China’s enthusiastic embrace of, and desire to set the pace for, the 
institutionalization of regional multilateralism. Nonetheless, even if China becomes the 
primus inter pares of the East Asian-Western Pacific region, regional order is hitched to a 
China-Japan relationship that is, if not friendly, at least workable, for which China would 
have to convince everyone that its rise is peaceful, and Japan would have to be more 
independent of the USA in its strategic calculations.545 
 
When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the 2009 elections in Japan and Yukio 
Hatoyama became Prime Minister, a political environment conducive for a more benign 
China-Japan relationship seemed to be emerging. Hatoyama wanted a more independent 
and closer relationship with China, he announced his firm support for the idea of an East 
Asian Community based on the principle of fraternity, and viewed East Asia as Japan’s 
“basic sphere of being.” He further advocated a common East Asian currency and argued 
that only regional integration could solve the historical and cultural animosities of the 
region and used the European Union as the analogous example. Hatoyama embodied the 
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“growing pan-Asian consciousness”546 that had started to develop in the region. However, 
the Obama administration had already taken decisive steps towards preventing this 
development and ensuring its inclusion and regional leadership in the new world center. 
Even though opinions differ, and it would certainly be too much to say that the Obama 
administration singlehandedly orchestrated Hatoyama’s fast removal from office and thus 
downplay the domestic Japanese context, foreign policy elites and US officials launched a 
massive discursive attack against Hatoyama that indeed played a part in his downfall.547  
In relation to the evolving regional order, the United States faced status disavowal 
and systemic unfavorability. In this way, America’s sole superpower status was not 
matched with a corresponding leadership role in the most dynamic region of the world. At 
the height of unipolarity, the Clinton administration could afford to give up on APEC, and 
the Bush administration could focus singlehandedly on the War on Terror, as no other 
pressing challenges could be perceived. This is further reflected by the direction that 
America’s trade strategy of “competitive liberalization” took under the Bush 
administration when bilateral FTAs with countries like Jordan and Columbia were 
considered strategic, and the East Asian region was de facto neglected and dropped from 
Washington’s “strategic radar.”548 More fundamentally, as Vinod Aggarwal accurately 
points out, the US policy of “competitive liberalization,” with its focus on bilateral and 
minilateral FTAs, had undermined American leadership. 549  The US proposal for the 
FTAAP that emerged as a response to the competitive pressure from the EAFTA and the 
CEPEA proposals was all but naïve given the “institutional weakness” of APEC.550 The 
United States was, in effect, “not seen as a natural member of East Asian regionalism” and 
“viewed as an outsider” in the region;551 it was excluded from the ASEAN + 3, the main 
secondary institution of the region; and, institutionally, trade barriers put American 
                                                 
546  Joshua Kurlantzick, “Pax Asia-Pacifica? East Asian Integration and Its Implications for the United 
States,” The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2007): 68. 
547 Paul O’Shea, “Overestimating the ‘Power Shift’: The US Role in the Failure of the Democratic Party of 
Japan’s ‘Asia Pivot,’” Asian Perspective 38, no. 3 (2014): 435–59. 
548 Kishore Mahbubani, “Wake Up, Washington: The US Risks Losing Asia,” 20. 
549 Vinod K. Aggarwal, “Look West: The Evolution of US Trade Policy Toward Asia,” Globalizations 7, no. 
4 (2010): 455–73. 
550 Ibid. 
551 Takashi Terada, “The United States and East Asian Regionalism,” 133, 136. 
155 
businesses at a disadvantage while China and Japan launched proposals for regional 
economic integration exclusive of the United States.  
Although concerns about China’s military intentions and the leadership struggle 
between China and Japan effectively prevented the formation of a regional bloc, the 2008 
Financial Crisis triggered perceptions of relative decline and generated status anxiety in 
the United States, and the contradiction between US sole superpower status and the absence 
of regional leadership in the new world center became causally salient. This status anxiety 
particularly related to the possibility of being excluded or “locked out” from the evolving 
Asia-Pacific region unless the United States acted decisively to change its trajectory. 
Simply put, the United States needed to check China’s rise and revise the regional 
institutional environment in order to maintain status. 
In the following chapter, I will ascertain how US relative decline generated status 
anxiety and how it caused the Obama administration to revise the regional order to maintain 
US sole superpower status.  
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7. Status Anxiety 
In this chapter, I will ascertain how the change in the distribution of power and prestige 
generated perceptions of relative decline and status anxiety among US officials in the 
Obama administration and think-tank experts. They essentially viewed Asia-Pacific as the 
new “world center” and China’s rise as the greatest geo-strategic challenge. These 
perceptions and anxieties became especially prominent with the 2008 Financial Crisis and 
stand in relation to the possibility of being “locked out” from the evolving Asia-Pacific 
region. China’s rise and its influence within regional institutions exclusive of the United 
States needed to be checked and the regional order needed to be revised in order to secure 
membership, leadership status, and favorable rules in the new world center. In this chapter, 
I will also demonstrate how the perceptions and anxieties differ in the economic and 
security domains of the regional order.  
 
7.1 Status Anxiety in Relation to the Regional Economic Order 
The 2008 US National Intelligence Council (NIC) report Global Trends 2025: A 
Transformed World plainly states that, “the transfer of global wealth and economic power 
now under way – roughly from West to East – is without precedent in modern history.”552 
Before launching the subsequent study Global Trends 2030, the NIC commissioned an 
academic review of the previous reports. One of the reviewers’ key findings was that past 
studies “correctly foresaw the direction” of the ongoing redistribution of power, but 
emphasized that “China’s power has consistently increased faster than expected,” pointing 
to the fact that the reports “tend toward underestimation of the rates of change.”553 It is clear 
that America’s principal office for strategic intelligence gathering perceived a historically 
unprecedented structural change.  
Core representatives of the Obama administration shared this perception. In 
November 10, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in her famous “America’s Pacific 
Century” speech at the East-West Center in Honolulu, stated that the Asia-Pacific is “the 
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world’s strategic and economic center of gravity”:  
 
So many global trends point to Asia. It is home to nearly half the world’s population, 
it boasts several of the largest and fastest-growing economies and some of the world’s 
busiest ports and shipping lanes… It is becoming increasingly clear that in the 
21st century, the world’s strategic and economic center of gravity will be the Asia 
Pacific, from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas.554  
 
Senior Director for Asian affairs in the National Security Council Jeffrey Bader echoed this 
perception: “With wealth, power, and influence gradually shifting from Europe toward Asia 
in the past several decades, the region has emerged as the world’s center of gravity for 
economic, political, and security decisions in the twenty-first century.” 555  Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell reverberated the same 
message: “there is a recognition that the lion’s share of the history of the 21st century will 
indeed be written in the Asia-Pacific region.”556 
President Barack Obama made similar acknowledgments. In his well-known speech 
to the Australian parliament, Obama stated that Asia-Pacific is “the world’s fastest-
growing region…home to more than half the global economy,” and he declared, “here, 
we see the future.” Given that Asia-Pacific is viewed as the new world center, Obama 
stated that the region “will largely define whether the century ahead will be marked by 
conflict or cooperation, needless suffering or human progress.”557 In the State of Union 
address in January 2011, Obama referred to the heightened economic competition 
generated by the emergence of China and India, and plainly stated: “Yes, the world has 
changed.”558  
At the center of this fundamental structural change, China unambiguously stands 
out. In an interview with the famous talk-show host Charlie Rose, Obama made a blunt 
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statement about China, saying that the country has “achieved such rapid growth” and “have 
grown so fast” that it is “almost on steroids.”559 In Jeffrey Bader’s insightful biographical 
account of his time in the National Security Council, he acknowledges the extent and 
significance of China’s rise. “China’s spectacular growth…and its thorough integration 
into the economies of the region through a web of trade and investment had permanently 
altered the geopolitical landscape.”560 In addition, the Director of the National Economic 
Council Larry Summers affirms that we are observing “Asia’s China-led renaissance.”561 
In essence, the Obama administration unequivocally perceived the ongoing fundamental 
structural change in the international system. The shift in the world center from the Europe-
Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific and the rise of China was clearly acknowledged.  
The Obama administration also acknowledged the change in the distribution of 
prestige. Jeffrey Bader makes it known that at the height of the 2008 Financial Crisis, 
“America’s economic strength, the central reason for its global prestige and influence, 
seemed to be dissolving.”562 Bader also acknowledged that the War on Terror and the 
quagmires produced by US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in the most 
negative attitudes towards the US “in modern history.”563 Or as Andrew Kohut argued in 
the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, it “is not just a rift with our European allies 
or hatred of America in the Middle East. It is a global slide, and positive views of the US 
have declined in other regions of the world, particularly in Latin America and Asia.”564 In 
2008, Kurt Campbell, widely credited for being the key architect behind the US pivot to 
Asia, argued that worries about the United States “becoming a peripheral player on key 
strategic issues in the Asia-Pacific” were prevalent. Campbell outlined a “daunting array 
of challenges” for the next president – the first among those: “reversing the decline in 
America’s global standing.”565  
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The 2008 Financial Crisis “put the final nail in the perceptual coffin of the post-
Cold War interregnum”566 and it “dramatically intensiﬁed” perceptions of US decline.567 
Instead of physical fear, this change triggered status anxiety. The anxiety about the 
possibility of downward mobility, leadership disavowal, and exclusion from the Asia-
Pacific region unless the United States acts to maintain its preeminent position. What 
emerged was “a new conventional wisdom that foresees continued decline of the United 
States, an end to the unipolar world order that marked the post-Cold War world.”568 In 
Barack Obama’s 2009 inaugural address, he summarized the American anxiety of looming 
downward mobility: 
 
That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood.  Our nation is at war against a 
far-reaching network of violence and hatred.  Our economy is badly weakened, a 
consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure 
to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age.  Homes have been lost, jobs 
shed, businesses shuttered.  Our health care is too costly, our schools fail too many – and 
each day brings further evidence that the ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries 
and threaten our planet. These are the indicators of crisis, subject to data and statistics.  Less 
measurable, but no less profound, is a sapping of confidence across our land; a nagging 
fear that America's decline is inevitable, that the next generation must lower its sights.569 
 
The US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner similarly underlined that the 2008 
Financial Crisis was “a moment of maximum challenge for our economy and our 
country.”570 
Obama made several references and comparisons that point to status anxiety and the 
worry that the United States is about to fall to a lower rung. In Obama’s 2010 State of 
Union address, Obama strongly accentuated that America’s status was at stake: “I do not 
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accept second place for the United States of America.”571 In the 2011 State of Union 
address, Obama put a strong emphasis on trade and referred to the competitive pressures 
emanating from various countries in the world, yet the weight of the message was placed 
on the challenge coming from China. Obama stated that it is China that now is “home to 
the world’s largest private solar research facility, and the world’s fastest computer;” it is 
China that now “is building faster trains and newer airports.” Obama lamented that “[o]ur 
infrastructure used to be the best, but our lead has slipped,” and “when our own engineers 
graded our nation’s infrastructure, they gave us a ‘D.’”572 Obama’s strategic plan for High 
Speed Rail is permeated with anxiety about the fact that the US lags behind.573 
The anxiety particularly related to the potential effects US decline in power and 
prestige would have in Asia. In Hillary Clinton’s “America’s Pacific Century” speech she 
did not only refer to the Asia-Pacific as the “world’s strategic and economic center of 
gravity,” but also addressed the anxieties wrought by America’s “serious economic 
challenges.” She acknowledged the “understandable” calls to “scale back,” but assured that 
America must fight the international paralysis suggested by anxiety; it must refrain from 
the temptation of isolationism. Clinton made clear that, “Asia stands out as a region where 
opportunities abound,” and “what will happen in Asia in the years ahead will have an 
enormous impact on our nation’s future.” For that reason, “we cannot afford to sit on the 
sidelines and leave it to others to determine our future.”574 In connection to a discussion 
about the global recovery, US Senior Official for APEC Kurt Tong highlights the economic 
consequences of standing outside the regional integration process: “America risks 
becoming disadvantaged economically if we do not participate constructively in the 
process of economic integration that is already underway in the region.”575 Similarly, the 
USTR under the first term of the Obama administration, Ron Kirk, highlighted that “the 
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number of trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific that exclude the United States has 
proliferated, shutting American business and workers out of valuable opportunities.”576 
In a 2013 Chatham House article, when outlining the context that faced the Obama 
administration as it launched the US pivot, Campbell points out that the economic turmoil 
following the 2008 Financial Crisis “raised profound questions about the long-term 
viability of the US economic model and the international liberal order the United States 
has championed since the Second World War, particularly when juxtaposed with the 
perceived success of China’s economy.” The narrative at the time, both at home and in the 
Asia-Pacific, “was one of American lack of strategic focus and decline.”577 In an interview 
with the Japanese daily newspaper The Asahi Shimbun, Campbell reiterated, “I think it 
would be fair to say that in 2009, there were really grave anxieties about an American 
decline.”578  
Not only did top US officials of the Obama administration perceive the United 
States to be in relative decline in terms of both power and prestige, they also viewed it as 
a zero-sum game in relation to China and worried about what positional effects it would 
produce in Asia-Pacific. Experts from the US foreign policy think-tank complex in 
Washington also resonated this anxiety, and raised concerns about the unfavorable regional 
order that was developing in East Asia and the negative consequences it would have for 
America’s status unless the Obama administration acts to restore its leading position. This 
status anxiety encompassed the entire American political spectrum – from left- to right-
leaning think tanks.  
In a special report by the Council of Foreign Relations, Evan Feigenbaum and 
Robert Manning cautioned that America’s sole reliance on the traditional hub-and-spokes 
“is unsustainable” and warned that the United States might face future exclusion from the 
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regional architecture, which would affect US interests and influence, “unless it acts to 
shape multilateral trends in Asia.”579 They argued:  
 
[S]ome multilateral institutions that exclude the United States have become the locus of 
economic and financial trends that will increasingly disadvantage US firms and work 
against US objectives. Certain preferential trade agreements and financial arrangements, 
as well as regionally based regulations and standards, threaten American interests. And 
some of the new institutions created without US involvement, notably ASEAN Plus 
Three, hold the potential to marginalize the United States in Asia over time.580 
 
Alexander Foxley, in a report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
resounds this message, and argues that the fact that “ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 
exclude…the United States” represents a “strategic dilemma” since Washington would like 
to “prevent an Asia-only bloc from emerging.”581 Likewise, Claude Barfield and Philip 
Levy from the American Enterprise Institute paraphrased former Singaporean Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew and stated that the implications of “a narrower, more exclusive 
vision of regionalism, limited to Asian nations” are clear: “unless the United States 
becomes more engaged in Asia, through reassuming leadership, the Peoples Republic of 
China (PRC) will inexorably emerge as the regional hegemon.”582  Fred Bergsten and 
Jeffrey Schott from Peterson Institute for International Economics issued a similar counsel: 
 
Simply put, key Asian countries have prioritized economic integration within East Asia 
rather than within the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum. Within the next few years, it is likely that the East Asian 
countries will deepen their economic ties and conclude both a regional trade agreement and 
a monetary agreement. In addition, Japan has initiated the East Asian Summits, and a new 
East Asian architecture is in the process of formulation. These countries are well on the 
way toward creating an Asian bloc, a development that could ‘draw a line down the Pacific’ 
by discriminating against US exporters and investors and by excluding the United States 
from important regional economic and security forums.583 
 
                                                 
579 Evan A. Feigenbaum and Robert A. Manning, “The United States in the New Asia,” Council Special 
Report, no. 50 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009), 4. 
580 Ibid, 4. 
581  Alejandro Foxley, “Regional Trade Blocs The Way To The Future?” (Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 42. 
582 Claude Barfield and Philip I. Levy, “Tales of the South Pacific: President Obama and the Transpacific 
Partnership,” American Enterprise Institute, International Economic Outlook, no. 2 (December 2009): 2. 
583 C. Fred Bergsten and Jeffrey J. Schott, “Submission to the USTR in Support of a Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement” (Paterson Institute for International Economics, 2010), accessed September 12, 2016, 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=1482. 
163 
The assessments are straightforward, unambiguous, and clear. They point to the 
exclusionary tendencies of the East Asian regional order, which threaten US status and 
influence unless the trajectory and the regional order is changed. Hence, in relation to the 
regional economic order US perceptions of relative decline and status anxiety were 
pervasive as Obama assumed power. And rightly so, for China’s rise, in pure material term, 
challenges the structural leadership role of the United States; a regional integration process 
exclusive of the United States challenges Washington’s entrepreneurial leadership role; 
and as China’s development experience is gaining attraction as an alternative model, 
whatever the nature of this model,584 China equally challenges US intellectual leadership 
role. 
Yet did US status anxiety only pertain to the economic domain of the regional 
order? Indeed, the United States still perceives itself to be an unrivalled global military 
power, yet military status anxiety were present nonetheless, albeit in a less pervasive way. 
This anxiety does not concern an impending challenge to US global military dominance, 
but implicates a challenge to US regional superiority perceived to be presently unfolding. 
In particular, US anxiety very much connects to China’s capacity to challenge the United 
States’ command of the commons. With this said, I will now examine the military status 
anxiety of the Obama administration. 
 
7.2 Status Anxiety in Relation to the Regional Security Order 
The Obama administration perceived no fundamental change in the military balance of 
power; it perceived the United States to be an unrivalled global military power. 
Nevertheless, US status anxiety is observed in relation to the regional security order and 
particularly revolves around two core aspects: global access and command of the commons 
in light of China’s asymmetric A2/AD capabilities, and an impending Chinese hegemonic 
challenge. 
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In the beginning of his presidency, Barack Obama, somehow reluctantly, 
proclaimed that the United States, “whether we like it or not,” continues to be “a dominant 
military superpower.”585 In the 2011 State of Union address, Obama stated, “No single wall 
separates East and West. No one rival superpower is aligned against us.”586 In 2015, in 
front of the world leaders in the United Nations General Assembly, Obama confidently 
declared, “I lead the strongest military that the world has ever known.”587 Something he 
reiterated with even greater buoyancy a year later in his last State of Union address: 
 
Let me tell you something. The United States of America is the most powerful nation on 
Earth. Period. Period. It’s not even close. It’s not even close. It’s not even close. We 
spend more on our military than the next eight nations combined. Our troops are the 
finest fighting force in the history of the world. No nation attacks us directly, or our 
allies, because they know that’s the path to ruin. Surveys show our standing around the 
world is higher than when I was elected to this office, and when it comes to every important 
international issue, people of the world do not look to Beijing or Moscow to lead – they 
call us.588 
 
Obama downplayed the challenges coming from antagonistic great powers or rival 
superpowers by stating that in the contemporary world the threat does not primarily come 
from “evil empires,” but from “failing states.”589 
Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Obama 
administration, shares this appraisal of US military power. In his assessment of the 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review, Dempsey outlined his perception of America’s military 
position:  
 
I believe that in 2020, we will still be the most powerful military in the world. More than 
1 million men and women under arms – present in more than 130 countries and at sea – 
will still possess capabilities in every domain that overmatches potential adversaries. 
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Enjoying alliances with a majority of the most powerful states, we will be the only nation 
able to globally project massive military power.590 
 
He continued by outlining the unique global managerial responsibilities that come with this 
this sole superpower status: “Our forces will also have considerable responsibilities. They 
must protect allies, be globally present to deter conflict, protect the global commons, and 
keep war far from our shores and our citizens. These obligations are unique to the United 
States military.”591 Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter shares the assessment, despite 
emphasizing the “historic change” of Asia-Pacific, which he attributes to rising countries 
and economic miracles. In the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue Carter stated: 
 
The Defense Department maintains its world-leading capabilities because the United 
States has made incomparable investments in it over decades.  As a result, it will take 
decades or more for anyone to build the kind of military capability the United States 
possesses.  This strength is not simply about dollar figures.  We harness those dollars to 
America’s innovative and technological culture to develop revolutionary 
technologies.  And that military edge is strengthened and honed in unrivaled and hard-
earned operational experience over the past 15 years.  No other military possesses this kind 
of skill and agility backed by this much experience.592 
 
This perspective is widely shared among US officials, scholars, and think-tank experts – 
US military power is unrivalled in the world, and the balance of military power has not yet 
undergone fundamental structural change. Hence, militarily, the world is unipolar still. Yet 
even the most vocal academic proponents of the longevity of American military unipolarity 
argue that China is the only country with the raw potential to become a true peer.593 In fact, 
the Obama administration perceived the security environment to be changing. Albeit not 
undergoing fundamental structural change, they perceived an ongoing regional change, 
and that change concerns China’s steadfast military expansion and modernization – a 
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change that is perceived to have regional consequences, causing status anxiety despite 
United States’ preeminent global position. China’s emergence as a regional military power 
that challenges American access and command of the commons in the world’s economic 
and strategic center of gravity is what make up American status anxiety in relation to the 
regional security order. This is particularly perceived to be the case in the Western Pacific, 
resulting from the lateral pressure of China’s military expansion and modernization, 
coupled with uncertainty about China’s intentions and lingering hegemonic ambitions.  
To be clear, already under the Bush administration the regional balance of power 
in East Asia called the attention of the United States. Aside from the initial focus on China 
as a “peer competitor,” which was scaled down as the Middle East and the War on Terror 
started to occupy American decision makers,594 the Bush administration still perceived the 
regional balance of power in East Asia to be changing. As laid out in the 2006 QDR, 
 
Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily 
with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time off 
set traditional US military advantages absent US counter strategies…The pace and scope 
of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk. China is likely 
to continue making large investments in high-end, asymmetric military 
capabilities…These capabilities, the vast distances of the Asian theater, China’s 
continental depth, and the challenge of en route and in-theater U.S. basing place a premium 
on forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied areas.595 
 
Yet with United States’ extensive military campaigns in the Middle East, the concern about 
the China’s impending challenge was not placed on the top of the American utility calculus, 
nor was America’s supreme military position in the Asia-Pacific yet perceived to be 
seriously challenged by the rise of China. The challenge from China was at the time rather 
a potential, impending challenge cautioned by the Bush administration. However, during 
the Obama administration heightened concerns about China’s challenge to the established 
regional security order and United States’ preeminent position are observable.  
The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy released by the Department of 
Defense in 2015, claims that the United States “has played a vital role in undergirding 
regional peace, stability and security” for 70 years, yet the policy document simultaneously 
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cautions that “this task is becoming more challenging.” 596  The “changing” regional 
security environment is partly explained as arising from “rapid economic and military 
modernization, combined with growing resource demands,” which “has exacerbated the 
potential for conflict over long-standing territorial disputes.”597 These concerns highlight 
specific forms of status anxiety.  
 Apart from maritime and territorial disputes another pressing issue for the United 
States is the “unprecedented rise” in unsafe air and maritime maneuvers carried out by the 
PLA, which often targets the US and “threatens the US objectives of safeguarding the 
freedom of the seas and promoting adherence to international law and standards.”598 The 
Chinese military maneuvers in air and maritime spaces testify to the lateral pressure from 
China’s military expansion that challenge the dominant status of the United States in the 
Western Pacific. They do not threaten the freedom of the seas; rather, they threaten the 
United States’ safeguarding of the freedom of the seas. It is an issue about who is going to 
do the safeguarding of the commons in the Western Pacific. To be clear, and this is widely 
acknowledged, both the United States and China share a fundamental interest in keeping 
the seas open and safe. China’s status as the world’s biggest trading nation necessitates an 
active safeguarding of the uninhibited flow of goods. What is at stake is the authoritative 
interpretation of international law, and whom that is going to provide this authoritative 
interpretation. The United States and China diverge on what should be permitted in the 
territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), specifically in relation to innocent 
passage and prior approval. In fact, many Southeast Asian and South Asian states share 
China’s position, but while those countries issue diplomatic protests when the US navy 
operates in their waters without consent, China is the only country that “has operationally 
challenged US warships on multiple occasions.”599 As long as China continues to expand 
and challenge the American presence in the Western Pacific, the United States must engage 
in practices of boundary-maintenance [read: Freedom of Navigation Operations 
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(FONOPS)] with the proviso that Washington maintains its desire for preeminence in the 
Western Pacific.  
 China has indeed long been involved in setting standards, as evidenced by the 
signing of the Declaration of Conduct (DoC) and the ongoing negotiations for a Code of 
Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea together with the ASEAN. The United States 
reiterates that it supports these initiatives, but the fact is that China wants the setting of 
these standards to be a regional issue. On those occasions when China and the United States 
do agree, such as in the signing of two Memoranda of Understanding on Confidence 
Building Measures (CBMs) in November 2014 that now includes new annexes on air-to-
air safety and crisis communications, and the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea 
(CUES), then it is of practical concern designed to manage so that strategic rivalry does not 
spin out of control, yet not about resolving the underlying positional competition for status 
and influence.  
 In relation to China’s increasing presence in the Western Pacific, the most pressing 
issue concerns China’s A2/AD capabilities. As Van Jackson notes, “[b]y any meaningful 
measure of capability, the United States has long maintained military superiority in Asia, 
but the US defense community has begun raising concerns about China’s rapid military-
technical advances and its asymmetric strategy explicitly designed to nullify the traditional 
advantages of the US military.”600  China’s A2/AD capabilities is the most significant 
“strategic challenge” the US military is facing.601 The status anxiety that it generates is 
amply present in the core policy documents of the US Department of Defense, and concerns 
the future of the US military in the Western Pacific. 
 In the 2014 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, the US Department of Defense 
conceives of the Asia-Pacific region as “a contested A2/AD environment.”602 In the 2012 
Defense Strategic Guidance, the A2/AD challenge is further highlighted, and China, 
together with Iran, are singled out as the main perpetrators behind a strategy that seeks to 
restrict “access and freedom to operate” by using asymmetric A2/AD capabilities.603 In the 
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2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the same anxiety is reiterated, and China is sometimes 
called out by name, and sometimes not. Even so, it is evident who is hiding behind the 
notion of “increasingly capable and economically strong potential adversaries” when the 
following is highlighted:  
 
Our technological superiority has allowed largely unfettered access to project power where 
needed. However, this superiority is being challenged by increasingly capable and 
economically strong potential adversaries that are likely developing and fielding counters to 
some or all of the key technologies on which the United States has come to rely.604 
 
This anxiety does not concern an impending challenge to US global primacy, but a 
challenge to US regional superiority perceived to be presently unfolding. In particular, the 
anxiety very much connects to China’s capacity to challenge United States’ command of 
the commons.605 As US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert put it in 
front of the Senate Arms Services Committee in April 2014, “I’m very concerned” about 
“our ability to project power in an area against an advanced adversary [China] with those 
advanced capabilities…We’re slipping behind.” 606  Or as spelled out by former US 
ambassador Chas Freeman, with a long experience of working with US-China issues both 
inside and outside government, 
 
China is modernizing its military at a peculiar moment of history. The United States 
inherited worldwide military superiority from the collapse of its Soviet rival. Without much 
discussion, it has embraced the neo-conservative agenda of sustaining this superiority at 
all costs. But rising Chinese defense capabilities erode American supremacy. China’s new 
anti-carrier weapons endanger U.S. force projection capabilities in the Western Pacific; its 
anti-satellite programs imperil U.S. global surveillance and communication capabilities; its 
growing operations in cyberspace menace U.S. government operations and the economy 
of the American homeland alike. These are serious challenges not just to American 
hegemony but to core U.S. interests.607  
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The concern about Chinese military expansion and modernization, especially in terms of 
sophisticated A2/AD technology capable of restring US access to, and dominance of, the 
commons within the First Island chain, is connected to another issue that evoke great 
anxieties, namely China’s potential regional hegemonic ambitions. This issue evokes great 
concerns among conservative US politicians and experts on the right flank of the think-
thank strategic complex as well as a few representatives of the Obama administration, who 
have made a few, occasional comments about China’s hegemonic intentions.  
 Perhaps former Republican Senator, Tea Party activist, and President of the think 
tank The Heritage Foundation, James Warren DeMint, is the best example of the 
conservative position. DeMint argues that “it’s fair to say that China is seeking a form of 
dominance, at least, or hegemony in the Western Pacific and that this impulse is expressing 
itself through a series of actions in the East and South China Seas.” He adds that “the 
balance of power in the region is shifting toward China…it’s shifting because of their 
comprehensive, concerted, and purposeful effort in building up their military…They are 
becoming, if they’re not already, a peer competitor of the U.S. in the Western Pacific.”608 
Even though voices like these are not officially sanctioned pronouncements that emanated 
from the US government, similar concerns have been uttered by core representatives of the 
Obama administration despite the official position not to single out China as a “peer 
competitor” with hegemonic ambitions. 
 When Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made his last trip to Asia, he stated that 
he believes China’s long-term goal is to push the United States out of the first island chain 
to the second island chain, and even farther beyond. 609  The head of the US Pacific 
Command Admiral Harry Harris represents another such a voice. Harris stated that China 
is “clearly militarizing the South China Sea” and “changing…the operational landscape.” 
In order to prove his point, he added, “You’d have to believe in a flat Earth to think 
otherwise.” Apart from this illustrative metaphor, Harris was more concrete when he voiced 
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his concerns about China’s intentions: “I believe China seeks hegemony in East Asia.”610 
These perceptions indicate anxieties about the future US military status in the Western 
Pacific.  
 However, aside from these outlier statements about China’s hegemonic intentions, 
views that were more moderate characterized the articulations of the core representatives 
of the Obama administration who instead echoed concerns about the ambiguity of China’s 
military intentions and development trajectory. Although Obama, Kerry, Donilon, Bader, 
Panetta, and other key officials in the Obama administration repeatedly insisted that they 
adopted a “welcoming approach” to China – that the United States “welcomes the rise of a 
prosperous, peaceful and stable China” 611  – greater transparency concerning China’s 
intentions and its military modernization is nonetheless an enduring caveat embedded into 
this welcoming approach. For instance, as stated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, 
signed by both Barack Obama and Leon Panetta: 
 
Over the long term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect 
the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong 
stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral 
relationship. However, the growth of China’s military power must be accompanied by 
greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region.612 
 
This specifically concerns the Western Pacific, where strategic mistrust is increasing as 
China expands its presence and is able to project power in the South and East China Seas 
and the Taiwan Strait. Tom Donilon urges the United States and China to set up “open and 
reliable channels to address perceptions and tensions about our respective activities in 
the short-term and about our long-term presence and posture in the Western Pacific.”613 
The short-term presence largely concerns conflict control, the avoidance of military 
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collusions through increased communication to prevent disastrous unintended 
consequences arising from unplanned military encounters; the long-term presence, 
however, concerns China’s potential hegemonic intentions, and they cannot be solved by 
establishing new communication channels. Hence, as long as China’s military presence 
in its immediate neighborhood is increasing these anxieties will not be relaxed, they will 
rather continue to grow. With this expansion comes a growing practical capability to 
exercise the regional rights and responsibilities associated with true great power status, 
and it enables China’s longstanding demand for “discourse power” or a “right to speak” 
to be articulated with greater muscle in relation to the regional security order. Since China 
is rising in relative terms, the advent of a new regional balance of power can only mean 
retrenchment for US forces in the Western Pacific, unless Washington struggles to 
maintain its dominant status and revises its design of the regional security order.  
 Ultimately, sequestration or the automatically triggered all-round budget cuts put 
in place by the 2011 Budget Control Act adds the last component of US status anxiety and 
demonstrates the concrete material effects US relative decline has on defense spending. In 
the 2014 QDR, Martin Dempsey argues that the reduced defense budget affects United 
States’ ability to meet its unique military obligations.614 Reduced defense spending “would 
undermine a core competitive advantage for the United States, decreasing our ability to 
engage globally, project power, deter conflict, and decisively win against potential 
adversaries.”615 Hence, faced with these fiscal constraints, a rebalance of the military 
budget is necessary. As Dempsey puts it:  
 
The core theme for the FY 2014 QDR from my point of view is one of rebalance. Because 
of geo-political change, frequent evolution in the way wars are fought, improving 
capabilities of our potential adversaries, and reduced resources as a result of the national 
imperative of deficit reduction, we will need to rebalance in many areas.616 
 
Apart from making defense spending more effective and lean, the United States needs to 
prioritize in times of fiscal strain. Tellingly, Dempsey argues that the United States is safe, 
that the overseas basing is secure, and that the United States still possess unique power 
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projection capabilities, yet he points to East Asia as the place where America’s position 
will be challenged.617 Thus, a military strategy that shifts its focus to East Asia where the 
greatest challenge is located is necessary. As spelled out in the 2012 Strategic Defense 
Guidance, “while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will 
of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”618 One can question how long US 
military dominance can be sustained when the very viability of a military insurance policy 
is challenged by budgetary constraints that reduce the coverage of the insurance. It is in 
times like these when the relatively declining sole superpower must prioritize and make 
tough decisions, and the key decision was to rebalance to the region where the greatest 
challenger is arising – that is, the Asia-Pacific. 
 In this way, US status anxiety in relation to the regional security order particularly 
relates to global access and command of the commons in light of China’s asymmetric 
A2/AD capabilities, coupled with an impending hegemonic challenge from China that 
threatens the United States’ dominant position in the Western Pacific, and so in times of 
sequestration. US status anxiety revealed the future possibility and the necessity to act; it 
revealed the possibility of downward mobility and the challenge to US dominant status and 
leadership, and it revealed the necessity to act in order to prevent the materialization of this 
very possibility. The following chapter will outline how US status anxiety determined the 
grand strategic priority of the Obama administration. 
 
7.3 Status Anxiety Reveals the Possibility and the Necessity to Act 
The Obama administration’s concern about China and the Asia-Pacific was not about fear 
and physical insecurity. As Martin Dempsey makes clear, the overseas basing is secure and 
“the homeland is safe,”619 and as spelled out in the RAND report Choices for America in 
a Turbulent World: Strategic Rethink, the United States faces no existential threat. 620 
Instead, perceptions of relative decline generated status anxiety, anxieties about the future 
of US status, leadership, and influence in the Asia-Pacific. Yet status anxiety does not 
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paralyze, but becomes a “ministering spirit” that reveals the choice and leads the United 
States to act. It reveals the necessity of a status-maintenance strategy. 
In the midst of the financial crisis, Charles Krauthammer published a widely 
acclaimed article where he outlined the state of the US national sentiment in this historic 
moment. Once more, Krauthammer argued, are “[t]he weathervanes of conventional 
wisdom…engaged in another round of angst about America in decline. New theories, old 
slogans: Imperial overstretch. The Asian awakening. The post-American world. Inexorable 
forces beyond our control bringing the inevitable humbling of the world hegemon.” He 
continued by arguing, “just as the rise of China is a straight-line projection of current 
economic trends, American decline is a straight-line projection of the fearful, pessimistic 
mood of a country war-weary and in the grip of a severe recession.” 621  Although 
Krauthammer launched a polemic against the resurrection of the conventional wisdom of 
the declinists, specifically by claiming that “decline is a choice,” he nonetheless captures a 
mood that was imperative for the reassessment of US grand strategic priorities. Yet properly 
understood, it is anxiety that reveals the choice.622 
US foreign policy elites had long been aware of Asia’s growing strength. In 2004, 
James Hoge Jr. argued that,  
 
The transfer of power from West to East is gathering pace and soon will dramatically 
change the context for dealing with international challenges – as well as the challenges 
themselves. Many in the West are already aware of Asia’s growing strength. This 
awareness, however, has not yet been translated into preparedness.623 
 
The reason this awareness had not developed into preparedness is simply that the change in 
the distribution of power and prestige was not profound enough; that the Bush 
administration was occupied with interventions in the Middle East and the global War on 
Terror only served to reinforce the inattentiveness. Yet with the Obama administration, the 
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time had come to “redeem US foreign policy” and restore Washington’s leadership.624 The 
American status anxiety that was triggered by the efficient cause of the 2008 Financial 
Crisis finally revealed the ramifications of the material obstacle course and the declining 
reputational capital facing the United States in the Asia-Pacific. The 2008 Financial Crisis 
was a moment that “tested” the United States and forced it to “answer history’s call,” as 
Obama put it. 625  It awoke Washington’s strategic choice – the choice of whether 
Washington should “abdicate or retain its dominance;” 626  whether Washington should 
retrench or “restore confidence in America’s economic leadership around the world.”627 As 
stated by Eric Edelman, “the possibility of avoiding multipolarity or non-polarity clearly 
exists. It requires resolve to maintain the United States’ role as the ‘indispensable nation’ 
and a strategy for doing so.”628  Burdened by possibility, the possibility of downward 
mobility and the challenge to an Americancentric liberal world order, status anxiety 
revealed the necessity to pivot to Asia. 
In 2005, renowned scholar official Joseph Nye, who has an extensive curriculum 
vitae covering academia, think-tanks, NGOs, and government, argued, “it is clear that the 
rise of China’s soft power – at America’s expense – is an issue that needs to be urgently 
addressed…It is time for the US to pay more attention to the balance of soft power in 
Asia.” 629  In 2008, Kurt Campbell made clear that “China’s ‘charm offensive’ in the 
region…should serve as a guide to American decision makers that if we don’t reenergize 
our diplomatic efforts in the region, we will lose out.”630 The implications of this zero-sum 
logic is spelled out: “Power will continue to shift in Asia, but a shift in the balance of 
influence could challenge the stability of the liberal and democratic system that took root 
under U.S. protection and engagement in the aftermath of World War II.”631 In other words, 
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in Asia, the American-led world order is at stake. In fact, emerging multipolarity and 
relative decline gives rise to strong structural pressures – the new world center, the region 
of the most powerful rising challenger, becomes the target of the sole superpower bent on 
maintaining dominance.  
The United States needed to act, act to maintain its dominant status by securing 
leadership in the Asia-Pacific. In his celebrated speech to the Australian parliament, 
Obama declared what we can term America’s “three leaderships”: security leadership, 
economic leadership, and moral leadership. 632  In his remarks at the Swearing-in 
Ceremony as Secretary of State, John Kerry affirmed that, now “is not a time for America 
to retreat,” now “is a time for us to continue to lead.”633 Similarly, and despite the fact that 
Jeffrey Bader argues that Obama and his foreign policy team dealt with Asia in a 
“resolutely pragmatic” and “nonideological” manner (without the split between 
neoconservatives and traditional realists that haunted the Bush administration), Bader 
nonetheless described his Asia advisory team as consisting of individuals who “all…were 
by conviction internationalists who believed in American global leadership.”634 Likewise, 
in an interview in The Asahi Shimbun, Kurt Campbell lays out the unambiguous purpose 
of the US pivot: “to sustain American leadership in Asia.” The significant and explicitly 
spelled out caveat is that China should accept this leadership.635 
The higher-order end of status maintenance thus centers the rational-
decisionmaking process on finding the best practical means for this desired end. For 
America to lead in a global order, it must revise the regional order. The logic-of-position 
(power) and the logic-of-interpretation (prestige) of the regional order and the status 
anxiety that the perceptions of relative decline generated clearly informed the 
decisionmaking process of the Obama administration. 
Tom Donilon discloses that a grand strategic reassessment took place among US 
officials in the Obama administration directly after Barack Obama was elected, and even 
before he was inaugurated:  
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[F]rom the outset – even before the President took office – he directed those of us 
on his national security team to engage in a strategic assessment, a truly global 
examination of our presence and priorities.  We asked what the US footprint and 
face to the world was and what it ought to be.  We set out to identify the key national 
security interests that we needed to pursue.  We looked around the world and asked: 
where are we over-weighted?  Where are we underweighted?636 
 
This led to “the President’s judgment that we were over-weighted in some areas and 
regions, including our military actions in the Middle East.  At the same time, we were 
underweighted in other regions, such as the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, we believed this was 
our key geographic imbalance.”637 Kurt Campbell makes a similar description: 
 
From the beginning of the administration, there were clear indicators that we did, in fact, 
want to step up our game in the Asia-Pacific region. In my first conversations with 
Secretary Clinton and, in fact, in the White House, that was the going-in proposition, that 
we needed to do more.638 
 
Jeffrey Bader reveals that, “the major geostrategic challenge” that confronted the Obama 
administration “was how to react to the dramatic rise of China.”639 It was the shift in the 
“world’s center of gravity” to the Asia-Pacific and “China’s rise” that “led the Obama 
foreign policy team to several fundamental strategic judgements about the Asia-Pacific 
region, the actors in it, and the American interests there.”640 In his speech to the Australian 
parliament, Obama argued that we are living in “times of great change and uncertainty”641 
– times of fundamental structural change and uncertainty about the future rank of the 
United States. Hence, as Obama made clear, it was “of necessity” that the United States 
“rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific.”642 
With the Obama administration’s aim of maintaining US sole superpower status, 
global leadership, and an Americancentric liberal world order, whatever China does, it will 
be a competitor that must be stopped. With the change in the balance of power and the 
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balance of prestige, and the status anxiety this generated, by necessity, the United States 
needed to act to preserve its dominant position in the world’s strategic and economic center 
of gravity. In order to do so, the United States needed to revise the regional order and make 
it more amenable for the realization of this goal – revise to maintain.  
I have now ascertained the two causal factors (change in the balance of power and 
change in the balance of prestige) and demonstrated how they induced perceptions of 
relative decline and status anxiety, which led the Obama administration to reorient its grand 
strategy towards the Asia-Pacific. I will now analyze the Obama administration’s 
revisionist projects for the regional order – the transformational revisionist project of the 
TPP and the reformist revisionist project of America’s Principled Security Network.
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8. The US Pivot to Asia: The Obama Administration’s Grand 
Strategic Reorientation to Maintain US Sole Superpower 
Status, American Leadership, and a Liberal World Order 
In a series of high-profile diplomatic performances, the Obama administration declared 
that it would end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and reorient America’s grand 
strategy towards the Asia-Pacific. The strategy was explicitly intended to check China’s 
rise and to strengthen “America’s presence and influence in Asia.”643 As Barack Obama 
assumed power, the new administration took immediate steps to pivot to Asia. 
According to Jeffrey Bader, 
 
[Tom] Donilon and Denis McDonough, chief of staff of the National Security Council 
(NSC), called for early steps to demonstrate this new approach. Although the State 
Department’s assistant secretary of state designate for East Asian and Pacific affairs, 
Kurt Campbell, was not confirmed by the senate until June [2009], he strongly 
supported an early trip to Asia by Secretary Hillary Clinton to demonstrate Asia’s 
centrality to US interests.644 
 
Clinton’s trip to Asia in February 2009 hit all symbolic records. It was the first time an 
American Secretary of State selected Asia, not Europe, as the first official overseas 
destination since Dean Rusk’s visit in 1961, and the first time a Secretary of State 
visited the ASEAN Secretariat. On top of that, Clinton announced that the US would 
assign an ambassador to ASEAN based in Jakarta. In her second trip to the continent 
just a few months later Clinton firmly declared that “United States is back”645 and went 
on to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which paved the way 
for membership in the East Asian Summit. The stage was set for Obama to present 
himself as “America’s first Pacific President” and declare the United States’ identity as 
an “Asia-Pacific nation” in his visit to Japan in November 2009.646 
Two years later, in October 2011, Clinton published her famous “America’s 
Pacific Century” article in Foreign Policy where she articulated Washington’s regional 
vision and declared that the 21st century will be “America’s Pacific Century,” thus 
appropriating the meaning of the “Pacific Century” or the “Asian Century” – originally 
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a slogan denoting Asia’s economic renaissance.647 A month later, she reiterated the 
same message in her remarks at the East-West Center in Hawaii and revealed the 
intentions behind the carefully orchestrated diplomatic moves of the Obama 
administration: “This region is known as the Asia-Pacific, but sometimes the second 
word gets less attention than the first. And the Obama Administration has taken many 
steps to right that balance.” 648  There should therefore “be no doubt,” as Obama 
declared, “In the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all 
in.”649  
The scope of the region, and America’s place in the region, had long been 
contested (as demonstrated in chapter six). The representational force of the diplomatic 
performances of the Obama administration was now clearly directed towards 
broadening the insider-outsider logic of the region and demarcating a space for its 
liberal internationalist project. The Obama administration was actively engaged in 
“locking down” the meaning of the region and relegitimizing America’s place in it. At 
the core of the revisionist project, we find the necessity to reinvent the geographical 
scope of the region from East Asia to the Asia-Pacific (economically) and the Indo-
Pacific (militarily), and ensure that the secondary institutions of the regional order not 
only include the United States, but that the United States will occupy the leadership 
position. Through personal anecdotes and experiences that turn the Asian-Pacific space 
into places with emotional attachments linked to service and sacrifice, American 
officials were reminding the regional audience that the United States is and has always 
been a “Pacific Nation” and a “Pacific Power,” essential for upholding peace and 
prosperity.650 In the words of Tom Donilon: “We are a resident Pacific power, resilient 
and indispensable.”651 
In Barack Obama’s speech to the Australian parliament, a two-year long build-
up of consistent “forward-deployed” diplomacy reached its crescendo. Obama elevated 
the Asia-Pacific to the strategic center stage, determining the fate of humankind. It is 
in Asia-Pacific it will be determined if the “century ahead will be marked by conflict 
                                                 
647 Mark Borthwick, Pacific Century - The Emergence of Modern Asia (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), 
1. 
648 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” emphasis added. 
649 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament” 
650 Core representatives of the Obama administration repeat this message in several key speeches. 
651 Tom Donilon, “Remarks By Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President: ‘The United 
States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013’” 
181 
or cooperation, needless suffering or human progress;” it is here that the United States 
must restore unambiguity and put history on a progressive American liberal trajectory: 
 
The currents of history may ebb and flow, but over time they move – decidedly, 
decisively – in a single direction. History is on the side of the free – free societies, free 
governments, free economies, free people. And the future belongs to those who stand 
firm for those ideals, in this region and around the world….This is the future we seek 
in the Asia-Pacific – security, prosperity and dignity for all. That’s what we stand 
for. That’s who we are. That’s the future we will pursue, in partnership with allies and 
friends, and with every element of American power.652 
 
The Obama administration decisively turned the Asia-Pacific into a site of contestation, 
part of a struggle between two alternative futures and regional orders. It dismantled the 
weight of the material forces of history and asserted that the future will follow an 
idealist trajectory. In other words, it countered the attraction of China’s economic rise 
and made it clear that East Asia’s economic resilience rests on feeble foundations unless 
the countries in the region adopt a broader Asia-Pacific outlook and stand on a firm 
liberal foundation. In the same vein as the Bush administration, the democratic 
leadership of Barack Obama believed that the United States is on “the right side of 
history.”653 That the United States was in the middle of an economic crisis did not alter 
the resolve. Although Obama acknowledged that “our nation is at a moment of 
transition” and that “we face an inflection point,” he stressed that “in a changing world 
that demands our leadership, the United States of America will remain the greatest force 
for freedom and security that the world has ever known.”654 
The action that the Obama administration was forced to undertake in this 
formative moment revolved around the two core components of the US pivot to Asia – 
the military and the economy components – that will guarantee peace and prosperity. 
The military component revolves around traditional geopolitics, and arguably ensures 
peace and stability; the economic component revolves around geoeconomics, and 
arguably ensures prosperity and progress. These two dimensions were in turn part of an 
American commitment to advancing its values in the region,655 which exemplified a 
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successful “bipartisan consensus” of the US Asia policy that the foreign policy team 
and the Asia team of the National Security Council “tried hard to build” by basing it on 
common “American principles.”656 It represents a view of progress and modernization 
“based in the necessity of American world leadership.”657 To ensure global leadership, 
the United States needed to revise the regional order of the new world center. This 
status-driven logic serves as the core impetus behind the Obama administration’s pivot 
to Asia and its associated revisionist projects intended to make both the regional 
economic order and the regional security order more amenable to the maintenance of 
America’s sole superpower status. 
I will now demonstrate the transformational revisionist characteristics of the 
TPP and then turn to the reformist revisionist project of America’s Principled Security 
Network. Both projects were pushed by the Obama administration to maintain US sole 
superpower status and global leadership. 
 
8.1 The Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Transformational Revisionist 
Project 
The TPP was a transformational revisionist project since it aimed at changing the two 
core dimensions of the regional economic order – the regional status order and the 
regional institutional order. In this way, the TPP represents change of secondary 
institutions since it was designed to replace the existing regional institutions that 
regulated the market. With the TPP, the Obama administration intended to maintain 
global leadership by setting the basis for regional leadership and implement new rules 
for the regional economic order, which thus entails both positional and institutional 
change of the regional status quo – revise to maintain. Yet the TPP also involves 
contestation in the primary institution of the market since it also involved a struggle 
to define the very limits and intrusiveness of trade liberalization. By extension, this 
also has consequences for the primary institution of sovereignty since it involves the 
question if the market, through international legislation, should be permitted to 
overpower the sovereign authority of the state.  
Under the Obama administration, the United States engaged in a productive 
revisionist process to change the “noodle bowl” structure of the regional trade 
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landscape and combat the threat of exclusion from future regional trade agreements, 
as evidenced by the EAFTA and the CEPEA proposals. The Obama administration 
was declaring and relegitimizing its leadership status and the need for an Asia-Pacific 
wide regional trade agreement simultaneously as it was delegitimizing East Asian 
trade practices and excluding China from its revisionist project for the regional 
economic order. Even if the Obama administration was open to include China in the 
future, it needed to set the rules of the game first so that if China eventually enters it 
entails accepting a subordinate position and a ready-made rule set that would shape 
China’s behavior.  
The Obama administration interpreted the regional status quo according to a 
certain logic of inappropriateness; the norms of the ASEAN way or the values of neo-
mercantilism should not guide the pace and mold the normative structure of regional 
economic integration, nor should East Asia or the broader Asia-Pacific define the scope 
of regional economic cooperation. The regional economic status quo is not only seen 
as highly inappropriate from a rhetorical, ethical, and liberal capitalist perspective, 
according to which the slow-moving, incremental transformation of regional economies 
are seen as signs of illiberal illwillingness and inefficient ways of conducting economic 
life, but also, and even more so, from a US leadership perspective, according to which 
the exclusionary scope poses a serious threat to the regional, and by extension global, 
leadership of the United States. The optimal choice to maximize status and influence 
was positional appropriation through exclusionary social closure – ensuring leadership 
status and maximizing influence through the creation of a new exclusionary trade 
grouping. In this way, the United States would coopt Japan and gain greater ability than 
China to influence the rules of the regional economic game. 
Even though anxieties about US leadership and impending exclusion were 
present during the Bush administration among “many American policymakers, 
businessmen, and commentators,”658 the USTR Robert Zoellick argued that the United 
States “is not worried about exclusion.”659 However, the 2008 Financial Crisis forced a 
rapid perceptual change. In fact, the financial crisis came to dominate the last days of 
the Bush administration. The crisis “was not merely a challenge localized to the US 
economy or the welfare of US workers and shareholders. It was intrinsically global and 
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linked to US prestige and authority abroad.”660 In September 2008, as perceptions of 
relative decline were raging in the midst of the crisis, then USTR Susan Schwab 
referred directly to the unfolding economic turmoil when she announced the launching 
of what was then called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Agreement between the 
United States and the P4 countries (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei). 
She pointed out that the “uncertain times we are experiencing” offer “an opportunity” 
to “strengthen the United States.”661 The decision, according to Schwab herself, was 
largely motivated by the anxiety of being “locked out” from the region by multilateral 
processes exclusive of the United States.662  
The subsequent launching of the TPP negotiations in 2010 by the Obama 
administration was the intentional grand strategic move to stand up for America’s goal 
of maintaining global preeminence and economic leadership in the world’s most 
significant region, so at a time when the balance of power and the balance of prestige 
were working against the United States. The American position in the East Asian 
economic order had been undercut for some time, yet the tension only became salient 
with the critical juncture of the financial crisis when the change in the balance of power 
and the balance of prestige and the relocation of the world center to East Asia became 
fully perceptible. Only then did the contradiction between America’s sole superpower 
status and the absence of economic leadership in the world’s most significant strategic 
space become perceptible. The economic path the region had embarked on was not 
favorable; regional path dependency would lead to a dead end for US preeminence 
unless the course was changed. Therefore, the institutional barriers of the regional 
economic order had to be dismantled. As Ron Kirk, the first USTR of the Obama 
administration, highlighted in front of the audience at the Washington International 
Trade Association, “we are not just here to talk about the status quo,” a status quo “that 
exclude the United States,” rather, they were gathered to talk about the new, and indeed 
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revisionist, “model for the future” – the TPP. 663  Through the TPP, the Obama 
administration aimed at creating the scope for an Asia-Pacific regional trade agreement 
that would ensure US leadership and change the outdated economic rules of the game.  
Hillary Clinton stressed that “one of the most important tasks of American 
statecraft over the next decades will be to lock in a substantially increased investment 
– diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in this region.”664 Jeffrey Bader 
bluntly underscored that the intention behind joining the East Asian Summit (EAS) was 
to “[beat] back proposals for regional integration that would have excluded the United 
States” and to set “the basis for US leadership in the new emerging regional architecture 
of the Asia-Pacific region.”665 Likewise, Kurt Campbell argued that, “in opting out of 
forums like the EAS, America perpetuates its own marginalization and gets partners 
comfortable working without Washington. If not properly balanced, this could portend 
serious challenges for future American influence in the region.”666 However, the TPP 
is of far greater importance in the struggle for leadership as there is nothing that 
guarantees that the EAS does not become watered-down regional forum that loses its 
relevance subsequent to US efforts to control its trajectory. The crux of the matter is 
that political boundaries lose significance once economic barriers are dismantled. 
Without permeation of economic forces, the EAS becomes an empty castle with little 
worth, which is why the pivot will be “on the rocks” if the TPP fails667 – it would leave, 
as Larry Summers plainly states, “the grand strategy of rebalancing US foreign policy 
toward Asia with no meaningful nonmilitary component.”668 Hence, the rebalancing 
strategy to Asia “cannot be based on political and military initiatives alone,” it must “be 
backed by rejuvenated American leadership in trade and investment.”669 
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8.1.1 Transformation of the Regional Economic Order: Necessary to 
Maintain Global Leadership and an Americancentric Liberal World Order 
Leadership status and political influence, in terms of the power to steer “the direction 
of Asia-Pacific regionalism,”670 was the dominant motivation behind the TPP. In the 
USTR website about the TPP, the reader is informed that if the TPP is not passed and 
the rules not changed, the status quo will be “undermining US leadership in Asia,” 
which is a prerequisite for “global leadership.” And so, “the strategic stakes extend 
beyond the Asia-Pacific,” since “[f]undamentally, TPP presents a choice between two 
futures.” 671  Along these lines, the famous statement by former Prime Minister of 
Singapore Lee Kuan Yew exactly captures the logic of the TPP: 
 
The 21st century will be a contest for supremacy in the Pacific, because that is where 
the growth will be. That is where the bulk of the economic strength of the globe will 
come from. If the U.S. does not hold its ground in the Pacific, it cannot be a world 
leader. America’s core interest requires that it remains the superior power in the 
Pacific. To give up this position would diminish America’s role throughout the world. 
 
Obama unequivocally shares the same perception: “The world has changed,” and “[t]he 
rules are changing with it.” Obama points to efforts by China and other regional 
groupings that exclude the United States as the main challenge to American global 
leadership, before he declares, “Instead, America should write the rules. America 
should call the shots. Other countries should play by the rules that America and our 
partners set, and not the other way around.” However, “none of this will happen if the 
TPP does not become a reality.”672 Obama’s message was resonated by John Kerry in 
a speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center in September 2016. “If we reject TPP,” Kerry 
argued, “we take a giant step…away from our leadership in the Asia Pacific,” and he 
continued by paraphrasing a message underwritten by several US generals, admirals, 
and secretaries of defense, saying, “America’s prestige, influence, and leadership are 
on the line.”673 This puts the discrepancy between the goal of status maintenance and 
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the exclusionary regional status quo, in times of relative decline, at the very fore of 
strategic rivalry. Without the TPP, the regional order as it stands will continue to 
disavow the United States regional leadership and its systemic unfavorability will 
endure – all to the detriment of US sole superpower status, global leadership, and an 
Americancentric liberal world order.  
In light of sluggish WTO negotiations and the impasse of the Doha 
Development Round, the TPP was seen as the only game in town that could sustain 
American global leadership. By attaining regional economic leadership in the new 
world center the United States would ensure global economic leadership and revitalize 
the Americancentric liberal world order by expanding a new, revisionist model of far-
reaching regulation of economic practices. The US would then bind the East Asian 
states to a new set of rules that would maintain America’s position atop global and pan-
regional value chains, sustain US “network centrality,” and “block mercantilist 
temptations for a ‘closed regionalism.’”674 Consequently, as the United States “lock 
in” the region to an American-led liberal order and appropriate the positional good of 
regional leadership, China is simultaneously “locked out.” Yet as much as the TPP was 
about keeping China out and preventing it from taking part in writing the rules, it was 
about keeping Japan in. For without Japan’s participation in the TPP, as Kurt Campbell 
plainly stated, the US-Japan relationship “is going to wither,”675 and the fight for the 
liberal cause would be seriously weakened. In this way, the TPP “solidifies 
relationships with our allies and firmly establishes the United States as a leader in the 
Pacific.”676 
The relaunching of trade negotiations under the TPP is then not merely a move 
on the chessboard; its intention is to transform the scope, the regional status order, and 
the rules of the game so as to change the very premise of how the game is played and 
who that is allowed to participate in the game. The institutional reality of the noodle 
bowl structure should then be dismantled in favor of a regional trade agreement that 
spans both sides of the Pacific, and the institutional visions of the EAFTA and CEPEA 
proposals should be firmly contested. With Japan on board the TPP, a very significant 
step was taken towards this direction, a step that was rightly labelled a “game 
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changer”677 given that it is the most advanced economy in the region and effectively 
serves as America’s Trojan horse in the fight against an exclusive East Asian bloc.678 
Simply put, the Obama administration did not want a world of regions with coexisting, 
yet variegated forms of capitalist arrangements, but a world order where the TPP (and 
TTIP) should set the new liberal global standard of civilization.  
This new standard of civilization would counter state capitalism and update 
America’s “Open Door” policy679 by truly kicking in the door and target behind-the-
border regulatory barriers. Despite East Asia’s impressive economic development, 
“higher standards” and new rules for the “twenty-first century” are necessary to 
generate “not just more growth, but better growth.”680 The East Asian neo-mercantilist 
state of economic affairs is outdated and necessitates a new standard; a standard “where 
every nation plays by the rules; where workers’ rights are respected, and our businesses 
can compete on a level playing field; where the intellectual property and new 
technologies that fuel innovation are protected; and where currencies are market driven 
so no nation has an unfair advantage.”681 Barack Obama’s message is clear: “[Y]ou 
have to meet higher standards. If you don’t, you’re out.”682 It is understood that China 
is the principle target of such discourse, as it connects to rhetorical commonplaces and 
reiterated allegations of intellectual property theft, currency manipulations, and unfair 
competition from state-sponsored capitalism. It delegitimizes China’s leadership 
ambitions and tarnishes its prestige. 
The temporal classification scheme embedded in the TPP – where “higher,” 
“twenty-first century” rules and standards are pitted against outdated “lower,” 
“twentieth-century” modes of economic regulation – is “not innocent, but 
hierarchical.”683 It distances countries that do not “buy into” the new arrangement and 
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situates them at inferior evolutionary economic stages. This form of exclusionary social 
attribution is an example of “spatiotemporal distancing,” 684  or how geostrategic 
discourses are infused with exclusionary notions of space and time. Although though 
this form of distancing is not as radical or racist as the “boundaries of humanity” and 
“degrees of humanity” schemes of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, 685  the 
notions of a “high standard,” “twenty-first century” trade agreement build on August 
Compte’s conception of knowledge as progressing through historical stages, thus 
excluding those that are temporally backward because they adherence to “low quality,” 
“twentieth century” trade rules. This social attribution delegitimizes East Asian trade 
practices, adds another layer to the struggle for prestige, and builds America’s 
reputational capital by portraying the United States as the most advanced, sophisticated, 
and innovative trading nation in the world. The TPP thus represents “an enticement 
strategy,”686 as it is expected that “America’s best resource” – its market –687 holds such 
great attraction that it will lure countries to bind themselves to a pervasive American-
led liberal economic order. 
The transformational revisionist project of the TPP was negotiated as a single 
undertaking, covered twenty non-tariff trade issues, and represented a much more 
intrusive institutional framework than the current WTO rules. These “WTO-plus” trade 
rules “cover all aspects of commercial relations” between member countries.688 Even 
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though the legal text includes features that preserve “the right of governments to 
regulate in the public interest” and “the use of transitional measures,”689 the TPP is 
meant to “tolerate no exclusions” and aims at “regulatory coherence” across the Asia-
Pacific. It is designed “to deliver full liberalization” by, for instance, “systematically 
targeting non-tariff barriers,” “discriminatory state capitalism” and provisions that 
“curb the spread of indigenous innovation requirements” used in government 
procurement policy in China and other states in the region. 690  The Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is meant to provide protection for investors from actions by 
foreign governments such as right to transfer capital, freedom from discrimination, 
protection against uncompensated expropriation of property, and protection against 
denial of justice. However, in view of UN’s independent expert on the promotion of a 
democratic and equitable international order Alfred de Zayas, the ISDS system is 
“fundamentally imbalanced” and tilted against states “since investors can sue 
governments whereas governments cannot sue investors before these ad hoc 
tribunals.”691 Despite consent from participating nations, this in effect represents a 
contestation in the primary institution of sovereignty where neoliberal principles 
override the sovereign authority of the state.  
It could further be argued that the TPP consists of “fair weather principles” that 
work well for advanced economies ready to face extensive competition after having 
developed through mercantilist means, but effectively “kicks away the ladder” for less 
developed economies that started their development trajectory at a later stage.692 The 
revisionist challenge from the TPP spurred ASEAN to launch the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in order to take the next step on the 
endogenous pathway towards regional economic integration already staked out within 
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the region. The RCEP only covers six non-tariff WTO-plus issues in comparison to the 
TPP’s twenty. In this way, the RCEP is more or less WTO consistent and does not stray 
much from global trade rules. The principles of the “ASEAN way” also guide the 
regional integration process and take different levels of development among its 
members into consideration, in line with the regional status quo. For instance, it 
includes India that starts out with very low commitments, while Japan makes 
comprehensive undertakings, yet with special exemptions. Thus, while the TPP is a 
“rule-making, cutting-edge mechanism” that is “deep but narrow” (due to the 
dominance of the US and Japan), the RCEP is more of a “market expansion 
mechanism” that is “shallow but wide” (owing to the fact that China, India, and 
Indonesia are all participating), which does “not make the 21st century model 
feasible.”693 
In sum, the TPP was designed to change the scope, the rules of the game and 
the normative underpinnings of the regional economic order; to counter the emerging 
economic centrality of China; and to put the material forces of history under American 
institutional subduance so as to steer economic development, ensure American 
leadership, and maintain US sole superpower status. The TPP warned those that neither 
adjust to US rules and standards nor embraced US values that they would be “locked 
out” from an Americancentric liberal world order. However, with the election of 
Donald Trump and his swift withdrawal from the TPP, the United States took a giant 
step back from global leadership. In the conclusion, I will discuss this aspect, but for 
now, let us turn to the Obama administration’s project for the regional security order. 
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8.2 America’s Principled Security Network as a Reformist Revisionist 
Project 
In this section, I will outline the reformist revisionist characteristics of the Obama 
administration’s project to change the regional security order.  I make use of Secretary 
of Defense Ashton Carter’s term “Asia-Pacific’s Principled Security Network” to 
designate this project, but I add a slight modification. I label it “America’s Principled 
Security Network” since it is a matter of a project pushed by the Obama administration 
to reform the regional security order with the intention of making it more amenable to 
the preservation of US dominance – revise to maintain.  
The Obama administration’s reform of the regional security order consists of 
two main components. First, it involves an alteration of the alliance with Japan that 
moves from an asymmetric patron-client relationship to a more symmetric and equal 
alliance that elevates Japan’s security role. Second, it involves changes that move 
beyond the bilateral hub-and-spokes alliance system and cover bilateral partnerships, 
trilateral security practices, and multilateral engagement short of binding alliance 
commitments. Through these new security practices, the Obama administration aimed 
at building collective capacity and enabling concerted action.  
In line with the 2x2 table I developed in chapter two (see Table 4), the revisionist 
project is mainly reformist. Logically, the United States cannot be revisionist in relation 
to the positional status dimension of the regional security order since it wants to 
maintain its place atop the military hierarchy that it already occupies. The objective of 
status maintenance unequivocally means preservation of the positional status-quo. Even 
so, the United States can rearrange and actively promote change in the hierarchical 
positioning of subordinate states or grant them greater security roles, which is exactly 
what the change of the US-Japan alliance implies. This modifies the positional 
dimension, but it does not change the status quo of the US position in the Asia-Pacific. 
It rather represents a change in the secondary institution of the hub-and-spokes system 
that reduces the asymmetric component with respect to Japan. In terms of the Obama 
administration’s aim to move beyond the established hub-and-spokes system – 
bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally – these reforms represent change of secondary 
institutions in that they represent new security practices that develop parallel to the old 
hub-and-spokes alliance system. In this way, the reformist revisionist project highlight 
the innovative changes the Obama administration implemented in order to “stay 
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ahead”694 in times of relative decline and sequestration. I will now outline the previous 
status quo before I analyze the reformist project of the Obama administration. 
Since the Second World War, the United States has been at the pinnacle of the 
regional security order of the Asia-Pacific. It has dominated the region through a 
bilateral alliance system – the hub-and-spokes system – that encompasses Japan, South 
Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand.695 When this system was established, 
it was underpinned by marked power asymmetries that emerged after the Second World 
War, and was designed to function as a bulwark against communism and as mechanism 
to exert control over rogue allies.696  More specifically, the hub-and-spokes system 
consists of four central pillars: bilateral alliances, strongly asymmetrical patron-client 
defense ties, absence of a NATO-like multilateral security system, and special 
precedence to Japan 697  (see Figure 7). This system equips the United States, the 
centrally positioned actor, with unique strategic flexibility, leverage, and capacity to act 
through dense and exclusive ties with the members of the network. In fact, alliance 
exclusivity is the core feature of the hub-and-spokes system, which allows the United 
States to tailor specific security commitments with various security dependent client 
states that among themselves have no independent security relationships.  
This strictly bilateral and asymmetrical security system is sometimes accused of 
stunting the development of greater regional multilateral institutions as well as East 
Asian regionalism. 698  If we recall former Secretary of State James Baker’s harsh 
reactions against its Asia-Pacific allies when they flirted with ideas of closed 
regionalism, such claims are not too farfetched, even though other political, economic 
and cultural factors also play a part. Nevertheless, up until the end of the Cold War, the 
hub-and-spokes security system served its purposes well. But as times have changed, 
criticism have been voiced, and proposals for other forms of military engagement,699 
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even an Asia-Pacific NATO-type organization,700 have been suggested, stressing the 
unfavorability of the bilateral hub-and-spokes system. 
 
Figure 7. The US Bilateral Hub-and-Spokes System 
 
 
 
Since the mid-1990s, a number of ASEAN-centered multilateral initiatives have 
been initiated. Apart from the ones discussed in chapter six, the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) was established in 1994 with the objective “to foster constructive dialogue 
and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and 
to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive 
diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.”701 ARF includes major players like the United 
States, Russia, and the European Union as well as all states from the wider Indo-Asia-
Pacific region, including India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Similar to APEC, the ARF 
has been divided between Asians and “Anglo-Americans,” where the former prefers a 
gradual, non-binding, consultative approach and the latter favors a more practical 
problem solving approach.702 In 2006, the first ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting 
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(ADMM) was held in Kuala Lumpur, set to “promote mutual trust and confidence 
through greater understanding of defense and security challenges as well as 
enhancement of transparency and openness.”703  Four years later, in 2010, the first 
ADMM-Plus was convened in Hanoi, Vietnam, a platform for ASEAN and its eight 
Dialogue Partners – China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, the United 
States, and Australia – set “to strengthen security and defense cooperation for peace, 
stability, and development in the region.”704  
As outlined in chapters four and five, China’s rapid increase in power and 
reputation generated anxieties about the evolving regional trend towards greater 
multilateralization, encompassing institutions both inclusive and exclusive of the United 
States. As Obama assumed power, leading officials and think-thank experts argued that 
America’s reliance on the hub-and-spokes system is unsustainable and that Washington 
must start to shape the trends of the evolving regional order to avoid exclusion. Even 
though this problem certainly is less pronounced in the regional security order, in 
relation to which Washington did not fear exclusion, times of relative decline and 
sequestration still necessitated the Obama administration to tie regional states to its 
agenda in new ways – into a security network steered by Washington’s logic to ensure 
its predominant status.  
After the Cold War, the United States maintained that the bilateral security 
system in the Asia-Pacific should not be changed. It is argued that the administrations 
of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton paid lip service to security multilateralism as a 
complement to the existing hub-and-spokes alliance system, and displayed disinterest 
to issues of regional architecture, relating to what Victor Cha terms “an ‘if it ain’t broke, 
don’t fix it’ mentality.” 705  After 9/11 and the ensuing War on Terror, the Bush 
administration, however, demanded active participation and involvement of all its Asia-
Pacific allies in the global spanning “coalition of the willing” set to combat terrorism. 
In addition to this ad hoc security construct, William Tow and Amitav Acharya point 
out that the Bush administration started to engage with states outside the bounds of the 
hub-and-spokes system, as illustrated by US-India and US-Singapore security 
cooperation as well as the initiation of the trilateral strategic dialogue between the 
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United States, Japan, and Australia and the Six-Party Talks. As Tow and Acharya 
accurately point out, for the Bush administration, “integrating bilateralism and 
multilateralism really means sustaining American power and influence…It does not 
mean relinquishing the United States’ dominant strategic position in the Asia–Pacific 
by acquiescing to power sharing arrangements with China or other regional actors.”706 
Yet, as Victor Cha argues, the course of action of the Bush administration deviated only 
marginally from previous US policy in the Asia-Pacific.707 In fact, it was not until the 
Obama administration that a straightforward and unambiguous official critique of the 
hub-and-spokes system was articulated and that an intentional reformist project for the 
regional security order was implemented. 
 
8.2.1 Reformation of the Hub-and-Spokes System: Necessary to Maintain 
Sole Superpower Status in Times of Relative Decline 
In four key policy documents – Defense Strategic Guidance, National Security 
Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy – 
the United States outlines its military strategy. Aside from their meticulous review and 
all-encompassing scope, one central teleological theme unites them all – status 
maintenance. In his forewords to the 2015 National Security Strategy, Barack Obama 
lays out the teleological essence of US grand strategy:  “Strong and sustained American 
leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security 
and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all peoples. The question is 
never whether America should lead, but how we lead.” 708  Similarly, the Defense 
Strategic Guidance underlines that “United States will continue to lead global efforts 
with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both 
by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining 
relevant and interoperable military capabilities.”709  The 2014 Quadrennial Defense 
Review states that the Department of Defense “rebalances toward greater emphasis on 
fullspectrum operations,” and thus “maintaining superior power projection capabilities 
will continue to be central to the credibility of our Nation’s overall security strategy.”710 
In the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, the objective is “to advance US military 
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dominance in the 21st century and ensure the United States can deter adversaries and 
prevail in conflict, including maritime Asia.”711 What emerges from these strategic 
policy documents is straightforward and clear: America’s central goal is status 
maintenance.  
Yet faced with relative decline and sequestration, US status-maintenance was 
predicated on the need to reform the regional security order. As stated by Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta at the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, the “new fiscal reality has 
given us an opportunity to design a new defence strategy for the 21st century that both 
confronts the threats that we face and maintains the strongest military in the world.”712 
To this end, Panetta outlined a defense strategy consisting of four principles: a rules-
based international order, expanding partnerships and strengthening allies, maintaining 
an enduring presence, and investments in force projection. Since the military budget is 
shrinking, the United States “will of necessity rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific 
region” – the new world center.713 In Obama’s much-debated speech at the US Military 
Academy in West Point in 2014, while clearly affirming America’s objective of status 
maintenance, Obama emphasized the necessity of changing how America’s military 
power is used,714  which connects to worries of what will happen with America’s 
dominant position when faced with a declining military budget. What this means for 
the regional security order is revealed in a 2015 policy statement released by the 
White House that lays out the reformist revisionist project that the Obama 
administration pursued:  
 
We are moving beyond the ‘hub and spokes’ model of the past, toward a more 
networked architecture of cooperation among our allies and partners – including 
through expanded trilateral cooperation frameworks – built on shared values and 
interests.715 
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Yet apart from moving beyond and reforming the hub-and-spokes system in order to 
“stay ahead” as the regional security environment undergoes change,716 the United 
States must buttress its position. I will now outline this positional reinforcement before 
I continue to ascertain the reformist components of the Obama administration’s project 
for the regional security order. 
 The strategic concept Air-Sea Battle, now integrated into the Joint Concept for 
Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), and other “innovative ideas 
and capabilities” known as Pentagon’s “third offset,” are designed “to advance US 
military dominance in 21st century”717 through unrivaled technological sophistication 
that maintains the competitive edge in light of China’s military modernization and 
A2/AD capabilities. In relation to the militarization of the Asia-Pacific, the US is 
actively reinforcing its preeminent position and global managerial role. As stated by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey: 
 
Our technological superiority has allowed largely unfettered access to project power 
where needed. However, this superiority is being challenged by increasingly capable 
and economically strong potential adversaries that are likely developing and fielding 
counters to some or all of the key technologies on which the United States has come 
to rely. To maintain superiority, it will be necessary for the military to develop new 
capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures to continue to be effective.718 
 
Consequently, the United States is changing it deployment structure in the Asia-Pacific. 
It will move from a 50/50 to a 60/40 ratio of Pacific to Atlantic US navy units by 2020. 
It will also deploy the most advanced type of US navy assets to the Pacific, including 
Nimitz-class and Ford-class aircraft carriers, Aegis missile defense-equipped vessels, 
Zumwalt-class stealth destroyers, Virginia-class attack submarines, littoral combat 
ships, amphibious assault ships, as well as F–22 and F–35 fighters, B–2 and B-52 
strategic bombers, P–8 and E-2D patrol aircrafts, and the MQ-4C unmanned aircraft 
system. The United States will also strengthen its military presence on the island of 
Guam, which include three Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles, a fourth attack 
submarine, continuous rotational deployment of bombers as well as sustaining rotations 
of fighter aircrafts and the placement of a THAAD missile defense system. Apart from 
the above, the redeployment of 5000 US Marines to Guam will be carried out to decrease 
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the American presence on Okinawa and is set to begin in 2020. The United States also 
deploys a THAAD battery in South Korea, and assigns a second Amphibious Ready 
Group to the region, consisting of three ships and 2500 marines, and is estimated to be 
based in Japan by 2019.719 These sophisticated, high-end, newest class capabilities are 
not aimed at combating meagre pirates, but testify to how the US seeks to maintain its 
dominant status in the region, notwithstanding cuts in the defense budget.  
 Apart from buttressing the US position, reforms of the social-systemic structure 
of the US-led regional security order are necessary. The Obama administration and the 
Abe administration in Japan took decisive steps to reduce the traditional US-Japan 
patron-client relationship and situate Japan as a more equal partner of the United States, 
which further implies that Japan moves ever closer to becoming a “normal state.” In 
fact, the desire to “normalize” Japan’s foreign and security policies and to create a more 
equal alliance in which Japan performs a less subservient role has been a longstanding 
concern among Japanese politicians and decision makers.720 Since Japan already enjoys 
a special status in the US-led alliance system, the change involves an elevation of the 
security role associated with this status. 
Japan’s “pacifist” constitution, as reflected in Article 9, rejects war and prohibits 
the formation of an army. For instance, during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Japan referred 
to the peaceful principle of its constitution when it refused to put troops on the ground, 
and instead committed to “checkbook diplomacy” by contributing 13 billion US dollars 
to ﬁnance the military operations and agreed to send minesweepers as part of an UN-
sponsored peacekeeping force.721 Even though Japan enhanced its defense cooperation 
with the United States in 1990s to include “contingencies surrounding Japan,”722 it 
maintained its “restraint about defense procurements,” and has, in fact, “been hesitant 
about transforming the US-Japan alliance into a more symmetrical one whereby the 
latter would exercise the right of collective self-defense.”723 Japan’s involvement in the 
Bush administration’s War on Terror included sending Japan Self-Defense Forces 
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(JSDF) to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, which, however, did not represent a radical 
deviation from Japan’s security path. Even so, Christopher Hughes argued that Japan’s 
involvement in the War on Terror would probably set a precedent for a more expanded 
regional and global security role in the future.724 
Shinzo Abe’s first term as prime minister of Japan (2006-2007) seemed to mark 
the establishment of a more active military role, which was epitomized by Abe’s 
proposal for a quadrilateral initiative or an “arc of freedom and prosperity” 
encompassing Japan, Australia, India, and the United States, with ambitions to form a 
democratic coalition that would span the entire Asia-Pacific. Notwithstanding the 
proposal of what looked like an Asian NATO, Japan remained in the confines of what 
has been termed “reluctant realism.”725 As Abe resigned after just a year in office due 
to health issues, and “despite the discussion among some Japanese commentators about 
a ‘China threat’, the government’s view [was] that the People’s Republic [did] not pose 
a threat to Japan – at least for the moment.”726 However, similar to Christopher Hughes 
prediction, Mike Mochizuki argued that, “there is a high probability” that the United 
States and Japan will “recalibrate their policy toward China in similar directions and in 
similar increments in response to Chinese capabilities and behavior.” 727  As Abe 
reassumed office in September 2012, the estimate proved accurate and the stage was set 
for the United States and Japan to implement groundbreaking changes that would 
greatly reduce their patron-client relationship and enable Japan’s global security role – 
the cornerstone in the Obama administration’s reformist project for the regional security 
order. 
Three months after his return to power, Abe resurrected the idea of a democratic 
coalition. In a famous op-ed titled “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Abe warned, 
“the South China Sea seems set to become a ‘Lake Beijing’” and accused China of 
conducting “daily exercises in coercion around the Senkaku Islands in the East China 
Sea.”728 Against this backdrop, Abe’s intention was clear:  
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Peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from 
peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Developments 
affecting each are more closely connected than ever. Japan, as one of the oldest sea-
faring democracies in Asia, should play a greater role in preserving the common good 
in both regions.729 
 
Faced with US relative decline (Japan’s main security guarantor) and China’s rise 
(Japan’s main regional rival), at the same times as Washington implements 
sequestration, the systemic imperatives called for the elevation of Japan’s security role. 
As Abe’s senior national security advisor Yosuke Isozaki  put it: “Truth be told, the U.S. 
can no longer afford to play the world’s policeman…This is no longer an era when Japan 
is permitted to do nothing and count on America to protect us for free. It’s become 
extremely important we do our own share alongside the U.S.”730 Already in 2007 Abe 
believed a reinterpretation of the constitution was necessary, since it contains 
“provisions in the constitution that no longer suit the times” – times in which “the 
security environment surrounding Japan and the entire world has undergone major 
change.”731 If that was true then, it is even more pressing now, given “the increasingly 
severe security environment surrounding Japan,” which, according to Abe, makes it 
“necessary to reconstruct the legal basis for security so that Japan can take appropriate 
responses to these changes.”732 With the reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution in 
2014, the legal basis for the elevation of Japan’s security role was set, which now 
permits the JSDF to, 
1. Protect US navy vessels attacked by a third party near Japanese waters even 
previous to an attack on Japan 
2. Stop and inspect ships suspected of transporting weapons for use by third party 
attacking US warships 
3. Intercept ballistic missiles ﬁred over Japanese territory aimed at US territory at 
the request of Washington 
4. Provide military support for peacekeeping forces under attack 
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5. Join in UN minesweeping operations to secure sea lines in the Persian Gulf.733 
In the 2015 revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, the elevation 
of Japan’s security role was set in stone. The guidelines put emphasis on increasing 
synergy across the two governments’ national security policies and the “global” nature 
of the US-Japan alliance. The United States and Japan will strengthen operational 
coordination, information sharing, and common situational awareness. Gone is the hold 
patron-client relationship, as both will “take a leading role in cooperation with partners 
to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the 
Asia-Pacific region and beyond.”734 The common areas for cooperation in regional and 
international activities include maritime security, military exercises, ISR-activities, 
peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, partner capacity building, logistic 
support, and noncombatant evacuation operations. The United States and Japan will also 
jointly “promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense 
cooperation,” strengthen institutions and ground their cooperation on “international law 
and standards.”735 
US Secretary of State John Kerry said in the joint press conference of the US-
Japan “2-plus-2” meeting on April 27, 2015, that the revised guidelines represent “an 
historic transition” that “mark the establishment of Japan’s capacity to defend not just 
its own territory but also the United States and other partners as needed.”736 According 
to Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, the new guidelines allow the United States and 
Japan to cooperate in new domains, and “in new ways, both regionally and globally,” 
and they will “contribute even more proactively to ensuring peace, stability and 
prosperity of not only Japan but the Asia-Pacific region and the international 
community.”737 In this way, the new guidelines is a testament to how Japan’s revised 
interpretation of its constitution and its policy of proactive contribution to peace 
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converge with the US military rebalancing strategy.738 Surely, as John Kerry declared, 
“the United States could ask for no better friend or ally than Japan.”739 
The foundation of the regional security order is no longer based on a US-Japan 
patron-client relationship, rather, the defense relationship between the United States 
and Japan now more resembles a traditional alliance with mutual security commitments 
between two great powers, which effectively moves Japan closer to becoming a 
“normal state.” For now, the removal of Japan’s constitutional constraints is a product 
of interpretation, but perhaps in the future, it will move from constitutional 
reinterpretation to constitutional revision. Once completed, the post-1945 security 
order, which is based on a hierarchical system of patron-client relationships, will evolve 
into a regional security order more akin to traditional great power alliances, through 
which the United States as the sole superpower can continue to divide-and-rule the 
Asia-Pacific and contain China’s emergence as a regional hegemon. Japan’s crucial 
position in the Obama administration’s broader reformist project, especially its position 
in the trilateral security institutions, further testifies to Japan’s centrality in maintaining 
US dominance.  
Yet in times of relative decline and a diminishing defense budget, the reform of 
the US-Japan relationship is not sufficient, and thus the United States must revise the 
social-systemic structure of regional security order in ways that further break with the 
bilateral hub-and-spokes system. This constitutes the second component of the Obama 
administration’s reformist project for the regional security order. 
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who in his remarks at the 2016 IISS 
Shangri-La Dialogue underscored the necessity of building a new security 
architecture consisting of not only bilateral relationships, but also trilateral and 
multilateral ones, illustrates the reformist project for the regional security order. In 
arguing for what he termed a new “Principled Security Network,” Carter compares 
security to oxygen, stating that, “[f]or many years, the United States – along with its 
allies and partners – helped provide oxygen,” yet “by networking regional security 
together, we can all contribute more, and in different ways.” Thus, “[i]n the years 
ahead…providing the region’s oxygen will more and more become a networked 
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effort…all of us will provide that oxygen.”740 Hence, more nations need to carry the 
burden, while being steered by the logic of the predominant power – the United States.  
Although Carter emphasized America’s “welcoming approach” to China and 
the “inclusive” nature of the Principled Security Network, a systemic structure 
purportedly not targeting anyone, he nonetheless singled out China. He mentioned that 
there are great regional anxieties about China’s actions and warned that, “at a time when 
the entire region is coming together and networking,” China is ostensibly isolating 
itself, and if it continues with its actions, “China could end up erecting a Great Wall of 
self-isolation.”741 In fact, the Principled Security Network represents a new, broader 
and deeper reformist way of dealing with the challenge coming from China. That Carter 
in his speech mentions the long list of the world’s finest, most sophisticated and lethal 
military capabilities that will be deployed in the Asia-Pacific testifies to the fact that 
the means America provides to this new security system are not merely intended for 
humanitarian assistance and anti-piracy operations. Primarily, these means are directed 
towards a certain end – to keep regional challengers literally at bay (read China). In 
times of relative decline and sequestration, this task cannot be handled by a bilateral 
security system alone; hence, the ways of security system need to be reformed to 
maintain US military dominance. 
As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey makes clear, “With 
our ‘ends’ fixed and our ‘means’ declining, it is therefore imperative that we 
innovate…the ‘ways.’”742 By taking active steps to reform the security order, the US 
hopes to convince regional countries that it is still the principal organizer of the regional 
security order and indispensable for upholding of peace, prosperity and stability in the 
Asia-Pacific. Apart from the elevation of Japan’s security role, which serve as the hard-
core realist foundation of the US-led security order, the reformist project also involves 
new bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral security practices that serve as necessary 
complements to this foundation.  
Bilaterally, the strategy consists of courting countries termed new partners. The 
United States seeks to expand military ties and develop new security practices short of 
binding alliance commitments with countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, 
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Vietnam, India, and New Zealand. New and expanded exercises have been conducted 
with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam that all include operations in the South China 
Sea.743 For instance, Washington have established new and groundbreaking military 
ties with Vietnam. The US-Vietnam Naval Engagement Activity (NEA) has deepened 
and grown “more complex” during the Obama administration, and has moved from port 
visits to “multi-day bilateral engagement ashore and at sea,” and has included 
participation by a littoral combat ship for the first time.744 In 2016, the United States 
sent a guided missile destroyer to Vietnam and the two countries conducted search and 
rescue scenarios and communication exercises. The US also made a symbolic port call 
in Cam Ranh Bay for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War.745 Significantly, 
the same year Washington lifted the 50-year long ban on the sale of military equipment 
to Vietnam.746 
Trilaterally, the United States has considerably expanded this mode of security 
cooperation under the Obama administration. Whereas the existing US-Australia-Japan 
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue has been deepened, the Obama administration launched 
the US-Japan-India Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue, and initiated the US-Japan-South 
Korea Trilateral Meetings at the Vice Minister and Deputy-level. The US-Japan-India 
trilateral relationship is of special importance and forms a key element of the reformist 
revisionist change of the regional security order, facilitated by two parallel and 
converging developments in the US relationship with Japan and India.  
While there is a convergence between Japan’s revised interpretation of its 
constitution and the Obama administration’s reform of the regional security order, there 
is likewise a convergence between India’s “Act East” policy and Washington’s grand 
strategic reorientation. The Obama administration viewed India as “an important 
element of the Rebalance” and “welcomes India’s positive role in ensuring a stable, 
peaceful, and prosperous region.”747 The Vision Statement for the US-India Strategic 
Partnership that was released as US President Obama and Indian Prime Minister 
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Narendra Modi conducted their first bilateral summit on September 29, 2014 equally 
emphasized the regional and global nature of their partnership. On this day, the United 
States and India “committed to a new mantra for the relationship,” namely “Chalein 
Saath Saath: Forward Together We Go,” and India underscored that the United States 
is “a principal partner in the realization of India’s rise as a responsible influential world 
power.”748 The US-India strategic partnership was dubbed “transformative” in that it 
“will be a model for the rest of the world,” and is seen “indispensable” for the “peace, 
prosperity and stability” of the greater Indo-Pacific region. The vision statement also 
highlighted that the US-Indian strategic partnership rests on shared democratic values 
and supports “an open and inclusive rules-based global order.”749 Four months later, in 
January 2015, the United States and India released the Joint Strategic Vision for the 
Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region where the two countries affirmed “the 
importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and 
overflight throughout the region;” called for dispute resolution in accordance with 
UNCLOS; declared their intention to “work together to promote shared values;” and 
affirmed that they will strengthen regional dialogues, trilateral consultation, and seek 
“additional multilateral opportunities for engagement.”750 
The grand strategic convergence between the United States, Japan, and India set 
the basis for trilateral axis that covers security practices short of binding commitments 
and serves to uphold the US-led regional security order. Washington recognized the 
elevation of Japan’s security role associated with its special status, and India, who long 
has harbored great power ambitions, is recognized by the United States as a world 
power. In this way, the US-Japan-India trilateral relationship is beginning “to provide 
real, practical security cooperation that spans the entire region from the Indian Ocean 
to the Western Pacific.”751 A new type of security system that complements the bilateral 
hub-and-spokes system – trilateral and less asymmetric (see Figure 8) – is thus very 
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much in the making, one that effectively enlarges the scope of the region – from the 
Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific.  
Yet whereas the China factor and the intensifying security competition in the 
East China Sea, however theorized, is ubiquitous in explaining Japan’s desire to expand 
its regional presence and play a greater military role,752 India’s role is more ambiguous. 
At the same time as India is a member of the SCO and closely cooperates with China 
in the BRICS and the AIIB, it also desires America’s warm embrace and an elevated 
role in a US-led regional security order. If India is pursuing a sophisticated hedging 
strategy, then Japan, on the other side, is unambiguously siding with the United States. 
Japan also figures in all US trilateral relationships, which testifies to its special status 
and its increasing regional and global military role, crucial to the reinforcement of US 
dominance (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 8. The US-Japan-India Trilateral Relationship 
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Figure 9. US-Japan Trilateral Relationships 
 
 
 
Moreover, since the three countries officially and rhetorically base their 
relationship on shared values and adherence to a rules-based international order, there 
is real opportunity for resurrecting the old quadrilateral initiative that included 
Australia, especially so when India, Japan, and Australia already meet trilaterally. 
When the head of the US Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris visited India in 
March 2016, he flaunted exactly this idea: “One idea to consider is initiating a 
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between India-Japan-Australia and the United States. 
Adding the US into this dialogue can amplify the message that we are united behind 
the international rules-based order that has kept the peace and is essential to all of us.”753 
If this becomes the case, a crucial first step towards a NATO-like system would have 
been taken. Even if this does not materialize, the four countries are already advocating 
a “rules-based international order” that echoes a values-based strategic approach to the 
regional security order, which in fact goes against the ASEAN diplomatic norms of 
noninterference, quiet diplomacy, and non-involvement of third parties in dispute 
resolution.754 That great powers tend to ignore international legal verdicts755 does not 
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matter, since it goes without saying that a rules- and values-based approach to the 
regional security order targets the 250-pound Panda in the room.  
Even without a NATO-like multilateral security system in Asia, significant 
steps towards concerted action have been taken nonetheless, as exemplified by how 
trilateral military exercises aim at improving interoperability. The US-Japan-South 
Korea trilateral ballistic missile warning exercise is aimed at developing a coordinated 
approach to the North Korean nuclear threat. 756  The US-Japan-Australia trilateral 
passing exercise (PASSEX), which involves ship maneuvers and helicopter cross deck 
landings, is “designed to increase maritime interoperability and deepen mutual 
understanding.” 757  In relation to the US-Japan-India trilateral relationship, Japan 
became a permanent member of the US-India Malabar exercise in 2015, which has 
expanded its scope and complexity, and consists of “complex, high-end warfighting 
exercises conducted to advance multinational maritime relationships and mutual 
security issues.”758 In 2016, the Malibar exercise involved military training both at sea 
and ashore and consisted of professional exchanges on carrier strike group operations; 
surface and anti-submarine warfare, helicopter operations, maritime patrol and 
reconnaissance operations; visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations; and anti-
piracy operations. The Malibar exercise was “designed to advance participating 
nations’ military-to-military coordination and capacity to plan and execute tactical 
operations in a multinational environment,”759 and as such, the “members of the Indo-
Asia-Pacific nations utilize their maritime forces as natural partners, and continue to 
strengthen relationships.”760 Through these trilateral exercises, concrete steps are taken 
towards the development of a more coordinated approach to defense cooperation that 
enables concerted action towards traditional security ends, and which represents a clear 
departure from the bilateral hub-and-spokes system. 
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Multilaterally, the Obama administration further expanded US engagement. 
Apart from expanded bilateral allied exercises, such as the Key Resolve/Foal Eagle 
exercise with South Korea that now includes anti-submarine warfare, and which has its 
parallel in the US-Japan Shim Kame exercise designed to counter diesel submarines, 
the Obama administration was “increasing the size, frequency, and sophistication” of 
regional military exercises, with a particular focus on “developing new exercises with 
Southeast Asian partners.”761  
During the Obama administration, the United States conducted “the largest and 
most sophisticated” Balikatan exercise ever together with the Philippines and Australia, 
and with Japan as an observer.762 In the 2014 Pacific Partnership, an annual US-led 
humanitarian and civic assistance exercise in Southeast Asia, a Japan Maritime Self-
Defense Force (JMSDF) ship served as the primary mission platform, marking the first 
time the Pacific Partnership was led from a partner nation’s ship. In 2015, Japan joined 
the US and the Philippines in another humanitarian drill in Subic Bay, which Rear 
Admiral Charles Williams, commander of the US Seventh Fleet, viewed as part of a 
changing trend: “You are seeing in exercises…a shift from strictly bilateral engagement 
to multilateral, which is why you see the Japanese here today.”763 A further aim is to 
expand joint patrolling. As Admiral Harry Harris declares, “I welcome Japan’s potential 
of patrolling in the South China Sea, just as I welcome India’s and I welcome all of 
your navies’ abilities to patrol there…I support the right of every country to patrol in 
the South China Sea because the South China Sea at large does not belong to any 
country.” 764  Even though Japan has yet to join the US Freedom of Navigation 
Operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea, Harris declaration is a further testimony 
to US acceptance of Japan’s elevated security role and its desire for a more proactive 
Japanese military posture. 
The Obama administration also developed “new presence models,”765 in terms 
of which the use of rotational deployments is a crucial development. The port of Darwin 
in Australia is set to open up for rotation of US Marines, estimated to reach a total 
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number of 2,500 by 2020. Singapore has welcomed rotational deployment of Littoral 
Combat Ships and P–8 reconnaissance aircrafts, and discussions about stationing four 
additional ships in the near future is currently ongoing. In this way, Singapore has 
turned into a vital maintenance and resupply hub for the US navy. The US and the 
Philippines have also signed and approved the Enhanced Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (EDCA), which grants access to four airfields as well as a land base. This 
“will provide the first persistent US naval presence in Southeast Asia in more than 20 
years.”766 
The Obama administration also expanded its multilateral engagement through 
innovative approaches to military exercises, necessary in times of fiscal constraints. In 
2014, the Pentagon introduced the “Pacific Pathways” operational concept. According 
to Robert Brown, commanding general of US Army Pacific, the Pacific Pathways is 
“the biggest innovation…in training and exercises in 35 years.”767 By employing a 
single unit on what is termed a “training pathway,” it conducts a three to four months 
mission in which it engages in series of consecutive bilateral and multilateral military 
exercises around the region. In this way, according to Brown, the United States can 
provide “more faces in more places without more bases.”768  
Since 2014, through the Pacific Pathways, the United States has engaged Japan, 
South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Vietnam. 
In 2016, for instance, the Pacific Pathways involved the 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat 
Team for a deployment spanning three months through which it participated in the 
Cobra Gold exercises in Thailand, the Foal Eagle exercise in South Korea, and the 
Balikatan exercise in the Philippines. This was followed by a second three-months 
deployment, where the 2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team participate in the Hanuman 
Guardian exercise in Thailand, the Salaknib drills in the Philippines, the Keris Strike in 
Malaysia as well as the Garuda Shield in Indonesia. This, in turn, was followed by a 
third deployment that participated in the Tiger Balm drills in Singapore, the Rim of the 
Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in Hawaii, the Arctic Anvil in Alaska, and the Orient Shield 
in Japan. According to US Army Pacific spokesperson Rumi Nielson-Green, “the 
linking of exercises allows the Army to practice at a tactical, operational and strategic 
                                                 
766 US Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, 23.  
767 Quoted in Michelle Tan, “Army Grows Pacific Pathways, Ties with Asian Partners,” Army Times, 
August 24, 2016, https://www.armytimes.com/articles/army-grows-pacific-pathways-ties-with-asian-
partners. 
768 Ibid. 
212 
level.”769 David Johnson at the Washington think-tank Center for Advanced Defense 
Studies argues that the Pacific Pathways, as paraphrased, “sends clear signals that 
America’s rebalance of forces to the region is real and affecting operational thinking” 
as well as it “demonstrates multilateral capacity” that “may deter potential regional 
aggressors,” yet it does so in a soft way by incorporating long-held exercises.770 In 
times of sequestration, the Pacific Pathways provides a groundbreaking way for the 
United States to maintain its preeminent status and expand its military presence in the 
region. 
Other naval interactions of importance in Southeast Asia are the Southeast Asia 
Cooperation and Training (SEACAT), the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 
(CARAT), and the Cobra Cold military exercises.771 The Cobra Gold military exercises 
has grown to become the largest multinational drill in Asia. The main participants in 
the exercise are the United States, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and Singapore. In total 27 countries participated in 2016, with many nations performing 
minor auxiliary roles or holding observation status. However, during the Obama 
administration the United States scaled down its involvement in the Cobra Cold 
exercises in a symbolic gesture against the military rule of the Thai junta, declaring that 
Thailand needs to restore democracy for the US-Thai defense relationship to return to 
normality. Yet the United States’ relationship with Vietnam lacks this principled 
approach. Washington expanded its defense relations with Vietnam despite insisting 
earlier that this would be conditioned on improvements in Vietnam’s human rights 
record. What is evidenced here is that the United States uses carrots and sticks 
strategically despite its hypocritical glare – it tries to punish Thailand, which has 
improved relations with China following the coup d'état; and it rewards Vietnam for 
standing up against China in the South China Sea. This, again, suggests that the US 
rebalancing strategy is targeted against China.  
In May 2015, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter 
announced the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI). The purpose is “more 
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than simply providing money or hardware, the United States is helping these five 
countries connect with each other and develop a networked approach to regional 
challenges.”772 More specifically, the United States seeks to “expand regional maritime 
domain awareness capabilities;” develop “a regional common operating picture;” and 
invest in “necessary infrastructure, logistics support, and operational procedures to 
enable more effective maritime response operations.”773 Initially the MSI involves a 
five-year American commitment of 425 million US dollars, which might seem pale, yet 
it forms a significant part of a greater whole that indicates the intention of the United 
States build collective capacity. Another significant development is the establishment 
of the Singapore Maritime Information-Sharing Working Group. According to the US 
Department of Defense, it is “an ideal platform to share best practices and lessons 
learned from recent regional maritime activities and explore options for increased 
information sharing across partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region.” The plan is to 
expand this bilateral initiative and “include other regional partners to participate in this 
community of interests.” Besides, the United States also wants Singapore’s Information 
Fusion Center (IFC) to turn into a regional interagency information-sharing hub.774 This 
would lay crucial building blocks for the establishment of a regional intelligence 
architecture. 
A key objective is to improve interoperability – bilaterally, trilaterally, and 
multilaterally – which, as defined by NATO, is “the ability to operate in synergy in the 
execution of assigned tasks.”775 The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy upholds 
the following: 
 
We are working together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian 
Ocean to build their maritime capacity. We are building greater interoperability, 
updating our combined exercises, developing more integrated operations, and 
cooperatively developing partner maritime domain awareness and maritime security 
capabilities, which will ensure a strong collective capacity to employ our maritime 
capabilities most effectively.776 
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The US Department of Defense is “pursuing a robust slate of training exercises and 
engagements with our allies and partners that will allow us to explore new areas of 
practical bilateral and multilateral maritime security cooperation, [and] build the 
necessary interoperability to execute multilateral operations.”777 In other words, the 
Obama administration took concrete steps towards a more coordinated regional security 
order. 
Certainly, joint military operations often involve anti-piracy missions, 
humanitarian drills, and disaster relief, yet other high-end, sophisticated warfighting 
exercises make it clear that the purpose is not merely to develop humanitarian or anti-
piracy capacity. The aim is to maintain America’s dominant status and regional access; 
to preserve the command of the commons through a more coordinated and integrated 
regional defense system. The improvement of interoperability and the establishment of 
common operational procedures enable concerted action and allow for pooling of 
resources, functional division of tasks, and information sharing. Hence, it is clear that 
the Obama administration intended to move beyond the bilateral hub-and-spokes 
alliance system and develop a coordinated approach towards both nontraditional and 
traditional security ends. In this reformed security order, the elevation of Japan’s 
security role is crucial since it plays a central part of the trilateral relationships and the 
expanded multilateral operations.  
However, we should not discount growing US-China cooperation. Since 2009, 
the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) at the most senior levels has 
been an important bilateral mechanism between the two governments. However, in the 
2015 Annual Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission it states that the S&ED “yield limited results.” Whereas the report 
acknowledged “some progress on environmental and financial issues,” it indicated that 
the S&ED had “reached an impasse in addressing fundamental strategic and economic 
issues.” 778  In 2016, conversely, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang 
declared that the S&ED delivered 120 outcomes in the strategic track, and over 60 
outcomes in the economic track. 779  Out of these achievements, we find a shared 
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commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a global climate 
agreement, improving global nuclear security, cyber security, addressing global 
humanitarian needs and augmenting disaster response capacity, strengthening global 
health security, cooperation on food security and sustainable development.780 Even so, 
these achievements and outcomes do not resolve the positional competition for 
leadership and the increasing strategic rivalry. As stated by one Chinese international 
relations scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS): 
 
Each year there is a list of all the results the dialogue has produced. More than hundreds 
of achievements... The S&ED is a comprehensive mechanism to cooperate, negotiate, 
and even to quarrel. Some of the achievements are significant, but the majority are not. 
Can you imagine that the US and China can attain hundreds of significant 
achievements every year? The problem is that the S&ED cannot resolve the 
fundamental tension in the relationship.781 
 
RIMPAC is another example of where the United States is engaging China in a 
multilateral context. In 2014, China was invited to participate in the world’s largest 
multilateral maritime warfare exercise for the first time, and was invited again in 2016. 
“Even though it is a good chance for the Chinese navy and other countries to know and 
understand each other, it is more a symbol of cooperation than anything else.”782 As 
stated by a Chinese Professor from Beijing, “RIMPAC is not so important in the context 
of increasing rivalry in the Western Pacific and the strategic military build-up. Five 
years ago, we never talked about arms races, space warfare, cyberspace, etc., but now 
everyone talks about the increasing strategic rivalry. I do not think RIMPAC can 
mitigate this.”783  
The US Department of Defense states that the US-China security cooperation 
covers three pillars: dialogue aimed at developing common views on the security 
environment and its related challenges; capacity development for security cooperation 
in areas of shared interests; and activities to improve operational safety.784 The problem 
is that the views of the United States and China in relation to the Asia-Pacific security 
environment diverge, and whereas the United States and China can cooperate in areas 
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where they share interests, such as the Iranian nuclear issue, antipiracy operations in 
the Gulf of Aden, climate change, etc., the Asia-Pacific is the decisive “testing ground” 
for US-China relations.785 Activities to improve operational safety, such as the CUES, 
is of practical concern and keeps strategic rivalry under control, but it does not resolve 
the underlying positional competition for influence. Beijing’s message to the United 
States is that it must genuinely respect and accommodate China’s core interests and 
major concerns in the region. In this way, there is perhaps increasing global 
cooperation, yet increasing regional competition. The crux of the matter is that the 
United States is bent on maintaining its dominant status, and as long as it maintains this 
goal, containment in some form is inevitable. As described by Michael Armacost and 
Stapleton Roy: 
 
A declared objective is to dissuade others from becoming ‘peer competitors.’ If we 
retain this goal, then China’s rise, or for that matter the rise of any other major Asian 
power, will be seen at some point as a threat to the United States, regardless of that 
country’s conduct. Sooner or later a ‘containment’ effort will be required.786 
 
The US Principled Security Network de facto expands the encirclement of China; 
hence, it is appropriate to term the US rebalancing strategy a “soft” containment 
strategy, despite growing US-China security cooperation. Since the new revised 
regional security order is intended to check China’s rise, the contradiction will only 
increase and positional competition intensify as structural change ensues. It is in these 
muddy waters that the Chinese perception of the rebalancing as a containment strategy 
finds its breeding ground. A gun is always a gun, and as long as there is no true 
friendship between the United States and China,787 the minimal requirement for enmity 
cannot be discounted, and it can thus be reasonably argued that American cannons 
indeed are directed against China. While the containment meme continues to have 
strong reverberations as a social fact among Chinese citizens, intellectuals and political 
elites, the institutional fact is that the US military – US military forces, US bases, US 
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allies and partners – indeed encircle China, and now in new and updated ways – 
bilaterally, trilaterally, multilaterally, and with Japan free to roam the seas – even 
though they serve the lofty ideal of regional peace and stability.  
Both China and the United States share a fundamental interest in maintaining 
regional peace and stability, open seas and freedom of navigation, indispensable for 
both nations’ prosperity and development – yet their strategic divergence is positional. 
Whereas the United States is pursuing a reformist revisionist project that remodels the 
regional security order to maintain US sole superpower status and global leadership, 
China seeks a transformational revisionist project with the aim of embarking on “a new 
path for Asian security” – a regional Asian security order devoid of alliances, where 
China would be the first among equals equipped with a leading role commensurate with 
its great power status. Hence, the positional competition involves a struggle for 
alternative regional orders. But before I turn to China’s projects to change the regional 
order, I will ascertain Chinese perceptions of US relative decline and China’s ensuing 
status expectations. 
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9. From Status Expectations to Status Frustration 
In this chapter, I will examine Chinese perceptions of China’s rise and the relative 
decline of the United States, outline China’s status expectations, and demonstrate how 
the Chinese leadership perceived the US pivot as a status challenge. 
 
9.1 Perceptions of China’s Rise and the Relative Decline of the United 
States 
The Chinese political and intellectual elite have long debated and evaluated US relative 
decline. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, experts 
carried out rigorous analyses of the emerging international order and China’s position 
within it. In particular, Germany and Japan were perceived as US competitors in the 
economic domain, especially in the area of high technology. Yet more significantly, 
“[s]ome Chinese experts began to predict the emergence of a post-Cold War multipolar 
world order, a greater balance among major powers, resistance toward ‘Western values’ 
and an increased emphasis worldwide on economic and diplomatic approaches as 
opposed to military might.” However, these assessments “proved overly optimistic,” 
which led Beijing to conclude that, “the United States would maintain its status as ‘sole 
superpower’ for the next 15 to 20 years, if not longer.”788  
Nevertheless, the CCP have long viewed the emergence of multipolarity as an 
inevitable trend, and US relative decline as unescapable. To gauge this trend, Chinese 
experts have developed a rigorous measurement of comprehensive national power 
(CNP) that includes a wide variety of factors, both hard and soft power indicators. 
Although their predictions vary, Chinese experts predict a long-term scenario “in which 
the United States will decline economically, socially, militarily, and internationally to 
become one of five ‘poles’” in a multipolar world structure - “[n]othing can save the 
United States from this fate.”789 Although the CCP and Chinese experts acknowledged 
that, after the Cold War, the world is inevitably moving towards multipolarization, the 
consensus at the time was that fundamental structural change had not yet occurred – 
“yes, but not just yet.” 
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China’s impressive economic development is often represented as a “rise,” but 
China rather views its development experience as a “return.” As Yan Xuetong makes 
clear, “the Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather 
than as obtaining something new.”790 Over the long haul, China’s development curve 
takes the shape of an upright U; from making up a third of the world’s total 
manufacturing base in 1750, China declined because of Western European 
industrialization and imperialism, and is now embarking on a path towards completing 
the U curve. Hu Angang estimates that the complete restoration of China’s former 
strength will be accomplished by 2050. Yet by 2020, Angang claims that China is 
already set to become a superpower – “politically, militarily, and in terms of science 
and technology.” From the perspective of a “return,” China “goes back to normal” and 
reclaims its formers position atop the global hierarchy, and the ascendancy of the 
Western world looks more like a historic aberration that temporarily displaced the 
traditional world center of gravity, symbolized by a development curve taking the form 
of an inverted U.791 
Relatedly, the debate about US relative decline resurfaced once more against 
the background of the protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the 2008 Financial 
Crisis. Still, experts that have surveyed the intellectual debates following the crisis 
argue that there is no scholarly consensus concerning the emergence of multipolarity 
and the end of US dominance.792 Notwithstanding this scholarly ambiguity, Chinese 
officials in fact started to perceive a more rapid change in the balance of power in 
China’s favor after the 2008 Financial Crisis, especially so as China was weathering 
the international economic turmoil with great success. This assessment can be found in 
China’s 2008 Defense White Paper, where it states that, “[e]conomic globalization and 
world multipolarization are gaining momentum.”793 Likewise, Michael Yahuda argues 
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that “decisive” structural change was “noted at the Party’s Central Work Conference 
on Foreign Affairs” in 2009.794 Even though the full text of Hu Jintao’s speech at the 
conference is not publically available, Hu reportedly asserted that, “the prospect of 
global multipolarization has become clearer.”795 China’s 2011 Peaceful Development 
white paper echoes a similar assessment:  
 
The global trend towards multipolarity is irresistible. The emerging economies, 
regional groups and Asian and other regions are becoming stronger, and various non-
state actors are growing fast, which, taking advantage of economic globalization and 
the information age, expand their influence and have become an important force in 
various countries and in the international arena….The world today is moving towards 
multipolarity and economic globalization is gaining momentum.796 
 
Suisheng Zhao argues that the “narrowing” of the “power gap” and China’s successful 
“weathering the 2009 global ﬁnancial crisis” lead the Chinese leadership to “see a shift 
in the world balance of power in China’s favor.”797 While Chinese officials started to 
perceive fundamental structural change and US relative economic decline at the time of 
the 2008 Financial Crisis, “key Chinese sources, including analyses by military experts, 
did not forecast any diminution of America’s military advantage.”798 However, the 
view is that “the [military] rise of China will help restore a balance of power in the 
Asia-Pacific region and reduce the dangers embedded in the domination of just one 
power.”799 With China’s military modernization and expansion in the Western Pacific, 
this is exactly what is presently occurring. 
In 2009, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences released its yellow book on 
the world economy and the international situation in which it assessed China’s 
comprehensive national power. It ranked China number seven in the power hierarchy, 
which owes to the gauge’s wide-ranging indicators. Apart from population, territory 
and natural resources, economy, and military and science, the utilized indicators also 
included sustainability, social development, domestic politics, and security. Hence, the 
ranking blurs China’s economic prowess. Even so, upon the release of the Yellow Book, 
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China Daily reported that, “2009 marked a year for a changing international power 
balance, with increased influence for newcomers to the global stage,” a year in which 
“China experienced a steady lift of its influence both in regional and international 
realms.”800 Since then, however, no major new assessment of China’s comprehensive 
national power has been undertaken to measure China’s present power status. 801 
Nevertheless, in a Brookings Institution report on US-China strategic distrust, 
renowned Peking University Professor and advisor to the Chinese government Wang 
Jisi makes it clear that “many Chinese officials believe that their nation has ascended 
to be a first-class power in the world and should be treated as such.”802 The fact is that 
“the popular sensibility, even among the intellectual class, is that the gap has narrowed 
dramatically, and momentum is all in China’s favour.”803  
With the Chinese leadership transition and Xi Jinping in power, China’s 
perception of ongoing fundamental change in the international system remains strong. 
In Xi’s first state visit to Russia, he described his view of the world:  
 
It is a world where emerging markets and developing countries in large numbers have 
embarked on the track of fast development. Billions of people are moving towards 
modernization at an accelerating pace. Multiple growth engines have emerged in 
regions across the world. And the international balance of power continues to evolve 
in a direction favorable for peace and development.804 
 
Similarly, at the Central Conference on Foreign Affairs, Xi Jinping articulated the “five 
unchangeables” – multipolarity, economic globalization, peace and development, 
reform of the international system, prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific: 
 
While being mindful of the complexity of the evolving international architecture, we 
should recognize that the growing trend toward a multi-polar world will not change. 
While being fully aware that the global economic adjustment will not be smooth 
sailing, we need to recognize that economic globalization will not stop. While being 
fully alert to the grave nature of international tensions and struggle, we need to 
recognize that peace and development, the underlying trend of our times, will remain 
unchanged. While being keenly aware of the protracted nature of contest over the 
international order, we need to recognize that the direction of reform of the 
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international system will remain unchanged. While fully recognizing the uncertainty 
in China’s neighboring environment, we should realize that the general trend of 
prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific region will not change.805 
 
The Chinese leadership unequivocally perceive these trends to be moving in a favorable 
direction, showcasing a confident view of China’s development trajectory and with it, 
the expectation for reform of the international system and further positional gains. 
However, the very concept of the “new model of great power relations” presents the 
greatest evidence for China’s perception of fundamental structural change. In essence, 
the new model of great power relations is the clearest sign that China sees itself as a 
first-class power and the United States, in particular, should respect it as such.  
When Xi Jinping visited the United States as Vice President in February 2012, 
he called for the creation of “a new type of relationship between major countries in the 
21st century.” In May 2012, at the fourth S&ED, both Hu Jintao and Dai Bingguo 
reiterated Xi’s call and made historic references to power shifts, in particular by 
debunking “the traditional belief that big powers are bound to enter into confrontation 
and conflicts” and urging the United States and China to learn from past “tragic lessons” 
by building a “new type of great power relationship.”806 These historic analogies were 
repeated by Xi Jinping in Seattle in September 2015, when Xi stated that “[t]here is no 
such thing as the so-called Thucydides trap in the world. But should major countries 
time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such 
traps for themselves.”807 Here Xi is merely debunking the view that tragic major wars 
are inevitability by highlighting human agency and miscalculation; he does not deny, 
however, the structural environment of two competing major powers, whose struggle 
for status and influence sets the background for the historic reference point. The “new 
model of major power relations” is in effect a recognition of the new structural reality 
in place; that while the United States is the sole superpower, China is indeed the premier 
great power. As stated by Wang Yi, the new model of great power relations “is a logical 
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development, because it accords with…the trend of our times.”808 Hence, while the 
Chinese consensus about multipolarization in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War 
was “yes, but not just yet,” after the 2008 Financial Crisis the consensus was “yes, this 
time it’s real,” to paraphrase Christopher Layne.809  
The change in the balance of power also figures as the material “backdrop” for 
China’s concept of “a new type of international relations.” As Wang Yi puts it: 
 
As the trend toward a multipolar world, wider application of information technology, 
economic globalization and cultural diversity gains momentum, the international 
community is entering a crucial phase where changes are taking place in the world's 
landscape and systems. ‘Where are international relations heading,’ this question of 
our times thus cries out louder for an answer. Against such a backdrop, the CPC 
Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as its General Secretary has put forth, in 
a timely fashion, the important thinking of building a new type of international 
relations.810 
 
Here Wang Yi clearly spells out China’s perception of a change in the international 
environment, a change that has entered a historic moment that calls for a new type of 
international relations or a reform of the international order that considers these 
changes. These perceptions are further revealed in China’s White Paper on Asia-Pacific 
Security in relation to the regional context: 
 
The Asia-Pacific region covers a vast area with numerous countries and 60 percent of 
the world's population. Its economic and trade volumes take up nearly 60 percent and 
half of the world's total, respectively. It has an important strategic position in the 
world. In recent years, the development of the Asia-Pacific region has increasingly 
caught people's attention. It has become the most dynamic region with the strongest 
potential in the world. All parties are attaching greater importance to and investing 
more in this region. With the profound adjustment of the pattern of international 
relations, the regional situation of the Asia-Pacific area is also undergoing profound 
changes.811 
 
Furthermore, at the China Development Forum at Diaoyutai Sate Guesthouse in March 
2016, in a dialogue between Dai Bingguo and Henry Kissinger on the new model of 
major-country relations, Dai accentuated that nuclear weapon induced stability and 
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mutual assured destruction characterize the US-China relationship.812 Hence, as US-
China relations transpires in the context of nuclear deterrence that mitigate security 
concerns, the struggle for status and influence becomes the main driving force of US-
China competition as the international system undergoes fundamental change. With 
China’s rise, and especially so after the critical juncture of the 2008 Financial Crisis, 
its status expectations and desire for political influence increased.  
 
9.2 China’s Status Expectations 
In many ways, the domestic Chinese sentiment is optimistic and confident. In a poll by 
Pew Research Center in 2005, 50% of Chinese believed that they had made personal 
progress over the last five years, which was the top result among the surveyed countries. 
When asked about their position on a “ladder of life” – where 0 represents the worst 
possible life and 10 the best possible life – the majority of the Chinese in the poll still 
view themselves as being placed on the middle steps of the ladder. However, when 
asked where they would see themselves in five years from the time of the survey, 69% 
believed they would have reached a high position on the ladder, indicating a score 
between 7-10, and a striking 75% considered themselves to be optimists in contrast to 
pessimists, leading Pew Research Center to conclude that “China emerges as the world 
leader in hope for the future on a composite index of optimism.” 813  This is not 
significantly different from India’s position, but stands in marked contrast to the United 
States. Moreover, 72 % were satisfied with national conditions, topping the list of the 
countries in the survey.814 
In another poll by Pew Research Center in 2008, when rating China’s 
performance, a staggering 86% were satisfied with the country’s direction and 82% 
viewed the economy as good, which represents an increase with 38% and 30% 
respectively since 2002. Again, this places Chinese optimism at the top of the global 
ranking.815 Moreover,  
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The Chinese generally have a positive view of their country’s role in world affairs. 
They see their country as well-liked abroad and believe China considers the interests 
of others in making decisions about foreign policy. They also see their country on the 
rise – most think China will ultimately supplant the United States as the world’s 
leading superpower.816  
 
Even though these self-perceptions do not always correspond with how other countries 
view China, it still indicates widespread confidence in China’s future trajectory and the 
expectation that China will eventually surpass the United States. 
Yet this perspective coexists with the view that China’s rise will not come 
without struggle. For instance, in a 2009 Lowy Institute poll,817 Chinese participants 
were asked to consider what issues and what countries they think pose the greatest 
threat to China’s security. Environmental issues and water and food shortages were two 
top issues viewed as threatening to China’s security, but when asked about which 
countries that threaten China, the United States and Japan were singled out as the 
foremost threats. 34% viewed the United States as the “greatest threat” and 45% viewed 
it as the “greatest or the second-greatest threat”; whereas 14% viewed Japan as the 
“greatest threat” and 36% viewed it as the “greatest or the second-greatest threat.” The 
top reason why the United States was considered a threat was in fact related to status 
issues, namely that the United States “might seem to restrain China’s growing influence 
in the world.” Thirty-three percent somewhat agreed, and forty-four percent strongly 
agreed with this. Even though concerns about US support for separatist elements in 
China (30% somewhat agreed, 46% strongly agreed) or the US siding with Taiwan in 
a cross-strait dispute (30% somewhat agreed, 43% strongly agreed) were as prevalent, 
it indicates a domestic belief that the United States will try block or prevent China’s 
rise. Significantly, the lowest level of agreement found in relation to potential US 
threats was the proposition that “the values it holds and promotes could undermine 
China’s standing in the world,” which can be seen in relation the United States’ 
declining reputational capital. In this way, the Chinese people view China’s rise as 
“constrained by the United States.” 818  This relates to the constant sense of 
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dissatisfaction in China with the country’s international status. As Yan Xuetong points 
out: 
 
First, the Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather 
than as obtaining something new. This psychological feeling results in the Chinese 
being continuously dissatisfied with their economic achievements until China resumes 
its superpower status. Second, the Chinese consider the rise of China as a restoration 
of fairness rather than as gaining advantages over others. With this concept, the 
Chinese people take the rise of their nation for granted. They never concern themselves 
with the question of why China should be more advanced than other nations, but rather 
frequently ask themselves the question of why China is not the number one nation in 
the world.819 
 
Even though the Chinese might be continuously dissatisfied until China attains 
superpower status, which in itself is evidence for a revisionist sentiment, they still take 
China’s rise for granted. China is preordained to restore its past glory or as Yan puts it, 
China’s rise “is granted by nature.”820 Therefore, as China increases its power and 
prestige and its comprehensive national power grows, it expects to be treated with 
greater respect and demands that its rise translates into greater “discourse power” or a 
“right to speak,”821 specifically concerning its core interests and major concerns. As 
China continues to rise, its confidence and expectations for greater status in the 
international order grow. This expectation is crystalized in China’s peaceful 
development theory, which, in effect, reflects “a desire to search for a new foreign 
policy facilitating China’s emergence as a global power.”822 As China determinately 
pushes a strategy designed to reveal its benevolent face, these status expectations 
increase even further as all that hard labor to debunk the China threat theory and 
convince the world of its benign intentions is expected to pay off.  
With the 2008 Financial Crisis and the United States bogged down in the 
economic turmoil, China’s confidence was boosted. It took pride in its state-directed 
development model, while throwing trenchant critique against the United States – the 
most notable example being when former Premier Wen Jiabao blamed the American 
economic system for the financial crisis at the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos. 
While the notion of Beijing Consensus is not an officially promoted Chinese model or 
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counterhegemonic alternative to the Washington Consensus,823 China is not short of 
representatives that claim developing countries can learn from China successful 
development experience. Justin Yifu Lin, a renowned Peking University Professor and 
advisor to the Chinese government who was Chief Economist to the World Bank in 
2008-2012, is perhaps the best example of a person who has been advocating this 
idea.824 As Lin assumed his position in the World Bank, he seized the opportunity to 
spread China’s voice tirelessly as the financial contagion spread was throughout the 
globe. 
Apart from the confidence generated by China’s successful handling of the 2008 
Financial Crisis, the crisis also engendered status expectations among the Chinese 
political and intellectual elite in terms of appeals to change the established international 
order to make it more representative. For instance, Fu Mengzi, vice-president of the 
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations argued: 
 
The impact of the financial crisis on global politics, economy, security, and social 
aspects is perhaps greater than that of any previous crisis, war or disaster since the end 
of the Cold War. Such has been the impact that world leaders could be forced to build 
a new world order that conforms to the changed political and economic situation and 
takes into consideration the importance of emerging economies.825 
 
We find similar evidence for rising expectations among Chinese officials. At a press 
conference adjacent to the 2009 G20 Summit in London, Chinese Ambassador Fu Ying 
made a revealing statement while commenting on the changes and expectations 
associated with the financial crisis: 
 
Never before has China been given the chance of revolution of the international 
economic and financial order to express its just demand and raise its proper concern, 
win more representation and greater say for the emerging countries including itself 
and adapt the changing order and reform in the interests of developing countries like 
itself. We should, therefore, see, value and take this chance to uphold and assert justice 
for the shared interests of people in China and across the world.826 
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Moreover,  
 
The world is undergoing a crisis, the size of which was only seen once in the past one 
hundred years. It is also embracing an opportunity for international cooperation unseen 
in history. With unprecedented challenges ahead of us, the world should demonstrate 
unprecedented solidarity, courage and confidence, to respond to global challenges 
through global cooperation, to cultivate a stable, mature, equal and cooperative model 
of country-country relationship, and to facilitate reform in the concept, structure and 
model of international governance. China is fully prepared and ready to join hands 
with the rest of the world.827 
 
 
At the G20 Summit, China heralded the expectation for “substantive progress in the 
reform of global financial institutions” and a “raise” in “the representation and say of 
emerging markets and developing countries.” 828  A similar sentiment is echoed in 
China’s 2011 Peaceful Development white paper, where “a growing call for change in 
the international system” is noted against the backdrop of “historical challenges.”829 
Relatedly, Bonnie Glaser and Benjamin Dooley argue that CCP’s Central Work 
Conference on Foreign Affairs in 2009, “signal[ed] an intention to use China’s 
economic weight, financial resources and growing geopolitical influence to expand its 
say in designing any future international and economic system.”830  
Noticeable evidence for China’s status expectations can also be drawn from the 
BRIC-summit declarations. As the shockwaves of the financial crisis was sweeping 
over the world, the BRIC-countries convened for the first time, and in their joint 
statement following the first summit in June 2009 in Russia, they connected their plea 
for greater positions to changes in the balance of power: “We are committed to advance 
the reform of international financial institutions, so as to reflect changes in the world 
economy. The emerging and developing economies must have greater voice and 
representation in international financial institutions.”831 In the second summit in April 
2010 in Brasilia, the message is even more straightforward:  
 
                                                 
827 Ibid, emphasis added. 
828 Ibid.  
829 State Council, “China’s Peaceful Development” 
830 Bonnie S. Glaser and Benjamin Dooley, “China’s 11th Ambassadorial Conference Signals Continuity 
and Change in Foreign Policy,” China Brief 9, no. 22 (November 4, 2009), 11.  
831  BRIC, “Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders June 16, 2009 Yekaterinburg, Russia” 
(Yekaterinburg, June 16, 2009), http://brics5.co.za/about-brics/summit-declaration/first-summit/, 
accessed September 12, 2016, emphasis added. 
229 
We share the perception that the world is undergoing major and swift changes that 
highlight the need for corresponding transformations in global governance in all 
relevant areas. We underline our support for a multipolar, equitable and democratic 
world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, 
coordinated action and collective decision-making of all States.832 
 
Moreover,   
 
The IMF and the World Bank urgently need to address their legitimacy deficits. 
Reforming these institutions’ governance structures requires first and foremost a 
substantial shift in voting power in favor of emerging market economies and 
developing countries to bring their participation in decision making in line with their 
relative weight in the world economy.833 
 
 
The emergence of status expectations following the financial crisis is supported by 
interviews I conducted with International Relations scholars and think-thank experts 
from several universities and institutes in Beijing and Shanghai in July 2016. For 
instance, a Beijing-based Chinese Professor and International Relations expert argued 
that, “following the financial crisis, Chinese scholars and leaders expected China to be 
awarded a greater international role.” 834  Similarly, a Shanghai-based International 
Relations expert and think-tank expert argued, “the financial crisis really gave birth to 
a feeling that the balance of power had changed significantly, and that the time for 
reform of the international system had come.”835 
Cary Huang’s assessment of Xi Jinping’s “new diplomacy” aptly summarizes 
the discussion: 
 
It’s driven by the belief that the global order is in the midst of a historic change that 
might end the US domination of global affairs of the last few decades, leading to one 
shared by the West and East. This change has created an opportunity or even necessity 
for China to take the lead, the belief goes, and helps explain why Xi is more active and 
assertive than his predecessors in foreign policy and diplomacy.836 
 
This new activism and the effective abandonment of China’s long-cherished grand 
strategy of “keeping a low profile” is a consequence of fundamental change in the 
international system. However, while China was gaining status globally through greater 
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representation and voice in both the WTO and the G20, the US pivot to Asia clearly 
demonstrated that the United States did not intend to give up its dominance of the 
regional order. 
 
9.3 Frustrating China’s Status Expectations 
China’s status aspiration is to regain its lost preeminence. China’s self-conception, 
embodied by the political elite, is that of being a returning power, not a rising one; a 
country preordained to restore its past glory. Hence, China is pervaded by one 
predominant state telos: to restore its former position atop the global hierarchy.837 In 
view of this, the US pivot indicated a status threat to China’s long-standing aspiration 
and restorationist ethos, and so at a critical juncture when China perceived that the time 
had finally arrived for a genuine change of the international order. As Robert Ross 
notes, the US pivot “sparked” China’s “combativeness,” “damaged its faith in 
cooperation,” and made the Asia-Pacific “more tense and conflictprone.” 838  Or as 
former Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei puts it: “In recent years, 
geopolitical tensions between major powers have been rising, which is reflected in the 
Ukraine crisis, Syrian conflict and the U.S. rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific.”839 
Similarly, as Yan Xuetong debunks the American rhetoric saying the “US pivot is not 
targeted at China,” he states that the US pivot “is making the rivalry between China and 
the United States more intense,” and that “it is understandable for the Americans to 
adopt that kind of policy, if they want to maintain solo superpower status in the 
world.”840 A Chinese International Relations expert at a Beijing think tank further 
argues that, “the US pivot was the ‘tipping point’ for US-China relations”841 – an 
indication that the United States would prevent China’s positional ascendancy.  
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The high-profile speeches, announcements, and diplomatic performances of the 
Obama administration were seen as simulacra of a “Cold War mentality” still 
dominating American strategic thinking. The Chinese political and intellectual elite 
perceived the US pivot to be going against the prevailing trend of the times, and it was 
widely viewed as an antagonistic move that stepped up military encirclement through 
reinforcement and expansion of the US regional security system and economic 
containment of China’s rise.842 In 2014, the assessment of the Chinese leadership about 
US strategic intentions were summarized in a five-point consensus, the message is 
clear; namely, the United States is seeking to contain China; to isolate China; to 
diminish China; to sabotage China’s leadership; and to internally divide China.843 In 
other words, the US pivot was experienced by the Chinese foreign policy elite as an 
attempt to “lock out” China.” And rightly so, for through the TPP the Obama 
administration sought to exclude China from its revisionist project for the regional 
economic order, and through the reform of the US hub-and-spokes system the Obama 
administration reinforced its position by enlarging the encirclement of China and 
creating a new regional security system that moved beyond the traditional hub-and-
spokes structure. In this way, the Obama administration was erecting both positional 
barriers and new rules that disavow China status and influence. 
When China views the US pivot as going against the trend of times, it means 
that when the world is moving towards multipolarization, the United States is seeking 
to maintain preponderance; when the world is moving towards peace and development, 
the United States revitalizes its Cold War mentality; and when China is expecting 
greater status, the United States attempts to block its regional ascendancy. As stated by 
Suisheng Zhao: 
 
In Beijing’s view, deeply embedded in the rebalance is Washington’s profound 
concern about China’s rise. Under this overarching theme, Beijing sees a 
comprehensive policy by Washington to block China’s rise through strengthened 
military alliances with Japan and other allies and partners, ‘sabotaging’ China’s ties 
with ASEAN, and undercutting China’s effort to lead the regional economic 
integration by pushing for a US-centered and China-free Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership.844 
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This specifically relates to the regional order, since in relation to the global order China 
has in fact been rewarded greater positions. It now holds considerable influence within 
the WTO and is part of the premier status groupings within the organization. “We can 
say that after 10 years of efforts, China’s important position in the WTO is widely 
recognized and China has won the substantive right to speak in making international 
trade rules.”845 Through the elevation of the G20 to the summit level, China has also 
gained voice in what is now regarded as the premier forum on global financial issues. 
In the IMF and the World Bank, even though the United States still holds veto power 
over the most significant decisions, China has increased its position and is now the third 
largest member country. IMF has also given the renminbi global reserve currency 
status. Moreover, by being a permanent member of the UNSC and enjoying the rank of 
second largest economy and third strongest military in the world, China is in many ways 
a well-established great power on its way to superpower status, yet the feeling that 
China’s status expectations have not been fully met still remains. As Lucian Pye 
observes:  
 
The economic successes of Deng’s reforms should have warmed up relations [with the 
U.S.], making the Chinese more self-confident and at ease with the outside world, less 
touchy about slights to their sovereignty or perceived meddling in their internal affairs. 
However, this success has only generated greater tensions and frustrations. The Chinese 
take seriously the forecast that they will soon have the world’s largest economy. They 
therefore feel that they deserve recognition and respect as a superpower-in-waiting. It 
is not enough that they are already a permanent member of the United Nations Security 
Council and one of the five nuclear powers. Somehow all of their accomplishments of 
the last two decades have not produced as dramatic a change in their international status 
as they had expected or believe is their due.846  
 
In particular, in one central capacity China does not possess a duly significant criterion 
for true great power status – namely, regional leadership. With the US pivot to Asia, 
the Obama administration demonstrated that it did not intend to grant China that 
position. 
Yan Xuetong neatly describes the sentiment felt by the Chinese: “China’s 
economic status has risen, but the country has yet to garner commensurate respect from 
the international community.”847 Wang Jisi makes a similar argument: “China deserves 
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more respect as first-class power,” which means that the “the United States should take 
China’s interests and aspirations more seriously than before, and should change its 
international behavior.”848 As Wang Yi made clear, the Asia-Pacific is the “testing 
ground” for US-China relations and the “new model of great power relations,” and the 
United States should genuinely respect and accommodate China’s core interests and 
major concerns in the region.849 However, the US pivot to Asia indicated the very 
opposite; the Americancentric blueprint for the regional order signposted that China 
would not be awarded the preeminent status it so desires and feels it deserves. 
In March 2013, when Xi Jinping travelled to Russia in his first foreign visit as 
president, he portrayed a world characterized by both growing interdependence and 
rising struggle. Xi stressed that, “countries are linked with and dependent on one 
another at a level never seen before,” yet he also depicted a world of struggle, “a world 
where mankind is beset with numerous difficulties and challenges.” In this world of 
teething troubles, Xi mentioned that the world is witnessing “rising hegemonism, power 
politics and neo-interventionism.”850 As he continued his speech, Xi laid out a notion 
of historical progress strikingly similar to, yet still strikingly opposed to, Barack 
Obama’s famous speech to Australian parliament two years before:  
 
We hope that the world will become a better place. We have every reason to 
believe that it will. At the same time, we are soberly aware that while the future 
is bright, the path leading to it can be tortuous… Yet as shown by humanity’s 
progress, history always moves forward according to its own laws despite twists 
and turns, and no force can hold back its rolling wheels. The tide of the world is 
surging forward. Those who submit to it will prosper and those who resist it will 
perish. Keeping up with the times, one cannot live in the 21st century while 
thinking in the old fashion, lingering in the age of colonial expansion or with the 
zero-sum mentality of the Cold War.851  
 
Even though the trends of the time – the “five unchangeables” – define historical 
progress and China’s strategic opportunity period, the US pivot to Asia accentuated the 
importance of strategic choice in order to “maintain and make the best of the strategic 
opportunities we now enjoy.”852 In this sense, although “some Chinese scholars say that 
the rebalancing strategy narrowed China’s strategic space,” China’s strategic 
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opportunity period “depends on how China makes use of its foreign policy…China can 
still enjoy the opportunity period if it…counters the adverse changes in the region.”853 
This echoes Xi Jinping’s argument that the “current circumstances” require China to 
“be ever more active” and to “be bold in assuming responsibilities.”854 China should 
enhance its pursuit of leadership, as a passive approach “would eventually back Beijing 
in a corner.”855 By standing up for its status aspiration, China needed to “make friends” 
and attract a significant circle of recognition. With Xi Jinping in the top position, China 
started to “strive for achievement.”856 
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10. Striving for Achievement: China’s Status Enhancement 
Strategy and the Remaking of the Regional Order 
Before I specify China’s goal of status enhancement, and how it seeks to revise the 
regional order, we have to deflate the argument that great powers do not always try to 
maximize status. Referring to China, Xiaoyu Pu and Randall Schweller argue that, 
“rising powers do not always choose to maximize their international status. Determined 
to sustain their growth trajectory, emerging powers tend to be inward-looking states, 
reluctant to take on the burdens and responsibilities associated with a leading role on 
the world stage.”857 This is true to a certain extent, yet it nonetheless misconceives an 
important aspect of status enhancement, namely the acquiring of necessary status 
attributes.  
In the beginning of the 1980s, when China moved from “a militantly 
reconstructionist to a reformist developmental regime” 858  under Deng Xiaoping, it 
turned its full attention to economic development in order to rise in the economic power 
hierarchy. Since the second half of the 1990s, China has intentionally engaged in a 
strategy to counter the China threat theory and climb the prestige hierarchy, and since 
the beginning of the 2000s, China has rapidly climbed the military power hierarchy. All 
with the purpose of gaining greater status and influence. It is therefore not entirely 
correct to claim that China, based on its earlier reluctance to assume a leading role, was 
not engaging in status maximization. In fact, China’s relentless and unprecedented 
focus on economic growth shows a consistent determination to enhance a core achieved 
status variable – that of economic wealth – no matter the social and environmental costs. 
China’s launching of new concepts, its good neighbor policy, and its vigorous courting 
of regional institutions shows a consistent determination to enhance a core ascribed 
status variable – that of reputation. The China-Japan struggle for regional economic 
leadership played out in the 2000s was in fact a struggle for status and influence. In 
relation to the definition of social mobility as the “improvement…of a given rank on 
one or more status dimensions…within a given period of time,”859 China has, clearly 
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and resolutely, enhanced its position, and so during a historically unprecedented time 
span. 
Under Mao Zedong’s leadership, China was, after all, the self-proclaimed leader 
of the Third World. Deng Xiaoping’s realization, however, was that without a solid 
economic base neither China’s rise nor true leadership would materialize, and China’s 
economic “backwardness” would continue to “incur beatings by others.” In Deng 
Xiaoping’s speech at the third plenary session of the central advisory commission of 
the CCP in October 1984, the message is laid bare:  
 
The real, permanent solution is to quadruple the GNP and develop the economy. Of 
course, we shall still have to conduct education among the people; work among the 
people can never be dispensed with. But economic development is the foundation, and 
it will make that work easier. What will the political situation be like once we have 
quadrupled the GNP? I am confident that there will be genuine stability and unity. 
China will be truly powerful, exerting a much greater influence in the world. That is 
why we have to work hard.860 
 
Hence, according to Deng, it is for the purpose of stability and unity domestically, and 
influence-maximization internationally, that China has to work hard. China’s 
“unswerving goal” is “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”861 Deng’s power 
maximization serves as a necessary means for China’s rejuvenation and the restoration 
of its former glory atop the global hierarchy. The China 2020 Research Team, 
spearheaded by Zhou Qiren of the National School of Development at Peking 
University, lay down China’s status enhancement goal in plain and simple terms: 
China’s objective is to overtake the United States to become number one. 862  Yan 
Xuetong disseminates the same unequivocal message: “the political goal of China is to 
regain the status it held as a world power in past.”863 Orville Schell and John Delury 
elegantly summarize the argument:  
 
Unlike democratic political reform in the West, which developed out of a belief in 
certain universal values and human rights as derived from a “natural,” if not God-
given, source, and so were to be espoused regardless of their efficacy, the dominant 
tradition of reform in China evolved from a far more utilitarian source. Its primary 
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focus was to return China to a position of strength, and any way that might help achieve 
this goal was thus worth considering. What “liberté, egalité, fraternité” meant to the 
French Revolution and to the making of modernity in West, “wealth, strength, and 
honor” have meant to the forging of modern China.864 
 
The notion of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” has survived the times and 
been invoked by every great modern Chinese leader, from Sun Yet-Sen and Chiang 
Kai-Shek to Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.865 In other words, China does not 
take American preponderance as inevitable, neither American leadership as natural. 
The fact that the notion of rejuvenation has persisted throughout the course of different 
historical periods, political leaders, regime types, and at various levels of power shows 
that it is not epiphenomenal to material structures – it is rather a constant. In other 
words, status-maximization is the enduring motivator of China’s grand strategy. 
In the seminal anthology Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamic edited 
by David Shambaugh, Chinese scholars Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping outline four 
core pillars of China’s grand strategic orientation. The first pillar is China’s 
restorationist ambition to become “a great power again.” Zhang and Tang claim that 
Chinese leaders “have always believed that China rightly belongs to the ‘great power’ 
club.” This notion serves as the unshakable telos that guides China’s progress, as noted 
above. The second pillar relates to China’s determined developmentalist agenda and 
the realization that for its “Four Modernizations” project to bear fruit “China needs a 
stable and peaceful environment.” The third core pillar is self-restraint and relates to 
Deng’s cautioning “against actively seeking leadership in global or regional affairs and 
shouldering responsibilities that China cannot bear.” The fourth, notwithstanding the 
third, relates to the notion that took shape under Jiang Zemin, and in particular, after 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which stresses that in an interdependent world, China 
needs to “shoulder certain burdens and responsibilities.” Hence the development of the 
notion of China as a “responsible great power.” The four pillars relate to corresponding 
practices: great power diplomacy oriented towards the United States, the strategy to 
create friendly relationships with its neighbors, as well as the reluctance to pursue 
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multilateral leadership and the pronounced selectiveness in shouldering international 
responsibility.866  
While the first two pillars of China’s grand strategic orientation and 
corresponding practice are relatively immutable, the last two are changeable. China is 
no longer heeding Deng’s advice, but is actively seeking leadership; and the notion of 
responsibility is being autonomously defined in relation to China’s rights as a great 
power and its active promotion and shouldering of responsibility in a reformed 
international order. 
This then relates to the debate on whether China has abandoned Deng 
Xiaoping’s famous grand strategic “laying low” dictum and his specific instruction “do 
not seek leadership.”867 The China 2020 Research Team claims that given the changing 
global context and the expansion of Chinese interests, “China will no longer be able to 
continue with such a passive policy,” but argues that it remains the guiding principle 
for Chinese foreign conduct.868 Yan Xuetong, on the other hand, argues that China has 
abandoned the strategy of “keeping a low profile” (KLP) and now puts emphasis on the 
strategy of “striving for achievement” (SFA).869 Yan’s argument is largely supported 
by interviews I conducted with International Relations scholars and think-thank experts 
in China in July 2016. For instance, one Chinese International Relations expert and 
think-tank professional made use of an illustrative analogy to illustrate the point:  
 
You can compare it to a bird in a cage. The cage is the principle of keeping a low 
profile, and the bird is striving for achievement. Before, although the bird could not 
flee from the cage, the cage could be enlarged or reduced. Today the cage does not 
exist anymore, and the bird is free. Before, keeping a low profile was the grand 
strategic position of China, but now keeping a low profile is only tactical, and striving 
for achievement is at the core of China’s grand strategy. I think this is the mainstream 
view by now.
870
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At the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2012, 
the “two centennial goals” were set: by 2021, China is poised to become a moderately 
prosperous society, and by 2049 a prosperous, strong, culturally advanced, harmonious, 
democratic, and modern socialist country. Less than two weeks after Xi Jinping’s 
assumption of power, he issued his first slogan – the China Dream. While visiting the 
“The Road Toward Renewal” exhibition at the National Museum of China, Xi 
professed, “to realize the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for 
the Chinese nation in modern history.”871  
The China Dream has an implicit grand strategic element, which is not spelled 
out directly in the official discourses. A Professor from Shanghai used an amusing 
analogy to illustrate what is at stake: “Xi Jinping launched the China Dream when 
China is number two in the world. Do you think when he wakes up from his dream that 
he wants to be number three? Of course not, he wants to be number one.”872 Ye Zicheng 
offers another illustrative account: “If China does not become a world power, the 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be incomplete. Only when it becomes a world 
power can we say that the total rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been 
achieved.”873Another Professor from Beijing further laid bare the consequential zero-
sum logic: “Internationally, it means that China should eventually become a 
superpower. China should have decisive influence in Asia and the Western Pacific at 
American cost.”874 Simply put: “China’s quest to enhance its world leadership status 
and America’s effort to maintain its present position is a zero-sum game.”875 
The clearest empirical example of China’s grand strategy and its pursuance of 
leadership in the regional economic order is the establishment of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The AIIB exemplifies an aspirational 
revisionist project that satisfies China’s status ambitions. The importance of “making 
friends”876  and providing international public goods to gain leadership recognition 
makes it faulty, however, to denote China as a “post-responsible power;”877 neither is 
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China a “responsible stakeholder” that passively accepts the US characterization of 
responsibility. What is at stake is a “clash of responsibilities,” as part of the struggle for 
the positional good of regional leadership. 
 
10.1 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as an 
Aspirational Revisionist Project 
Whereas the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) represents China’s first 
contribution to the reform of global economic order, the AIIB represents China’s first 
contribution to the reform of the regional economic order. For now, the AIIB is an 
aspirational revisionist project that satisfies China’s leadership ambitions and 
challenges the established status order by erecting a parallel China-led multilateral 
development bank set to provide funding for regional public goods. In this way, the 
AIIB represents change of secondary institution, which in fact was the only option that 
could satisfy China’s desire for status. It is also an example of usurpationary social 
closure in that the AIIB effectively disavows the United States and Japan leadership 
positions. For the time being, this positional change does not represent a change of the 
rules of game, as the Chinese leadership adamantly has branded the AIIB as building 
on established practices and standards. But it represents a significant step of China’s 
grand strategy intended to place “all under heaven”878 in a new Community of Common 
Destiny, regional at first, and global well ahead, and as such, Chinese inspired rules and 
values might gradually come to permeate China-led international organizations in the 
future. 
For long, China has voiced critique against the established global financial 
institutions, most vividly evidenced in the BRICS summit declarations.879 Although 
China’s call for greater voice and representation in the Bretton Woods Institutions was 
finally granted, it does not imply that the United States will give up its leading status 
and veto power in these institutions. In contrast to the global reforms, the reform of the 
regional financial order was even more sluggish. In the position paper by the Group of 
77 and China on the reform of the international and financial economic system 
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presented in a UNGA working group in May 2010, the underrepresentation of China 
and other developing countries in Regional Development Banks (RDB’s) was 
emphasized.880 China was dissatisfied with the slow pace of reform of the international 
financial institutions since they do “not match its economic strength.” 881  As the 
fundamental change in the international system became all the more evident, the AIIB 
was established as “a response to dissatisfaction with the existing development 
financing regime.”882 
China faced status disavowal in terms of a positional ceiling to its status 
enhancement in the Asian Development Bank (ADB), led by Japan and the United 
States. The President of the ADB is by tradition Japanese, and in terms of subscribed 
capital and voting power, Japan and the United States widely exceeds the influence of 
China. They lead the organization and have no plans on giving up their positions to an 
ascendant China. Whereas Japan and the United States account for 15.68% and 15.57% 
of the subscribed capital and 12.84% and 12.75% of the voting rights respectively, 
China merely accounts for 6.47% of the subscribed capital and 5.48% of the voting 
rights (see Table 23).  
In contrast to the metaphor of the “glass ceiling” used to describe the barriers to 
social mobility women and minorities are facing in the domestic sphere, the ceiling that 
prevents China’s status enhancement is better compared to a thick titanium wall 
impossible to shatter since dominant states do rarely allow for free international 
political competition within the organizations they control. This is evidenced by the 
fact the ADB has not heeded the 2009 G20 declaration stating that the president of an 
international institution should be appointed through an “open, transparent and merit-
based process.”883 Instead, the head position of the ABD is still reserved for Japanese 
candidates and the selection process is conducted in secrecy.  
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Table 23. Distribution of Influence within the Asian Development Bank 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Status Disavowal: 
Positional Ceiling 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank, “Annual Report 2014” (Asian Development Bank, 2014), available 
at https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/158032/oi-appendix1.pdf, accessed 
August 12, 2016. 
 
Moreover, in a study on donor influence in the ADB, Christopher Kilby finds 
that humanitarian factors do not affect lending decisions; rather donor interests decide 
the allocation of lending. More specifically, the American influence in the ADB is 
generally directed toward deciding over issues of access (i.e. denying funding for 
certain countries, such as China); whereas Japan has had greater say over the level of 
lending. Kirby concludes that the merits of ADB is questionable on humanitarian and 
economic grounds, instead the existence of the ADB is political in nature.884 In essence, 
“institutions are fraught with tensions because they inevitably raise resource 
considerations and invariably have distributional consequences. Any given set of rules 
or expectations, formal or informal, that patterns action will have unequal implications 
                                                 
884 Christopher Kilby, “Donor Influence in Multilateral Development Banks: The Case of the Asian 
Development Bank,” The Review of International Organizations 1, no. 2 (2006): 173–95.  
Rank Country Subscribed 
capital  
(% of  
total) 
Voting 
power  
(% of  
total) 
1 Japan 15.677 12.840 
2 United States 15.567 12.752 
 
 
3 
 
 
China 
 
 
6.473 
 
 
5.477 
4 India 6.359 5.386 
5 Australia 5.812 4.948 
6 Canada 5.254 4.502 
7 Indonesia 5.131 4.404 
8 South Korea 5.060 4.347 
9 Germany 4.345 3.775 
10 Malaysia 2.735 2.487 
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for resource allocation.”885 Institutions are not mere neutral problem-solving arenas, 
but configurations of privilege and sites of power and contestation.886 Hence, within 
the ADB the ceiling is unbreakable. For China, to enhance status and influence, the 
only option is to erect a parallel structure. 
As Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang assumed office, they quickly took the opportunity 
to launch a new regional strategy. In Xi’s state visit to Indonesia in October 2, 2013, he 
announced the establishment of the AIIB, a pledge reiterated by Li in his trip to South 
East Asia a week after. In these trips, Xi and Li simultaneously unveiled the OBOR 
initiative. The same month, in October 24-25, at the Conference on the Diplomatic 
Work with Neighboring Countries, intended to “identify the strategic goals, 
fundamental policies, and general diplomatic work with neighboring countries in the 
coming 5 to 10 years,” Xi reiterated the pledges and expressed his desire of letting a 
Community of Common Destiny take “deep root” in the neighboring countries.887 Xi 
stressed that “China needs to make neighbouring countries more friendly, stay closer to 
China, more recognizing and more supportive, and increase China’s affinity, 
magnetism and influence.”888 Moreover, Xi urged to “speed up the implementation of 
the free trade zone strategy, on the basis of neighboring countries, to build a new pattern 
of regional economic integration.” 889  Xi declared that “[g]ood diplomacy with 
neighboring countries is a requirement for realizing the Two Centenary Goals, and the 
Chinese Dream of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”890  
The Community of Common Destiny serves as the overarching vision of 
regional togetherness, and the OBOR initiative of boosting regional and 
intercontinental connectivity by reviving the ancient trade routes of the Silk Road, 
introduces a new tangible dimension to China’s leadership aspirations. China’s desire 
is also that the RCEP will create a new pattern of regional integration centered on China 
as it gradually climbs the global value chain. The aspiration is to become a true regional 
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center, a center of consumption, innovation and services. Even though China’s 
alternative project for the regional economic order covers the AIIB, OBOR, and the 
RCEP, of greatest significance hitherto is the establishment of the AIIB since it 
represents the clearest, most successful empirical example of China’s revisionist status-
enhancement strategy.  
Just one year after China’s announcement to set up the AIIB, in October 24, 
2014, representatives from 21 Asian countries signed the agreement to establish the 
new multilateral development bank. Six months later, in March 12, 2015, the United 
Kingdom became the first G7 country to join the bank despite US opposition, a decision 
that swiftly triggered France, Germany, Italy, and others to join. China branded the 
AIIB as a necessary complement to the established international financial order. By 
relegitimizing its benign role as provider of regional development finance, China was 
simultaneously delegitimizing the global and regional financial institutions as incapable 
of sustaining the needs of the world, often expressed in their incapacity to bridge the 
estimated 8-trillion dollar infrastructure-financing gap in Asia.891 As Chinese Minister 
of Finance Lou Jiwei puts it: 
 
World economy is undergoing slow recovery and anemic growth in the aftermath of 
the 2008 global financial crisis. Investment would play an essential role in spurring 
economic recovery and growth, while infrastructure investment, in particular, is the 
cornerstone that anchors sustainable economic growth in the long term. Yet financing 
gap in infrastructure globally has hindered infrastructure investment from playing its 
due role in promoting world economic growth.892 
 
Therefore, by “mobiliz[ing] more funds to support infrastructure development and 
regional connectivity,” China is “promoting regional development” and “inject[ing] 
long-lasting momentum into the economic growth of Asia.”893 In view of that, “[t]he 
AIIB is nothing but a welcome supplement. It has attracted signatories from near and 
far because it conforms to the needs and wants in the region and beyond.”894 China thus 
reaffirms and relegitimizes its rise as an opportunity, makes use of the prestige 
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associated with its successful development experience, and “welcomes all countries to 
ride on its development.”895 
Moreover, China debunked the closed, secretive, and unrepresentative 
appointment process of the established financial institutions and branded the AIIB an 
open, merit-based alternative. The BRICS-countries have long called for “an open and 
merit-based selection method, irrespective of nationality, for the heading positions of 
the IMF and the World Bank,” and that the “staff of these institutions needs to better 
reflect the diversity of their membership.”896 Now, as Lou Jiwei promises, the AIIB 
will “tap the global talent pool for management and staff positions through open, 
transparent and merit-based multilateral processes.”897  China assures that the AIIB 
“will draw experiences from other multilateral development banks,” “adopt 
international good practices,” and adhere to “high standards.”898 In other words, the 
AIIB represents continuity, and by learning from past mistakes of the established 
financial institutions, the AIIB can further improve the operation of development 
lending.899 
China also labels the AIIB an advance in the democratization of international 
relations that accord with the trends of the times. As stated by Xi Jinping in the AIIB 
opening ceremony, “the founding and opening of the AIIB also means a great deal to 
the reform of the global economic governance system. It is consistent with the evolving 
trend of the global economic landscape and will help make the global economic 
governance system more just, equitable, and effective.” 900  Former Executive Vice 
Chairman of China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy Wu Jianmin 
further debunks Washington’s fierce, but misguided and failed opposition to the AIIB:  
 
What is the trend in world development? Today we are no longer living in a unipolar 
world. It is moving towards multipolarity. The US is no longer in the position to dictate 
how others should behave. Issues concerning the future of mankind are to be discussed 
and resolved democratically by all countries involved. Is the US aware of this trend? 
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Does Washington try to adapt to it? I hope America will stop misreading the trends of 
world development and adapt to the trend towards multipolarity.901 
 
Even so, as China’s astounding economic growth started to decelerate and entered a 
“new normal” phase, Beijing needed to display confidence in its economic future to 
counter concerns about the recent economic downturn and its potential effects on the 
viability of its regional economic projects. At the 2013 Boao Forum, while 
disseminating his vision for the region coated with a benign veneer of “Asianess,” Xi 
acknowledged China’s daunting economic challenges, yet still proclaimed: “looking 
ahead, we are full of confidence in China’s future.”902 A year later, at the 2014 APEC 
meeting, Xi assured the audience anew: “As its overall national strength grows, China 
will be both capable and willing to provide more public goods for the Asia-Pacific and 
the world, especially new initiatives and visions for enhancing regional cooperation.”903 
Likewise, at the AIIB inauguration ceremony in January 2016, Xi stated, “China has 
the confidence and capability to ensure sustained and sound economic development and 
bring more opportunities and benefits to Asia and beyond.” 904  Beijing effectively 
downplays concerns about China’s new domestic economic situation by confidently 
declaring that it is ready to perform the role of a responsible great power, standing up 
for its desire to take the lead in the provision of regional public goods.  
 In terms of infrastructure, China has long been a key player and is the number 
one investor in the world.905 According to Deutsche Bank global strategist Sanjeev 
Sanyal, China is a “world investor,” especially so “amid growing demand for 
infrastructure investment in other developing countries.”906 Besides, in terms of foreign 
exchange reserves, as former US Deputy Treasury Secretary Roger Altman points out, 
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“no nation is wealthier.”907 Certainly, accumulating large foreign exchange reserves 
primarily denominated in US dollars serves as a wise strategy to insulate the national 
economy from future crises; it does not challenge the international financial order, 
instead it props up the US dollars and helps the United States to maintain its position 
as the global currency leader. However, the fact that China still holds the largest foreign 
exchange reserves in the world, around 3.2 trillion US dollars by February 2016 despite 
the recent slowdown in its economy and massive stimulus spending,908 gives China a 
substantial source of influence that can be used for productive purposes to enhance its 
position. This is especially true concerning China created multilateral development 
banks, such as NDB and AIIB.  
In AIIB China now institutionalizes its leading position or “sets status in stone” 
and provides public goods. China’s structural leadership is reflected in the fact that it 
holds 30.34% of the stakes and 26.06% of the voting rights, which equips China with 
veto power over major decisions in the bank, as they require a minimum of 75% of the 
votes (see Table 24).909 At the initial stage, the AIIB is set to provide 100 billion dollars 
for infrastructure funding. So far, the approved AIIB projects seem pale in comparison 
to China’s many grandiose bilateral loans and development assistance schemes (see 
Table 25 and Table 26). The fact that the AIIB will lend in US dollars also shows that 
China will not use it as an organization to stimulate the internationalization of the 
renminbi, at least not yet. Instead, China sets up a parallel platform that serves as a 
crucial and necessary foundation for Chinese regional leadership and incremental 
reform of the regional order.  
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Table 24. Subscribed Capital and Voting Power in the AIIB (as of July 6, 2016) 
Rank Country Subscribed 
capital  
(% of  total) 
Voting 
power  
(% of  total) 
1 China 34.6663 29.8777 
2 India 9.7401 8.6250 
3 Russia 7.6086 6.8076 
4 Germany 5.2199 4.7710 
5 South Korea 4.3521 4.0311 
6 Australia 4.2968 3.9839 
7 France 3.9294 3.6707 
8 Indonesia 3.9121 3.6559 
9 UK 3.5559 3.3522 
10 Turkey 3.0381 2.9107 
 
Source: AIIB, “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Subscriptions and Voting 
Power of Member Countries,” available at http://euweb.aiib.org/uploadfile/2016 
/0715/20160715113539537.pdf, accessed September 29, 2016. 
 
 
Even though the “participatory approach” of the AIIB works according the 
principle of “open regionalism” and welcomes all countries interested in contributing 
to regional development,910 it effectively erects a positional ceiling to future American 
and Japanese participation in the bank. As China makes use of power upwards to 
enhance status, the usurpationary closure of the AIIB disavows the United States and 
Japan leadership positions. 
Moreover, the AIIB is also a testimony to China’s agenda-setting power and 
entrepreneurial leadership role. China has long been pushing for a development 
approach that pays greater attention to infrastructure provision, which it not only sees 
as the foundation for growth, but as a core requirement for economic advancement that 
facilitates operations and transactions at all stages of development.911 To a certain 
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extent, this approach differs from the priorities of the established Bretton Woods 
Institutions: 
 
China, based on its own experience, agrees with the economic development theories 
that infrastructure construction will lay a solid foundation for the economic rise, and 
therefore advocates the prioritizing and construction of roads, rails, ports, power plants 
and base transceiver stations, instead of focusing on social sectors such as health, 
education and other human development — the latter being areas the World Bank’s 
aid is currently focused on.912 
 
China’s entrepreneurial leadership role further relates to China’s dual identity as both 
a great power and a developing country, and how it performs the role of the voice of 
the voiceless by advocating greater “representation” and “say,” not only for itself, but 
also for emerging markets and developing countries.913 Lou Jiwei made clear that since 
AIIB is “mainly led by developing countries, the AIIB must consider their appeals,”914 
which ties the appraisal of the AIIB to alleged voice opportunities. The negotiation 
process prior to the establishment of the AIIB reflected this approach: 
  
An open, inclusive, transparent and democratic approach has been adopted and the 
concerns and aspirations of all [members] have been taken into account with due 
respect. In that spirit, Chief Negotiators' Meetings have been co-chaired by China and 
other Prospective Founding Members who volunteered to host, including India, 
Kazakhstan and Singapore, and the negotiation process has been accelerated through 
a multilateral approach acceptable to all founding members.915 
 
Moreover, China’s disdain for political conditionalities embedded into multilateral 
development lending, and its approach to economic development without ideological 
straitjackets, charm countries in desperate need of investments. Then development 
capital “makes friends” and contributes to the portrayal of China as a benevolent nation 
bent on undertaking the arduous task of modernization without intrusive yardsticks. 
China has long been pushing this idea, yet with the AIIB, it enters the mainstream and 
testifies to China’s intellectual leadership role. This does not mean the absence of 
economic conditionalities, as loans have certain grace periods, repayment schedules, 
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and interest rates, but it means that the AIIB is imbued with a certain spirit, a spirit best 
portrayed by Xi Jinping: 
 
The principle of sovereignty not only means that the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of all countries are inviolable and their internal affairs are not subjected to 
interference. It also means that all countries’ right to independently choose social 
systems and development paths should be upheld, and that all countries’ endeavors to 
promote economic and social development and improve their people’s lives should be 
respected.916 
 
In this sense, the AIIB represents the sovereign norms and values of the region and 
resonates with the diplomatic approach of the Shanghai Corporation Organization 
(SCO) and the ASEAN. Far from being an example of transformational diplomacy 
designed to change the normative structure, the AIIB rather represents a fortification of 
the regional status quo. However, similar to the BRICS institutions, the AIIB represents 
the erection of another parallel structure in an alternative China-led international order. 
The erection of the AIIB endows China with a leading position for the provision 
of development finance that previously was the exclusive domain of the US, Europe, 
and Japan. However, the AIIB does not imply a radical change of the rules of the game. 
This is evident from the fact that four out of AIIB’s first six approved projects are co-
financed by the ADB, World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), and the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank 
group (IFC), and out of the other seven proposed projects still pending approval four 
are proposed to be co-financed by the World Bank (see Table 25 and Table 26).917 Jin 
Liqun, as paraphrased, claim these “partnerships with other well-established 
multilateral development banks…are important for the AIIB’s credibility.” 918 
Moreover, the drafting of the AIIB charter was assisted by Natalie Lichtenstein, a 
reputable lawyer with over 30 years of experience from the World Bank, which 
indicates that China wants to build on the accrued experience of established financial 
institutions.919 Hence, “the AIIB will serve to reinforce and supplement the established 
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wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1305051.shtml. 
917 AIIB, “Projects,” http://euweb.aiib.org/html/PROJECTS/. 
918  Li Xiang, “AIIB Narrows Infrastructure Financing Gap,” China Daily, January 17, 2017, 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2017-01/17/content_27979412.htm 
919 Wu Jianmin, “What Went Wrong With U.S. Strategy on China’s New Bank” 
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multilateral development banks as a whole,” as Lou Jiwei puts it. “AIIB will 
complement rather than compete with the existing multilateral development banks.”920 
The branding of AIIB as following the path of established financial institutions 
was important to gain the widest possible circle of recognition, yet we might find 
greater normative, institutional, and practical divergence with time. As Jin Liqun puts 
it: “Our bank is trying to do things differently, and do different things, finding unique, 
Asian approaches to development for the 21st century.”921 Ding Yifan at the State 
Council’s Development Research Center argues that, “it is too early to say if better 
integration in Asia and more economic influence over Asian countries will lead to 
changes in the region and eventually challenge the US-dominated international 
financial system…But it is likely, since changes to the international order have all 
gradually begun.”922 This highlights the incremental nature of the change towards a 
China-led international order. 
 
Table 25. Approved AIIB Projects as of October 15, 2016 
Country Type of Project Size of Approved 
Loans 
Co-financed 
Myanmar Myingyan Power 
Plant Project 
AIIB: USD 20 
million 
Other lenders: N/A 
 
AIIB financing 
together with IFC, 
ADB and other 
commercial lenders 
Pakistan Tarbela 5 
Hydropower 
Extension Project 
WB: USD 390 
million  
AIIB: USD 300 
million  
Co-financed with the 
World Bank 
Bangladesh Electric Distribution 
System Upgrade and 
Expansion Project 
AIIB: USD $165 
million 
Not co-financed 
Pakistan National Motorway 
M-4 (Shorkot-
Khanewal Section) 
Project 
 
AIIB: USD 100 
million 
ADB: USD 100 
million 
DFID of the  
United Kingdom: 
USD 34 million 
Co-financed with the 
Asian Development 
Bank 
Tajikistan Dushanbe-
Uzbekistan Border 
Road Improvement 
Project 
EBRD: USD 62.5 
million 
AIIB: USD 27.5 
million 
Co-financed with the 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development 
                                                 
920 Lou Jiwei, “Inclusive AIIB Can Make a Difference” 
921 Cecily Liu and Bo Leung, “AIIB’s Global Role ‘Set to Be Crucial,’” China Daily, January 26, 2017, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-01/26/content_28063244.htm, emphasis added. 
922 Quoted in Zhao Yinan, “Nations Put Faith in Asian Bank” 
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Indonesia National Slum 
Upgrading Project 
AIIB: USD 216.5 
million 
WB: USD 216.5 
million 
Co-financed with the 
World Bank 
 
 
Table 26. Proposed AIIB projects as of October 15, 2016 
Country Type of Project Size of 
Proposed 
Loans 
Co-Financed 
Oman  Duqm Port Commercial 
Terminal and 
Operational Zone 
Development Project 
N/A Not co-financed 
Oman Railway System 
Preparation Project 
N/A Not co-financed 
Indonesia Regional Infrastructure 
Development Fund 
Project 
N/A Co-financed with 
the World Bank 
Indonesia Dam Operation, 
Rehabilitation, and 
Improvement Project 
N/A Co-financed with 
the World Bank 
India Andhra Pradesh 24x7 – 
Power for All Project 
N/A Co-financed with 
the World Bank 
Kazakhstan Center South Road 
Corridor Project 
AIIB: USD 650 
Million 
Co-financed with 
the World Bank 
India Transmission System 
Strengthening Project 
AIIB: USD 150 
Million 
Not co-financed 
 
Source: AIIB, “Projects,” http://euweb.aiib.org/html/PROJECTS/ 
 
In the inauguration ceremony at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, Xi Jinping 
called the establishment of the AIIB “historic.”923 Lou Jiwei refers to the AIIB as an 
“epic journey” 924  and a significant “milestone” in the reform of the international 
system.925 To be sure, the AIIB represents a major breakthrough in China’s struggle for 
a new international economic order that reflects the new structural reality of the 
international system. In this sense, the AIIB “is commensurate with the evolving 
economic landscape of the world today, and is testament to the confidence and 
aspiration of Asian countries to spur infrastructure development and economic growth 
                                                 
923 Xi Jinping, “Full Text of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Address at AIIB Inauguration Ceremony” 
924 Lou Jiwei, “Inclusive AIIB Can Make a Difference” 
925 Li Xiaokun, “Chinese President Xi Calls AIIB’s Launch ‘Historical Moment,’” China Daily, January 
16, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-01/16/content_23114349.htm. 
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in the region.”926 The AIIB unequivocally marks China’s ascendance and represents a 
positional change to the regional economic order.  
In this light, it is wrongheaded to characterize Washington’s refusal to join as 
“irrational.”927 For a superpower bent on ensuring regional leadership in the Asia-
Pacific it makes perfect sense. A rational decisionmaking process is not necessarily 
governed by utility calculations based on wealth maximization, in this case by getting 
access to “bidding opportunities” for US corporations; rather, the goal that determines 
US rationality is positional. In a China-created organization, the United States would 
play second fiddle. The fact that the United States would have been a non-regional 
member indicates that the United States would play a more marginalized role, as 
regional member-countries are favored over non-regional ones. For instance, the Board 
of Directors (BoD) is comprised of nine Asian members and only three non-Asian 
members,928 which can be compared to ADB’s ratio of eight Asian members and four 
non-Asian members in the BoD.929 In a world characterized by struggle for positional 
goods such as leadership, China’s usurpation of a leading position in the regional 
economic order implies US status disavowal in the form of a positional ceiling to its 
participation, which is a thorn too painful to withstand.  
By extension, the AIIB, OBOR, and RCEP all challenge US leadership, and 
thus the Obama administration’s blueprint for the regional order. The AIIB has proven 
to be complementary to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and China’s 
regional projects might indeed be good for capitalist development and economic 
growth. Yet capitalist system maintenance goes on irrespective of who the leading 
actors are. The refusal of the United States and Japan to join, and Washington’s ham-
fisted efforts to dissuade its allies from joining, is not about complementarity, but about 
positional indivisibility; it is not about rules, but about leadership status; it is not about 
humanitarian concerns, but about influence. Joining the AIIB would not be worth it for 
Washington. The strain would be too painful – unless the United States gives up its goal 
of maintaining sole superpower status and global leadership. If Japan one day escapes 
Washington’s disciplining rod and accepts China’s rise, then Tokyo might decide to 
join the AIIB in the future. 
                                                 
926 Lou Jiwei, “Inclusive AIIB Can Make a Difference” 
927 Elisabeth C. Economy, “The AIIB Debacle: What Washington Should Do Now,” Council of Foreign 
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928 AIIB, “Governance,” http://euweb.aiib.org/html/aboutus/governance/Board_of_Governors/?show=1 
929 ADB, “Board of Directors,” https://www.adb.org/about/board-directors 
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China’s push for international reform is mainly about representation and status 
and thus resembles an aspirational revisionist project – revise to enhance. The appeal 
of the AIIB proves significant with more than 57 countries joining, and with an 
additional 25 countries set to become members in June 2017, 930  many of them 
American allies who the United States unsuccessfully tried to dissuade from joining. 
As China successfully assembles a significant circle of recognition and performs the 
role of a responsible great power, it finally assumes a regional leadership position 
commensurate with its great power status. 
In the following chapter, I will scrutinize China’s revisionist project for the 
regional security order. 
 
10.2 “Asia for Asians”: China’s Asian Security Order as a 
Transformational Revisionist Project 
In relation to the regional security order, China desires to change both primary and 
secondary institutions, and in this sense, China’s revisionist project, as far as its 
intentions are concerned, is transformational (see Table 4). The question, however, is 
if China will succeed or not, but this problem does not alter the fact that China desires 
a radical remodeling of the regional security order, covering both positional and 
institutional revisionism. 
In terms of the primary institution of great power management, China wants to 
completely expunge alliances, which it sees as an outdated form of security 
management incompatible with the trends of 21st century characterized by 
multipolarity, economic globalization, peace and development, reform of the 
international order, and prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific. Instead, China 
promotes a “new model of great power relations” that, although it represents a genuine 
attempt of establishing great power coexistence and equality, means the United States 
should know its place on the right side of the Asia-Pacific so as to restore China’s 
position as the natural preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific. It thus radically departs 
from a configuration where the United States is the sole superpower with a global 
sphere of responsibility. On top of that great power foundation, China desires to build 
a Community of Common Destiny and a new model of international relations, which 
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simply remove the need for alliances as win-win inter-state relations and harmonious 
inter-civilizational relations would prove them obsolete. Indeed, this is an extremely 
tall order, but it nonetheless represents China’s utopian project for the regional security 
order. 
On top of this transformation of the primary institution of great power 
management, Beijing seeks to improve and create new secondary security institutions 
in the form of both bilateral strategic partnerships and multilateral institutions in which 
consensus would be the decisionmaking mode, but in practice, China would secure a 
“right to speak” or a de facto veto power in relation to regional security affairs. 
Bilaterally it seeks to create comprehensive strategic partnerships more in tune with the 
new area of international relations, and multilaterally China prefers a regional security 
order that ultimately “locks out” the United States from the region and enables China 
to establish regional primacy. The strategy China uses to establish this regional order 
also contains many economic instruments, both bilateral and multilateral, and involves 
making its neighbors dependent on China to bind them to itself and deprive them of 
balancing motives. In this way, China seeks to establish itself as the principal organizer 
and provider of regional security with the long-term intended outcome to eclipse the 
US alliance-based regional security order. In the following part of the section, I will 
detail China’s transformational revisionist project for the regional security order. 
In order to restore its position atop the regional and global hierarchy, China 
seeks new concepts and ways of organizing the regional security order. Already in the 
1990s, China launched its New Security Concept, which seeks to “discard the old way 
of thinking and replace it with new concepts and means to seek and safeguard 
security.”931 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highlight four pillars that uphold the 
New Security Concept: mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination. Mutual 
trust refers to a political approach that “transcend difference in ideology and social 
system,” reject the cold war mentality, and “maintain frequent dialogue and mutual 
briefings on each other’s security and defense policies and major operations.”932 Mutual 
benefit puts the attention on social development and mutual respect for the security 
interests of all in order to achieve common security. Equality means that all members 
                                                 
931 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Position Paper on the New 
Security Concept,” available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm, accessed March 
9, 2017. 
932 Ibid. 
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of the regional security order are equals, which is understood in line with the principle 
of noninterference.933 An equal security order thus promotes the “democratization of 
the international relations” by giving all members, big or small, voice opportunities and 
by ensuring that their internal affairs are respected. Coordination puts the attention on 
the settlement of disputes through negotiation and consultation, and “wide ranging and 
deep-going cooperation on security issues of mutual concern.”934 Such security issues 
primarily concerns cooperation that combats non-traditional security issues, such as 
terrorism, piracy, and humanitarian operations, as traditional security issues relate to 
the rights and responsibilities associated with the managerial role of the great powers. 
China’s New Security Concept is also multifaceted in that it can take many different 
forms, including binding and non-binding elements as well as Track 1 and Track 2 
diplomatic mechanisms. 
China puts forth the SCO as “a successful case of the new security concept” in 
that it adheres to a “security cooperation model of non-alignment, non-confrontation 
and non-targeting at any other countries or regions.” 935  The Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs also lauds ARF for making “positive progress in promoting confidence 
building measures and preventive diplomacy,” and for stimulating “mutual trust and 
cooperation.”936 Whereas the New Security Concept supports a strict interpretation of 
the master institution of sovereignty and its derivative non-interference, it implies 
radical departure from the primary institution of great power management and 
traditional alliance systems. Even so, China pursued what we can term a “welcoming 
approach” to the United States. A joint statement by Barack Obama and Hu Jintao in 
January 2011 declares the following: 
 
The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful 
China that plays a greater role in world affairs.  China welcomes the United States as 
an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the 
region.  Working together, both leaders support efforts to build a more stable, peaceful, 
and prosperous Asia-Pacific region for the 21st century.937 
 
                                                 
933 Ibid. 
934 Ibid. 
935 Ibid. 
936 Ibid. 
937  The White House, “US-China Joint Statement,” January 19, 2011, available at 
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However, this stands in stark contrast to Xi Jinping’s speech at the fourth summit of the 
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in May 
2014, where he launched the Asian Security Concept,  
 
To beef up and entrench a military alliance targeted at a third party is not conducive to 
maintaining common security…In the final analysis, it is for the people of Asia to run 
the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. The 
people of Asia have the capability and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in the 
region through enhanced cooperation.938 
 
Yet in November the same year, Xi stated the following: 
 
I told President Obama that China has proposed the Asian security concept at the CICA 
summit here in May in order to encourage Asian countries to view common security 
in an inclusive and cooperative spirit.  At the same time, I also said that the Pacific 
Ocean is broad enough to accommodate the development of both China and the United 
States, and our two countries to work together to contribute to security in Asia.939 
 
This represents seemingly contradictory signals, but Xi essentially declares his 
alternative vision for the region, and his assertion that the Asia-Pacific is big enough 
for both China and the United States is a cunning word play that means the United 
States should know its place on the right side of the Asia-Pacific. In fact, Xi’s statement 
cannot be understood outside the concept of a “new type of major power 
relations,” which captures all fundamental areas of China’s security strategy into a 
unified project for the 21st century, a project fit for the end of the unipolar era. Before 
I outline China’s Asian Security Concept further, we thus have to scrutinize the concept 
of a “new type of major power relations.”  
 
10.2.1 The New Model of Great Power Relations 
When Xi Jinping visited the United States as Vice President in February 2012, he called 
for the creation of “a new type of relationship between major countries in the 21st 
century.” Xi urged the United States and China to enhance mutual understanding and 
strategic trust; respecting each side’s core interests and major concerns; deepening 
mutually beneficial cooperation; increasing cooperation and coordination in 
                                                 
938 Xi Jinping, “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation,” China.org.cn, 
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international affairs and on global issues.940  In May 2012, at the fourth US-China 
S&ED, both Hu Jintao and Dai Bingguo reiterated Xi’s call and urged the United States 
and China to learn from the “tragic lessons” of the past by building a “new type of great 
power relationship.”941 When Xi assumed power, the “new model of major power 
relations” became formalized and now stands on a foundation consisting of three core 
pillars: no conflict and no confrontation; mutual respect; and win-win cooperation.  
The first pillar, no conflict and no confrontation, essentially relates to the second 
and third aspects of the managerial role of the great powers; namely, avoidance and 
control of crises and limitation and containment of wars (see section 2.1.8), which is 
also what Yan Xuetong argues is the key for US-China relations – “conflict control.”942 
Wang Yi puts this first pillar in a historical light of major wars between great powers 
and claims that we now live in a different era.943 The second pillar, mutual respect for 
each side’s core interests and major concerns, is more ambiguous. Although Dai 
Bingguo articulated China’s “core interests” as (1) regime security, (2) sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and (3) social and economic development, 944  it is arguably an 
elusive concept in Chinese discourse and remains somewhat open to interpretation.945 
China’s “major concerns” is even more elusive. The ambiguity of the concept is well 
illustrated by a Chinese international relations expert at a Beijing-based think-thank: 
 
To be honest, I do not know what major concerns means exactly. It is very 
unclear...everything can potentially be a major concern. North Korea and THAAD is 
not core interest, but is certainly major concern; the TPP is not core interest, but can 
be major concern; global governance is not core interest, but can be major concern. In 
the South China Sea, only the specific islands and rocks are core interests as they are 
matters of sovereignty, but South China Sea affairs as a whole can be a major 
concern.946 
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Given that the THAAD deployment in South Korea is a major concern and potentially 
South China Sea affairs as well, it is not a stretch too far to argue that “major concerns” 
relate to the fifth aspect of the managerial role of the great powers; namely, regional 
spheres of influence, interests, and responsibility (see section 2.1.8). China’s struggle 
to secure a “right to speak” or “discourse power” in relation to regional security affairs 
implies veto power concerning what security deployments and practices are to be 
deemed permissible and legitimate. China has demanded that Washington and Seoul 
stops the THAAD deployment on the Korean peninsula as it “gravely damage the 
strategic balance in the region as well as the strategic security interests of countries in 
the region, including China.”947 What China wants is “to work in partnership”948 when 
dealing with the North Korean security issue, and views the THAAD deployment as 
blatantly ignoring China’s regional rights as a great power. THAAD should simply not 
be permissible as it violates China’s right to exercise a regional veto concerning the 
security developments in its immediate neighborhood and sphere of influence.  
Similarly, the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) of the US navy in 
the South China Sea should cease stop or “if you want to conduct naval passage you 
should apply for permission from China first.”949 Given the extensiveness of China’s 
claims in the South China Sea, as well as China’s security interests in the Yellow and 
East China Sea, this pivotal influence arguably covers the whole Western Pacific. As a 
Chinese Professor puts it: “China should have decisive influence in Asia and the 
Western Pacific at American cost.”950 In a Chinese sphere of influence, “China would 
have a final say on important political, economic, and strategic issues,”951 and in a 
Chinese-centered regional security order, China would institutionalize its right to 
speak.952 
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Hence, the best way to conceive of “core interests” and “major concerns” is that 
the former represents China’s security interests,953 whereas the latter concerns China’s 
status ambitions and its desire for regional preeminence. 
The third pillar, win-win cooperation, is essentially about US-China bilateral 
cooperation. The key is that China desires bilateral economic relations with the United 
States in line with the global rule set provided by the WTO and as evidenced by the 
US-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT) currently under negotiation. 954 
Multilaterally, China wants to see the establishment of a regional trade agreement 
exclusive of the United States. At the Conference on the Diplomatic Work with 
Neighboring Countries in October 2013, Xi Jinping urged to “speed up the 
implementation of the free trade zone strategy, on the basis of neighboring countries, 
to build a new pattern of regional economic integration.”955 As China primarily wants 
to trade and cooperate with the United States on a bilateral level, it desires an East Asian 
regional bloc exclusive of the United States that would set the groundwork for an 
eventual Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and thus pushes for a speedy 
finalization of the RCEP. Strategically, there is also an emphasis on bilateral relations: 
 
There is an enormous need and vast potential for bilateral cooperation in all fields. 
Besides, the world certainly needs China and the United States, two major countries 
with great influence, to work together and contribute on issues ranging from 
counterterrorism to cyber security, from nuclear non-proliferation to climate change, 
and from peace in the Middle East to Africa’s development.956 
 
Certainly, this does not prevent wider cooperation between the great powers on global 
issues where they share common concerns, as evidenced by the modalities of the P5+1 
and the Six-Party Talks in dealing with nuclear non-proliferation in the cases of Iran 
and North Korea. When Wang Yi stresses that China and the United States should 
“strengthen cooperation” in global and regional hotspots and seek “greater common 
responsibilities,”957 it thus connects to the sixth aspect of the managerial role of the 
great powers; namely, great power concert or condominium (see section 2.1.8). Yet the 
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characteristics of such a concert is more of an ad hoc nature rather than a permanent 
confluence of interests and it simultaneously implies respect for China’s regional sphere 
of influence. 
Significantly, Wang Yi argues that Asia-Pacific is the “testing ground” for the 
“new model of major power relations,” yet the only regional hotspots he mentions are 
the North Korean nuclear issue, in relation to which he advocates the restarting of the 
Six-Party Talks, and Afghanistan.958 The territorial and maritime disputes in the South 
China Sea are omitted, as China views them, first, as under control, and second, as none 
of the United States’ business. In relation to Taiwan, Wang asks the United States to 
“genuinely appreciate and respect China’s efforts to oppose separation and achieve 
peaceful reunification.”959 Thus, when Wang is arguing that, “China and the United 
States should genuinely respect and accommodate each other’s interests and concerns 
in the Asia-Pacific,” he is asking for the impossible since they clash. 
From the Chinese perspective, the “new model of major power relations” 
reflects the new structural reality in place; that the two most significant economies in 
the world are the two most significant great powers in the world, and that China, as a 
result, should be treated as an equal.960 As stated by Wang, the new model of great 
power relations “is a logical development, because it accords with…the trend of our 
times”961 – of multipolarity, peace and development, economic globalization, reform of 
the international order, and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. If the United States 
buys into the “new model of major power relations,” which despite contradictory 
statements from key representatives of the Obama administration962 it has not yet done, 
it would mean surrendering its sole superpower status for the sake of establishing a 
world of regions with coexisting great powers. This would in effect change the current 
shape of the primary institution of great power management (see section 2.1.8.2 and 
Table 5). 
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10.2.2 Asian Security Order  
If we return to Xi Jinping’s articulation of the Asian Security Concept at CICA in 2014, 
it is clear that China wants to eliminate the primary institution of alliances and create 
new secondary Asian security institutions. The Asian Security Concept consists of four 
pillars: common security, comprehensive security, cooperative security, and 
sustainable security. Common security implies that the region should be devoid of 
alliances directed at third parties; comprehensive security includes both traditional and 
non-traditional security issues; cooperative security means the fostering of mutual 
thrust through in-depth dialogue and cooperation; and sustainable security upholds 
economic development as the foundation for durable security. 963  At CICA, Xi 
envisioned “a new path for Asian security,” a path that “in the final analysis” should 
lead to a security order where “the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the 
problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.”964 This suggests a radical form of 
usurpationary social closure that would exclude the United States from the region. 
Xi’s declaration at CICA in large parts reiterated Li Keqiang’s message at the 
2014 Annual Conference of the Boao Forum where Li outlined China’s vision for a 
new regional order. Li sketched a vision that incorporated elements of the economic 
domain of the regional order – outlining the RCEP, OBOR, and AIIB as interlocking 
parts in the construction of a pan-regional intra-Asian industrial value chain and an 
Asian Community of Common Destiny. Li also stressed that in order “to maintain the 
general environment of peaceful development,” regional countries should strive to 
“build an Asian community of shared responsibilities and actively explore the 
establishment of a regional security cooperation framework in Asia.”965 Instead of a 
preponderant power that bears the bulk of the responsibilities alone and stands at the 
center of an alliance network targeted at third parties, regional countries shall join 
together to share responsibility and create a cooperative and comprehensive security 
framework that addresses a wide variety of security concerns. Li acknowledges, just 
like his American counterparts, the fact that “Asia owes its progress to a peaceful and 
stable regional environment, and peace and stability are the fundamental safeguards for 
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Asia’s development.”966 Yet he departs from the standard American narrative of US 
indispensability to this peace, and instead refers to the “Oriental wisdom” that 
underpins the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that China, India and Myanmar 
jointly arrived at. More than embodying oriental wisdom, “[t]hese 
principles…represent a major contribution to human civilization.”967 Hence,  
 
To achieve peace and stability in Asia, we the Asian countries should build consensus, 
make active efforts and jointly fulfill our due responsibilities. We should promote 
security dialogue and consultation, strengthen cooperation on non-traditional security 
issues, including disaster management, maritime search and rescue, counter-terrorism 
and combating transnational crimes, and actively explore the establishment of a 
regional security cooperation framework in Asia.968 
 
Parallel to the China-led Boao Forum that concentrates on economic issues, China also 
leads the Xiangshan Forum that focuses on security issues. In 2014, the biannual 
Xiangshan Forum was upgraded from a track 2 dialogue to a track 1.5 high-level 
dialogue platform to be held annually as a response to “the new demands of changes in 
the security environment in Asia-Pacific.”969 The upgrading of the Xiangshan Forum 
can be viewed in a competitive light where the Shangri-La Dialogue organized by an 
independent think-tank now coexists with China’s state-led forum. 
At the seventh Xiangshan Forum, Chairman of China Association for Military 
Science Cai Yingting, argued that, “the security challenges in Asia-Pacific…require us 
to abandon any forms of Cold War mentality” and advocated for the need to establish 
a security mechanism based on the Asian Security Concept. Cai promoted an “Asian 
method” for security cooperation including mutual respect, negotiation, and dialogue 
to seek common ground, and pushed for the establishment of “a new model of security 
management with Asia-Pacific characteristics,” entailing security partnerships 
characterized by tolerance, mutual trust, cooperation, win-win, and shared 
responsibility. He also associated the strengthening of regional security management 
with global governance reform, which “is the request of times.” Countries should 
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“abandon bias”, construct a new model of international relations, and build a 
community of common destiny.970  
However, China’s white paper on Asia-Pacific security cooperation highlights 
that, “a consistent security framework in this region is not foreseeable in the near future, 
and it will be normal to see multiple mechanisms advancing together in the evolution 
of a regional security framework.”971 Still, as the white paper outlines the existing 
multiple security mechanisms, the white paper mentions SCO, CICA, and ASEAN-led 
security forums, and adds that military alliances also exist, but that they are “formed in 
history.” 972  They are thus anachronistic to the security order China wants to see 
develop. With respect to the diversity of the region, “China promotes the building of a 
security framework in the Asia-Pacific region, which does not mean starting all over 
again, but improving and upgrading the existing mechanisms,” in which “all the 
countries involved should play their respective roles in safeguarding regional peace and 
stability.”973  
The focus on countries playing their “respective roles” is significant. In other 
words, all Asian states enjoy equal status as members of this evolving security order, 
yet China will play its “due role as a major power,”974 and therefore power differentials 
inevitably result in role differentition. This is further evidenced as the white paper 
points out that China views the safeguarding of regional prosperity and stability as “its 
own responsibility,” and that it therefore aims to develop its military to make it 
“commensurate with China’s international standing and its security and development 
interests.” This is “a strategic task” for China, and serves as “a strong guarantee for its 
peaceful development” and enables “positive contributions to the maintenance of world 
peace and regional stability.” 975  The differentiation between “major powers” and 
“medium-sized countries” – where the former should practice “mutual respect” and the 
latter “should not take sides” – is another testimony to the hierarchical structuring and 
its associated role differentiation, where all states enjoy formal equality but differs in 
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status and role, and rights and responsibilities. Since China is the preeminent Asian 
power, it should play the major role in the regional security order.  
The white paper on China’s policy for Asia-Pacific security cooperation 
consists of six pillars: common development, building of partnerships, improvement of 
regional multilateral mechanisms, promotion of rule-setting, intensification of military 
exchanges, and dispute resolution through negotiation, consultation, and consensus 
decisionmaking. 976  The first pillar, common development, serves as the economic 
foundation of regional security or the “fundamental safeguard for peace and 
stability.”977 To this end, China has established the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund, which 
financially serve the OBOR initiative, and pushes for a speedy completion of the RCEP. 
The aspiration is to become a true regional center – a center of consumption, innovation 
and services – and to create a regional institutional framework that bind China’s 
neighbors to the bandwagon and let them “ride on [China’s] development.”978 This 
echoes “sustainable security,” the fourth pillar of China’s Asian Security Concept and 
testifies to how China views the regional economic and security orders as inexorably 
intertwined. 
The second pillar, building of partnerships, serves as the political foundation 
for regional peace and stability. To this end, the white paper reiterates China’s call for 
the construction of a new model of major power relations with the United States, a new 
model of international relations, and a community of shared destiny with its neighbors 
along the Lancang-Mekong River, ASEAN, Central Asia, and beyond. China’s 
commitment to deepening its comprehensive strategic relationship of coordination with 
Russia is also mentioned, as are efforts to improve relations with Japan. The specific 
format of the partnerships that China seeks are “comprehensive strategic partnerships.” 
China has formed such partnerships with all ASEAN members except Brunei, 
Singapore, and the Philippines, and in 2003, China and ASEAN signed a “strategic 
partnership for peace and prosperity.” In 2008, China and South Korea engaged in a 
“strategic partnership.”  
The specific “calculations behind each strategic partnership vary,” yet “as a 
whole they are designed to protect China’s core interests (the defensive logic) and to 
construct a better environment for China’s rise (the assertive logic)…Despite some 
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shortcomings, strategic partnerships have helped China constructively engage with the 
world and rise peacefully.”979 Even though this assessment can be criticized since China 
still has not managed to solve the territorial and maritime disputes with its Southeast 
Asian neighbors or with Japan, “comprehensive strategic partnerships” offer an apt 
middle-ground for a great power that claims it adheres to a non-alignment policy980 and 
who seeks to win friends while assuaging fears about is rise.981 
The third pillar, improving regional multilateral mechanisms, emphasizes the 
wide range of regional security mechanisms China has initiated together with relevant 
countries, including SCO, Six-Party Talks, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, Xiangshan 
Forum, and the China-ASEAN Ministerial Dialogue on Law Enforcement and Security 
Cooperation. CICA and ASEAN-led multilateral security dialogues are also upheld. To 
this end, “China will shoulder greater responsibilities for regional and global 
security.”982  
In terms of improvement, at CICA in 2014, Xi Jinping “called for efforts to 
enhance the capacity and institutional building of the CICA, improve the functions of 
the CICA Secretariat, and establish a mechanism within the CICA for defense 
consultations among member states.” 983  And as mentioned above, in 2014, China 
upgraded the Xiangshan Forum to a track 1.5 high-level dialogue. Yet perhaps the most 
significant improvement is the establishment of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation 
(LMC), including China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, who all 
have signed “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with China. 
In 2016, at the first Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting, the LMC 
issued the Sanya Declaration, which includes signs of profound security cooperation 
and friendliness. The Sanya Declaration affirms, “that our six countries are linked by 
mountains and rivers, share cultural similarities and enjoy good neighborliness and 
strong friendship, and that our security and development interests are closely inter-
connected”; that “our six countries enjoy deepening political trust and sound 
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cooperation…in boosting peace, stability and development of the region and the world 
at large”; and “that the LMC is aimed at building a community of shared future of peace 
and prosperity and establishing the LMC as an example of a new type of international 
relations, featuring win–win cooperation.”984 Political and security issues, of which 
non-traditional security issues stand out, serve as the first of the three key fields of 
regional cooperation upheld in the Sanya Declaration, the other two are economic and 
sustainable development and social, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges. The 
Declaration also “encourage synergy” between OBOR and LMC activities and projects, 
and the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, and uphold that the LMC countries 
“work together to push forward the [RCEP]” and “seek support from the AIIB.”985 It 
further declares that the LMC is “based on the principles of consensus, equality, mutual 
consultation and coordination, voluntarism, common contribution and shared benefits, 
and respect for the United Nations Charter and international laws.” 986  At the first 
Leaders’ Meeting, the LMC countries also agreed to a Joint List of Early Harvest 
Projects. 
The LMC serves the end of a China-led regional order in the Asia-Pacific and 
erects an architecture according to Beijing’s design. In his speech at the first LMC 
Leaders’ Meeting, Li Keqiang urged the LMC countries to “jointly pursue peace and 
stability,” and that “our six countries are always in one and the same community as 
forged by our common interests and shared destiny,” whatever changes occur in the 
region. Li pressed on the need to “redouble our efforts and contribute even more to 
development and security interests of our countries and the region.” He also emphasized 
that the Lancang-Mekong community of shared destiny will “provide useful impetus to 
the ASEAN integration process,” and “lay a strong foundation for the fostering of an 
Asian community of shared destiny.”987  
In other words, the LMC is the springboard; it is the first tangible multilateral 
outgrowth of China’s concept of a Community of Common Destiny, an organism ready 
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to overgrow and asphyxiate the ASEAN community. Despite the LMC principles of 
equality and consensus, the nature of the relationship is strongly asymmetrical. China 
is the magnanimous giant ready to provide the necessary capabilities to implement the 
nearly 100 early harvest projects that the LMC countries have outlined. The LMC is a 
good testimony to how China seeks to establish itself as the principal organizer of the 
regional order. By making itself indispensable to its neighbors’ economic development, 
China binds them to itself and deprive them of balancing motives. Or once the day 
arrives when China’s neighbors are forced to choose, the choice is already laid out for 
them, as they will not want to get starved for American bullets. Perhaps Cambodia’s 
unilateral suspension of the US-Cambodia Angkor Sentinel joint military exercise in 
January 2017 offers a good illustration of what the future holds. China is Cambodia’s 
largest economic and military benefactor, and its support comes without political 
conditionalities. Although the Cambodian leadership denies that the decision had any 
relation to US-China strategic rivalry,988 it is indicative of the choice that regional 
countries might face in the future. 
The fourth pillar outlined in the white paper is the promotion of rule setting and 
strengthening institutional safeguards for peace. Here the principles of the UN Charter 
and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence upheld. Apart from international law, 
the white paper also emphasizes that regional rules and norms “should be discussed, 
formulated, and observed by all countries concerned, rather than being dictated by any 
particular country.”989 The white paper mentions the adoption of CUES, as well as the 
DOC and the COC in the South China Sea; the former is designed to curb 
miscalculation as the lateral pressure of China’s military expansion intensifies and 
increases encounters at sea,990 the latter is about the formulation of regional standards 
of behavior by countries directly concerned. Yet beyond that, Chinese leaders are 
advocating increasing institutionalization of the regional security order, but what that 
exactly means in still vague, especially so when the regional countries are very reluctant 
to consent to intrusive institutional measures. China-ASEAN non-traditional security 
cooperation are already based on “shared norms” that “govern an institutionalized 
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process of regularized consultation leading flexibly to various formal agreements.”991 
Yet it is argued that China’s “main objective is securing the right to speak in the process 
of making new international rules and conceiving major regional and global polies.”992  
China upholds the China-ASEAN Treaty on Good-neighborliness, Friendship 
and Cooperation and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone as 
potential institutional safeguards for regional peace and friendship.  At the 2014 China-
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Myanmar, Wang Yi mentioned that China and 
ASEAN should conclude the China-ASEAN Treaty on Good-neighborliness, 
Friendship and Cooperation to “anchor China-ASEAN relations on a more solid legal 
basis and ensure long-term and stable development of relations between the two sides.” 
Wang also said that China wants to sign on to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone, 993  which China holds “is of great significance for promoting 
regional and global peace and stability.”994 Similarly, at the China-ASEAN Expo in 
2014, Zhang Gaoli upheld the China-ASEAN Treaty on Good-neighborliness, 
Friendship and Cooperation as “the legal and institutional guarantee for lasting 
friendship between our two sides.”995 Yet what it will come mean in actual practice 
remains to be seen. 
The fifth pillar, intensification of military exchanges and cooperation, China 
views as a solid guarantee for regional peace and stability. This should focus on “non-
aligned and non-confrontational military cooperation not targeting any third party,” and 
primarily combat non-traditional security threats, such as terrorism, antipiracy, 
humanitarian disasters, pandemics, and environmental issues, with a special emphasis 
on securing border eras from transnational crimes.996 This is also the priority area of 
the cooperation between the SCO and ASEAN.  
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After Xi Jinping’s assumption of power, China has increased bilateral military 
exercises at an unprecedented rate. Since 2014, China has conducted first-ever military 
exercises with several of its Southeast Asian and South Asian neighbors (see Table 27). 
These exercises are coupled by the signing of memorandums of understanding and 
agreements where China and its counterparts agree to boost defense exchanges, military 
exercises, and defense procurements. To the best of my knowledge, China has held no 
military exercises with Myanmar, The Philippines, and Brunei, but it has nonetheless 
deepened defense exchanges with Myanmar, and Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte 
has mentioned that he is open to conduct exercises with China. While China’s bilateral 
military cooperation mostly covers non-traditional security, the Joint Sea exercise with 
Russia covers traditional security issues however, and involve sophisticated 
capabilities, such as sub-marines, destroyers, fighter jets, attack helicopters, and 
amphibious vehicles. Overall, China is markedly intensifying its bilateral military 
cooperation, which represents a tangible increase in China’s military presence 
throughout the region, and if we are to believe the statements by China’s partners, they 
view the military engagement as a constructive and positive development.997 
At the China-ASEAN Defense Ministers' Informal Meeting in 2016, State 
Councilor and Defense Minister Chang Wanquan reiterated China’s proposal for a joint 
military exercise with ASEAN, involving maritime search and rescue, disaster relief 
and application of the CUES in the South China Sea. Chang further mentioned that 
China wants to strengthen its anti-terrorism cooperation with ASEAN, specifically 
intelligence sharing and counterterrorism exercises. Yet while China has rapidly 
expanded its bilateral military engagement, it has not been successful in attracting 
ASEAN as a group to agree on participating in a China-led multilateral drill. On the 
other hand, China is participating in the US-led RIMPAC and the ASEAN-led ADMM-
Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) multilateral exercise. 
In 2015, Chang Wanquan laid out a five-point proposal for China-ASEAN 
defense cooperation, which further showcases China’s strategic intentions: (1) jointly 
ensure a good general orientation of cooperation (deepen the China-ASEAN strategic 
partnership and building the China-ASEAN community of shared destiny); (2) jointly 
maintain regional security and stability (in line with the Asian Security Concept); (3) 
jointly build and improve regional security mechanisms; (4) jointly deepen pragmatic 
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cooperation in defense fields (non-traditional security issues); and (5) jointly and 
properly deal with disputes and manage risks.998 Chang’s last point leads us to the sixth 
pillar of China’s policy on Asia-Pacific security cooperation, namely dispute resolution. 
 
Table 27. Chinese Bilateral Military Exercise 
Members Name Initial Year Purpose 
China-Cambodia Golden Dragon 2016 Humanitarian aid 
and disaster relief  
(HADR) 
China-Cambodia Unspecified 2016 Naval rescue 
operations 
China-Thailand Blue Strike 2010 Humanitarian aid 
and disaster relief  
(HADR), counter-
terrorist operations 
China-Thailand Falcon Strike 2015 Air force drills 
China-Laos Unspecified 2016 Counter-terrorist 
police exercise 
China-Vietnam Thien Thanh 2016 Counter-terrorist 
operations 
China-Vietnam Border Defense 
Friendship Exchange 
Program 
2014 Coordination of  
border guards, 
joint patrol in the 
Gulf  of  Tonkin 
and along land 
border 
China-Malaysia Peace and Friendship 2014 Humanitarian aid 
and disaster relief  
(HADR), search 
and rescue drills 
China-Singapore Maritime 
Cooperation 
2015 Communication 
drills and 
maneuvering 
exercises, CUES 
China-India Hand-in-Hand 2007 Counter-terrorism 
operations 
China-Sri Lanka Silk Route 2015 Tactical exercises 
China-Bangladesh Unspecified 2016 Naval exercise 
China-Nepal Pratikar 2017 Counter-terrorism 
operations 
China-Australia Panda-Kangaroo 2015 Survival exercises 
China-Russia Joint Sea 2012 High-end naval 
exercise, multiple 
scenarios 
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Sources: China Military, “Highlights of China-Cambodia ‘Golden Dragon 2016’ joint Drill,” 
December 27, 2016; Global Times, “Cambodian-Chinese Joint Drill Concludes Successfully” 
December 23, 2016; Prak Chan Thul, “Cambodia to Welcome Chinese Warships as Japan Navy Heads 
Home,” Reuters, February 17, 2016; Prashanth Parameswaran, “China, Cambodia Hold First Naval 
Exercise Amid South China Sea Fears,” The Diplomat, February 24, 2016; Xinhua, “China, Thailand 
Start Joint Military Exercise,” May 22, 2016; Jerome Taylor, “Thailand Pivots Closer to China with 
Exercises,” The Japan Times, November 29, 2015; Richard S. Ehrlich, “China-Thailand Joint Military 
Exercise Shows Longtime U.S. Ally Bangkok Hedging Its Bets,” The Washington Times, November 
9, 2015; Xinhua, “Vietnam, China Hold Joint Anti-Terror Exercise,” July 29, 2016; People’s Daily, 
“Chinese, Vietnamese Defense Ministers Witness Joint Patrols,” March 30, 2016; Xinhua, “Vietnam, 
China Hold Joint Anti-Terror Exercise,” July 29, 2016; Prashanth Parameswaran, “China, Vietnam 
Hold Joint Drills,” The Diplomat, July 30, 2016; VietNamNet News, “Vietnam, China Hold Border 
Defence Friendship Discussion,” May 16, 2015; Jason Ou, “China, Malaysia Start Joint Military 
Exercise,” The Straits Times, September 19, 2015; China Military, “China-Malaysia Joint Military 
Exercise Wrapped up,” November 28, 2016; Sumathy Permal, “China and Malaysia’s First-Ever Joint 
Military Exercise Is an Important Strategic Move,” The Star Online, September 28, 2015; Prashanth 
Parameswaran, “China, Singapore to Hold Naval Exercise,” The Diplomat, September 9, 2016; Franz-
Stefan Gady, “China and India Hold Joint Military Exercise,” The Diplomat, October 12, 2015; Ankit 
Panda, “Sri Lanka and China Wrap Up Silk Route 2015 Military Exercise,” The Diplomat, July 18, 
2015; Bdnews24.com, “China, Bangladesh Defence Relations Reach ‘unprecedented Heights,’” 
bdnews24.com, July 28, 2016; Shannon Tiezzi, “China, Bangladesh Pledge Deeper Military 
Cooperation,” The Diplomat, December 4, 2015; Indian Defence News, “Nepal-China Joint Military 
Exercise: Envoy Says India Shouldn’t Worry,” December 27, 2016; China Daily, “China to Join 
Australia, US in Exercises,” August 26, 2016; Brad Lendon, “China, Russia Begin Joint Exercises in 
South China Sea,” CNN, September 13, 2016; Ankit Panda, “Chinese, Russian Navies to Hold 8 Days 
of Naval Exercises in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, September 12, 2016. 
 
The sixth pillar upheld in China’s white paper is proper dispute resolution. 
Disputes should be solved by countries directly involved and “countries in the region 
should follow the tradition of mutual respect, seeking common ground while reserving 
differences, and peaceful coexistence, and work to solve disputes properly and 
peacefully through direct negotiation and consultation.”999 China’s view on regional 
hotspot issues differs from the US perspective in that China regards them as “basically 
under control.”1000 In his speech at the Xiangshan Forum, General Cai Yingting stated 
that, “At present, the Asia-Pacific situation is stable in general…Asia-Pacific maritime 
security is guaranteed, and freedom of navigation is not a problem.”1001 However, it is 
noted that this stability is at times disturbed by both traditional and non-traditional 
security issues. Director of the Expert Consultation Committee of the PLA Navy Yin 
Zhuo, states that the Asia-Pacific is “the only region in the world that still suffers from 
the looming wound of the Cold War.”1002 Therefore, China wants to work with ASEAN 
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“in dispelling interference” in the South China Sea, as put forward by Li Keqiang in 
September 2016 during a meeting with ASEAN leaders.1003  In Wang Yi’s words, 
“China and ASEAN countries have the ability and wisdom to make the South China 
Sea a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.”1004  
China’s view is that the United States and ASEAN do not “have a common 
responsibility to ensure the maritime security of critical sea, lands and ports,” as John 
Kerry claimed in 2014.1005 ASEAN secretary-general Le Luong Minh rebuffed the US 
proposal for a suspension on provocative acts in the South China Sea: “It is up to 
ASEAN to encourage China to achieve a serious and effective implementation of this 
commitment, rather than ASEAN asking whether it should support or not support the 
(US) proposal.”1006 Former Minister of Information and Spokesperson for the President 
of Myanmar U Ye Htut argues that the disagreement between ASEAN members and 
China should be settled by themselves, and it is not workable for irrelevant countries to 
make indiscreet remarks.”1007 Malaysian Prime Minister Razak, as paraphrased, prefers 
disputes “to be worked out through dialogue and peaceful negotiations.” 1008  And 
according to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, China “is not a threat for any country 
in the region.”1009 Even so, ASEAN is divided in relation to the South China Sea issue, 
which represents a significant impediment to the acceptance of China’s project for the 
regional security order. I will soon deal with this aspect below. 
To get a good overview of China’s concept and policies in relation to the 
regional security order, I organize two tables below that covers core concepts, policies, 
and multilateral mechanisms (see Table 28 and Table 29). Even though China has a 
long way to go, it is clear as that China’s intentions for the regional security order 
represents a transformation of the US dominated security system in favor of a regional 
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security order where China enjoys preeminent status and plays its due role as first 
among equals. Such a regional order would probably dilute the effectiveness of, and 
even the need for, ASEAN-centred security forums. China’s intention is rather to create 
new China-centered security groupings and forums in the Asia-Pacific while 
maintaining the status quo in ASEAN-led forums with an extra-regional scope, that is 
to say, China does not desire further institutional deepening. As the United States, 
Japan, and China support different interpretations of the primary institution of great 
power management and push alternative secondary security institutions in the region, 
ASEAN-led multilateral security processes will remain as contested rhetorical 
battlegrounds where major powers delegitimize each other’s contending projects for 
regional order, while they simultaneously construct parallel regional arrangements. 
 
Table 28. Core Pillars of China's Security Concepts and Policies 
New Security 
Concept 
Asian Security 
Concept 
New Model of  Great 
Power Relations 
(US-China) 
China’s Policies on 
Asia-Pacific Security 
Cooperation 
Mutual Trust Common  
Security 
No conflict and no 
confrontation 
Common Regional 
Development (AIIB, 
OBOR, RCEP) 
Mutual Benefit Comprehensive 
Security 
Mutual Respect  
(core interests and 
major concerns) 
Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnerships 
Equality Cooperative  
Security 
Win-Win Cooperation 
(bilateral) 
(improvement of) 
Regional multilateral 
mechanisms 
Coordination Sustainable 
Security 
 (promotion of)  
Rule-setting 
   (intensification of) 
Military Exchanges 
   Dispute Resolution 
(through negotiation 
and consultation with 
countries concerned) 
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Table 29. Regional Security Mechanisms 
China US Both 
 US Alliance System  
 Trilateral Security 
Relationships 
 
CICA  ARF, EAS 
Lancang-Mekong Sub-Region Lower Mekong Initiative  
China-ASEAN Informal 
Defense Ministers’ Meeting 
US-ASEAN Informal  
Defense Ministers’ Meeting 
ASEAN Defense Ministers’ 
Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) 
Xiangshan Forum (inclusive, 
yet Chinese-led forum) 
 Shangri-La Dialogue 
In addition: both the United States and China are engaging in parallel and overlapping bilateral 
and multilateral military exercises. While the United States is engaging in wide-ranging and 
sophisticated military exercises that clearly dominate the region, China is making significant 
strides in developing the quality and quantity of  its military exercises with regional countries. 
 
 
China’s call for major powers to play a “constructive role” or a “proper role” 
undoubtedly means that the United States and Japan ought to heed China’s major and 
legitimate concerns in the region, as exemplified by Beijing’s position on THAAD and 
the FONOPS in the South China Sea.1010 In fact, China’s call for prudence1011 very 
much resembles classical realist thinking on the making of constructive diplomatic 
relations through balance of power.1012  Moreover, from the perspective of English 
School theorist Hedley Bull, it is vital to protect the rules of coexistence, to contain 
ideological conflicts and to appease dissatisfied states, and as great powers exercise 
their special rights and duties, they need to secure the acquiescence of secondary 
states.1013 Since the United States will not retrench or appease China, it is up to China 
to gain a significant circle of recognition, a struggle in which it faces considerable 
challenges – primarily due to the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China 
Sea, which tarnish Beijing’s prestige. What follows is an analysis on how the South 
China Sea issue impedes the acceptance of China’s project for the regional security 
order. 
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10.2.3 The South China Sea Disputes and the Damage to China’s Prestige 
Despite the expansiveness of China’s claims in the South China Sea and widespread 
accusations of Chinese assertiveness with pejorative connotations, the fact is that China 
has exercised moderation and its involvement in the disputes is to a certain extent 
reactive. Even so, the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea is the 
major obstacle to China’s status recognition since it seriously damages one of the two 
core status components, namely China’s prestige. 
If we look into the reactive nature of China’s involvement in the South China 
Sea first, a number of events illustrate this fact. In 2011, the Chinese Maritime 
Surveillance Force interference with Filipino and Vietnamese oil exploration activities 
and the cutting of seismic cables on Petro-Vietnam’s vessel “occurred after survey 
activity by other claimants increased.”1014 The same dynamic is found in relation to 
China’s submission of two note verbale documents (in 2009 and 2011) and a 
declaration of an extended continental shelf to the United Nations in 2011. Although 
spurring much controversy, “the submission of the three documents did not constitute 
new, unilateral actions by China. They were all taken in response to requests for 
information made by the UN with specific deadlines or in reaction to the actions of 
other nations.”1015 In 2012, after the Philippine Navy dispatched a warship to inspect 
Chinese fishing vessels in the Scarborough Shoal, ostensibly violating domestic 
Filipino law and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, China 
responded by sending two surveillance ships to the area,1016 which lead to the long 
standoff between vessels from both countries that received world-wide attention. 
Likewise, China’s establishment of a regional prefecture for the South China Sea, the 
founding of Sansha City in the Paracels, and the construction of military garrisons can 
be viewed as rejoinders to the activities of other littoral states. 
Even if China so desired, engaging in unilateral attempts to seize control of the 
South China Sea would result in world-wide condemnation, invite a response from the 
US, and alienate its neighboring states. Moreover, “China’s rise is very much dependent 
on external factors. The Chinese economy remains largely dependent on external 
                                                 
1014 M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A 
Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 3 (2011): 306-307, emphasis added. 
1015 Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior - Part Two: The Maritime 
Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 35 (2011), 3, emphasis in original. 
1016 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Standoff in the South China Sea,” Yale Global Online, June 12, 2012, available 
at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/standoff-south-china-sea, accessed January 12, 2014. 
277 
demand and external supply of investment capital.”1017 A disturbance to these flows 
resulting from unilateral assertions would cause damage to China’s own economic well-
being and would be utterly self-defeating. Hence, the Chinese government stresses that 
its economic development necessitates a “peaceful and stable international 
environment”1018 and signals its peaceful intentions by insisting on the unremitting 
continuance of China’s good neighbor policy. The structural interplay between US 
military power and beneficial economic interactions produce a distinct logic of 
consequences that make antagonist assertions in order to establish regional hegemony 
utterly costly and irrational. Furthermore, antagonistic assertions violate the 
international peremptory norm of war of aggression, just as they go against China’s 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and its deeply held exceptionalist beliefs of 
benevolent pacifism and harmonious inclusionism.1019 
On the other hand, when the other littoral states, Vietnam and the Philippines in 
particular, assert their claims and China merely reacts, then the logic of consequences 
literally turn around and activate an actor-centric perspective that favors China. 
Precipitously, China becomes part of a game where it has to defend its position in order 
to maintain its claimed historic entitlement to the South China Sea. Reactive 
assertiveness is thus a legitimate response towards circumstances initiated by others. It 
is not an antagonist call for hegemonic subduance, but part of the game played by 
sovereigns in dispute. From Beijing’s perspective, it is “a logical and necessary 
response, in order to defend its policies and prevent an adverse change in the status 
quo.”1020 
However, China’s reactions move beyond mere tit-for-tat reciprocity. In a report 
released by International Crisis Group, this reactive assertiveness is defined as a tactic 
where “Beijing uses an action by another party as justification to push back hard and 
change the facts on the ground in its favour.” 1021  It displays “a disproportionate 
propensity to punish and to physically assert its sovereign claims in a manner that is 
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1020 Swaine and Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior,” 15. 
1021 International Crisis Group, “Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks,” Asia Report 
(Beijing/Brussels, 2013), 12. 
278 
disconcerting, and which frankly frightens regional states.”1022 For instance, following 
the standoff at Scarborough Shoal China boycotted imports of Filipino bananas and 
stopped sending tourists to the Philippines1023 – a reprimand of importance for a small 
country that is dependent on trade with China.1024 In light of the growing regional 
asymmetry,1025 for China’s neighbors to maintain their claims over the Spratly islands 
while reaping the benefits of trading with China presents a delicate vulnerability for 
regional states that China can exploit. Thus, when China perceives the others as pushy, 
China will push back even harder to deter future attempts that go against its national 
goals. More than frightening regional states, it tarnishes China’s prestige.  
The current security situation and the competition for maritime rights in the 
South China Sea stem from an increasing readiness among all the involved countries to 
secure their claims, much related to the “creeping jurisdiction” that follows from the 
expansion of the international maritime regime. It contributes to forming a game of 
international law where “all sides are under some pressure to act as if their claims are 
legitimate – whether it is to fish, occupy, drill, survey or expel others for 
‘trespassing.’”1026 Nonetheless, whether China’s actions should be considered reactive 
or not depends on one’s time span and what actions one includes in the analysis. For 
instance, in 1996 China set baselines around the Paracels, which was strongly protested 
by Vietnam and the Philippines.1027 In 1997, China moved an oilrig into waters claimed 
by Vietnam and granted an American oil company exploration rights in what Vietnam 
considers its exclusive economic zone.1028 If we include China’s earlier assertions in 
the Spratly islands and the occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995 as part of the analysis, 
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instead of being disregarded for reasons of historic periodization, then China’s reactive 
approach becomes even more tainted. In addition, China’s imposition of annual 
unilateral fishing bans and interceptions of foreign vessels further contribute to a more 
nuanced narrative. Whereas the other disputants, Vietnam and the Philippines in 
particular, are certainly not innocent, the problematic, however, lies in the fact that,   
 
China considers itself entitled to patrol the area and intercept vessels that are seen to violate 
its right to resources and to refuse passage…What counts is not that China appears to exercise 
moderation. Rather, it is Beijing’s alleged discretionary right to intervene that engenders 
insecurity in the international system, forcing other states to hedge against China’s random 
use of force in the South China Sea…The Sino-Centric rules suggested by China’s behavior 
in the South China Sea appear to be sovereign rights to territory and maritime space based on 
historical claims as defined by the strongest power and exercised at its discretion.1029 
 
Therefore, “not surprisingly, having had the experience of encountering Chinese oil 
rigs, warships, and fishermen operating in the vicinity of the disputed South China Sea 
islands, the Philippines and the Vietnam are in favour of an expanded US role in 
Southeast Asia.”1030 Certainly, China has not used aggressive force to subdue the South 
China Sea. Beijing justifiably argues that an unfair amount of attention has been 
directed against China as analysts and commentators take opportunity to disseminate 
stories about China’s rise and its supposed perilous maneuvering, which injects new 
life into the “China threat theory.” It is, nonetheless, intelligible why China’s actions 
have been interpreted as “creeping expansionism,” 1031  “gradual, creeping 
occupation,”1032 and “creeping assertiveness.”1033 What we are witnessing is a fast-
growing great power that consolidates its claims, expands its military and naval 
presence, and employs a discretionary right to intercept foreign vessels. Albeit 
representing a mixture of reactive and unilateral assertions, it is suggested that China’s 
actions allow the stronger part to slowly materialize its claims as any move by the 
counter-claimants are worthy a reaction from China. The claim that the improvement 
in Sino-ASEAN relations “was due to tactical, not substantive, shifts in China’s 
calculus vis-à-vis its Southeast Asian neighbors”1034  still resonate among some of 
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China’s neighbors. Putting the lid on a pressing security issue and seeking to win hearts 
by redirecting the focus towards China’s magnanimous economic deeds do not reassure 
secondary states of the prospective benign intensions of the benefactor.  
Even though I claim that revisionism and change of the international order must 
be pro-social in that the leadership pretender must attract a significant circle of 
recognition, there is another more abrasive, self-assertive side to China’s restorationist 
ambition. The liberal argument is that economic interdependence and externally 
oriented economies cause moderation. However, China’s economic relations with its 
Southeast Asian neighbors are better characterized as asymmetric rather than 
interdependent. Also, liberal proponents often ignore that “globalization does not lead 
to an automatic harmony of interests [and tend] to skirt rather easily over the problem 
of managing power, especially unequal power, and the difficulties of mediating 
between conflicting values.”1035 While it is true that the means to develop the material 
substrata of the state transcend boundaries, other political and cultural boundaries are 
being erected that stress the uniqueness of the state as a “unit of meaning,” which stands 
in relation to the difference of others – despite economic interlinkages.1036 At the center 
of this notion stands China’s restorationist impetus, a core component of Chinese 
assertiveness that is intimately connected to the great renewal of the Chinese nation – 
the dream of restoring China’s past glory and rightful place atop the regional and global 
hierarchy. 
Expounding on Max Weber’s view of “the nation,” Peter Baehr elucidates how 
this unit of meaning functions in the form of a “community of sentiment” that derives 
its purpose from shared memories of conflict and struggle: 
 
As an idea abbreviating a human collectivity, the nation transfigures the “naked prestige of 
‘power’” into a value. That value, in turn, consists of the belief that a certain community 
possesses distinctive cultural peculiarities and even a worldly providential mission. Cementing 
idea and value is what Weber repeatedly calls a “sentiment of solidarity” or a “community of 
sentiment” typically derived from shared memories. These memories are especially strong 
when they recall times of trial and conflict in which one collectivity (“the nation”) has been 
pitted against another or several.1037 
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The colonial subjugation of China and the “century of national humiliation,” is a 
prominent example of such a conflictual encounter. “China’s memory of this period as 
a time when it was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialists serves as the 
foundation for its modern identity and purpose.”1038 The “strong interest in topics such 
as the Unequal Treaties, national humiliations, and the indigenization of international 
law indicate that China today still believes it has a wrong to rectify.”1039 Although 
China’s Southeast Asian neighbors were not responsible for the humiliation of China, 
their claims to the South China Sea is inherently a colonial product. Therefore, one 
indisputable “wrong to rectify” is the colonial partition of the South China Sea, 
motivated by the desire “to restore the Chinese motherland.”1040 As Arnold Wolfers 
emphasized in his seminal work: states seek to restore the “core national values” that 
they have been denied, and “almost any nation which has suffered a loss of territory or 
has been subjected to discrimination will, when its power permits, take some action to 
redress its grievances – and thus fall into the ‘revisionist’ category.”1041 Imperative to 
Wolfers conception is that an important feature of revisionism is restorationist, and that 
revisionist purposes do not merely emerge because of power. Power, in Wolfer’s 
account, is intimately connected to action and enables the state to transform the 
meaning of an often-broad revisionist telos into a specific project. In other words, power 
enables the addressing of the grievance. China’s claim to the South China Sea and its 
wider restorationist purpose have been consistent throughout the decades, but what has 
changed is China’s power. What the growing structural asymmetry means is an ever-
enhancing hypothetic possibility for China to turn its historical entitlement into practice 
– to restore the Chinese motherland in accordance with the “nine-dashed line” and 
resume its preeminent position. However, power is not sufficient, and without a benign 
military reputation, China will not gain recognition from its neighbors. 
China’s silence on what its expansive claims in the South China Sea exactly 
means generates ambiguity, as “Beijing’s aspirations to restore the Chinese motherland 
appear to encourage disregard for the need to demonstrate commitment to 
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coexistence.”1042 In fact, in Chinese official documents and speeches, magnanimous 
proposals and initiatives that form parts of China’s project for the regional order often 
exist side-by-side with assertions that China will not give up an inch of its territory and 
that it will never hesitate in defending its legitimate rights. China’s growing military 
capabilities, economic strength, and political influence forms a new and fast-changing 
context in which China’s international practice and restorationist objectives are given 
new meaning; not only as part of standard stories of China as pursuant of regional 
hegemony, but also in the way that it might inspire and legitimize future Chinese state 
conduct. Steve Tsang aptly summarizes the ambiguous situation: 
 
Nothing is wrong in wanting China to be great. But it must be uncomfortable for the 
rest of the world, particularly China’s neighbors, to see a new general secretary who 
wants to be identified as the man who reasserts China’s illustrious past – which, despite 
Chinese rhetoric was primarily the result of establishing hegemony.1043  
 
Against this ambiguous background, external observers are led to interpret China’s 
actions as signs of rising aggressiveness, and neighboring states are left wondering what 
China really wants. 
The tension between attraction and self-assertion displays that “issues that are 
physically divisible can become socially indivisible, depending on how they relate to 
the identities of the decision makers.”1044 The disputes in the South China Sea thus turns 
into a problem of national consciousness. In addition, “identity motivations, such as the 
need to save face or maintain an image of toughness, can affect conflict 
behavior…[and] what people care about affects their assertiveness in conflict and 
negotiation.” 1045  With Chinese nationalism as an important pillar of regime 
legitimacy,1046  “any Chinese leader, who…gives up ‘historical’ claims, risks being 
ostracized for surrendering the ‘sacred motherland’”1047 and for failing “to maintain 
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China’s national face.”1048 Hence, when China responds successfully to attacks against 
the nation – by appearing tough and assertive in territorial disputes – the party “gains 
face before nationalist audiences, and solidifies regime legitimacy.”1049 Compromises 
are thus seen as weakness and the space for concessions gets smaller, in the process, 
China’s prestige is damaged and its neighbors remain uncertain about its intentions.  
If China wants to become the principal organizer of the regional economic and 
security orders, it must compromise in the South China Sea as it did in its inland border 
disputes, 1050  which gave a tremendous boost to China’s reputational capital, and 
without which the SCO would not have been what it is today. After all, regional 
leadership status is not just about power, it is equally about prestige. As Xi Jinping 
pointed out, “[g]ood diplomacy with neighboring countries is a requirement for 
realizing the Two Centenary Goals, and the Chinese Dream of the rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation.”1051 If China is willing to compromise and take a minor loss, it will win 
something much greater – that is, a circle of recognition that accepts China’s leadership 
status and buys into its transformational project for the regional security order. 
With this said, the empirical part of the dissertation is now completed and what 
follows is the conclusion. 
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11. Conclusion 
Before I answer the questions formulated in the introduction, I will briefly recapitulate 
the dissertations structure. 
I started out the dissertation by addressing core puzzles related to revisionism, 
both conceptually and theoretically, specifically by suggesting, in contrast to 
conventional wisdom, that both the declining dominant power and the rising power can 
be understood as revisionist actors that desire to change the international order. In order 
to tackle this problem, I developed a novel conceptual framework of international order 
and a theory of status driven revisionism. I then demonstrated the relevance and 
plausibility of my framework by applying it to four different contemporary cases part 
of a positional struggle for leadership status in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
11.1 Findings 
Two general questions of theoretical relevance and three particular questions of 
empirical relevance guided the dissertation. They are the following: 
 
Overarching research questions (of theoretical interest): 
 When and why do great powers seek to revise the status quo? 
 How can we reconcile the counterintuitive proposition that both the 
dominant power and the rising power, simultaneously, can be 
understood as status quo-seeking and revisionist powers? 
 
Specific empirical questions: 
 Is there an ongoing positional struggle for leadership between the United 
States and China in the Asia-Pacific? 
 How can we understand the US pivot to Asia as a status-maintenance 
strategy designed to change the regional order? 
 How can we understand China’s reaction as a status-enhancement 
strategy designed to change the regional order? 
 
In terms of the first two questions, the theory proposes that we shift the 
analytical focus from security to status in order to grasp the core impetus behind 
revisionism. The theory further proposes that both the dominant power and the rising 
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power can be revisionists. I develop a set of assumptions and a causal mechanism that 
incorporates fundamental change in both the distribution of power and prestige as well 
as institutional barriers that prevent the attainment of status. These core causal factors 
explain revisionism for both the declining dominant power and the rising power. For 
the dominant power, decline in both power and prestige induces status anxiety, which 
motivates action, while the existence of institutional barriers to status maintenance 
(status disavowal and/or systemic unfavorability) necessitates a revisionist project. For 
the rising power, increase in both power and prestige induces status expectations, but 
the preventive measures of the dominant power frustrates its status expectations, which 
motivates actions, while the existence of institutional barriers to status enhancement 
(status disavowal and/or systemic unfavorability) necessitates a revisionist project.  
The dominant power engages in exclusionary social closure: by excluding the 
rising power and revising the regional order, the dominant power attempts to maintain 
its preeminent status. The TPP and the US alliance network in Asia-Pacific are clear 
examples of this exclusionary strategy. The rising power, on the other hand, engages in 
usurpationary social closure: by excluding the dominant power or erecting a positional 
ceiling to its participation in the new order, the rising power attempts to enhance its 
status. The AIIB is a clear example of this usurpationary strategy. China also desires to 
push the United States out of the regional security order, yet for now, it remains an 
unfulfilled utopian scheme.  
The counterintuitive proposition that both the dominant power and the rising 
power, simultaneously, can be understood as status quo-seeking and revisionist powers 
is reconciled, first, by showing how the dominant power revises to maintain and how 
the rising power revises to enhance, and second, by analyzing their respective 
revisionist projects in terms of both positional and institutional revisionism. 
Considering this, I developed a 2x2 table that captures the dynamic of preservation and 
change in the international order in terms of four particular projects (see Table 4). My 
empirical cases attempt to demonstrate the plausibility of my theoretical framework. 
In terms of the three empirical questions, I find that the Obama administration, 
through the US pivot to Asia, intensified a struggle between alternative regional orders 
in the Asia-Pacific. The Obama administration pursued a strategy designed to maintain 
an Americancentric liberal world order – that is, a world with a sole superpower, one 
global leader, one global security hierarchy, and one dominant mode of capitalist 
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modernity. China, on the other hand, pursues a strategy designed to establish a 
Sinocentric international order – that is, a world of regions with coexisting great powers, 
regional leaders, spheres of influences, and various modes of capitalist modernity. This 
is primarily a struggle between global and regional orders.    
Moreover, the Obama administration pursued a status-maintenance strategy 
intended to revise the regional order of the Asia-Pacific. The TPP was a 
transformational revisionist project designed to dismantle the “noodle bowl” structure, 
the neomercantilist values, and the exclusionary tendencies of the regional economic 
order, and thus represents a change of the scope, rules, and normative underpinnings of 
the regional economic order. The TPP would remodel both the status order and the 
established institutional order of the region. The purpose was to restore steering 
capacity and ensure American regional leadership in order to maintain global 
leadership.  
In relation to the regional security order, America’s Principled Security 
Network is a reformist revisionist project designed to move beyond the hub-and-spokes 
system, first, by changing the US-Japan asymmetric patron-client relationship to a more 
symmetric and equal alliance that elevates Japan’s security role, and second, by creating 
new bilateral partnerships, trilateral security practices, and multilateral engagement 
short of binding alliance commitments. Through these new security practices, the 
Obama administration aimed at building collective capacity and enabling concerted 
action in a way that clearly goes beyond the hub-and-spokes system. The Obama 
administration’s regional projects excluded China, for it is only through exclusionary 
social closure and preventive measures that high status actor can maintain its dominant 
status when faced with a competitor.  
The US pivot to Asia sparked the US-China struggle for regional leadership, 
which forced China to elevate its status-enhancement strategy to the next level. The 
China Dream articulated by Xi Jinping essentially means that China no longer hides its 
desires to restore its place atop the regional and global hierarchies.  
The first and thus far clearest empirical example of China’s new active 
pursuance of regional leadership we find in the AIIB. The AIIB is an aspirational 
project. It complements the BRICS institutions and the global capitalist system as a 
whole, but it sets up a parallel governance structure for the provision of public goods 
that clearly challenges Japanese and American leadership. In the AIIB, China enjoys 
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veto power and its structural leadership widely exceeds that of the other members. It 
represents a clear example of usurpationary closure; China does not close the door for 
Japan or the United States, however, it has established an institutional structure where 
the ADB leaders have to play second fiddle. Since the AIIB primarily is about 
leadership, China’s push for institutional reform is essentially about status and 
representation and thus clearly resembles an aspirational revisionist project.  
In relation to the regional security order, China pursues a transformational 
revisionist project. It desires to change both the positional and the institutional 
dimension of the regional order. China has developed a clear vision that implies a 
radical remodeling of the US-led regional security order. China wants to expunge 
alliances, which it sees as an outdated form of security management incompatible with 
the trends of 21st century. China’s intention is to create and Asian Security Order for 
Asians, which effectively would constitute a truly exclusionary form of usurpationary 
closure. Although China promotes a “new model of great power relations” that 
represents a genuine attempt of establishing great power coexistence and equality, it 
implies restoration of China as the natural preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific and 
that the United States should now its place on the right side of the Asia-Pacific. China’s 
vision thus departs from a configuration where the United States is the sole superpower 
with a global sphere of responsibility. Yet it resembles more of a constructivist and 
liberal security order in that China desires to establish a Community of Common 
Destiny, win-win inter-state relations, bilateral strategic partnerships, and harmonious 
inter-civilizational relations as the basis for the regional security order, which primarily 
would be directed towards non-traditional security threats. This is certainly a tall order, 
but it nonetheless represents China’s utopian project for the regional, and by extension, 
the global order.  
We now have a good overview of the different revisionist projects and where 
they belong in accordance with the 2x2 table (see below).  
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With the above, I have summarized the dissertation and answered the research 
questions. However, there is one significant caveat to the findings that I wish to clarify. 
The election of Donald Trump and his Jacksonian neoisolationist/populist “America 
First” principle represents a radical departure from US grand strategy that, in various 
forms and guises, have rested on a foundation of Wilsonian internationalism for the last 
70 years. For the first time since the Second World War, the United States might take 
a radical step back from global leadership, which is well illustrated by the decision to 
withdraw from the TPP.  
This, however, does not invalidate my analysis about the TPP. In fact, the TPP 
is the epitome of a revisionist project designed to maintain dominant status in times of 
relative decline and is thus best explained by system-level factors. As Randall 
Schweller makes clear, we should only make use of domestic-level variables when 
behavior and outcome diverge from the expectations of system-level theories,1052 and 
the Obama administration’s decision to push the TPP did not. It was a revisionist project 
designed to transform the regional economic order as the United States faces relative 
decline and the rise of China. Yet Trump’s populist neoisolationist rhetoric and his 
decision to withdraw from the TPP indeed diverge from what system-level theories 
                                                 
1052 Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in International 
Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2003), 346. 
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would lead us to expect and are therefore better explained by domestic-level variables. 
As described in chapter seven, US anxieties triggered by the 2008 Financial Crisis were 
prevalent throughout American society. Whereas the US public was rather ignorant 
about the TPP, vocal activists and a majority in the US congress disapproved of the TPP, 
yet the foreign policy elite of the Obama administration followed the imperatives of 
system-level factors and rightly saw the TPP as crucial to maintain US global leadership.  
Even though structural factors work against the United States, the TPP, however, 
would have prolonged US dominance. But now, with Trump’s decision, the longevity 
of an Americancentric liberal world order is at stake, which in fact leaves the regional 
economic status quo intact and opens an opportunity for China to assume the leadership 
position. Although China has made significant strides in developing its military power 
and expanding defense ties, China still suffers from strategic mistrust and a tarnished 
reputation in the regional security order, something the United States certainly will 
continue to exploit. Therefore, China might very well continue to be the economic 
protagonist, while the United States will continue to be the security protagonist in the 
“Tale of Two Asias”1053 – a regional economic order centered on China and a regional 
security order centered on the United States. 
 
11.2 Contribution 
The contribution of the dissertation is the following. First, the dissertation provides a 
novel conceptual framework based on a meticulous scrutiny of core concepts, which 
further our understanding of status-quo seeking and revisionism. The specific 
contribution is reconceptualization. Second, the conceptual framework can be applied 
to other cases and serve as a useful, context-transcending heuristic devise. The specific 
contribution is methodological development. Third, the dissertation develops a dynamic 
theoretical framework that explains both the revisionist status-maintenance strategy of 
the dominant power and the status-enhancement strategy of the rising power. This 
departs from the traditional one-sided focus on the rising power and sheds new 
theoretical light on why and how the preventive measures of the dominant power are 
revisionist. The specific contribution is theoretical innovation. Fourth, in contrast to 
many other IR scholars who study historical cases, the dissertation sheds light on 
                                                 
1053 Evan Feigenbaum and Robert Manning, “A Tale of Two Asias,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2012, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/31/a-tale-of-two-asias/ 
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contemporary international relations and revisionist processes. The fact that we are 
currently observing fundamental structural change provides a good opportunity to study 
how great powers are acting amidst this historical transition. The specific scientific 
contribution is contemporary relevance. Fifth, I have contributed to answering the 
perennial IR question of what states want, and I argue that, apart from security, great 
powers desire status, and even more so today as nuclear weapons mitigate violent forms 
of great power competition. The specific contribution is engagement in a core IR-
debate. Together – reconceptualization, methodological development, theoretical 
innovation, contemporary relevance, and engagement in IR-debate – all form 
interlocking parts of the greater contribution of the dissertation as a whole. Yet the 
contribution of particular significance is theoretical innovation, and therefore a brief 
recapitulation on how my theory improves earlier IR theories follows. 
To begin with, I depart from neorealism’s focus on security-maximization. The 
offensive positional logic of my theory is absent in neorealism, and by emphasizing that 
great powers enjoy abundance of security in the nuclear age, I put the analytical focus 
on the fact that great powers struggle for the secondary objective of status when the 
primary objective of security is assured. Similar to offensive realism, I acknowledge 
that states maximize power. Yet I depart from offensive realism by arguing, first, that 
power-maximization serves as a means to the end of status, not merely security, and 
second, that power is not sufficient to attain leadership status in the international order. 
Aside from power, prestige is necessary to attain status and influence. I then modify 
power-transition theory and build on hegemonic stability theory, and argue that not only 
the rising power, but also the dominant power can suffer from a prestige deficit or 
declining reputational capital. It is when the power and prestige balances change, and 
with it, the growing possibilities for the rising power to institutionalize leadership status 
that the dominant power becomes anxious and feels that it needs to act. Besides, I depart 
from hegemonic stability theory and liberal historical institutionalism’s treatment of 
institutions as favoring the dominant power, and argue that institutional barriers can 
prevent both status enhancement and status maintenance, which necessitates revisionist 
projects. Hence, the competitive logic is about a recurring struggle to acquire both 
power and prestige in order to attain status and influence in the international order.  
In this way, we shift the analytical focus from security to status; from a singular 
focus on power to integration of prestige; and from exclusive attention on the rising 
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power to a framework, that explains both the revisionist status-maintenance strategy of 
the dominant power and the revisionist status-enhancement strategy of the rising power. 
This is a matter of theoretical and conceptual priority, not a claim that traditional 
considerations of security are unimportant or irrelevant. Neither does the analytical 
focus on the competitive logic of US-China relations mean the absence of substantial 
US-China cooperation. Again, it is a matter of perspectival priority, not empirical one-
dimensionality. 
 
11.3 Concluding Remarks 
Several scholars point out that we are now living in a world without leaders. Richard 
Haass captures this situation with the concept of nonpolarity: “a world dominated not 
by one or two or even several states but rather dozens of actors possessing and exercising 
various kind of power.”1054 According to Randall Schweller, we have entered an age of 
entropy, or an age of increasing disorder, where polarity has become less meaningful 
and the future international relation is profoundly uncertain.1055 Ian Bremmer conceives 
the current international order in terms of the notion G-Zero, a world without leadership 
– “a period of transition from the world we know toward one we cannot yet map.”1056 
Steven Weber and Bruce Jentleson terms it a Copernican world characterized by 
“competing propositions about how world politics ought to be ordered and conducted” 
and “competition among several possible centers of authority for where legitimacy 
resides.”1057 All these various concepts are insightful, but they downplay the material 
structure of the global economy and the dominant role of the great powers. 
The global economy consists of a regionalized tripolar structure where North 
America, the European Union, and East Asia contain the vast bulk of global wealth. The 
international system is characterized by a multipolar structure, and if the current trends 
continue we are yet again moving towards a bipolar structure constituted by two 
                                                 
1054 Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance,” Foreign Affairs 
87, no. 3 (June 2008): 44–56. 
1055 Randall L Schweller, “Entropy and the Trajectory of World Politics: Why Polarity Has Become Less 
Meaningful,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 23, no. 1 (2010): 145–63; Randall L Schweller, 
“The Future Is Uncertain and the End Is Always near,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24, 
no. 2 (2011): 175–84. 
1056  Ian Bremmer, Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World (New York: 
Portfolio/Penguin, 2012), 34. 
1057 Steve Weber and Bruce W. Jentleson, The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Competition of 
Ideas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 102, 122. 
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dominating great powers – the United States and China. The bifurcation of the regional 
order of Asia-Pacific, with a regional economic order increasingly centred on China and 
a regional security order still centred on the United States, is a reflection of the material 
structure where China dominates the economic landscape and the United States is doing 
everything to maintain its dominance of the security environment. In other words, 
polarity still matters. Certainly, competition for leadership is increasing and will 
continue to increase, but this is primarily a struggle for prestige among the principal 
power wielders to gain the acquiescence of secondary states and to institutionalize 
leadership status. Even if we can find examples of initiatives led by mid-sized powers, 
these initiatives stand or fall depending on the active participation and support of the 
great powers.  
For instance, the RCEP was launched by ASEAN and the lead negotiating 
committee is chaired by Indonesia, yet without China and Japan the RCEP is little more 
than an empty castle. It is true that China, and other great powers, have to “show 
leadership…by way of example,”1058 or to put it in theoretical parlance, they have to 
perform honorable deeds and provide public gods that boost their reputational capital. 
Yet it is equally true that without the participation of the principal power wielders there 
would be no project to begin with. The key issue is who organizes the international order, 
and without the necessary material capabilities, your good ideas will remain just that – 
good ideas. The reason we observe increasing competition and rivalry is not that we are 
living in a world of ambiguous power diffusion with multiple smaller centers of power; 
the reason is that the core components of the status dimension have undergone rapid 
change. Power transition and ambiguous prestige hierarchies’ call the established 
unipolar status order into question and give birth to a more uncertain and unpredictable 
situation. A long-drawn-out struggle of piecemeal reordering processes and incremental 
erection of parallel governance structures is indeed to be expected. It is true that great 
powers cannot dominate the international order in the same way as they did in the past, 
yet they are still the major players of the game. If you count them out, you do so at your 
own peril. 
 
 
                                                 
1058  Shiro Armstrong, “A New Deal in Asia,” Foreign Affairs, March 17, 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2017-03-17/new-deal-asia 
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